Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jimmy Walker petitioned for mandamus relief following the circuit court's denial of his motion for summary judgment. While plaintiff Jeremy Deason was was incarcerated, he participated in a Department of Corrections work-release program and was assigned to an inmate construction detail; Walker, who was employed as a "carpenter supervisor" with DOC's Correctional Industries Division, served as Deason's work-release supervisor. In 2010, Deason suffered an on-the-job injury when scaffolding he and Walker were dismantling collapsed. Before both Deason and Walker's ascent onto the scaffolding, Walker had performed a visual inspection of the scaffolding and the "mud plates," which prevent scaffolding from settling, in order to assess the stability of the scaffolding; according to Walker, the scaffolding appeared secure before Deason started ascending. As a result of his injuries, Deason sued, among other defendants, numerous DOC officials, including Walker, whom Deason sued only in his individual capacity. Specifically, as to Walker, Deason contended that Walker "started climbing the scaffold on the same side as [Deason] knowing that the scaffold was not set up properly for workers to climb the same side at the same time." The Supreme Court granted relief: "the record is devoid of any evidence indicating - and Deason does not establish - either that Walker violated any applicable DOC rule or regulation governing his conduct or that Walker was acting 'willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, [or] in bad faith' in the exercise of judgment in regard to the scaffolding when Deason was injured. Therefore, Walker has successfully demonstrated that he is entitled to State-agent immunity as to Deason's tort claims." View "Ex parte Jimmy Walker." on Justia Law

In 2011, 74-year-old Garnell Wilcoxon lived alone. He suffered a stroke, awoke on the floor of his bedroom covered in sweat, feeling sore and with no memory of how he got there. Wilcoxon was admitted to the Troy Regional Medical Center for analysis and treatment for approximately one year before he died. Following Wilcoxon's death, Brenda McFarland, one of Wilcoxon's daughters, filed a complaint as the personal representative for Wilcoxon's estate, asserting claims for : (1) medical malpractice; (2) negligence; (3) breach of contract; (4) negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention; and (5) loss of consortium. In its answer, Troy Health asserted, in part, that McFarland's claims were barred from being litigated in a court of law "by virtue of an arbitration agreement entered into between plaintiff and defendant." Troy Health then moved to compel arbitration, asserting that forms signed by one of Wilcoxon's other daughters, acting as his attorney-in-fact, contained a valid and enforceable arbitration clause. McFarland argued that "Wilcoxon did not have the mental capacity to enter into the contract with [Troy Health,] and he did not have the mental capacity to give legal authority to enter into contracts on his behalf with" relatives who initially helped admit him to Troy Health facilities when he first fell ill. According to McFarland, "[t]he medical records document that Wilcoxon was habitually and/or permanently incompetent." Therefore, McFarland argued, both a 2011 arbitration agreement and a 2012 arbitration agreement were invalid. The circuit court denied Troy Health's motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that McFarland failed to prove that Wilcoxon was mentally incompetent when he executed a 2012 durable power of attorney naming his other daughter as his attorney-in-fact, and also failed to demonstrate that Wilcoxon was "permanently incompetent" before that date, and because there was no other issue concerning the validity of the 2012 arbitration agreement. View "Troy Health and Rehabilitation Center v. McFarland" on Justia Law

In 1993, Michael Biddle was convicted in South Carolina of a lewd act upon a child, a violation of S.C. Code 16-15-140. He was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment; his sentence was suspended and he was ordered to serve 5 years on probation. Biddle moved to Alabama in January 2014. Under section 15-20A-10 of the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act ("ASORCNA"), Biddle's conviction required that he register as a sex offender, and subjected him to certain residency restrictions. On January 22, 2014, Biddle registered with the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department as a sex offender in compliance with ASORCNA. About a month later, Biddle filed a form averring that he was residing at an address in Jefferson County that was not within 2,000 feet of a school or a child-care facility. Biddle was ultimately indicted for two counts of violating the residency requirements of 15-20A-11. After a bench trial, Biddle was found not guilty on both counts. That same day and in the same proceeding, Biddle filed, in the criminal division of the Jefferson Circuit Court, a petition pursuant to 15-20A-23 that he may be relieved of the residency restrictions of the ASORCNA if he was "terminally ill or permanently immobile." Biddle alleged in his petition that he was terminally ill, that he needed a full-time caregiver, and that his sister lived in Vestavia Hills and would care for him if he resided with her. Biddle did not pay a filing fee to the circuit court for filing his petition, and he did not file the petition as a new civil case. The State filed an objection, challenging the circuit court's jurisdiction and asserting that Biddle's petition was incomplete because he had not paid a filing fee or sought in forma pauperis status. The circuit court granted Biddle's petition for relief, and the State filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court concluded the State had a clear legal right to the relief sought because the circuit court, sitting in a completed criminal case, lacked jurisdiction to relieve Biddle from the residency requirements of the ASORCNA in what should have been a civil proceeding. Biddle should have filed a "new" civil action in order to seek relief from the residency requirements of the ASORCNA. View "Alabama v. Biddle" on Justia Law

The Escambia County Board of Education terminated the employment of John Lambert, a tenured teacher, as the band director at Flomaton High School for leaving a pistol in his school office, which was locked. During the course of his teaching career and military service, Lambert was never charged with neglect of duty, insubordination, or failure to perform duties in a satisfactory manner. Before this incident, no school board had ever taken disciplinary action against Lambert, nor had Scott Hammond, the principal of Flomaton High School, ever disciplined Lambert. Before getting on a bus for a band trip where the students were waiting for Lambert to join them, Lambert placed a small bag on the desk in his office. The bag contained personal items, including clothing, tools, Lambertís checkbook, and 10 20-dollar bills in a folded bank envelope. The bank envelope was in the side pocket of the bag, which was zipped. Lambert placed the bag in his office because he did not want to leave it in his truck overnight while he was away on the trip. According to Lambert, he forgot that a loaded .380 automatic pistol and an additional loaded magazine were in a small case at the bottom of the bag. Both the case containing the pistol and the bag were zipped. The bag was black, and it was impossible to identify the contents of the bag from the exterior of the bag. Lambert, who had a permit for the pistol, testified that both his office door and the door to the band room were locked when he left for the band contest at approximately 8:00 a.m. Around noon that same day, a school custodian notified school administrators that a gun was found on school premises. Only Lambert, the custodian, and the principal had keys to Lambert's office. Lambert acknowledged the pistol was his, and discovered that $80 was missing from the bag. Lambert was placed on administrative leave, then later terminated. He appealed the Board's decision. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the decision of the hearing officer. The Supreme Court, however, reversed. "In light of the fact that this Court has resolved, as a material question of first impression, the standard of review a hearing officer is to apply to an employer's decision to terminate the employment of a tenured teacher, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remand the cause to that court to, in turn, reverse the judgment of the hearing officer and remand the cause to him with instructions to review the sanction imposed against Lambert under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review as that standard [was] articulated in this opinion." View "Ex parte John Lambert." on Justia Law

Christopher Floyd was convicted of capital murder in 2005 for the death of Waylon Crawford, for which he was sentenced to death. The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review of Floyd's appeal to determine whether the following holdings of the Court of Criminal Appeals were proper: (1) that the trial court did not err in holding that the State provided valid race- and gender-neutral reasons for its exercise of its peremptory strikes during jury selection; (2) that the trial court did not err by refusing to admit into evidence all of Floyd's statements made to law-enforcement officers; and (3) that the trial court did not err in denying Floyd's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ex parte Christopher Anthony Floyd." on Justia Law

Gerri Rogers appealed a Probate Court order removing her as the personal representative of the estate of Ilse Martha Nagel. Appellee Sigrid Hansen argued that Rogers's appeal should have been dismissed because dismissed because Rogers failed to post bond as required by section 12-22-24, Ala. Code 1975. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with Hansen and dismissed the appeal. View "Rogers v. Hansen" on Justia Law

The Alabama Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to address the State's request that it overrule "Ex parte J.A.P.," (853 So. 2d 280 (Ala. 2002)), the controlling precedent applied by the Court of Criminal Appeals in reversing Eric Higdon's conviction for first-degree sodomy by forcible compulsion. "In overruling 'Ex parte J.A.P.,' this Court returns to an approach more consonant with the statutory definition of forcible compulsion and the principles set forth in a 'Powe [v. Alabama, (597 So.2d 721 (Ala. 1991))]' in conducting a forcible-compulsion analysis when a defendant, regardless of his or her age, exercises a position of domination and control over a child." The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals was reversed, and this case remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte State of Alabama." on Justia Law

Appellants Branch Banking & Trust Company ("BB&T"), Rusty Winfree, and Todd Fullington appealed a circuit court judgment entered in favor of Rex Nichols ("Sonny") and Claudene Nichols on the Nicholses' claims against appellants and on BB&T's counterclaim against the Nicholses. In late 2005, Sonny began talking to Winfree about obtaining financing from Colonial Bank ("Colonial"), Winfree's employer, for the purchase of approximately 500 acres of real property in Stapleton, Alabama. The Nicholses intended to develop the Stapleton property into a subdivision. In February 2006, the Nicholses executed a loan agreement with Colonial, in which Colonial agreed to lend the Nicholses close to $2.8 million to purchase the property. Sonny testified that in late 2007, as the maturity date on the note approached, he began contacting Colonial regarding renewing the loan; he further testified that, around the same time, Winfree became slow to communicate with him. Sonny also testified that before the February 27, 2008, maturity date on the promissory note, he spoke to Fullington about renewing the loan, with Colonial carrying the interest going forward. A few weeks later, the Nicholses were notified that Colonial would not carry the interest on the loan or provide additional funds for development of the property. Colonial ultimately renewed the terms of the note until Colonial failed in August 2009. The FDIC assumed control of its assets and liabilities. The FDIC sold many of Colonial's assets and liabilities to BB&T, including the Nicholses' loan. Fullington was hired by BB&T; Winfree was not. In early November 2009, BB&T informed the Nicholses that it would not lend them additional funds to develop the property. The Nicholses stopped making interest payments on the loan in November 2009. On March 10, 2010, the Nicholses sued the appellants and fictitiously named defendants, alleging fraud, reformation, negligence, wantonness, and breach of fiduciary duty against all appellants. Against BB&T, the Nicholses also alleged a claim of unjust enrichment and sought damages on a theory of promissory estoppel. The appellants separately moved the circuit court to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. BB&T also filed a counterclaim, alleging that the Nicholses had defaulted on their obligations under a June 2009 promissory note and seeking damages related to that default. The circuit court denied the motions to dismiss the complaint but granted a motion to strike the request for a jury trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in entering a judgment in favor of the Nicholses on their claims against the appellants and on BB&T's counterclaim against them. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded with instructions to the circuit court to enter a judgment in favor of the appellants on the Nicholses' claims against them and in favor of BB&T on its counterclaim against the Nicholses and to determine the damages to be awarded on the counterclaim. View "Branch Banking & Trust Company v. Nichols" on Justia Law

In 2011, Wanchetta Reese, individually and as owner and beneficiary of the life-insurance policy issued on the life of her husband Lee Reese, filed a complaint in the Etowah Circuit Court against the defendants, Alfa Life Insurance Corporation, Josh Griffith and Judy Russell, two licensed Alfa insurance agents. Reese advised Defendants that she sought to obtain life insurance on her husband so that she would have funds available to bury him in the event of his death. Mr. Reese suffered from several chronic conditions, including kidney disease and diabetes. Reese contended that after being advised of Lee Reese's medical condition, Griffith stated to Reese that he needed to ask Russell for advice in completing the insurance application. In the presence of Reese, Griffith advised Russell Lee Reese's medical issues, and Russell advised Griffith, in the presence of Reese, to not put that information in the application. Lee Reese passed away unexpectedly on May 23, 2010. Mrs. Reese turned to defendants to make a claim for benefits, and Alfa denied it in a letter dated August 16, 2010. In her complaint, Mrs. Reese raised several claims including breach of contract, bad faith, fraud and the tort of outrage. Defendants moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted the motion with respect to the outrage claim, and denied as to Reese's other claims. The Supreme Court, after review, reversed the trial court's denial of defendants' motion as to the remaining claims: the undisputed evidence showed: (1) that Reese improperly relied on the agents' oral representations regarding the validity of the application without making any attempt to read the life-insurance policy application; (2) that Reese made no attempt to inquire into or to investigate any inconsistencies between the agents' oral representations and the language of the application; and (3) that no exception to the duty to read applied here. View "Alfa Life Insurance Corp. v. Reese" on Justia Law

Southeast Construction, L.L.C. ("SEC"), appealed a circuit court order that found WAR Construction, Inc., had provided SEC with certain releases as previously ordered by the circuit court and that SEC was accordingly now required to pay the outstanding $263,939 remaining on a $373,939 judgment previously entered on a February 16, 2011, arbitration award obtained by WAR against SEC, along with interest accruing from February 16, 2011. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed that judgment to the extent it held that WAR provided all required releases and that SEC was obligated to fulfill the judgment entered on the arbitration award. However, the Court reversed the judgment inasmuch as it held that SEC is required to pay interest on the award as calculated from February 16, 2011. On remand, the circuit court was instructed to calculate interest on the principal at the rate set forth in the arbitration award accruing from September 8, 2014. View "Southeast Construction L.L.C. v. WAR Construction, Inc." on Justia Law