Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Fairfield Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC; D&N, LLC; DTD HC, LLC; Aurora Cares, LLC (alleged to be doing business as "Tara Cares"); and Aurora Healthcare, LLC (collectively, "the defendants"), petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to vacate its February 6, 2015, order denying their "Motion to Quash Depositions and Motion for Protective Order, and Motion to Reconsider January 30, 2015[,] Order." The defendants also requested that the Supreme Court direct the trial court to grant their motion. In May 2006, Myrtis Hill was a patient at Fairfield. While under Fairfield's care, Hill suffered a broken leg when a Fairfield employee, while attempting to transfer Hill to a bedside commode, allegedly dropped her to the floor thereby breaking Hill's right leg and causing severe injury to both of her legs. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the defendants demonstrated they had a clear legal right to the relief they requested, and that the trial court clearly exceeded its discretion in denying the defendants' motion for a protective order. Hill's "Motion for Award of Damages based on [the defendants'] pattern and practice of filing frivolous appeals" was denied. View "Ex parte Fairfield Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC" on Justia Law

On or about August 1, 2006, the University of Southern Alabama (USA) hired Azin Agah, a cell biologist, as a tenure-track employee, to teach biochemistry and to research the abnormalities in the extracellular matrix and angiogenesis associated with the pathogenesis of scleroderma. In 2010, USA did not reappoint Agah based on alleged research misconduct. In 2011, Agah sued several department members at the College of Allied Health Professions at USA and chairman of the two ad hoc committees that evaluated Agah, and other fictitiously named parties, alleging theft of electronic computer data and her research logbook and intentional and malicious interference with her contractual relationship with USA and seeking recovery of chattels in specie for the electronic data and her research logbook. On March 21, 2013, Agah amended her complaint adding USA and others as defendants and adding various claims. The only claim in her amended complaint that specifically named USA as a defendant "[sought] a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and monetary damages against USA for the breach by USA of [her] tenure track employment contract with USA." As a state school, USA argued it was immune from civil actions and petitions the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to dismiss it from Agah's suit. Additionally, Amber Bartlett, a student who worked under Agah's supervision in USA's research laboratory and a defendant in the same underlying action, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to issue an order quashing the subpoena issued to Alabama Psychiatric Services, P.C. ("APS"), ordering production of her mental-health records. The Court granted the petitions and issued the writs. USA and Bartlett have established that they had a clear, legal right to the relief they have requested. USA was entitled to absolute sovereign immunity from Agah's civil action, and the trial court was directed to enter a judgment of dismissal for USA. Bartlett was entitled to confidentiality of her mental-health records, and the trial court was directed to enter an order quashing Agah's subpoena for Bartlett's mental-health records from APS. View "Ex parte University of South Alabama" on Justia Law

In April 2010, Officer Brandon Brown, a police officer with the City of Fultondale, received a be-on-the-lookout ("BOLO") from dispatch for a blue Mitsubishi automobile, the occupants of which were suspected of having committed a theft, engaged in the pursuit of a blue Mitsubishi that he saw leaving the area of the offense. Moments after Officer Brown ceased pursuit of the blue Mitsubishi, the driver, Christopher Mitchell, ran a red light at an intersection and struck a vehicle being driven by Pamela Cupps in which David Cupps was a passenger. Pamela Cupps was killed and David Cupps was injured. David Cupps, on behalf of himself and as administrator of Pamela Cupps' estate, sued Mitchell, Officer Brown, and others. With regard to Officer Brown, David Cupps alleged that Officer Brown negligently and/or wantonly pursued Mitchell's vehicle by driving recklessly, that he negligently and/or wantonly pursued Mitchell's vehicle in violation of the City of Fultondale Police Department's pursuit policy and procedure, and that he violated section 32-5A-7(c), Ala. Code 1975, by operating his patrol vehicle in pursuit of another vehicle without the use of an audible signal. After the complaint was filed, David Cupps died; Allison Cupps, the administrator of the estates of David Cupps and Pamela Cupps, was substituted as the plaintiff. Officer Brown petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying his summary-judgment motion and to enter a summary judgment in his favor based on State-agent immunity and statutory immunity on claims filed against him by Allison Cupps. Finding that Officer Brown established, as a matter of law, that he was entitled to State-agent immunity from Cupps' action, the Supreme Court granted his petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Brandon Brown." on Justia Law

Dixon Mills Volunteer Fire Department, Inc. and its assistant fire chief, Louis Cass White, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion for summary judgment on the basis of immunity as to negligence claims asserted against them by plaintiffs L.C. Westbrook, Jr., and Kimberly Lewis. Plaintiffs were seriously injured when the automobile they were driving collided with a fire department truck that was dispatched to a house fire. Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court concluded that petitioners established a clear right to mandamus relief as to White, but not to the department itself. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted the petition as to White, and directed the trial court to enter summary judgment in his favor on plaintiffs' negligence claim. The Court denied the petition as to the department. View "Ex parte Dixon Mills Volunteer Fire Department, Inc." on Justia Law

Kevin Geeslin filed this action challenging a "convenience fee" and "token fee" charged in connection with his on-line electronic filing of a civil action (fees assessed in addition to the statutorily defined filing fee that were mandated by a 2012, administrative order issued by then Chief Justice Charles Malone). That 2012 order made it mandatory for parties to file all documents in civil actions on-line, or electronically in civil actions in Alabama circuit courts and district courts by parties represented by an attorney. "AlaFile" required credit-card payment of filing fees and charges users a "convenience fee" in addition to the filing fees. Geeslin filed a putative class action naming as defendants Chief JusticevMalone in his official capacity and On-Line Information Services, Inc. ("On-Line"), the company that managed and maintained the electronic-filing system for the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts ("AOC"). Geeslin alleged that Chief Justice Malone's order was unconstitutional and that the fees collected over and above the statutorily defined filing fee amounted to an illegal tax. Geeslin sought a judgment declaring the convenience fee and another "token fee" unconstitutional and a refund of the fees paid by him and the other putative class members. The Chief Justice and On-Line moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and Geeslin appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of dismissal as it related to all claims against On-Line, to all claims seeking monetary relief and injunctive relief, and to the action asserted against the Chief Justice under section 1983. As to the declaratory-judgment claim against the Chief Justice, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment of dismissal and rendered a judgment in favor of Geeslin. View "Geeslin v. On-Line Information Services, Inc." on Justia Law

IBI Group, Michigan, LLC, f/k/a Giffels, LLC ("Giffels"), appealed a circuit court order ordering it to arbitrate its claims against Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, f/k/a ThyssenKrupp Stainless USA, LLC ("OTK"), and ThyssenKrupp Steel USA, LLC, f/k/a ThyssenKrupp Steel and Stainless USA, LLC ("TK Steel") (collectively, "the steel companies"), pursuant to an arbitration provision in the contracts at the center of this dispute. Giffels initiated this action after the steel companies commenced arbitration proceedings once it became apparent that the action the steel companies had initiated in the federal district court involving the same contract dispute would be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court thereafter granted the steel companies' motion to stay the action pending the completion of arbitration, and Giffels appealed, arguing that, under the circumstances, the steel companies either had no right to compel arbitration or had waived that right. The Supreme Court found that the language of the arbitration provisions in the contracts executed by the parties gave the steel companies the broad right to select arbitration as a method to resolve any disputes based on those contracts, and, because Giffels failed to demonstrate substantial prejudice as a result of the steel companies' actions, the steel companies did not waive their right to proceed in arbitration. Accordingly, the order of the trial court sending the case to arbitration and staying all proceedings pending the completion of the arbitration of the claims presented in this action was affirmed. View "IBI Group, Michigan, LLC v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC" on Justia Law

Kenneth Adams appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Tractor & Equipment Co., Inc. ("TEC"). Adams and James "Buddy" Money are the only two members of Waste Two Energy, LLC, a company that operated two landfills in Mobile. In early 2011, Money, the managing member of Waste Two, had discussions with representatives of TEC, a company that repairs, rents, and sells heavy equipment, about servicing heavy equipment used by Waste Two in the operation of its business. Waste Two provided a "credit application and agreement" to TEC; Money and Adams were listed as the "officers, partners, or owners" of Waste Two. Money signed the agreement as the "principal of the credit applicant or a personal guarantor;" The names "James Money" and "Ken Adams" were handwritten on two lines below a guaranty provision that were each labeled "Guarantor." Beginning in March 2011 and continuing through July 2011, TEC performed various services on equipment owned by Waste Two. At some point after TEC had performed a substantial amount of work on Waste Two's equipment, a dispute arose between Waste Two and TEC over the amount of money Waste Two owed TEC for the services it had provided. Waste Two filed a complaint in the Mobile Circuit Court, asserting claims of breach of contract and misrepresentation against TEC. TEC filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to its third-party claims against Adams and Money. The court granted TEC's motion. Adams moved for reconsideration, arguing that he did not sign the guaranty to TEC, and that he should not have been held responsible in TEC's claims against Money and Waste Two. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to whether a valid guaranty bound Adams to TEC's alleged debt. Because an affidavit was properly before the trial court, and because the court had no basis for disregarding it, the Supreme Court held the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of TEC on its breach-of-guaranty claim against Adams. View "Adams v. Tractor & Equipment Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants Branch Banking & Trust Company ("BB&T"), Rusty Winfree, and Todd Fullington appealed a Circuit Court judgment in favor of Rex ("Sonny") and Claudene Nichols on the Nicholses' claims against the appellants, and on BB&T's counterclaim against the Nicholses. The dispute arose over loans made by BB&T's predecessor-in-interest, Colonial Bank. After a development loan was made, but before it could be paid back, Colonial became insolvent and entered receivership. BB&T purchased much of Colonial's assets, including the loan made to the Nicholses for development of their parcel. After refusing to extend the terms of the original Colonial loan, or to provide any additional funds to finish the development, the Nicholses stopped making payments on their loan and sued alleging fraud, reformation, negligence, wantonness, and breach of fiduciary duty against all appellants. Against BB&T, the Nicholses also alleged a claim of unjust enrichment and sought damages on a theory of promissory estoppel. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred in entering a judgment in favor of the Nicholses and on BB&T's counterclaim. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Nichols" on Justia Law

In November 2011, following a physical attack on his father, David Brown, Jeffery Brown was involuntarily committed by the Mobile Probate Court to Searcy Hospital, a long-termcare facility for mental illness operated by the Alabama Department of Mental Health. Brown was 19 years old at the time of his commitment and had a long history of mental illness and psychiatric hospitalizations. At Searcy Hospital Brown was assigned a "treatment team." Dr. Amee Kozlovski, a licensed physician and psychiatrist employed by the Alabama Department of Mental Health, was the head of Brown's treatment team and was responsible for making the ultimate judgment about whether Brown met the criteria for discharge from Searcy. During his time at Searcy Hospital, Brown had several incidents of self-injurious behavior but was otherwise fully compliant with his treatment. The treatment team reached a consensus that Brown had met the conditions for discharge. Despite reservations expressed by Brown's family that he would run away from a group-home facility, Brown was discharged a group home owned and operated by Altapointe Health Systems, Inc. Dr. Kozlovski approved the discharge. Shortly after discharge, Brown left Safe Haven without the knowledge of Safe Haven's staff. Ten days later, Brown's body was found lying on a road in Mobile, apparently been struck and killed by a motorist. David Shamlin, as the court-appointed administrator of Brown's estate, initiated the underlying wrongful-death action, naming as defendants Dr. Kozlovski and Altapointe. The complaint alleged that Dr. Kozlovski had been negligent and/or wanton in numerous respects. Dr. Kozlovski filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the claims against her were barred by the doctrine of State-agent immunity. Based on the trial court record the Supreme Court concluded Dr. Kozlovski was entitled to State-agent immunity from the wrongful-death action asserted against her. Accordingly, she had shown a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to enter summary judgment in her favor. View "Ex parte Amee Kozlovski, M.D." on Justia Law

Plaintiff James Freeman, a parolee whose earlier parole from a life sentence for murder was revoked, appealed a trial court's dismissal of his claims against the City of Birmingham; Birmingham Police Officer Dewayne Holyfield, Charles W. Edwards; and Alma Berry, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and conspiracy. Freeman was convicted of first-degree murder in 1975, and was sentenced to life in prison. He was granted parole in 1993. In 1995, Officer Holyfield responded to a complaint that a man was beating a female near 14th Avenue North in Birmingham. Officer Holyfield drove to that address and discovered a female whose neck had been scratched and whose eyes were blackened and swollen. She claimed that Freeman had attacked her. Based on this incident, a warrant was issued the next day for Freeman's arrest. He was arrested and charged with "domestic assault" hours after the warrant was issued. As a result of the arrest, Edwards, then the executive director of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, initiated parole-revocation proceedings against Freeman. Berry was the parole-revocation hearing officer at the proceedings. Berry found sufficient evidence to support the charge of domestic assault against Freeman, and recommended the revocation of Freeman's parole. A member of the Board of Pardons and Paroles adjudged Freeman guilty of domestic assault and revoked his parole. At the time his parole was revoked, no court had adjudged Freeman guilty of domestic assault. Freeman was incarcerated and remained in prison until March 7, 2011, when he was again released on parole. From 1995 to 2011, Freeman was denied parole six times, based in part, he alleges, on his having committed the offense of domestic assault, of which he had never been convicted. In 2012, Freeman reported to the municipal court in Birmingham "to address the 1995 charge of 'domestic assault.'" He claimed that, when he arrived at the municipal court, he learned for the first time that the 1995 charge was assault and battery and not domestic assault. Freeman filed this suit in 2014, more than 18 years after the revocation of his parole in 1995 and 2 years, 11 months, and 29 days after he appeared in the municipal court in Birmingham and allegedly learned of the assault-and-battery charge against him. After review of Freeman's arguments on appeal of the trial court's dismissal of his claims, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the dismissal of those claims. View "Freeman v. Holyfield" on Justia Law