Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kelly Horwitz and Cason Kirby were both candidates in the August 27, 2013, election for District 4 of the Tuscaloosa Board of Education. Kirby was certified as the winner of the election. The certified vote totals were 416 votes for Kirby and 329 votes for Horwitz. Horwitz contested the results. The trial court entered a "Final Order Denying Contest" in which, among other things, it concluded that the affidavits established that no more than 70 illegal votes had been cast in the election. On November 24, 2013, Horwitz filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court's judgment; that motion was denied by operation of law on February 24, 2014. Horwitz appealed the trial court's order denying her election contest. Based on the applicable law and facts, the Supreme Court concluded that "Phase I" of the election contest yielded a total of 159 ballots that should have been rejected. The judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded back to the trial court for the conduct by the trial court of Phase II of the contest. View "Horwitz v. Kirby" on Justia Law

On November 12, 2009, M.C. had an appointment to for physical therapy at Tallassee Rehabilitation, P.C. She was referred to Tallahassee Rehab by her physician for treatment of back pain. M.C. was seen by Kristopher Vanderwall, a physical therapist, whom she had never met. Vanderwall took her to a room, where he instructed her to put on a gown. M.C. took off her jacket and shirt and put on a gown. She did not take off her underwear or pants. Vanderwall returned to the room, unhooked M.C.'s bra and told her to lie on the table in the room; M.C. did as she was instructed, but, after she was on the table, Vanderwall started to move his hands over her body, removing her bra and the gown. Vanderwall then began to rub M.C.'s breasts, and he removed M.C.'s pants and panties and placed his fingers into her buttocks and genitals. Vanderwall testified that "any and all transactions and interactions" he had with M.C. were "in connection with the rendition of physical therapy services." M.C. filed a complaint against Vanderwall and Tallassee Rehab in which she sought money damages based on a claim of assault and battery against Vanderwall and a claim of negligent or wanton hiring against Tallassee Rehab. Vanderwall resisted certain discovery requests M.C. made in the course of litigation, and she moved for partial summary judgment and to compel discovery. The trial court granted these motions, and Vanderwall appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, dismissed Vanderwall's appeal and denied his petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Ex parte Kristopher Vanderwall." on Justia Law

In 2009, Christopher Dalton pled guilty to two counts of attempted murder, one count of breaking and entering an automobile, and one count of misdemeanor theft. Dalton was sentenced to 2 terms of 30 years' imprisonment for his attempted-murder convictions, a 5-year prison sentence for his unlawful-breaking-and-entering conviction, and a 1-year prison sentence for his theft-of-property conviction. The sentences were to run concurrently. In November 2009, Dalton filed his first Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition, alleging that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he erroneously told Dalton that, on the 30-year sentence for attempted murder, he would be eligible for parole in 6 years. The Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately affirmed the trial court, finding that Dalton's counsel did not promise parole or that he would be eligible for parole in six years. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals, "a promise of parole and a representation as to when a defendant will be eligible for parole are two different things." The case was remanded for the circuit court to determine whether Dalton's trial counsel misrepresented his eligibility for parole. View "Ex parte Christopher Eric Dalton." on Justia Law

Frank Kruse, administrator ad litem for the estate of Dansby W. Sanders, appealed the grant of summary judgment entered by the Mobile Circuit Court in favor of R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc., now known as Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC ("Vanderbilt"), in a wrongful-death action. Dansby was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2009; he sued numerous defendants in 2010, alleging that he had been exposed to asbestos through products manufactured and distributed by those defendants during the 37-year period he worked for Mobile Paint Company. Dansby filed an amended complaint naming Vanderbilt as a defendant because of its role as a supplier of industrial talc under the brand name "Nytal." After a thorough review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of Vanderbilt. "The trial court entered its judgment on a basis not contemplated by its own scheduling order and, in fact, not presented in the motion for a summary judgment filed in keeping with that order (and, in any event, Sanders subsequently presented substantial evidence contradicting that basis for the summary judgment)." Furthermore, the Court found that Sanders presented substantial evidence that Dansby was exposed to Nytal talc supplied by Vanderbilt during his employment at Mobile Paint, thus demonstrating a genuine issue of fact as to the issue actually raised in the motion for a summary judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Kruse v. Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC" on Justia Law

This case involved Barbara Johnson's claim against the City of Mobile in which she alleged retaliation based on several complaints and lawsuits she filed against the City under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("the ADA"). Johnson, an African-American woman over 40 years of age, began working for the City in 1996. Johnson previously filed several complaints and lawsuits against the City pertaining to her employment with the City. In 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2012, Johnson filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("the EEOC") complaints against the City alleging various forms of discrimination. Johnson also unsuccessfully sued the City in 2007, 2008, and 2010. Johnson filed the underlying action in 2013, alleging that, in violation of Title VII and the ADA, the City retaliated against Johnson because she had filed discrimination charges against the City with the EEOC. Johnson's deposition testimony indicated that in 2008 or 2009 Johnson had surgery to correct a problem with her toe. As a result of her surgery, Johnson was "taken off of work" for what "could have been a month." Johnson's time off work to recover from her injury was preapproved by the City, and she was paid for her time off. Once Johnson returned to work, she had to wear a boot to protect her toe, and her doctor "wanted [her] on light duty." Johnson's supervisor, Terrell Washington, informed Johnson that there was no light duty available at that time so Johnson remained at home on paid leave. Once Johnson returned to work, Johnson was ordered by her physician to wear a certain kind of shoe that did not comply with the City's dress code: the City required Johnson to wear black shoes, but her physician-prescribed shoes were white. Johnson subsequently received an unsatisfactory-annual performance rating from Washington for the period ending June 8, 2010. Thereafter, Johnson used the MCPB's appellate process for review of her unsatisfactory-performance rating. Ultimately, the MCPB affirmed Johnson's rating. Johnson received a "Letter of Determination" concerning the complaint she filed against the City from the EEOC. The Department of Justice did not elect to sue on Johnson's behalf, but advised that she was free to file suit on her own. The underlying matter in this appeal is the suit Johnson filed with regard to her EEOC complaint. The matter ended with judgment entered in favor of the City. After review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment on the merits and its denial of Johnson's post-judgment motions. The Court also affirmed the trial court's decision to award the City attorney fees. However, the Court reversed the judgment insofar as it set the amount of the fees, and remanded the case for recalculation of fees with reasons supporting the recalculation. View "Johnson v. City of Mobile" on Justia Law

Before 2010, Azin Agah was employed at the University of South Alabama ("USA") as a professor engaged in scientific research. Agah's position was a tenure-track professorship. In early 2010, USA's vice president for Health Sciences, Ronald Franks, notified Agah that she would not be reappointed to her professorship because of alleged research misconduct. Agah sued Amber Bartlett and Julio Turrens. Bartlett was a student of Agah's, and she reported her concerns regarding Agah's research to Turrens, who was a professor and associate dean at USA. Agah sought compensatory and punitive damages against the defendants for the alleged theft and conversion of her computerized electronic-research data and the alleged theft and conversion of her animal-research logbook and intentional interference with a contractual property right arising out of the termination of her employment by USA. Agah also sued "R.T., W.B.D., R.F.," whose names were "known and unknown" and who, according to Agah, played a role in the theft of her research, "the defamation of the Plaintiff's character, and the intentional interference with the Plaintiff's property right of employment." After the lawsuit had been filed, and after a period of discovery, Agah gave names to the initials previously listed in her original complaint: Richard Talbott, William Brad Davis, and Ronald Franks. She would also add Dusty Layton and others who were involved in the review of Agah's research. The petitioners (Talbott, Ballard, and Layton) each filed a motion to dismiss. Each argued, among other things, that, with the exception of the conversion and detinue claim, Agah's remaining claims accrued in February 2010 when her employment was terminated, that Agah's amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint, and that the remaining claims asserted in the amended complaint were time-barred. They also argued that they were entitled to immunity with respect to Agah's claims alleging tortious interference with contractual rights, tortious violations of her procedural and substantive due-process rights, and conversion and detinue, because, they argued, they were sued in their individual capacity and lacked the authority to grant Agah her requested injunctive relief. Following a hearing, the trial court denied all three motions. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that petitioners demonstrated a clear legal right to the dismissal of Agah's amended complaint against them. Agah's amended complaint did not relate back to her original complaint; thus, all of her claims against the petitioners, with the exclusion of her conversion and detinue claim, were barred by the statute of limitations. Furthermore, Agah's conversion and detinue claim against the petitioners in their individual capacities sought relief that the petitioners could not provide. Therefore, the trial court was directed to vacate its order denying the petitioners' motion seeking dismissal of the claims against them. View "Ex parte Richard Talbott et al." on Justia Law

Brenda Franks was a former nontenured employee of the Choctaw County Public School System. Before the 2008-2009 school year, Franks had been employed as a full-time counselor in the school system for three years when her contract was not renewed. For the 2008-2009 school year, Franks was offered and accepted a part-time, temporary position as a vocational counselor starting in February 2009. She signed an employment contract acknowledging that the position was temporary. She also signed a "Letter of Understanding Concerning Temporary Employment." Franks worked pursuant to the contract for five months. The superintendent notified Franks, in writing, of her intention to recommend that the School Board members cancel the contract because of a "justifiable decrease in jobs in the system." The Board members approved the recommendation to cancel the contract. Franks did not contest the cancellation. In July 2010, the Board members posted a vacancy for a business-education teacher. Franks applied for the position, but was not hired. Franks sued the Board and Superintendent, asserting that the Board members had terminated her employment based on a reduction in force ("RIF"), but that she was entitled to be hired for the teaching position pursuant to the RIF policy. Franks sought to be instated to that position, with backpay, interest, and restoration of progress toward tenure. However, Franks died prior to the conclusion of this suit. Petitioners Ronald Hampton, Darry Phillips, Wayne Taylor, Isaac Johnson, and Sharon Sheppard, the individual members of the Choctaw County Board of Education, and Sue Moore, the superintendent of the Choctaw County Public School System sought an order compelling the Choctaw Circuit Court to vacate its denial of their summary-judgment motion and to enter summary judgment in their favor on the ground that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims because of plaintiff's death and the petitioners' immunity. The Supreme Court concluded that the superintendent and the Board members demonstrated immunity and established a clear legal right to a summary judgment on the claims asserted against them in their official capacities. Therefore, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued a writ directing the Choctaw Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the petitioners' summary-judgment motion and to enter a summary judgment on all the claims asserted against the superintendent and the Board members. View "Ex parte Ronald Hampton, et al." on Justia Law

Diversicare Leasing Corp. d/b/a Canterbury Healthcare Facility ("Canterbury") appealed an order denying its motion seeking to compel arbitration of a wrongful-death claim filed by Betty Hubbard, as the personal representative of the estate of Johnathan Hubbard. Johnathan was diagnosed with cerebral palsy when he was six months old, which caused him to be developmentally delayed and to suffer from a seizure disorder. Johnathan could not walk and was confined to a wheelchair his entire life. He could not speak; he could not feed, clean, or dress himself; he had no use of his hands; and he could not otherwise communicate his needs to others. Johnathan spent various periods of his life in residential-care facilities. Betty made all health-care decisions relating to Johnathan's care and executed all documents in furtherance of that care. Betty executed a number of documents upon Johnathan's admission to Canterbury, including the admission agreement and the arbitration agreement made the basis of this appeal. Johnathan was found unresponsive by the Canterbury staff in early 2011, and was transferred to a local hospital. Johnathan was diagnosed with sepsis; he died on February 21, 2011. Betty sued Canterbury asserting a wrongful-death claim. Canterbury moved the trial court to compel arbitration of Betty's wrongful-death claim and to stay the claim pending the arbitration. Betty argued in response to the motion to compel that she lacked the legal authority to bind Johnathan to the arbitration agreement because at the time the agreement was executed Johnathan was incapacitated and was 21 years old and had reached the age of majority, and she did not hold his power of attorney nor had she been appointed his personal representative or guardian by any court. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying Canterbury's motion to compel arbitration and to stay the proceedings. Canterbury appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Betty could not be bound to the arbitration agreement in her capacity as the personal representative of Johnathan's estate when she signed the arbitration agreement in what amounts to her capacity as Johnathan's relative or next friend. View "Diversicare Leasing Corp. v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

Dothan/Houston County Communications District and Ozark/Dale County E-911, Inc. ("the districts"), sued Century Tel of Alabama, LLC ("CTA"), and Qwest Communications Company, LLC (collectively, "the defendants"), seeking, among other things, to recover E-911 charges that the defendants were alleged to have not properly billed and collected in accordance with the Emergency Telephone Service Act ("ETSA"). The defendants moved the circuit court to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. The circuit court denied the defendants' motion. The defendants then petitioned the Supreme Court for permission to appeal from the circuit court's interlocutory order. The defendants contended that the "repealed-statute rule" prohibited the districts from suing to collect unpaid 911 charges requested to be levied prior to October 1, 2013. Specifically, the defendants argued that no cause of action could be brought for violation of a statute after that statute had been repealed. Further, the defendants argued that the districts' claims were barred because the ETSA did not authorize a private right of action against telephone-service providers for failing to bill and collect the 911 charges from subscribers. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. The Court found the statute at issue here was not repealed by subsequent acts by the Legislature, but amended, and civil actions were expressly authorized by Alabama law to bill and collect the 911 fees used by E-911 services to operate and maintain the emergency-communications system. View "Century Tel of Alabama, LLC v. Dothan/Houston Cty Comm. Dist." on Justia Law

Sentinel Insurance Company, Limited appealed a declaratory judgment entered in favor of Alabama Municipal Insurance Corporation ("AMIC") in this dispute between Sentinel and AMIC over which insurance company was responsible for providing primary insurance coverage in an underlying automobile-accident case. After reviewing the AMIC policy and the Sentinel policy, the Supreme Court concluded that the language in each was unambiguous as to which provided primary coverage: the AMIC policy provided primary coverage, and the Sentinel policy provided excess coverage. The Court held that the trial court erred in concluding that the Sentinel policy provided primary coverage. Therefore, the trial court's judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Sentinel Insurance Company, Ltd. v. Alabama Municipal Insurance Corp." on Justia Law