Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants Courtyard Citiflats, LLC, and Action Property Management, L.L.C. (collectively, "Citiflats"), petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff Coretta Arrington as untimely filed. On July 18, 2014, Arrington filed, both individually and in her capacity as the administrator of the estate of her deceased minor child, a complaint against Citiflats. Arrington's complaint alleged tort-based claims in connection with the death of Arrington's child as the result of injuries allegedly sustained in 2012, on premises owned and managed by Citiflats. Arrington's complaint was accompanied by an "Affidavit of Substantial Hardship," alleging that Arrington was unable to pay the corresponding filing fee. At the time it was filed, the hardship statement had not been approved by the trial court as required by statute. Arrington's complaint was also accompanied by the summonses necessary for service on the named defendants, which were stamped "filed" by the clerk of the trial court on the filing date. On August 18, 2014, after the July 24, 2014 expiration of the applicable two-year statute of limitations, the trial court entered an order approving the hardship statement. On August 19, 2014, the clerk of the trial court issued the previously filed summonses for service. Citiflats filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion seeking to dismiss Arrington's complaint on the ground that the statutory limitations period had expired without the payment of a filing fee or the approval of a hardship statement. The Circuit Court denied Citiflats' motion. Because the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss Arrington's complaint as untimely, it concluded that Citiflats made the requisite showing of a clear legal right to the relief sought. View "Ex parte Courtyard Citiflats, LLC, and Action Property Management LLC." on Justia Law

The Retirement Systems of Alabama ("RSA"), the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama ("TRS"), the Public Education Employees' Health Insurance Plan ("PEEHIP"), the Public Education Employees' Health Insurance Fund ("PEEHIF"), the Board of Control of TRS ("the TRS Board"), the Board of Control of PEEHIP ("the PEEHIP Board"), David Bronner, as chief executive officer of RSA and as secretary-treasurer of TRS and PEEHIP, and various members of the TRS Board and of the PEEHIP Board in their official capacities ("the PEEHIP defendants") sought mandamus review of the Circuit Court's denial of their motion to dismiss the claims filed against them by James Burks II, Eugenia Burks, Martin Hester, Jacqueline Hester, Thomas Highfield, Carol Ann Highfield, Jake Jackson, and Melinda Jackson, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals ("the public-education plaintiffs"). PEEHIP, which is managed by the PEEHIP Board, provided group health-insurance benefits to public-education employees in Alabama. The public-education plaintiffs alleged that a policy adopted by the PEEHIP Board in 2009 changed the amounts participants and their eligible dependents, and this change violated Article V, section 138.03, Alabama Constitution of 1901, as well as the public-education plaintiffs' rights to equal protection, due process, and freedom of association under the Alabama Constitution, the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The public-education plaintiffs also alleged that the 2009 policy violated Alabama public policy and their right to family integrity as protected by the Alabama Constitution. The public-education plaintiffs sought relief in the form of: (1) a judgment declaring "[the PEEHIP defendants'] practice of denying an allotment for insurance benefits to educators who are married to another educator and who have dependent children to be unconstitutional, discriminatory and unlawful under both State and Federal law"; (2) an injunction preventing the PEEHIP defendants from "denying an allotment for insurance benefits to educators whose spouse is also an educator in the public school system and who have dependent children"; (3) restitution of "amounts ... unlawfully withheld and/or ... amounts [the public-education plaintiffs] have paid for insurance that they would not have paid absent [the PEEHIP defendants'] unlawful conduct" or other equitable relief; and (4) costs and attorney fees. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Alabama Supreme Court granted the petition in part, denied in part, and issue a writ to direct the circuit court to dismiss all the public-education plaintiffs' claims against RSA, PEEHIP, the PEEHIP Board, PEEHIF, TRS, the TRS Board, the members of the TRS Board, and Bronner, in his capacity as chief executive officer of RSA and as secretary-treasurer of TRS; to dismiss all the public-education plaintiffs' state-law claims against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP; and to dismiss the public-education plaintiffs' claims against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP, for monetary relief, pursuant to § 1983. The petition was denied with regard to the public-education plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief, pursuant to section 1983, against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP. The PEEHIP Board and Bronner were entitled to immunity from the state law claims, but not to immunity from the Eleventh Amendment claims for prospective injunctive relief under section 1983. View "Ex parte The Retirement Systems of Alabama et al." on Justia Law

Sergio Acosta petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate an order granting a motion filed by Trinity Bank to strike Acosta's jury demand with respect to all counts in Acosta's counterclaim and third-party complaint in the bank's action against him. The bank filed filed suit seeking a judgment against Acosta for financial losses it incurred after Acosta defaulted on certain "Multipurpose Note and Security Agreement[s]" he had executed with the bank. The bank alleged that Acosta had executed two secured notes and one unsecured note, which, it said, Acosta had failed and/or refused to pay; that the bank had foreclosed on the properties pledged as collateral on the secured notes; and that proper credit had been applied to the notes. The bank sought a judgment for the balance due on the notes, plus interest, fees, costs, and attorney fees. Acosta filed a counterclaim against the bank, as well as a third-party complaint against two of its officers, alleging that he had entered into a business relationship with R&B Properties under the name of SilverPalm Properties, LLC; that loans from the bank were the principal source of funding for SilverPalm; that the financing plan was for SilverPalm to procure from the bank the funds to construct the properties, for SilverPalm to pay the interest on the notes until the properties were rented, and for SilverPalm to pay off the notes once the properties generated sufficient rental income to do so. Acosta and R&B Properties dissolved SilverPalm because of a downturn in the economy; but the bank induced that Acosta was personally liable for the notes previously secured only by SilverPalm The bank at some point advised Acosta that additional security was required to continue financing the notes, that Acosta declined to pledge additional security. The bank then called the notes due and foreclosed on the properties securing the notes. Acosta requested an accounting for the amounts claimed by the bank on the notes and the mortgages securing the notes, and he sought damages based on allegations of wantonness, breach of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. The counterclaim and third-party complaint included a demand for a jury trial. In its motion to strike Acosta's jury demand, the Bank relied on a jury-waiver provision in four Assignments of Rents and Leases that Acosta had executed in consideration of the notes. The trial court initially denied the bank's motion to strike, and then granted it after reconsideration. The Supreme Court concluded that Acosta demonstrated a clear legal right to a jury trial on the claims asserted in his counterclaim and third-party complaint. As such, the Court granted the petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order striking Acosta's jury demand. View "Ex parte Sergio Acosta." on Justia Law

Tanya Butts petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Clarke Circuit Court to stay the proceedings in the underlying civil case until a criminal case pending against her was completed. Gaines McCorquodale and Butts each owned a one-half interest in Hometown Hospice, Inc. In July 2014, McCorquodale sued Butts, asserting claims based on allegations that Butts had misappropriated funds belonging to Hometown. The trial court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting Butts from any involvement in the operation of Hometown. Butts contended that a stay in the civil case was necessary to protect her constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court denied the petition: Butts was not entitled to a stay of that part of the civil case determining the value of Hometown in accordance with 10A-2-14.34. Because the trial court had not yet ruled on whether the remaining parts of the civil case should be stayed pending the resolution of the criminal case against her, mandamus relief was not appropriate on that issue. View "Ex parte Tanya Butts." on Justia Law

Defendants below, J. Don Gordon Construction, Inc. and Western Surety Company appealed the circuit court's judgment on an arbitration award entered against them. The defendants argued that the award should have been vacated for various reasons under section 10(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq. ("the FAA"). After review of their arguments, the Alabama Supreme Court was unpersuaded by the argument: the arbitrator's failure to recuse himself upon learning the information about a domestic-violence case did not indicate evident partiality. The large award of legal fees against Western Surety –– an award the arbitrator testified was "significantly less" than the amount claimed by the plaintiffs –– did not indicate evident partiality, either. "The alleged partiality at most suggests a 'mere appearance' of bias that is remote, uncertain, and speculative rather than 'direct, definite, and capable of demonstration.' [ . . .] A reasonable person would not have to conclude that the arbitrator was partial given these facts." The Court affirmed the circuit court's order. View "J. Don Gordon Construction, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendants Quality Carriers, Inc. and Bennie Hugh Orcutt filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to direct the Dallas Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to transfer the underlying action to the Autauga Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. Desmond Woods was driving northbound on Interstate 65 in Autauga County; Kimberly Livingston, Tory Cooper, Marquita Speer ("Marquita"), and Aaron Jones were passengers in the automobile. The automobile Woods was driving had a mechanical problem and stalled in the right travel lane; it was nighttime, and the lights on the automobile were not on. Woods, Cooper, and Jones got out of the automobile and started looking under the hood. Livingston and Marquita remained in the automobile. Orcutt, who was employed by Quality Carriers, was also traveling northbound on Interstate 65 in a tractor-trailer rig that was owned by Quality Carriers. The tractor-trailer rig Orcutt was driving collided with the back of the automobile. Both vehicles caught fire. Livingston and Marquita, who were in the automobile when it caught fire, were pronounced dead at the scene by the Autauga County coroner. Woods and Cooper were transported to Prattville Hospital. According to the accident report, marijuana was found on Woods's person at the hospital. At the time the accident report was filed, toxicology results were pending to determine whether Woods was under the influence of marijuana at the time of the crash. Upon review of defendants' argment on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying Quality Carriers and Orcutt's motion for a transfer based on the interest-of-justice prong of the forum non conveniens statute. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court, in the interest of justice, to enter an order transferring the case from the Dallas Circuit Court to the Autauga Circuit Court. View "Ex parte Quality Carriers, Inc." on Justia Law

Keith Westphal and Joyce Osborn Wilson filed suit against David Northcutt III, DMD, Bobby R. Wells, DMD, Stephen R. Stricklin, DMD, Thomas T. Willis, DMD, Sam J. Citrano, Jr., DMD, William Chesser, DMD, and Sandra Kay Alexander, RDH, in their official capacities as members of the Alabama Board of Dental Examiners. Westphal and Wilson sought a judgment declaring unconstitutional the portion of the Alabama Dental Practice Act, (Sec. 34-9-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975) that made it unlawful for anyone other than a duly licensed dentist to perform teeth-whitening services, and sought a permanent injunction forbidding future enforcement of the prohibition in the Act on teeth-whitening services performed by non-dentists. The parties submitted cross-motions for a summary judgment, and the Jefferson Circuit Court entered a summary judgment in favor of the Dental Board. Westphal and Wilson appealed. But finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Westphal v. Northcutt III" on Justia Law

Christopher Floyd was convicted for the 2005 murder of Waylon Crawford, for which he was sentenced to death. The Alabama Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to determine whether the following holdings of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Floyd's appeal of his capital-murder conviction were proper: that the the trial court did not err in holding that the State provided valid race- and gender-neutral reasons for its exercise of its peremptory strikes during jury selection; that the trial court did not err by refusing to admit into evidence all of Floyd's statements made to law-enforcement officers; and that the trial court did not err in denying Floyd's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ex parte Christopher Floyd" on Justia Law

Nicholson Manufacturing Limited petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in its favor on the ground that Gerald Templeton's substitution of Nicholson for a fictitiously named defendant was made after the expiration of the applicable statutory limitations period and did not "relate back" to the filing of the original complaint. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Nicholson established it had a clear legal right to the relief requested. The Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Nicholson Manufacturing Ltd." on Justia Law

Gudel AG, one of several defendants to this case, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Crenshaw Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Gudel's motion to dismiss the personal-injury claims filed against it by Robert and Cindy Rutledge, and to enter an order dismissing the Rutledges' claims on the basis of a lack of in personam jurisdiction. In February 2013, Robert sued Smart Alabama, LLC ("SAL"), an automotive-parts manufacturer located in Crenshaw County, seeking to recover worker's compensation benefits in connection with an alleged work-related injury Robert suffered in November 2011 while in SAL's employ. In November 2013, Robert amended his original complaint to add a count pursuant to Alabama's Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine as well as negligence and wantonness claims. In addition, the amended complaint added both Hyundai WIA ("Hyundai") and Gudel, as well as several fictitiously named entities, as defendants. The amended complaint alleged that Gudel, a foreign corporation headquartered in Switzerland, "designed, built, manufactured, tested and sold [the] subject machine/equipment that is the subject matter of [the Rutledges'] lawsuit." After review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court exceeded its discretion in determining that it possessed personal jurisdiction over Gudel. Accordingly, Gudel has established a clear legal right to the dismissal of the claims against it; therefore, the Alabama Court granted the petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying Gudel's motion to dismiss and to dismiss the Rutledges' claims against Gudel. View "Ex parte Gudel AG." on Justia Law