Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Alabama Supreme Court granted review of this case filed by E.L. seeking review of a Court of Civil Appeals decision to affirm a family court order insofar as that judgment recognized and gave effect to an adoption decree entered by the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia approving the adoption by V.L., E.L.'s former same-sex partner, of E.L.'s biological children, S.L., N.L., and H.L. E.L. and V.L. were involved in a relationship from approximately 1995 through 2011. During the course of that relationship, they maintained a residence in Hoover. In December 2002 E.L. gave birth to S.L., and in November 2004 E.L. gave birth to twins, N.L. and H.L. All births were achieved through the use of assisted-reproductive technology. The parties eventually made the joint decision to take legal action to formalize and to protect the parental role V.L. had undertaken. In 2007, V.L. filed a petition with the Georgia court to adopt the children. The Georgia granted the petition, and subsequently new birth certificates were issued. In approximately November 2011, E.L. and V.L. ended their relationship, and, in January 2012, V.L. moved out of the house E.L. and V.L. had previously shared. 2013, V.L. filed a petition in the Jefferson Circuit Court alleging that E.L. had denied her access to the children and had interfered with her ability to exercise her traditional and constitutional parental rights. She asked the Alabama court to register the Georgia judgment, to declare her legal rights pursuant to the Georgia judgment, and to award her some measure of custody of or visitation with the children. The matter was transferred to the Jefferson Family Court, and E.L. moved that court to dismiss V.L.'s petition on multiple grounds. The Jefferson Family Court ultimately denied E.L.'s motion to dismiss, without a hearing, and simultaneously awarded V.L. scheduled visitation with the children. E.L. filed her notice of appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals. After reviewing the record and analyzing the relevant law of both Alabama and Georgia, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Civil Appeals and the Jefferson Family Court erred in giving full faith and credit to the Georgia judgment because the Georgia court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the Georgia judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte E.L." on Justia Law

In 2010, Yan Chen, who had a business interest in a restaurant, entered into a 10-year lease agreement with Russell Realty, LLC, and MRT, LLC. The property to be leased was located in Greenville. The lease agreement was drafted by Russell Realty and contained an arbitration clause. In 2012, Russell Realty and MRT sued Chen along with Qiaoyun He, Joe Zou, and Yami Buffet, Inc., alleging breach of contract. Chen filed a response to the motion, alleging that she had been in China for a few months, and that she had not been personally served with notice of the lawsuit. She subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the lease agreement contained an arbitration clause and that "said complaint[] fails to state any measures that have been taken in lieu of the fulfillment of such agreed Arbitration Clause." The trial court denied both Russell Realty and MRT's motion for a default judgment and Chen's motion to dismiss. About a month after this, Chen filed a motion to compel arbitration, asserting that, as "part of Plaintiffs['] lease agreement, plaintiff[s] agreed to binding arbitration. In 2013, Chen filed a second motion to dismiss, alleging that Russell Realty and MRT had refused to mediate and had refused to arbitrate. Russell Realty and MRT filed an objection to Chen's second motion to dismiss, asserting that "time of the stay set by the court has almost expired and Defendant Yan Chen has not made any movement, act, or effort to seek Arbitration to resolve the issues." Russell Realty and MRT again sought a default judgment against the defendants, including Chen. She asserted that counsel for Russell Realty and MRT had failed to respond to her attempts to seek a settlement before the hiring of a mediator or arbitrator and that, subsequently, she had contacted a mediator/arbitrator and Russell Realty and MRT had not responded to her choice of mediator/arbitrator. The trial court then entered an order stating that the Chen's appeal was moot as the court had not yet entered a final order. In early 2015, the trial court entered an order awarding Russell Realty and MRT $682,050.10 against all the defendants, including Chen, jointly and severally. Chen appealed. Based on its review of the facts in the circuit court record, the Supreme Court reversed with regard to Chen and remanded the case for the trial court to enter an order requiring arbitration in accordance with the terms of the lease agreement. View "Chen v. Russell Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

John R. Cooper, in his official capacity as director of the Alabama Department of Transportation ("ALDOT"), appealed a Circuit Court's December 16, 2014, order enjoining him from prohibiting Eddie Ziegler, Lisa Ziegler Player, Jennifer Ziegler Cousins, Angela Gay Ziegler Bracknell, and Cathy Donaldson (referred to collectively as "the Zieglers"), from obtaining legal permits to build seven to eight houses on the Zieglers' property or from otherwise interfering with the Zieglers' plans and likewise enjoining Cooper from withholding consent for the building of those houses in the event the Zieglers obtain the required permits. Because the Supreme Court found that Cooper was entitled to sovereign immunity, it reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cooper v. Ziegler" on Justia Law

Larry Butler, individually and as executor of the Estate of Elizabeth S. Butler, appealed a circuit court judgment declaring void the will of Elizabeth S. Butler executed in October 2012, and setting aside the Probate Court's admission of that will to probate. Ned Butler, Sr. ("Ned"), and Elizabeth Butler ("Betty") were married and had three children, Ned N. Butler, Jr., Steve Butler, and Michael Robin Butler ("Robin"). In July 2008, after numerous discussions about their estate, Ned and Betty executed a document entitled The Butler Family Trust, a joint revocable living trust that contained provisions for the well being of themselves, their children, and their grandchildren. Ned and Betty executed wills identical in all material respects that provided that their assets pour over into The Butler Family Trust at their deaths. In September 2011, Ned and Betty executed new wills that were virtually identical to their July 2008 wills with the exception that different alternate executors were named. Ned died in late 2011. In October 2012, Betty executed a will in which she expressly revoked all other wills and codicils. The distribution of Betty's estate in this new will differed from the distribution of her estate as provided in The Butler Family Trust; Larry was named executor of her will. Betty died in late 2013. The Probate Court admitted Betty's 2012 will to probate in 2014. The following day, Ned Jr.'s children filed a complaint with the Circuit Court against Larry, individually and as executor of Betty's estate, contesting Betty's 2012 will. The circuit court set aside Betty's will and declared it void. Larry moved to vacate the circuit court's judgment, arguing that the court erred in applying 43-8-250, Ala. Code 1975, to the facts of this case because, as he contended, there was language in the Butler Family Trust prohibiting Betty from changing the trust after Ned's death, but that there was no language in either the Family Trust or Betty's earlier wills creating a contract that prohibited her from changing anything else. The circuit court denied the motion, and Larry appealed. Because the evidence did not establish that Betty entered into a contract not to revoke her will or a devise, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court's judgment declaring Betty's 2012 will to be void and setting aside the probate court's order to admit that will to probate because Betty had executed a contract not to revoke her 2011 will was erroneous. View "Butler v. Butler" on Justia Law

The State of Alabama, on behalf of Rick Allison, Probate Judge of Walker County, appealed a Walker Circuit Court judgment entered in favor of Jill Farris, the county administrator for Walker County. By statute, Judge Allison, as the chief elections officer for Walker County, must publish certain voter lists and election notices. Judge Allison argued on appeal, as he did in the circuit court, that he had the authority to determine in which newspaper of general circulation notices would be published and that he could also contract with that newspaper for the cost of publishing the notices. Farris argued Judge Allison did not follow established procedure by obtaining competitive bids for the pricing of such publishing. The Supreme Court As chief election officer for Walker County pursuant to statute, Judge Allison could contract to publish the notices he is required to publish. The Court reversed the circuit court's judgment insofar as it held otherwise. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including a determination of whether Judge Allison substantially complied with the competitive-bid law and, if so, whether Judge Allison's request for attorney fees was appropriate. View "State of Alabama ex rel. Allison, v. Farris" on Justia Law

The City of Birmingham sued "Bonedaddy's of Lee Branch" for failing to pay its business-license taxes, occupational taxes, interest, penalties and fees for multiple years since the business' formation in 2007. The City alleged that the defendants had failed and refused to submit business records and tax returns for the periods that were the subject of the complaint; that the defendants were currently engaged in business in the City of Birmingham in violation of the City's business-license code; and that notice of the final tax assessments had been mailed but that no payments had been forthcoming. The City asked the trial court to enter a preliminary injunction directing the defendants to refrain from further conducting business within the City and causing the sheriff to padlock the defendants' place of business in the City. The trial court ultimately granted the City's request, and Bonedaddy's was prohibited from further business until its back-taxes were paid. Cowan and Bonedaddy's argued on appeal that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a final judgment against defendant John Cowan in this case because, they say, the City did not comply with certain provisions of the Alabama Taxpayers' Bill of Rights and Uniform Revenue Procedures Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the City had issued a final sales-tax assessment against Bonedaddy's. The notice of final assessment, however, did not name Cowan individually as the taxpayer nor was the notice mailed to Cowan. Additionally, the City did not present any evidence at trial to indicate that it had ever issued a final sales-tax assessment against Cowan per se. Based on the evidence presented at trial, it did not appear that the City complied with the requirements of the TBOR with regard to Cowan. The Court reversed the trial court with respect to Cowan's responsibility to pay Bonedaddy's outstanding sale taxes, but affirmed with regard to the tax assessments against Bonedaddy's itself. View "Bonedaddy's of Lee Branch, LLC v. City of Birmingham" on Justia Law

Jason Tulley was convicted of carrying a pistol on premises not his own in violation of a Jacksonville city ordinance. The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine whether by charging him under Ordinance No. O-514-10, which incorporated by general reference section 13A-11-52 Ala. Code 1975, the City violated Tulley's due-process rights. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming Tulley's conviction. At the time of Tulley's alleged offense, 13A-11-52 was unconstitutional on its face, and the City's purported adoption of that offense as an offense against the City by general reference in Ordinance No. O-514-10 was a nullity. Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict Tulley. View "Ex parte Jason Dean Tulley." on Justia Law

Defendant Jimmy Walker petitioned for mandamus relief following the circuit court's denial of his motion for summary judgment. While plaintiff Jeremy Deason was was incarcerated, he participated in a Department of Corrections work-release program and was assigned to an inmate construction detail; Walker, who was employed as a "carpenter supervisor" with DOC's Correctional Industries Division, served as Deason's work-release supervisor. In 2010, Deason suffered an on-the-job injury when scaffolding he and Walker were dismantling collapsed. Before both Deason and Walker's ascent onto the scaffolding, Walker had performed a visual inspection of the scaffolding and the "mud plates," which prevent scaffolding from settling, in order to assess the stability of the scaffolding; according to Walker, the scaffolding appeared secure before Deason started ascending. As a result of his injuries, Deason sued, among other defendants, numerous DOC officials, including Walker, whom Deason sued only in his individual capacity. Specifically, as to Walker, Deason contended that Walker "started climbing the scaffold on the same side as [Deason] knowing that the scaffold was not set up properly for workers to climb the same side at the same time." The Supreme Court granted relief: "the record is devoid of any evidence indicating - and Deason does not establish - either that Walker violated any applicable DOC rule or regulation governing his conduct or that Walker was acting 'willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, [or] in bad faith' in the exercise of judgment in regard to the scaffolding when Deason was injured. Therefore, Walker has successfully demonstrated that he is entitled to State-agent immunity as to Deason's tort claims." View "Ex parte Jimmy Walker." on Justia Law

In 2011, 74-year-old Garnell Wilcoxon lived alone. He suffered a stroke, awoke on the floor of his bedroom covered in sweat, feeling sore and with no memory of how he got there. Wilcoxon was admitted to the Troy Regional Medical Center for analysis and treatment for approximately one year before he died. Following Wilcoxon's death, Brenda McFarland, one of Wilcoxon's daughters, filed a complaint as the personal representative for Wilcoxon's estate, asserting claims for : (1) medical malpractice; (2) negligence; (3) breach of contract; (4) negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention; and (5) loss of consortium. In its answer, Troy Health asserted, in part, that McFarland's claims were barred from being litigated in a court of law "by virtue of an arbitration agreement entered into between plaintiff and defendant." Troy Health then moved to compel arbitration, asserting that forms signed by one of Wilcoxon's other daughters, acting as his attorney-in-fact, contained a valid and enforceable arbitration clause. McFarland argued that "Wilcoxon did not have the mental capacity to enter into the contract with [Troy Health,] and he did not have the mental capacity to give legal authority to enter into contracts on his behalf with" relatives who initially helped admit him to Troy Health facilities when he first fell ill. According to McFarland, "[t]he medical records document that Wilcoxon was habitually and/or permanently incompetent." Therefore, McFarland argued, both a 2011 arbitration agreement and a 2012 arbitration agreement were invalid. The circuit court denied Troy Health's motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that McFarland failed to prove that Wilcoxon was mentally incompetent when he executed a 2012 durable power of attorney naming his other daughter as his attorney-in-fact, and also failed to demonstrate that Wilcoxon was "permanently incompetent" before that date, and because there was no other issue concerning the validity of the 2012 arbitration agreement. View "Troy Health and Rehabilitation Center v. McFarland" on Justia Law

In 1993, Michael Biddle was convicted in South Carolina of a lewd act upon a child, a violation of S.C. Code 16-15-140. He was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment; his sentence was suspended and he was ordered to serve 5 years on probation. Biddle moved to Alabama in January 2014. Under section 15-20A-10 of the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act ("ASORCNA"), Biddle's conviction required that he register as a sex offender, and subjected him to certain residency restrictions. On January 22, 2014, Biddle registered with the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department as a sex offender in compliance with ASORCNA. About a month later, Biddle filed a form averring that he was residing at an address in Jefferson County that was not within 2,000 feet of a school or a child-care facility. Biddle was ultimately indicted for two counts of violating the residency requirements of 15-20A-11. After a bench trial, Biddle was found not guilty on both counts. That same day and in the same proceeding, Biddle filed, in the criminal division of the Jefferson Circuit Court, a petition pursuant to 15-20A-23 that he may be relieved of the residency restrictions of the ASORCNA if he was "terminally ill or permanently immobile." Biddle alleged in his petition that he was terminally ill, that he needed a full-time caregiver, and that his sister lived in Vestavia Hills and would care for him if he resided with her. Biddle did not pay a filing fee to the circuit court for filing his petition, and he did not file the petition as a new civil case. The State filed an objection, challenging the circuit court's jurisdiction and asserting that Biddle's petition was incomplete because he had not paid a filing fee or sought in forma pauperis status. The circuit court granted Biddle's petition for relief, and the State filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court concluded the State had a clear legal right to the relief sought because the circuit court, sitting in a completed criminal case, lacked jurisdiction to relieve Biddle from the residency requirements of the ASORCNA in what should have been a civil proceeding. Biddle should have filed a "new" civil action in order to seek relief from the residency requirements of the ASORCNA. View "Alabama v. Biddle" on Justia Law