Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Alabama Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to address the State's request that it overrule "Ex parte J.A.P.," (853 So. 2d 280 (Ala. 2002)), the controlling precedent applied by the Court of Criminal Appeals in reversing Eric Higdon's conviction for first-degree sodomy by forcible compulsion. "In overruling 'Ex parte J.A.P.,' this Court returns to an approach more consonant with the statutory definition of forcible compulsion and the principles set forth in a 'Powe [v. Alabama, (597 So.2d 721 (Ala. 1991))]' in conducting a forcible-compulsion analysis when a defendant, regardless of his or her age, exercises a position of domination and control over a child." The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals was reversed, and this case remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte State of Alabama." on Justia Law

Appellants Branch Banking & Trust Company ("BB&T"), Rusty Winfree, and Todd Fullington appealed a circuit court judgment entered in favor of Rex Nichols ("Sonny") and Claudene Nichols on the Nicholses' claims against appellants and on BB&T's counterclaim against the Nicholses. In late 2005, Sonny began talking to Winfree about obtaining financing from Colonial Bank ("Colonial"), Winfree's employer, for the purchase of approximately 500 acres of real property in Stapleton, Alabama. The Nicholses intended to develop the Stapleton property into a subdivision. In February 2006, the Nicholses executed a loan agreement with Colonial, in which Colonial agreed to lend the Nicholses close to $2.8 million to purchase the property. Sonny testified that in late 2007, as the maturity date on the note approached, he began contacting Colonial regarding renewing the loan; he further testified that, around the same time, Winfree became slow to communicate with him. Sonny also testified that before the February 27, 2008, maturity date on the promissory note, he spoke to Fullington about renewing the loan, with Colonial carrying the interest going forward. A few weeks later, the Nicholses were notified that Colonial would not carry the interest on the loan or provide additional funds for development of the property. Colonial ultimately renewed the terms of the note until Colonial failed in August 2009. The FDIC assumed control of its assets and liabilities. The FDIC sold many of Colonial's assets and liabilities to BB&T, including the Nicholses' loan. Fullington was hired by BB&T; Winfree was not. In early November 2009, BB&T informed the Nicholses that it would not lend them additional funds to develop the property. The Nicholses stopped making interest payments on the loan in November 2009. On March 10, 2010, the Nicholses sued the appellants and fictitiously named defendants, alleging fraud, reformation, negligence, wantonness, and breach of fiduciary duty against all appellants. Against BB&T, the Nicholses also alleged a claim of unjust enrichment and sought damages on a theory of promissory estoppel. The appellants separately moved the circuit court to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. BB&T also filed a counterclaim, alleging that the Nicholses had defaulted on their obligations under a June 2009 promissory note and seeking damages related to that default. The circuit court denied the motions to dismiss the complaint but granted a motion to strike the request for a jury trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in entering a judgment in favor of the Nicholses on their claims against the appellants and on BB&T's counterclaim against them. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded with instructions to the circuit court to enter a judgment in favor of the appellants on the Nicholses' claims against them and in favor of BB&T on its counterclaim against the Nicholses and to determine the damages to be awarded on the counterclaim. View "Branch Banking & Trust Company v. Nichols" on Justia Law

In 2011, Wanchetta Reese, individually and as owner and beneficiary of the life-insurance policy issued on the life of her husband Lee Reese, filed a complaint in the Etowah Circuit Court against the defendants, Alfa Life Insurance Corporation, Josh Griffith and Judy Russell, two licensed Alfa insurance agents. Reese advised Defendants that she sought to obtain life insurance on her husband so that she would have funds available to bury him in the event of his death. Mr. Reese suffered from several chronic conditions, including kidney disease and diabetes. Reese contended that after being advised of Lee Reese's medical condition, Griffith stated to Reese that he needed to ask Russell for advice in completing the insurance application. In the presence of Reese, Griffith advised Russell Lee Reese's medical issues, and Russell advised Griffith, in the presence of Reese, to not put that information in the application. Lee Reese passed away unexpectedly on May 23, 2010. Mrs. Reese turned to defendants to make a claim for benefits, and Alfa denied it in a letter dated August 16, 2010. In her complaint, Mrs. Reese raised several claims including breach of contract, bad faith, fraud and the tort of outrage. Defendants moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted the motion with respect to the outrage claim, and denied as to Reese's other claims. The Supreme Court, after review, reversed the trial court's denial of defendants' motion as to the remaining claims: the undisputed evidence showed: (1) that Reese improperly relied on the agents' oral representations regarding the validity of the application without making any attempt to read the life-insurance policy application; (2) that Reese made no attempt to inquire into or to investigate any inconsistencies between the agents' oral representations and the language of the application; and (3) that no exception to the duty to read applied here. View "Alfa Life Insurance Corp. v. Reese" on Justia Law

Southeast Construction, L.L.C. ("SEC"), appealed a circuit court order that found WAR Construction, Inc., had provided SEC with certain releases as previously ordered by the circuit court and that SEC was accordingly now required to pay the outstanding $263,939 remaining on a $373,939 judgment previously entered on a February 16, 2011, arbitration award obtained by WAR against SEC, along with interest accruing from February 16, 2011. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed that judgment to the extent it held that WAR provided all required releases and that SEC was obligated to fulfill the judgment entered on the arbitration award. However, the Court reversed the judgment inasmuch as it held that SEC is required to pay interest on the award as calculated from February 16, 2011. On remand, the circuit court was instructed to calculate interest on the principal at the rate set forth in the arbitration award accruing from September 8, 2014. View "Southeast Construction L.L.C. v. WAR Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Gladys Tellis, Sherry Bronson, Gwendolyn Moody, Nadine Ivy, and Uneeda Trammell (collectively, "the policyholders") initiated separate actions against American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida, asserting generally that American Bankers had sold them homeowner's insurance policies providing a level of coverage they could never receive, even in the event of a total loss involving the covered property. American Bankers moved the trial court hearing each action to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration provisions it alleged were part of the subject policies; however, the trial courts denied those motions, and American Bankers appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the five appeals for the purpose of writing one opinion, and reversed those orders denying the motions to compel arbitration. The Court based its decision on its holdings that the policyholders manifested their assent to the arbitration provision in their policies by continuing to renew the policies, that the sale of the policies affected interstate commerce, and that the arbitration provision in the policies was not unconscionable. View "American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Tellis" on Justia Law

In August 2011, Teddy Knox was driving along Interstate 59 in Fort Payne. Officer Matt Wilson of the Fort Payne Police Department stopped Knox's vehicle for improper lane use. During the stop, Officer Wilson became suspicious that Knox might be transporting drugs, and he requested backup from Officer Tony Blackwell, who was a member of the county drug task force and who had his drug-detection dog with him. Lt. Randy Garrison, another member of the drug task force, was also en route to the scene. Officer Wilson eventually issued a warning citation to Knox and told him that he was free to go, but he continued to question Knox about his travel plans. Lt. Garrison and Officer Blackwell arrived at some point during the questioning of Knox. After Officer Blackwell arrived with his dog, Officer Wilson asked Knox if he would consent to a search of his vehicle. Knox refused to consent, and Officer Blackwell then deployed his dog to perform a free-air sniff. The dog "indicated" for the odor of marijuana, and the police eventually searched the vehicle and discovered marijuana. The police seized in excess of 2.2 pounds of marijuana and arrested Knox for trafficking in marijuana, unlawful possession of marijuana, and first-degree unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. Knox filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the marijuana seized during the traffic stop. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court entered a written order granting the motion to suppress. The State appealed; the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment on a ground not raised in the circuit court: that Knox was no longer being detained at the time the search was executed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, surmising that it was likely that the State's failure to raise the absence-of-detention argument before the circuit court may have deprived Knox of an opportunity to present evidence in opposition to that theory. "The primary focus of the suppression hearing was the existence of reasonable suspicion, which was based largely on the police officers' observations. Had the State raised the absence-of-detention argument in the circuit court, it is possible that Knox might have chosen to present evidence as to (1) whether he felt free to leave the scene after he was given his warning citation and (2) whether there was a showing of authority sufficient to constitute a detention. By failing to raise this new issue at trial, the State deprived Knox of an opportunity to present evidence and to make arguments. The State's failure to raise the issue also deprived the circuit court of the opportunity to make factual findings and credibility determinations on this issue." View "Ex parte Knox." on Justia Law

Alfa Mutual General Insurance Company ("Alfa") petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to grant its motion seeking to realign the parties to the underlying litigation so that Alfa may "opt out" of participation in the trial. In October 2012, respondent Mark Trotter was injured when a "road sweeper" he was operating was struck by a vehicle being operated by Daniel Elijah Davis, an uninsured motorist. In October 2014, Trotter sued Alfa seeking to recover uninsured/underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits pursuant to a policy of insurance issued by Alfa to Trotter, which was in place at the time of the 2012 accident. Trotter did not include Davis as a codefendant in his action against Alfa. Alfa subsequently filed a third-party complaint adding Davis as a third-party defendant. Specifically, Alfa's third-party complaint alleged that, to the extent it was determined to be liable to Trotter for UIM benefits, then Alfa was subrogated to and entitled to recover the amount of that liability from Davis. Thereafter, Alfa filed a "Motion to Realign Parties" in which it asked to "opt out" of the litigation. Without explaining the findings on which its decision was based, the trial court denied Alfa's motion. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded after a review of the record, that Alfa has demonstrated a clear legal right to have its motion to realign the parties granted and to allow it to opt out of the underlying litigation. No authority is cited requiring that, in order to make the permitted election, Alfa must first release the right of subrogation to which it was also clearly entitled. View "Ex parte Alfa Mutual General Insurance Company." on Justia Law

Inmate Charleton Thomas petitioned for postconviction relief, which the circuit court summarily dismissed. The Court of Criminal Appeals, by unpublished memorandum, affirmed the summary dismissal of Thomas's petition, concluding that Thomas's Rule 32 petition was untimely because, at the time he filed his Rule 32 petition, Thomas had not paid the filing fee or filed a request to proceed in forma pauperis. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the evidence in the record created a question of material fact as to whether Thomas's in forma pauperis declaration was filed with his Rule 32 petition, so as to render the Rule 32 petition timely. View "Ex parte Thomas." on Justia Law

The plaintiff in the underlying case, Brian Barze, sought a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to set aside an order sealing a motion to stay filed by one of the defendants, James Holbrook. Barze filed suit against Sterne Agee Group, Inc., and Holbrook, the then CEO of Sterne Agee. Barze included claims of promissory fraud and fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, conversion, and defamation. In his complaint, Barze alleged that, in spring 2009, Sterne Agee had approached him about leaving his old company and becoming the chief financial officer ("CFO") of Sterne Agee and that Holbrook had told him that, if he joined Sterne Agee, Sterne Agee would pay him severance pay of at least one year's salary and bonus if the job with Sterne Agee did not work out. Barze alleged that he relied on Holbrook's promises and representations when he agreed to accept the job at Sterne Agee and when he left his former employer and gave up his opportunities there. Barze asserted that, after he started working with Sterne Agee, he was presented with an employment agreement to sign; that Holbrook assured him that the employment agreement was signed by all employees; that Holbrook assured him that Holbrook could and would take care of Barze and honor their oral agreement regarding the severance pay of at least one year's salary and bonus; and that Holbrook told Barze that he was committed to Barze as the long-term CFO of Sterne Agee. Barze asserted that, in reliance on Holbrook's assertions, he signed the employment agreement. Upon review of the dispute, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not comply with the controlling case law procedure set forth in "Holland v. Eads" (614 So.2d 1012 (Ala. 1993)), it exceeded its discretion when it granted Holbrook's motion and directed the circuit clerk to seal Holbrook's motion to stay the underlying civil action. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted the petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its July 23, 2014, order granting Holbrook's motion for leave to file his motion to stay under seal and sealing Holbrook's motion to stay. View "Ex parte Barze." on Justia Law

The father Andrew Duerr and mother Anne Marie Duerr were married in 1989, and had four children. The parties divorced in 2003. In October 2011, the father filed a petition to terminate alimony and to modify child support and visitation. In April 2013, the mother filed an answer and a counterclaim in which she sought postminority educational support for N.D., a child of the marriage, who was attending the Cleveland Institute of Music. After conducting a hearing, the trial court, among other things, ordered the father to pay up to $12,000 per semester in postminority support for N.D.'s tuition. The father appealed, arguing the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals affirming the trial court's order awarding postminority educational support for N.D. conflicted with "Ex parte Christopher," (145 So. 3d 60 (Ala. 2013)). After review, the Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Duerr." on Justia Law