Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

B.O.S. ("husband") and E.S. ("wife") began living together in 2005. They had one child together, a daughter, B.T.S., born in 2006. The couple married in 2007. The husband, the wife, and the child lived in a residence next door to the residence of the child's paternal grandfather, O.S. and his wife, J.A.S. The grandparents spent considerable time with the child and that the child often visited overnight with the grandparents. At some point in 2005 (during the wife's pregnancy) and again on at least one occasion in 2007, the grandfather proposed to "adopt" the child, stating to the wife that "nothing would ever change [and] that [the wife] would always be [the child's] mother." In August 2007, the husband and the wife agreed to the grandfather's proposal for a "paper adoption" of the child. In January 2010, the husband and the wife separated. The wife took the child, and the wife and the child began residing with the wife's parents. The husband filed a divorce complaint against the wife, requesting that the child be removed from the physical custody of the wife and returned to "the adoptive parents, i.e., the grandparents, immediately." The grandparents moved to intervene in the divorce action, asserting that they were the child's adoptive parents and seeking immediate pendente lite physical custody of the child. On February 4, 2010, the trial court entered an order allowing the grandparents to intervene in the action, granting their request for pendente lite physical custody of the child, and directing the wife to return the child to the grandparents. In this case, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals insofar as it directed the trial court to dismiss the wife's action against the grandparents for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court directed the Court of Civil Appeals to enter a judgment remanding the case to the trial court and directing the trial court to transfer the wife's action to the probate court. View "Ex parte E.S." on Justia Law

Defendants Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc. and Robert Shackelford, appealed the Circuit Court's order denying, in part, their motion to compel arbitration of the claims asserted against them by the plaintiffs Paul and Eleanor Jones. Specifically, defendants challenged the circuit court's refusal to compel arbitration of the plaintiffs' tort-of-outrage claim. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: the nonsignatory plaintiffs conceded that they were third-party beneficiaries of the agreement at issue here. The scope of the arbitration provision in the agreement was "indisputably" broad enough to encompass the plaintiffs' tort-of-outrage claim. Moreover, as the defendants noted, "[t]he events surrounding the change of beneficiary [on the Ameriprise accounts] form the basis for all of the [plaintiffs’] claims." Under this reasoning, the plaintiffs' tort-of-outrage claim is, like their other claims, subject to the arbitration provision in the agreement. The circuit court, therefore, improperly denied the defendants' motion seeking to compel arbitration of all of the plaintiffs' claims. View "Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc. v. Jones" on Justia Law

Petitioners R.J.J., W.L.C., and W.F. were convicted of hunting after dark, hunting from a public road, and hunting with the aid of an automobile. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed their convictions by an unpublished memorandum. The petitioners challenged the sufficiency of the State's evidence, arguing: (1) the State produced no evidence indicating that the petitioners had in their possession an artificial light suitable for night hunting and that the State produced tenuous evidence indicating that the petitioners were in an area frequented by protected wildlife; (2) the State's circumstantial evidence failed to link the petitioners to the shots allegedly fired and that evidence of two shots fired could not support three hunting convictions; and (3) the State failed to prove that the petitioners had the intent to hunt. The Supreme Court reversed petitioners' convictions and instructed the trial court to enter a judgment acquitting petitioners of all charges. View "Ex parte W. F., W.L.C., and R. J. J." on Justia Law

Riverstone Development Co., Inc. sued Garrett & Associates Appraisals, Inc. ("G&A Appraisals"), asserting negligence, wantonness, and conspiracy claims stemming from a July 2010 appraisal G&A Appraisals conducted on waterfront property Riverstone Development owned on Lake Guntersville. During the course of the eventual trial on those claims, the trial court entered a judgment as a matter of law in favor of G&A Appraisals on the negligence claim, and, at the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of G&A Appraisals on the wantonness and conspiracy claims. Riverstone Development appealed, arguing that the judgment as a matter of law was improperly entered on the negligence claim and that it is entitled to a new trial based on juror misconduct. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Riverstone Development Co., Inc. v. Garrett & Associates Appraisals, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Evangeline and Eladio Limon appealed the trial court's dismissal of their claims against defendants William Ellis Ogburn, Sr. ("Bill"), Sandra Sandlin, and William Ogburn ("Will"). The plaintiffs' daughter was, at all times pertinent to this case, a minor romantically involved with Will, who was also then a minor and who is Bill and Sandra's son. It was alleged that during the course of their relationship, plaintiffs' daughter became pregnant by Will and purportedly concealed from plaintiffs. In December 2011, defendants sought plaintiffs' permission to take the daughter on a trip to New York, under the guise of going to see Broadway shows and to meet some of Will's family. But, according to plaintiffs, the true purpose for the trip was for the daughter to obtain an abortion in New York (which had not enacted a parental-notification law applicable to minors seeking an abortion). The daughter had the abortion, and concealed that fact from plaintiffs. Plaintiffs ultimately found out about the nature of the New York trip. They sued defendants in 2014, alleging negligence, outrage, fraud and "interference with parental rights." The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' claims (except the fraud claim) as untimely. The trial court dismissed the fraud claim as lacking in specificity as required by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that dismissal of plaintiffs' claims on statute-of-limitations grounds was error. The Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Limon v. Sandlin" on Justia Law

Kelly Horwitz and Cason Kirby were both candidates in the August 27, 2013, election for District 4 of the Tuscaloosa Board of Education. Kirby was certified as the winner of the election. The certified vote totals were 416 votes for Kirby and 329 votes for Horwitz. Horwitz contested the results. The trial court entered a "Final Order Denying Contest" in which, among other things, it concluded that the affidavits established that no more than 70 illegal votes had been cast in the election. On November 24, 2013, Horwitz filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court's judgment; that motion was denied by operation of law on February 24, 2014. Horwitz appealed the trial court's order denying her election contest. Based on the applicable law and facts, the Supreme Court concluded that "Phase I" of the election contest yielded a total of 159 ballots that should have been rejected. The judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded back to the trial court for the conduct by the trial court of Phase II of the contest. View "Horwitz v. Kirby" on Justia Law

On November 12, 2009, M.C. had an appointment to for physical therapy at Tallassee Rehabilitation, P.C. She was referred to Tallahassee Rehab by her physician for treatment of back pain. M.C. was seen by Kristopher Vanderwall, a physical therapist, whom she had never met. Vanderwall took her to a room, where he instructed her to put on a gown. M.C. took off her jacket and shirt and put on a gown. She did not take off her underwear or pants. Vanderwall returned to the room, unhooked M.C.'s bra and told her to lie on the table in the room; M.C. did as she was instructed, but, after she was on the table, Vanderwall started to move his hands over her body, removing her bra and the gown. Vanderwall then began to rub M.C.'s breasts, and he removed M.C.'s pants and panties and placed his fingers into her buttocks and genitals. Vanderwall testified that "any and all transactions and interactions" he had with M.C. were "in connection with the rendition of physical therapy services." M.C. filed a complaint against Vanderwall and Tallassee Rehab in which she sought money damages based on a claim of assault and battery against Vanderwall and a claim of negligent or wanton hiring against Tallassee Rehab. Vanderwall resisted certain discovery requests M.C. made in the course of litigation, and she moved for partial summary judgment and to compel discovery. The trial court granted these motions, and Vanderwall appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, dismissed Vanderwall's appeal and denied his petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Ex parte Kristopher Vanderwall." on Justia Law

In 2009, Christopher Dalton pled guilty to two counts of attempted murder, one count of breaking and entering an automobile, and one count of misdemeanor theft. Dalton was sentenced to 2 terms of 30 years' imprisonment for his attempted-murder convictions, a 5-year prison sentence for his unlawful-breaking-and-entering conviction, and a 1-year prison sentence for his theft-of-property conviction. The sentences were to run concurrently. In November 2009, Dalton filed his first Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition, alleging that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he erroneously told Dalton that, on the 30-year sentence for attempted murder, he would be eligible for parole in 6 years. The Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately affirmed the trial court, finding that Dalton's counsel did not promise parole or that he would be eligible for parole in six years. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals, "a promise of parole and a representation as to when a defendant will be eligible for parole are two different things." The case was remanded for the circuit court to determine whether Dalton's trial counsel misrepresented his eligibility for parole. View "Ex parte Christopher Eric Dalton." on Justia Law

Frank Kruse, administrator ad litem for the estate of Dansby W. Sanders, appealed the grant of summary judgment entered by the Mobile Circuit Court in favor of R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc., now known as Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC ("Vanderbilt"), in a wrongful-death action. Dansby was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2009; he sued numerous defendants in 2010, alleging that he had been exposed to asbestos through products manufactured and distributed by those defendants during the 37-year period he worked for Mobile Paint Company. Dansby filed an amended complaint naming Vanderbilt as a defendant because of its role as a supplier of industrial talc under the brand name "Nytal." After a thorough review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of Vanderbilt. "The trial court entered its judgment on a basis not contemplated by its own scheduling order and, in fact, not presented in the motion for a summary judgment filed in keeping with that order (and, in any event, Sanders subsequently presented substantial evidence contradicting that basis for the summary judgment)." Furthermore, the Court found that Sanders presented substantial evidence that Dansby was exposed to Nytal talc supplied by Vanderbilt during his employment at Mobile Paint, thus demonstrating a genuine issue of fact as to the issue actually raised in the motion for a summary judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Kruse v. Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC" on Justia Law

This case involved Barbara Johnson's claim against the City of Mobile in which she alleged retaliation based on several complaints and lawsuits she filed against the City under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("the ADA"). Johnson, an African-American woman over 40 years of age, began working for the City in 1996. Johnson previously filed several complaints and lawsuits against the City pertaining to her employment with the City. In 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2012, Johnson filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("the EEOC") complaints against the City alleging various forms of discrimination. Johnson also unsuccessfully sued the City in 2007, 2008, and 2010. Johnson filed the underlying action in 2013, alleging that, in violation of Title VII and the ADA, the City retaliated against Johnson because she had filed discrimination charges against the City with the EEOC. Johnson's deposition testimony indicated that in 2008 or 2009 Johnson had surgery to correct a problem with her toe. As a result of her surgery, Johnson was "taken off of work" for what "could have been a month." Johnson's time off work to recover from her injury was preapproved by the City, and she was paid for her time off. Once Johnson returned to work, she had to wear a boot to protect her toe, and her doctor "wanted [her] on light duty." Johnson's supervisor, Terrell Washington, informed Johnson that there was no light duty available at that time so Johnson remained at home on paid leave. Once Johnson returned to work, Johnson was ordered by her physician to wear a certain kind of shoe that did not comply with the City's dress code: the City required Johnson to wear black shoes, but her physician-prescribed shoes were white. Johnson subsequently received an unsatisfactory-annual performance rating from Washington for the period ending June 8, 2010. Thereafter, Johnson used the MCPB's appellate process for review of her unsatisfactory-performance rating. Ultimately, the MCPB affirmed Johnson's rating. Johnson received a "Letter of Determination" concerning the complaint she filed against the City from the EEOC. The Department of Justice did not elect to sue on Johnson's behalf, but advised that she was free to file suit on her own. The underlying matter in this appeal is the suit Johnson filed with regard to her EEOC complaint. The matter ended with judgment entered in favor of the City. After review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment on the merits and its denial of Johnson's post-judgment motions. The Court also affirmed the trial court's decision to award the City attorney fees. However, the Court reversed the judgment insofar as it set the amount of the fees, and remanded the case for recalculation of fees with reasons supporting the recalculation. View "Johnson v. City of Mobile" on Justia Law