Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Alabama Corrections Institution Finance Authority ("ACIFA") and its ex officio vice president Kim Thomas appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding $5 million in compensatory damages to Albert Wilson, Donald Simmons, Rufus Barnes, Bryan Gavins, Joseph Danzey, and a class of current and former nonexempt correctional officers employed by the Alabama Department of Corrections ("ADOC"). The correctional officers sued ADOC and its commissioner alleging ADOC was violating its own regulations and state law in the manner in which it: (1) compensated correctional officers for overtime; (2) restricted the way correctional officers were allowed to use earned leave; and (3) paid correctional officers the daily subsistence allowance provided by law. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment in favor of the correctional officers, finding that there was a lack of substantial evidence in support of the officers' claims against ACIFA and against Thomas as ex officio vice president of ACIFA. As such, defendants were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. View "Alabama Corrections Institution Finance Authority v. Wilson et al." on Justia Law

Michael Howard appealed the grant of summary judgment entered against him in the action he commenced on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated taxpayers in Cullman County against Cullman County and its Revenue Commissioner Barry Willingham, in his official capacity. Howard sought a refund of property taxes he and other taxpayers paid in 2013. Howard sought a judgment declaring that, pursuant to former section 40-7-42, the Commission's levy of property taxes for October 1, 2012, through September 30, 2013, was invalid because it was done in May 2013 rather than at the Commission's first regular meeting in February 2013. He also sought the return of property taxes collected in 2013. The Supreme Court found that the trial court correctly concluded that the Commission's failure to follow the timing provision of former 40-7-42 did not invalidate its subsequent levy in 2013 of property taxes upon Howard and other property owners in Cullman County. Therefore, the Court affirmed summary judgment on all of Howard's claims in favor of Cullman County and the revenue commissioner. View "Howard v. Cullman County" on Justia Law

These appeals before the Supreme Court were the result of a family dispute that occurred following the death of Mr. B.J. Kirkley in 2011, concerning his will and his interest in Kirkley LLC.Karen Ann Kribel Kirkley, individually and as personal representative of the estate of B.J. Kirkley; Holly Muncie; and J. Alexander Muncie III ("Alex"), as trustee of the Karen Ann Kribel Kirkley Testamentary Trust appealed a circuit court's "order regarding granting of new trial" in favor of Donna Jo Kirkley Phillips and Kirkley, LLC (appeal no. 1130812). Donna Jo and Kirkley LLC cross-appealed the same order, but also filed a motion to dismiss the appeal filed by the estate plaintiffs on the basis that the order was not a final order and that the monetary judgment in the case has been satisfied (appeal no. 1130850). The Supreme Court agreed that the circuit court's order was not final, so the appeals were dismissed. View "Kirkley v. Phillips" on Justia Law

U.S. Bank National Association ("USB"), successor in interest to Bank of America, N.A., which was the successor by merger to LaSalle Bank, National Association, as trustee for Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-4 ("the Trust"), and Bank of America, N.A. ("BOA"), separately appealed a $3.9 million judgment entered against them on trespass and wantonness claims asserted by Chester and Emily Shepherd. USB also appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of the Shepherds on its claims related to an alleged error in a mortgage executed by the Shepherds upon which the Trust had foreclosed. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed. "'Every single one of these cases . . . rejects the availability of negligence and wantonness claims under Alabama law under comparable circumstances to those identified by the [plaintiffs]. Every one of these cases undercuts the legal viability of [the plaintiffs' negligence and wantonness claims], and rejects the very arguments articulated by the [plaintiffs] in opposing dismissal of those causes of action. ... the mortgage servicing obligations at issue here are a creature of contract, not of tort, and stem from the underlying mortgage and promissory note executed by the parties, rather than a duty of reasonable care generally owed to the public. To the extent that the [plaintiffs] seek to hold defendants liable on theories of negligent or wanton servicing of their mortgage, [those negligence and wantonness claims] fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted.'" View "U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Shepherd" on Justia Law

Dr. Thomas A. Staner, a board-certified neurosurgeon and neurologist, performed a lumbar laminectomy on Wilfred Borden at Brookwood Medical Center. Two days later, he complained of excruciating pain in his lower back and legs. He was taken to the emergency room. A hematoma was discovered and causing compression of the cauda equina. As a result of the damage caused by the hematoma, Wilfred was permanently disabled and unable to work, suffered from constant pain, had problems walking, and suffered from incontinence of bladder and bowel and from impotence. Wilfred and Pam sued Dr. Staner, Alabama Neurosurgeons, P.C., Dr. Staner's practice, and Brookwood in the Jefferson Circuit Court. Wilfred asserted a claim under the Alabama Medical Liability Act against the defendants, and Pam asserted a claim based on loss of consortium. Brookwood filed a motion for a summary judgment. The trial court entered an order granting Brookwood's summary-judgment motion as to any claim alleging a duty and breach of the standard of care on the part of Brookwood's ER department. However, it denied the motion for a summary judgment as to the Bordens' claims against Brookwood based an alleged breach of the standard of care by Brookwood's medical/surgical nurses. At the close of the Bordens' evidence, Brookwood moved for a judgment as a matter of law. The trial court granted the motion as to the issue of future medical expenses but denied it as to the Bordens' remaining claims. Brookwood renewed its motion for a judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence, and the trial court denied that motion. After deliberating for approximately six hours, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Wilfred as to his medical malpractice claim and fixed damages at $5 million. It also found in favor of Pam as to her loss-of-consortium claim and fixed damages at $2.5 million. The trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict. Brookwood appealed. In this case, the Bordens did not present expert testimony to establish a breach of the applicable standard of care. Therefore, Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred when it denied Brookwood's motions for a judgment as a matter of law as to Wilfred's medical-malpractice claim. The case was remanded for the trial court to render judgment as a matter of law in favor of Brookwood. View "Brookwood Medical Center v. Borden" on Justia Law

Anita Marion sued Noland Hospital Birmingham, LLC, and Noland Health Services, Inc. (collectively, "Noland"), Walter R. Ross, Jr., M.D., and Bernis Simmons, M.D., seeking damages resulting from the death of her husband, Arthur Marion. In 2009, Arthur underwent a kidney-stone removal procedure. Dr. Taylor Bragg performed the procedure, and Simmons was the anesthesiologist. During the procedure, Arthur suffered a heart attack. Arthur was revived, but the heart attack caused him to suffer hypoxic encephalopathy, which left him in a non-responsive state. Arthur was transferred to Noland Hospital Birmingham and was admitted by Ross. Arthur remained at Noland Hospital until he was transferred back to the hospital that originally treated him to receive dialysis for renal failure. Arthur passed away shortly transfer. The essence of Anita's claim against Simmons was that he breached the applicable standard of care by failing to position Arthur properly during his kidney-stone-removal procedure, and that breach caused Arthur's blood to be unable to circulate properly, which in turn caused Arthur's heart attack and hypoxic encephalopathy. As to Ross, Anita claimed that he breached the applicable standard of care by prescribing Rocephin, an antibiotic, to treat an infection Arthur was developing. Arthur had a documented allergy to Ancef, which, like Rocephin, was a cephalosporin. Anita alleged that Ross failed to note Arthur's allergy, and that, if Dr. Ross had noted the allergy, he would not have prescribed a cephalosporin to treat Arthur's infection. As to Noland, Anita alleged the hospital breached the applicable standard of care by failing to train its nurses to check for contraindications to medications. On October 3, 2014, the third day of jury deliberations, Ross, Simmons, and Noland moved for a mistrial, arguing that the trial court (specifically, the court clerk) answered questions from the jury outside the presence of counsel. The court denied the motion. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Simmons but against Ross and against Noland. Noland and Ross each filed a postjudgment motion for a judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, for a new trial, or to alter or amend the judgment. In those motions, Noland and Ross argued again that they were entitled to a new trial because of the trial court's communications with the jury. The trial court denied the motions. Ross, Noland and Anita appealed, Anita explicitly stating in her notice of appeal that she was not challenging the jury's verdict as to Simmons; only that, if the Supreme Court reversed the judgments in her favor against Ross and Noland and remanded the case for a new trial, her claim against Simmons be reinstated too. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Anita made no attempt to address Ross's and Noland's allegations that the trial court instructed the jury as to the burden of proof outside the presence of the parties and counsel. Because the Court reversed as to Ross and Noland, the Court considered Anita's claim against Simmons, and declined her request. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Ross v. Marion" on Justia Law

This case first went before the Alabama Supreme Court in "Ex parte Riverfront, LLC," (129 So. 3d 1008 (Ala. 2013)("Riverfront I")). In Riverfront I, Riverfront and Fish Market Restaurants, Inc. had entered into a lease for real property located in Gadsden. The lease contained a forum-selection clause naming Tuscaloosa County as the venue in which any litigation concerning the lease was to be brought. In determining that the forum-selection clause was enforceable, the Supreme Court held that Tuscaloosa County was not a "seriously inconvenient" forum. The Etowah Circuit Court transferred the action to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. Shortly thereafter, Fish Market filed a motion to transfer the action, then pending in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, back to the Etowah Circuit Court, citing section 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code 1975, that Tuscaloosa County "would be a seriously inconvenient forum." Riverfront responded, arguing that "[t]he issue stated in [Fish Market's] Motion to Transfer has previously been litigated between the parties, and adjudicated in [Riverfront's] favor by the Alabama Supreme Court." The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court held a hearing on Fish Market's motion and granted it. Riverfront then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court to vacate its order transferring the case back to the Etowah Circuit Court. The Supreme Court found, after review, that Fish Market could have challenged Tuscaloosa County as a "seriously inconvenient" forum in the Etowah Circuit Court and before the Supreme Court in Riverfront I. "Fish Market did not do so and may not now have a second bite at the forum apple and relitigate that issue. The matter has been decided." The Supreme Court granted Riverfront's petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Riverfront, LLC." on Justia Law

Michael Kelley petitioned for certiorari review of a Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to affirm the trial court's judgment sentencing Kelley to death for his convictions for two counts of capital murder, and for sentencing him to life for his conviction on one count of sexual torture. The Alabama Supreme Court granted Kelley's petition solely to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review Kelley's sexual-torture conviction. After that review, the Court reversed in part and remand. Kelley alleged that the Court of Criminal Appeals lacked jurisdiction to affirm his sexual-torture conviction because, he argues, his sexual-torture conviction was not ripe for appeal, and on this ground, the Supreme Court agreed. View "Ex parte Michael Brandon Kelley." on Justia Law

Mid-Continent Casualty Company appealed a circuit court judgment declaring that it had a duty to defend its named insured, Advantage Medical Electronics, LLC, in a pending legal action against Advantage. This case centered on Mid-Continent's duty to defend Advantage in a South Carolina litigation. Based upon both the allegations in the complaint and the undisputed facts, the Circuit Court concluded that the policy exclusions did not allow Mid-Continent to evade its obligation to provide a defense under the CGL policy it had issued to Advantage, and it entered a final judgment in favor of Advantage. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mid-Continent Casualty Company v. Advantage Medical Electronics, LLC" on Justia Law

B.O.S. ("husband") and E.S. ("wife") began living together in 2005. They had one child together, a daughter, B.T.S., born in 2006. The couple married in 2007. The husband, the wife, and the child lived in a residence next door to the residence of the child's paternal grandfather, O.S. and his wife, J.A.S. The grandparents spent considerable time with the child and that the child often visited overnight with the grandparents. At some point in 2005 (during the wife's pregnancy) and again on at least one occasion in 2007, the grandfather proposed to "adopt" the child, stating to the wife that "nothing would ever change [and] that [the wife] would always be [the child's] mother." In August 2007, the husband and the wife agreed to the grandfather's proposal for a "paper adoption" of the child. In January 2010, the husband and the wife separated. The wife took the child, and the wife and the child began residing with the wife's parents. The husband filed a divorce complaint against the wife, requesting that the child be removed from the physical custody of the wife and returned to "the adoptive parents, i.e., the grandparents, immediately." The grandparents moved to intervene in the divorce action, asserting that they were the child's adoptive parents and seeking immediate pendente lite physical custody of the child. On February 4, 2010, the trial court entered an order allowing the grandparents to intervene in the action, granting their request for pendente lite physical custody of the child, and directing the wife to return the child to the grandparents. In this case, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals insofar as it directed the trial court to dismiss the wife's action against the grandparents for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court directed the Court of Civil Appeals to enter a judgment remanding the case to the trial court and directing the trial court to transfer the wife's action to the probate court. View "Ex parte E.S." on Justia Law