Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In November 2010, Rodney Williams and Elmer Fleming were employed at KW Plastics Recycling Division, LLP (KWPRD). Williams was employed as a supervisor in the shipping department, and Elmer was training to become a shipping supervisor. KWPRD shipped recycled-resin pellets in tanker-trailers hauled by semi-tractors. Williams was killed and Fleming suffered permanent traumatic brain injury when the two men were run over by the tanker-trailer. Fleming, by and through his wife and guardian, and Williams’ family, appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Sanders Lead Company, Inc., Roy Baggett, and Donnie Glover on the plaintiffs' claims alleging that they "affirmatively undertook [a duty] to inspect for, identify and provide remedies to correct jobsite safety hazards" on KWPRD’s premises, and that the defendants negligently and wantonly performed the undertaken duty to inspect. After review, the Supreme Court found that defendants' summary-judgment motion failed to challenge the existence of evidence establishing the element of proximate causation as to the wrongful-inspection claims and, therefore, did not support the summary judgment, which was expressly grounded on the lack of evidence establishing the element of proximate causation as to the plaintiffs' wrongful-inspection claims. The Court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiffs' wrongful-inspection claims in these consolidated appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fleming v. Sanders Lead Company, Inc." on Justia Law

In appeal no. 1140870, Southern Cleaning Service, Inc. ("SCSI"), appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Essex Insurance Company and Genesee General Agency, Inc. on SCSI's claims stemming from Essex's refusal to provide SCSI coverage under a commercial general-liability policy ("the Essex policy") based on the alleged failure to timely notify Essex of the facts leading to the claim for coverage. In appeal no. 1140918, the insurance defendants cross-appeal the trial court's denial of their requests for costs. In August 2006, Winn-Dixie Montgomery, LLC ("Winn-Dixie"), entered into a contract with SCSI that obligated SCSI to provide floor-care and general janitorial services to multiple Winn-Dixie grocery stores in central Alabama. In 2011, a store customer allegedly slipped and fell on a wet floor, and sued. Winn-Dixie sought indemnification from SCSI. SCSI sought indemnification from Phase II, one of its cleaning subcontractors. Phase II, SCSI, and Winn-Dixie again asked Essex to provide them with a defense and indemnity under the terms of the Essex policy; however, their requests were denied. With regard to appeal no. 1140870, the Supreme Court concluded that the summary judgment entered in favor of the insurance defendants should have been reversed because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to who among the insurance defendants acted under the doctrine of apparent authority to settle the Winn Dixie customer's slip and fall claim. The Court pretermitted all discussion of the other grounds for reversal SCSI offered. Because the insurance defendants would have been entitled to the costs they seek in appeal no. 1140918 only if there was a final judgment in their favor, that appeal was dismissed as moot. View "Essex Insurance Co. v. Southern Cleaning Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Norman Ussery appealed a circuit court order dismissing his action in a will contest against Alan Terry ("Alan"), as executor of the estate of Donald R. Terry ("Donald"). Ussery argued that the circuit court's dismissal of his complaint conflicted with "Hons v. A. Bertolla & Sons," (537 So.2d 456 (Ala. 1988)), a case in which the Alabama Supreme Court interpreted the application of sections 43-8-199 and -200, Ala. Code 1975, included in the will-contest provisions of the Code. Alan argued in response: (1) that Ussery appealed as to only one of two grounds that Alan said were the circuit court's bases for dismissal; (2) that the circuit court ruled that joinder of indispensable parties was not possible and that Ussery failed to appeal that ruling; (3) that the circuit court correctly dismissed the will contest pursuant to the joinder requirements under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure; and (4) that "Hons" should have been overruled to the extent that it held that absent parties could be joined beyond the six-month period prescribed by 43-8-199. The Supreme Court disagreed with Alan's contentions on appeal, and reversed the circuit court. "After Ussery filed his complaint, the circuit court first should have determined whether it was a proper complaint under the provisions of 43-8-199. Then, if it was determined that the complaint met the statutory requirements, the circuit court, upon appropriate motion, should have joined 'interested parties' who were absent." View "Ussery v. Terry" on Justia Law

Hoover General Contractors – Homewood, Inc. ("HGCH"), appealed a circuit court order denying its motion to compel arbitration of its dispute with Gary Key regarding work performed by HGCH on Key's house in Jasper after that house was damaged by a fire. Six months after Key sued HGCH asserting claims stemming from HGCH's work rebuilding Key's house after a fire, HGCH moved the trial court to compel Key to arbitrate those claims pursuant to an arbitration clause in the contract Key had entered into with HGCH. The trial court denied HGCH's motion to compel; however, that denial was error because Key failed to establish through substantial evidence that HGCH had waived its right to arbitration by substantially invoking the litigation process. Accordingly, the order entered by the trial court denying HGCH's motion to compel arbitration was reversed by the Supreme Court and the case remanded for the trial court to enter a new order compelling Key to arbitrate his claims ursuant to the terms of his contract with HGCH. View "Hoover General Contractors - Homewood, Inc. v. Key" on Justia Law

In 2006, plaintiff Robert Kyle Morris, a licensed insurance agent, was working for his father's independent insurance agency, the Morris Insurance Agency ("Morris Insurance"). At some point, Morris contacted one of the Farmers entities about becoming a Farmers agent. Morris testified that he initially became interested in working as a Farmers agent because Farmers had a policy whereby a Farmers agent could place insurance with a different company if a customer was not eligible for insurance issued by Farmers or if Farmers refused to underwrite a policy for the customer. He further testified that he had not been looking to disaffiliate himself from his father's insurance agency and that he had told a Farmers recruiter that he did not want to cut off the working relationship he had with his father. Morris also testified that, when he agreed to become a Farmers agent, he signed several different agreements; that nothing in any of those agreements or documents indicated that his relationship with his father's agency constituted a conflict of interest; that the documents given to him did not say anything contrary to what he had been told by any recruiter, or that any representations made to him by the agents of Farmers were false. Despite signing an agent agreement, and having been recruited, Morris' contract was ultimately terminated for conflict of interest. Morris sued Farmers, arguing that Farmers had fraudulently induced him to become a Farmers agent. The trial court ruled in Morris' favor, and Farmers appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court found Morris did not blindly rely on oral representations and ignore the terms of his contract. "The only information contrary to what Morris had been told was buried in a 200-page manual among dozens of other documents provided for training modules, and even longtime Farmers employees were not aware of the existence of the statement." Morris presented sufficient evidence of fraudulent inducement for the matter to be decided by the jury. Farmers' postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law, but the trial court did not make any findings regarding Farmers' request for a remittitur of the punitive-damages award. The Court remanded this case for the trial court to conduct a hearing on the punitive-damages award. View "Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Morris" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs James Jordan, Sara Jordan Muschamp, and William Jordan (as representative of the estate of Emma K. Jordan, deceased) sued the Thomas Jefferson Foundation, Inc. ("TJF") for: (1) misrepresentation; (2) "slander, libel, and trade infringement"; (3) fraud; (4) wantonness; (5) suppression; (6) negligence; (7) breach of contract; and (8) tortious interference with business relations. TJF was a nonprofit organization that owned and curated a museum in Monticello, the historic home of Thomas Jefferson. In 1957, Juliet Cantrell lent TJF a "filing press" for display at Monticello. Cantrell passed away in 1976 and bequeathed the filing press, which was then on loan to TJF, and the dressing table to Emma. In 1977, Emma lent TJF the dressing table for use in the museum. Certain "loan agreements" were executed with TJF when the furniture was lent to TJF, and there were subsequent loan agreements executed by Emma, James, and Sara. The loan agreements were silent as to whether TJF had the authority to perform any "conservation" work on the furniture without first obtaining permission from plaintiffs. In November 2007, plaintiffs removed the furniture from Monticello and shipped it to Sotheby's in New York with the intent to sell it. Sotheby's "research consultants" questioned the authenticity of the dressing table, and determined that the filing press was not in sufficiently original condition to be offered for bid. Sotheby's declined to place either piece of furniture for sale at auction; according to plaintiffs, Sotheby's found that the value of the dressing table had been "destroyed" and that the filing press then had a market value of $20,000 to $30,000, whereas "its fair market value would be around $4 million" had TFJ not performed conversation work on it. Only the claims (6), (7), and (8) above were presented to the jury; the remaining claims were disposed of before the case went to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of TJF on all three counts, and the trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, arguing, in pertinent part, that TJF did not disclose that it had insurance and that, therefore, "the venire was not properly qualified as to insurance." The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion. TJF appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment insofar as it granted the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, and affirmed the trial court's judgment insofar as it granted TJF's motion for a JML on the plaintiffs' suppression claim. View "Thomas Jefferson Foundation, Inc. v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Devonte Acosta was convicted of first-degree burglary and was sentenced to 156 months in prison. Acosta argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that the trial court improperly prevented him from presenting his defense that he was not present during the burglary at trial by refusing to admit certain statements into evidence. After concluding that Acosta's argument was properly preserved for appellate review, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the statements in question. The Court reasoned that the trial court's strict application of the hearsay rule deprived Acosta of the ability to present a complete defense. Upon review of the record, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Acosta's fundamental rights to a fair trial and to due process were not violated by the trial court's refusal to admit the statements into evidence. The court of Criminal Appeals was therefore reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte State of Alabama." on Justia Law

Engineering Design Group, LLC, and David Stovall, the principal of Engineering Design Group, LLC (collectively, "EDG"), and Building & Earth Sciences, Inc. ("BES"), filed separate petitions to the Alabama Supreme Court, each seeking a writ of mandamus to direct the St. Clair Circuit Court ("the trial court") to enter an order transferring the action filed in the trial court by plaintiffs Delaney Exchange, LLC, and Springdale Stores Exchange, LLC, to the Shelby Circuit Court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded EDG and BES carried their burden of showing that Shelby County's connection to the action was strong, and St. Clair County's connection to the action was considerably weak. Thus, the trial court exceeded its discretion in refusing to transfer the case to the Shelby Circuit Court, and the interest of justice required the transfer. View "Ex parte Engineering Design Group, LLC" on Justia Law

This case concerned the application of the relation-back doctrine to wrongful-death claims. The trial court allowed James O. Kidd, Sr., the personal representative of the estate of Madeline Kidd, to use relation back to sustain his claims against various health-care providers. Some of those providers, defendants Mobile Infirmary Association d/b/a Mobile Infirmary Medical Center, Dr. Roger Alvarado, Dr. Barbara Mitchell, and IMC-Diagnostic and Medical Clinic, P.C., sought review of the trial court's order by filing separate petitions for permissive appeals. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in permitting the relation-back doctrine, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mobile Infirmary Association v. Estate of Madeline Kidd" on Justia Law

Regions Bank appealed a final judgment dismissing its action against BP P.L.C., BP Corporation North America, Inc., and BP America Inc. (collectively, "BP"). In 2010, an explosion and fire occurred aboard the Deepwater Horizon, an offshore-drilling rig, located off the coast of Louisiana. The incident led to a massive discharge of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, which, in turn, spawned an expansive clean-up and response operation by BP and various governmental agencies. Regions owned coastal real property located in Baldwin County, Alabama. Regions filed this trespass action against BP in Alabama Circuit Court, alleging BP occupied Regions' property, without authorization, for its spill-response operation; that BP moved equipment and structures onto the property without permission; and that BP erected fences and barriers on the property, again, without permission. Regions further alleged that BP stored hazardous materials and waste on the property and that those hazardous materials and waste damaged the property. BP filed a Rule 12(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., "motion to dismiss" Regions' trespass action on the ground that it was subject to the class-action settlement approved in the multidistrict litigation (MDL) and, therefore, that dismissal was warranted on the basis of the doctrine of res judicata. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court found "clear and unequivocal" exceptions to the MDL economic-and-property-damage-settlement class, and concluded that Regions was not a member of the settlement class. Therefore, its trespass claim was not adjudicated as part of the MDL class-action settlement. Accordingly, the Court reversed the circuit court for dismissing Regions' action on the ground of res judicata. View "Regions Bank v. BP P.L.C. et al." on Justia Law