Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The former athletic director of Alabama State University sued his former employer for what he claimed was wrongful discharge from his duties, and for withholding monies from his paycheck. Disputes arose between the parties over the director, Stacy Danley's travel expenses. Any non-authorized expenses charged to his corporate credit card were reimbursed through payroll deduction. Danley won at trial, and the University appealed the verdicts and the damages awards. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court for miscalculation of the damages awards, but affirmed in all other respects. View "Alabama State University et al. v. Stacy Danley" on Justia Law

The Alabama State Health Planning and Development Agency ("SHPDA") granted HealthSouth of Alabama, LLC ("HealthSouth") a certificate of need ("CON") allowing HealthSouth to operate 17 inpatient physical-rehabilitation beds in Shelby County. In a separate proceeding, SHPDA granted another CON to HealthSouth allowing it to operate an additional 17 inpatient physical-rehabilitation beds in Shelby County. Shelby Ridge Acquisition Corporation d/b/a Shelby Ridge Rehabilitation Hospital ("Shelby Ridge") opposed HealthSouth's CON applications, and, after SHPDA issued the CONs to HealthSouth, Shelby Ridge appealed SHPDA's decision. The circuit court reversed one of SHPDA's decisions but affirmed the other. HealthSouth, SHPDA, and Shelby Ridge appealed separately to the Court of Civil Appeals, which consolidated the appeals and concluded that SHPDA had erred by granting the CONs to HealthSouth. HealthSouth and SHPDA separately petitioned the Supreme Court for review, which was granted. While the appeals were pending, the parties resolved their disputes; the parties agreed that HealthSouth should have been allowed to build the planned 34-bed physical-rehabilitation hospital in Shelby County. The parties also agreed that the Court of Civil Appeals wrongly decided the appeals before it insofar as HealthSouth's CON applications were concerned. The Supreme Court agreed that the Court of Civil Appeals erred. "It is sufficient to note that the pivotal error of that court's opinion is the characterization as 'key' and determinative two of the many considerations to be evaluated and balanced by SHPDA in considering CON applications." The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals and rendered judgment in favor of HealthSouth and SHPDA. The Supreme Court also remanded the cases to the Court of Civil Appeals with instructions that that court remand the cases to the circuit court so the parties could implement the resolution they reached. View "Ex parte Alabama State Health Planning and Development Agency." on Justia Law

The State of Alabama appealed circuit court orders dismissing the State's petition for forfeiture of certain electronic-gambling devices and related records and currency located at VictoryLand casino (appeal no. 1141044). In 2013, the Alabama Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus ordering Circuit Judge Tom Young, Jr. to issue a search warrant "as to certain allegedly illegal gambling devices and related items" at the VictoryLand casino in Shorter. During the search, the State seized 1,615 gambling machines, $263,105.81 in currency, and related servers, terminals, and other equipment. Shortly thereafter, the State filed the forfeiture petitions at issue here. The Supreme Court, in response to a petition by the State, issued a writ of mandamus disqualifying Judge Young from presiding over the forfeiture proceeding. All the other eligible judges in the Fifth Judicial Circuit voluntarily recused themselves. Montgomery Circuit Judge William Shashy was appointed to preside over the case. Judge Shashy conducted a four-day bench trial. The State argued the machines seized were illegal gambling devices. Witnesses for KC Economic Development, LLC (KCED) testified that the intent of the voters who in 2003 ratified Macon County's "bingo amendment" was to legalize the very types of devices that had been seized. Nine months later, Judge Shashy entered an order dismissing the forfeiture action on equal-protection grounds, on the basis that the State tolerated at other locations in Alabama the operation of casinos that used the same type machines at issue in this forfeiture case. The order did not address the issue of the legality of the machines. KCED filed a postjudgment motion requesting that the trial court specifically find that the intent of the voters in approving Amendment No. 744 was to authorize the use in Macon County of electronic-gambling machines like those allegedly available at other locations in the State. KCED additionally requested that the trial court order that all the seized property be returned. The State disagreed that it had selectively enforced Alabama's gambling laws and contended that the equal-protection rationale was legally untenable. After a hearing, Judge Shashy issued an order that provided the findings of fact sought by KCED, and repeated his finding from his earlier order that the State was "cherry picking which facilities should remain open or closed" and thus was "not enforcing the law equally." Judge Shashy then entered a conditional order for return of the seized property. The State appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that the devices at issue here were not "bingo" machines, and therefore the "bingo amendment" as grounds for return of the machines was invalid. The Court reversed both circuit court orders and rendered a judgment for the State in appeal no. 1141044. The Court dismissed KCED's cross-appeal in appeal no. 1150027. View "KC Economic Development, LLC v. Alabama" on Justia Law

K.R. petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Mobile Probate Court to set aside its interlocutory order: awarding temporary custody of her biological child, E.R., to K.G.S. during the pendency of the underlying adoption proceedings; to remove J. Michael Druhan, who was serving as a temporary probate judge in this case; and to set aside the probate court's "gag" order concerning the adoption proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. "We have not been able to locate any law giving the clerk of the probate court the authority to appoint a temporary probate judge. As a result, Druhan was never properly appointed as a temporary probate judge. Accordingly, Druhan had no authority to enter the orders he entered, and any order entered by Druhan is void." K.R.'s petition insofar as it challenged the interlocutory order awarding custody of E.R. to K.G.S. was denied. The petition was granted insofar as it challenged Druhan's appointment as a temporary probate judge. View "Ex parte K.R." on Justia Law

The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine whether there was a "fatal variance" between the indictment, which charged James Hall with theft of "currency," and the evidence produced at trial, which established theft of the funds by means of depositing a check. Hall was the "commander" of the Houston County chapter (Chapter 87) of the Disabled American Veterans ("the DAV"). In 2013, Hall had issued to himself a check from the DAV's bank account in the amount of $1,500, purportedly to reimburse Hall for expenses incurred in the performance of his duties as commander. He deposited the check into his personal bank account. The expenditure, however, had not been approved by the DAV chapter and, therefore, violated the provisions of the DAV's constitution and bylaws. The DAV requested that Hall reimburse the funds to the DAV and provide the DAV with documentation supporting the alleged expenses. Hall failed to do so. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no material variance in the indictment and the evidence, and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. View "Ex parte James R. Hall." on Justia Law

Chad Bostick petitioned for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion reversing a circuit court judgment that reversed the administrative order issued by the Alabama Board of Examiners of Landscape Architects ("the Board") suspending Bostick's license for one year and imposing a $250 fine against him. Bostick had been employed by GRC Design Group, Inc. (GRC), a landscaping business owned and operated by Greg Curl. A dispute between Bostick and GRC arose, and Bostick resigned from GRC in 2010. Bostick started his own landscaping firm. In February 2010, Curl filed a written complaint with the Board alleging that Bostick had, while employed with GRC, "misrepresented himself to clients as part owner in [GRC] and as a result had clients write checks payable to him which he cashed for his own personal use." Curl claimed that Bostick "admitted to stealing these design fees and eventually to several more acts of fraud." Bostick denied these accusations. Bostick argued on appeal of the circuit court's adoption of the Board's findings, among other things, that the Board's decision was not supported by evidence presented and that the Board acted beyond its jurisdiction and authority in suspending his license to practice landscape architecture and in imposing a fine. After review of the record, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed the circuit court's judgment. View "Ex parte Chad Bostick." on Justia Law

Liberty National Life Insurance Company petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Civil Appeals' decision: (1) holding, as a matter of first impression, that 27-14-3(f), Ala. Code 1975, required an insurable interest in a life-insurance policy to exist at a point other than the time at which the policy becomes effective; and (2) reversing the trial court's dismissal of the complaint filed by Misty Ann Barton, as administratrix of the estate of Benjamin H. Miller, Jr, in which Barton alleged that Liberty National was negligent in allowing Leanne Miller, Benjamin Jr.'s stepmother, to substitute herself as beneficiary of an insurance policy insuring the life of Benjamin Jr. The Court granted Liberty National's petition, and, affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals. Barton alleged that Liberty National was negligent in allowing Leanne to name herself as beneficiary of an insurance policy that was owned by Benjamin Sr. at his death and, pursuant to the terms of the policy, payable to Benjamin Jr.'s estate. The Court found that the policy was not produced or viewed by the trial court, nor had any discovery ensued concerning ownership of the policy, and who exactly had the right to effect a beneficiary change. Accordingly, in viewing the allegations of Barton's complaint most strongly in Barton's favor, it appeared to the Supreme Court that Barton could, under certain circumstances, maintain a cause of action against Liberty National alleging negligence on its part in allowing Leanne, either as personal representative of Benjamin Sr.'s estate or individually, to substitute herself as beneficiary on the policy insuring Benjamin Jr.'s life. The Court affirmed that portion of the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion reversing the trial court's order dismissing Barton's complaint. The Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment insofar as it interpreted section 27-14-3(f) to require an insurable interest in personal insurance to exist at any point beyond the time the policy of insurance becomes effective. View "Ex parte Liberty National Life Insurance Company." on Justia Law

L.D. Owen III, as guardian ad litem for Wanda L. and Wesley A. Schlumpf ("Owen"), minor children, appealed a probate court order allowing the sale of real property held by the estate of James W. Schlumpf ("the decedent"). The decedent died intestate in 2014. James's two children, Wanda and Wesley, both of whom were under the age of majority, were the decedent's only surviving heirs. John Schlumpf, the decedent's brother, had legal custody of the Schlumpf children. At the time of the decedent's death, he owned real property in Baldwin County that he used as his personal residence. The probate court granted letters of administration for the decedent's estate to Romaine Scott. Scott decided to sell the decedent's real property and petitioned the probate court for permission; Owen and John objected to the petition for sale. The probate court entered an order granting Scott the authority to sell the property for the offered purchase price of $450,000. After the probate court entered the order for sale, it granted Scott's petition to resign as the administrator of the estate. The probate court appointed Harry M. D'Olive, Jr., as successor to Scott. Owen then appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that the probate court erred in ordering the sale of the property: upon the decedent's death, the Schlumpf children inherited the property subject to a mortgage on the property. Because the mortgagee did not file a claim against the estate, the mortgage was not a debt that could justify forcing the sale of the property to satisfy that mortgage. In the event the mortgage was not satisfied by the Schlumpf children, then the mortgagee had the remedy of foreclosure available if such an action became necessary to satisfy the debt. View "Schlumpf v. D'Olive" on Justia Law

Virginia Ladd appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Margaret Stockham, as personal representative of the estate of Herbert Stockham, deceased (appeal no. 1140365). Stockham cross-appealed the circuit court's denial of her motion for reimbursement of costs and attorney fees (appeal no. 1140407). Ladd was a beneficiary of three trusts that each held preferred and common stock in SVI Corporation ("SVI") (collectively, "the trusts"). Ladd sued Stockham for actions taken when Stockham served on the Board of Directors for SVI. After review of the specific facts entered in the circuit court record, the Alabama Supreme Court found no reversible error as to the grant of summary judgment in case 1140365. The Court concluded Stockham demonstrated that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying her request for reimbursement of costs and attorney fees. In case no. 1140407, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying Stockham's motion for the reimbursement of costs, attorney fees, and litigation expenses and remanded the case for the circuit court to reconsider Stockham's motion. View "Stockham v. Ladd" on Justia Law

South Alabama Brick Co., Inc., d/b/a Riley-Stuart Supply Co. ("SAB"), appealed a Circuit Court's judgment in the amount of approximately $12.6 million in favor of J. Gregory Carwie, as temporary conservator of Benito Perez, who suffered catastrophic injuries when he fell through a skylight in the roof of a warehouse owned and operated by SAB. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the condition at issue here was a preexisting condition of SAB's facility. SAB hired an independent roofing contractor, Cooner Roofing, with previous experience repairing the roof of that facility, to make repairs determined by that contractor to be necessary and appropriate. Under the circumstances of this case, SAB was not legally responsible for warning Cooner Roofing's employees of the risks of working on that roof. Because of the Court's disposition of the issue of liability, it did not reach SAB's arguments relating to the damages awarded against it. View "South Alabama Brick Co., Inc. v. Carwie" on Justia Law