Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Circuit Court dismissed claims asserted by St. Union Baptist Church, Inc. ("the corporation"), against Reverend James M. Howard, Sr., and the counterclaims asserted by Howard against the corporation and its directors after concluding that their dispute was ecclesiastical in nature and outside the jurisdiction of the court. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the corporation's claims because they were indeed ecclesiastical in nature and outside the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. But the Court reversed dismissal of Howard's claims because the issues underlying that appeal involved only the financial affairs and property rights of the church. Howard's case was remanded for further proceedings. View "St. Union Baptist Church, Inc. v. Howard" on Justia Law

This nearly two-decade-old case "is a veteran of numerous appellate campaigns." Pavilion Development, LLC's attempted redemption of the property at issue gave rise to five opinions from the Alabama Supreme Court. E.B. Investments, L.L.C. ("EB Investments"), appealed a Circuit Court holding that Pavilion was entitled to redeem certain property in Madison County in which EB Investments and other parties held legal interests (appeal no. 1141259). Pavilion filed a separate appeal naming as appellees JBJ Partnership, Pace Properties ("Pace"), James P. Pace, individually and as personal representative of the estate of James E. Pace, and William Byron Pace and challenged certain aspects of the same order, namely, the amount it had to pay redeem the property (appeal no. 1141416). The appeals were consolidated for the purpose of issuing one opinion. As to EB Investments' appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and dismissed the appeal in part. As to Pavilion's appeal, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "E.B. Investments, L.L.C. v. Pavilion Development, L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

These matters involved the administration of an estate. In case no. 1141293, Raymond Adams, the executor of the estate of Clifford Wayne Cleveland, appealed the preliminary injunction issued against him at the request of the beneficiaries of the estate, Clifford Wayne Cleveland II ("Chip") and Celeste Cleveland Minor. In case no. 1140732, Adams petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court: (1) to require the beneficiaries of the estate to produce certain materials disclosing the assets and liabilities of the estate; (2) to vacate its order prohibiting Adams from hiring attorneys and accountants to assist him with the administration of the estate; (3) to vacate its order requiring Adams to produce certain corporate documents; and (4) to sanction the beneficiaries; and (5) to direct the trial judge to recuse himself from further presiding over the underlying case. The decedent Cleveland died with of assets whose estimated value was between $2 million and $3 million; however, those assets were significantly encumbered, rendering the estate potentially insolvent. In 1140732, the Supreme Court denied the petition, and consequently, reversed and remanded in 1141293: "Chip and Minor's argument fails to acknowledge the language of Rule 65(d)(2) as well as the numerous decisions of this Court reaffirming that the requirements of Rule 65(d)(2) are mandatory. [. . .] the trial court's order does explain what issue the trial court intends to resolve during the term of the injunction, it wholly fails to state the specific grounds on which the injunction itself issued. That omission, alone, requires reversal of the trial court's order, regardless of the potential underlying merit." View "Adams v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

Jim Bishop Chevrolet-Buick-Pontiac-GMC, Inc. ("Jim Bishop"), appealed judgment entered on jury verdicts in favor of Michael and Tina Burden ("Burden"). In 2012, the Burdens sued General Motors, LLC, Jim Bishop, and Lynn Layton Chevrolet, Inc. ("Lynn Layton"), to recover damages for injuries they allegedly sustained as the result of a fire that occurred in a truck they had purchased from an automobile dealership owned and operated by Jim Bishop. When Jim Bishop filed its answer, also generally denying the allegations contained in the complaint and asserting certain affirmative defenses, Jim Bishop further asserted a cross-claim against General Motors alleging it had refused to indemnify Jim Bishop. The Burdens eventually entered into pro tanto settlements with General Motors, which agreed to pay them $20,000, and Lynn Layton, which agreed to pay them $32,000, as to the respective claims asserted by the Burdens against those defendants. The settlement with General Motors resolved the breach-of-warranty claims and the "Magnuson-Moss" claim. The trial court dismissed the Burdens' claims against both General Motors and Lynn Layton pursuant to joint stipulations of dismissal filed by those parties. Jim Bishop moved the trial court for a summary judgment on the Burdens' remaining claims against it, moved at the close of evidence for a judgment as a matter of law, and renewed its JML motion post-verdict. All three were denied, and the jury returned its verdict against Jim Bishop. Based on its review of the facts entered into the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in failing to grant Jim Bishop's motion for a JML and in submitting the case to the jury. Therefore, it reversed the judgment entered in favor of the Burdens on the jury's verdicts and rendered a judgment for Jim Bishop. View "Jim Bishop Chevrolet-Buick-Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. Burden" on Justia Law

James Cherry appealed the grant of summary judgment entered against him and in favor of Pinson Termite and Pest Control, LLC, and Jerry Pinson. In 2011, Cherry purchased a home. The sales contract required the seller to provide a "Wood Infestation Inspection Report (WIIR)." A termite-services contract with Pinson Termite ("termite bond") was transferrable from the seller to Cherry, but it was disputed whether the bond actually transferred to Cherry. In late 2011, Cherry began remodeling him home when he discovered extensive termite damage. A State inspector confirmed the damage and sent Pinson a letter that it had "observed findings of subterranean termite damage" that were not mentioned on the WIIR and that, although the WIIR "indicates the structure was treated by your company, ... we did not observe all mechanics of subterranean control work." The State inspector monitored Pinson's re-treatment of the house. At about the same time, Cherry and Pinson signed a contract for an extension of the termite bond. Shortly thereafter, cherry hired an attorney, who sent Pinson a letter offering to settle his claim for the re-treatment of his home. The State inspector sent Cherry a letter advising that it had supervised Pinson's re-treatment of the house and that if Cherry had any question he should contact the State within 10 days of receiving the letter. If he did not contact, the letter stated the State would "assume that the matter has been resolved." There was no record of any further contact between Cherry and State inspector. Approximately one year after the State letter, Cherry sued Pinson Pest, and Pinson alleging fraud; negligence; negligent hiring, training, and supervision; and breach of contract and seeking "equitable relief pursuant to the 'made whole' doctrine." When summary judgment was granted in favor of Pinson, Cherry appealed arguing that the trial court erred. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Pinson, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cherry v. Pinson Termite & Pest Control, LLC" on Justia Law

Synovus Bank appealed a circuit court order denying Synovus's motion to set aside a joint stipulation of dismissal. Synovus sued Tom James Mitchell d/b/a Mitchell Motors ("Mitchell") seeking damages for Mitchell's alleged default on a promissory note. Mitchell moved to dismiss, or, in the alternative, to transfer the case to another circuit court. Mitchell argued that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that, should the case nevertheless be allowed to proceed, venue was proper only in Jefferson County. The Walker Circuit Court entered an order denying Mitchell's motion to dismiss and transferring the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court. Ordinarily, the Supreme Court reviewed the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to determine whether, in denying the motion, the trial court exceeded its discretion. However, in this case, the trial court based its denial of Synovus's Rule 60(b) motion not on the merits of the motion but, rather, on the trial court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion. Because the trial court did not consider the merits of Synovus's motion, the Supreme Court could not address Synovus's argument that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying the motion; "indeed, there was no exercise of discretion for this Court to review." Thus, the Court reversed the order denying Synovus's Rule 60(b) motion and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the merits of Synovus's Rule 60(b) motion and to enter a judgment in accordance with its consideration of the merits of that motion. View "Synovus Bank v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

North American Adjusters, Inc. ("North American"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate certain orders denying a jury trial in this case because the written jury demand endorsed on the plaintiff's complaint was not signed. In 2013, Jeffery Saulsberry, acting pro se, filed a verified complaint against Green Tree Financial, LLC, Daniel Hood, and fictitiously named defendants on claims of trespass; invasion of privacy; conversion; negligence; and theft of property. Saulsberry included at the end of his complaint a demand for "A Trial By A Struck Jury," and for each of his asserted claims he sought compensatory and punitive damages "in an amount to be determined by the Jury." Additionally, a notation of a requested jury demand appears on the civil cover sheet, which Saulsberry served simultaneously with the summons and complaint. Saulsberry added as defendants North American and American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida ("American Bankers"). According to North American, American Bankers has yet to be properly served. In 2015, after North American learned that the trial court would be removing the case from its jury docket and placing it on a nonjury docket, it filed a motion to certify that the case would be tried by a jury. Saulsberry then filed an amended complaint seeking to, among other things, withdraw the jury demand on the ground that it was "without proper attestation." The trial court entered an order denying North American's motion to certify that the case would be tried by a jury; the trial court noted in its order that a "Jury Demand may be endorsed upon a pleading; none has been done in this case." North American unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that North American had shown it had a "(1) a clear legal right ... to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon [the trial court] to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court." Accordingly, the Court granted North American's petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the circuit court to vacate its orders finding that there had been no "indorsement upon a pleading" because the endorsement was not signed. View "Ex parte North American Adjusters, Inc." on Justia Law

Keneisha Kendrick appeals from a summary judgment entered against her and in favor of the City of Midfield ("the City") and one of its police officers, Joseph Wordell, in her action for damages based on personal injuries she sustained as a result of a car accident. Wordell had been dispatched in response to a domestic-disturbance call; he was traveling south on Highway 11 in his City-owned, police-outfitted Ford Crown Victoria automobile. Wordell testified that, upon receiving the dispatch, he turned on his emergency lights and siren and began proceeding toward the scene of the domestic disturbance. Kendrick was on her way to work and was traveling eastward on Woodward Road toward Highway 11 in a Ford Freestyle sport-utility vehicle owned by her mother. Kendrick was planning to turn left onto Highway 11. The front of Kendrick's vehicle collided with the right front passenger side of Wordell's vehicle. The impact of the crash rendered Kendrick unconscious. The impact of the collision caused Wordell's vehicle to veer across the median and two lanes of traffic in the opposite direction on Highway 11 and to collide head-on with a third vehicle. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded there remained disputed facts in the record, for which granting summary judgment was inappropriate. The Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kendrick v. City of Midfield" on Justia Law

Keneisha Kendrick appeals from a summary judgment entered against her and in favor of the City of Midfield ("the City") and one of its police officers, Joseph Wordell, in her action for damages based on personal injuries she sustained as a result of a car accident. Wordell had been dispatched in response to a domestic-disturbance call; he was traveling south on Highway 11 in his City-owned, police-outfitted Ford Crown Victoria automobile. Wordell testified that, upon receiving the dispatch, he turned on his emergency lights and siren and began proceeding toward the scene of the domestic disturbance. Kendrick was on her way to work and was traveling eastward on Woodward Road toward Highway 11 in a Ford Freestyle sport-utility vehicle owned by her mother. Kendrick was planning to turn left onto Highway 11. The front of Kendrick's vehicle collided with the right front passenger side of Wordell's vehicle. The impact of the crash rendered Kendrick unconscious. The impact of the collision caused Wordell's vehicle to veer across the median and two lanes of traffic in the opposite direction on Highway 11 and to collide head-on with a third vehicle. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded there remained disputed facts in the record, for which granting summary judgment was inappropriate. The Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kendrick v. City of Midfield" on Justia Law

Clatus Junkin, a resident of Fayette County, owned and operated Johnco Materials, Inc., a sand and gravel pit located in Lowndes County. At some point in time, Junkin purchased diesel fuel from Southeastern Energy and had it delivered to Johnco Materials. When Southeastern Energy did not receive payment for the fuel, Southeastern Energy sued Johnco Materials and Junkin, individually, in Lowndes County. With regard to Junkin, Southeastern Energy alleged that "Junkin was personally liable to Southeastern Energy for diesel fuel that was sold and delivered to Johnco Materials." At the request of the parties, the Lowndes Circuit Court entered a consent judgment against Johnco Materials and in favor of Southeastern Energy for an agreed-upon amount and dismissed Junkin from the action with prejudice. Junkin then sued Southeastern Energy in Fayette County alleging malicious prosecution by Southeastern Energy in the Lowndes County case. Southeastern Energy moved to dismiss the malicious prosecution action or, in the alternative, to transfer the action to "Montgomery County, Alabama, or any other proper venue, pursuant to Rule 82(d), Ala. R. Civ. P., and governing law." Southeastern Energy Corp. petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus ordering the Fayette Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Southeastern Energy's motion for a change of venue for the underlying action and directing the Fayette Circuit Court to grant the motion and transfer the action to the Montgomery Circuit Court (case no. 1150033). Southeastern Energy filed a second petition for a writ of mandamus asking the Supreme Court to direct the Fayette Circuit Court to vacate an order transferring the underlying action to the Lowndes Circuit Court, and to direct the Fayette Circuit Court to enter an order transferring the action to the Montgomery Circuit Court (case no. 1150294). Finding no errors in the transfer orders, the Supreme Court dismissed Southeastern Energy's petition in case no. 1150033, and denied its petition in case no. 1150294. View "Ex parte Southeastern Energy Corp." on Justia Law