Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Har-Mar Collisions, Inc. appealed a circuit court judgment after a jury verdict of $101,054.40 in favor of Har-Mar Collisions on its breach-of-contract claim against Scottsdale Insurance Company. The trial court offset the jury verdict by the amounts Har-Mar Collisions had recovered from a settlement agreement it had entered into with Auto-Owners Insurance Company and Owners Insurance Company and from a settlement agreement it had entered into with CRC Insurance Services, Inc. ("CRC"). Because the total amount Har-Mar Collisions recovered from those two settlement agreements exceeded the amount of the jury verdict, the trial court entered a judgment awarding Har-Mar Collisions $0. Har-Mar Collisions appeals, challenging the setoff. Scottsdale cross-appealed from the judgment against it. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment to the extent it applied a setoff against the jury verdict returned against Scottsdale and remanded the case for the trial court to enter a judgment reinstating the jury verdict of $101,054.40. The Court remanded for the trial court to reconsider Har-Mar Collisions' motion to tax costs. The trial court was affirmed in all other respects. View "Scottsdale Insurance Company v. Har-Mar Collisions, Inc." on Justia Law

Richard Watters petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to vacate its order denying his motion for a summary judgment as to count one of an amended complaint filed by Michael Gamble, in Gamble's capacity as administrator of the Estate of Barbara Ruth Findley Long ("Long"), deceased. Count one asserted a legal-malpractice claim against Watters under the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act ("the ALSLA"), alleging breach of a fiduciary duty. This proceeding involved title to real property located in Conecuh County, which was owned by Robert Findley at the time of his death. Long retained Watters & Associates, of which Watters was a partner, to represent her "in obtaining estate assets" of Findley, her deceased father. Watters filed suit seeking a declaration of Long's ownership in family property located in Conecuh County. The Circuit Court declaring that Long owned a one-sixth interest (approximately 30 acres) in the Conecuh County property Shortly thereafter, Long discharged Watters from any further representation in the declaratory-judgment action. Watters filed an attorney's lien against the Conecuh property to secure the payment of his attorney fees. Family members eventually quitclaimed their interests to Long. Taxes for 2006 weren't paid on the property, and Long's cousin Larry Findley purchased the property at a tax sale. According to Watters, Long asked him for a loan to redeem the property from the tax sale. Watters told Long that Langley would not record the quitclaim deed if Long repaid the loan within 30 days of redeeming the property; that, in the event the deed was recorded, any claim Watters might have against Long for services rendered regarding her deceased father's estate would be satisfied; and that Watters and Long agreed to terms concerning the loan arrangement. This arrangement was never reduced to writing. Long executed a quitclaim deed prepared by Watters, conveying title to the Conecuh property to "Langley & Watters, LLP." In 2010, Watters submitted to the Conecuh Probate Court a letter, enclosing "his client's" application for redemption of the Conecuh property. Long died on April 2, 2013, and a few months later, the Conecuh Probate Court appointed Gamble as administrator of Long's estate. Gamble filed a complaint against Watters, asserting claims of legal malpractice among other things. After review of this case, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Watters had another adequate remedy (i.e., an appeal) other than a writ of mandamus. Therefore, the Court denied relief. View "Ex parte Richard L. Watters." on Justia Law

Regions Bank appealed a circuit court order denying its motion to compel arbitration. In October 2011, Mary Rice opened both a savings account and a checking account with Regions. Rice opened each account by signing a one-page signature card indicating that she was agreeing to certain terms. Among other things, the signature cards referred to a Deposit Agreement, the terms of which contained the arbitration clause at issue here. In March 2015, Rice sued Regions, alleging that Regions was liable for a fall she suffered on Regions' premises. Regions filed a motion to compel arbitration, citing the arbitration provision in the deposit agreement. Rice opposed the motion to compel arbitration, arguing that her claim was beyond the scope of the arbitration provision in the Deposit Agreement. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the arbitration clause at issue clearly and unmistakably delegated questions of substantive arbitrability of matters between the parties to the arbitrator. Pursuant to the delegation provision, the arbitrator had to resolve the disputed issue whether Rice's claim is arbitrable under the arbitration provision. View "Regions Bank v. Rice" on Justia Law

In her application for rehearing, K.G.S. did not argue that the Alabama Supreme Court overlooked or misapprehended any point of law or fact in holding that J. Michael Druhan, a Mobile attorney, had been improperly appointed to hear the case after the recusal of Judge Don Davis. Instead, K.G.S. moved the Court to "consider the Affidavit of Probate Judge Don Davis and its attached Order of the Presiding Judge of the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama date April 28, 2010." K.G.S. had an "obligation to attach to her petition '[c]opies of any order or opinion or parts of the record that would be essential to an understanding of the matter set forth in the petition.'" But the Supreme Court found K.G.S. failed to do so, omitting the April 28, 2010 order. The Supreme Court overruling K.G.S.'s application for review: "K.G.S. may not now, for the first time in her application for rehearing, present additional documentation in support of her argument." Furthermore, the Court found K.G.S. did not present any evidence indicating that Judge Davis ever certified to the presiding judge of the circuit court his inability to serve in the case. "Therefore, even if we were to consider the new documents presented by K.G.S., she has not demonstrated that this Court overlooked or misapprehended any point of law or fact." View "Ex parte K.R." on Justia Law

CVS Pharmacy, L.L.C. ("CVS"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff Mildred Scott, as untimely filed. Scott filed a complaint asserting negligence and wantonness claims against CVS after she slipped and fell in a CVS store while shopping. Scott did not pay a filing fee when she filed the complaint; she filed an "Affidavit of Substantial Hardship," indicating that she was unable to pay the filing fee. The circuit court entered an order purporting to declare Scott indigent and to waive the filing fee. On that same day, the summons against CVS was issued, and CVS was served with the summons and complaint. A few days after the complaint was served, the circuit court entered an order reversing its earlier order, and denying Scott's affidavit of substantial hardship. Several days after this, Scott paid the filing fee. CVS moved to dismiss Scott's complaint on the ground that the applicable two-year statutory limitations period had expired without the payment of the filing fee or the approval of Scott's affidavit of substantial hardship. The circuit court denied CVS's motion to dismiss. Finding that the circuit court erred in this dismissal, the Supreme Court granted CVS' writ application. View "Ex parte CVS Pharmacy, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Once Upon a Time,LLC ("OUAT"), appealed by permission a circuit court decision denying OUAT's motion seeking a summary judgment on the third-party complaint filed against it by Chappelle Properties, LLC ("Chappelle"). Chappelle owned a building in Birmingham containing at least two commercial retail spaces. Chappelle and OUAT entered into a commercial lease agreement in which Chappelle agreed to lease one of the commercial retail spaces to OUAT. The agreement contained an indemnity clause. Deborah Anderson worked for OUAT as a sales clerk. In late 2011, the OUAT retail space was flooded with contaminated water. Certain items of OUAT's inventory were moved from the OUAT retail space to Chappelle's vacant commercial retail space. Although Anderson was not working on the day of the incident, in the days following she counted inventory that had been moved to the vacant retail space. In late 2013, Anderson filed a complaint alleging that she had suffered a bacterial infection caused by her handling the allegedly contaminated OUAT inventory stored in the vacant retail space following the flood of the OUAT-leased retail space. In 2014, Chappelle filed a third-party complaint against OUAT and its managers that sought, among other things, indemnification pursuant to the indemnity clause in the agreement. OUAT alleged that the indemnity clause in the agreement did not cover the claims asserted by Anderson in her complaint. After review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying OUAT's summary-judgment motion. The Court held that the indemnity clause should not have been interpreted to include incidents occurring in the vacant retail space. View "Once Upon a Time, LLC v. Chappelle Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

Wayne Farms, LLC, petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus ordering the Bullock Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Wayne Farms' motion for a change of venue and to enter an order transferring the underlying action to the Pike Circuit Court. Ben and Imogene Hicks owned and operated a chicken farm in Pike County. In April 2013, Imogene entered into an agreement in which Wayne Farms agreed to deliver flocks of broiler chicks to the Hickses' farm. Ronnie King, an employee of Wayne Farms, drove a tractor-trailer owned by Wayne Farms to the Hickses' farm to pick up a load of chickens. After the chickens were loaded, King began to drive the tractor-trailer away. Before King left the Hickses' property, the loaded trailer detached from the tractor and overturned, pinning Ben to the ground and causing him to be injured. Ben and Imogene sued Wayne Farms and King in Bullock County, alleging claims of negligence and wantonness and seeking damages for Ben's injuries. Wayne Farms moved the Bullock Circuit Court to transfer the action to the Pike Circuit Court, acknowledging that venue was proper in Bullock County but that pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens the action should have been transferred to Pike County. The Alabama Supreme Court granted the writ, concluding Wayne Farms demonstrated a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus directing the Bullock Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Wayne Farms' motion for a change of venue and to enter an order transferring the underlying action to Pike County. View "Ex parte Wayne Farms, LLC." on Justia Law

In 2005, Water's Edge, LLC purchased lots 62-69 of "Re-Subdivision A" in Baldwin County, commonly referred to as Gulf Shores Yacht Club and Marina ("the property"). Fairfield Financial Services, Inc. loaned Water's Edge $12.8 million of the $13 million needed to purchase the property. In 2006, Fairfield notified Water's Edge that it would not renew Water's Edge's loan. The members of Water's Edge authorized the managers to seek new financing. In December 2006, Vision Bank agreed to loan Water's Edge $14.5 million. Vision Bank later merged with SE Property Holdings, LLC ("SEPH"). Certain members of Water's Edge signed agreements guaranteeing all of Water's Edge's debt to SEPH. In October 2008, SEPH notified Water's Edge that the loans were in default. In October 2010, SEPH sued Water's Edge and 28 individuals, including the guarantors, based on the promissory notes and guaranty agreements pertaining to the various loans issued over the years. The trial took place in late 2014. The trial court did not submit the case to the jury, but instead discharged the jury and entered an order granting SEPH's motion for a JML. The trial court found the guarantors and the other defendants jointly and severally liable on continuing unlimited guaranty agreements. The trial court found each of them individually liable for differing amounts based on continuing limited guaranty agreements they had signed. A month later, the trial court revised its earlier order, taking into account settlements and declarations of bankruptcy that certain guarantors had declared. The guarantors timely filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, which the trial court denied. The guarantors then appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial court's judgment was not final because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to dismiss SEPH's claims against one of the guarantors, and the trial court did not certify its order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). "An order entered in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay is void as to the debtor, thus leaving the claims against [one of the guarantors] pending and rendering the judgment nonfinal. A nonfinal judgment will not support an appeal." View "Gaddy v. SE Property Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

In appeal no. 1140870, Southern Cleaning Service, Inc. ("SCSI"), appealed the grant of summary judgment entered favor of Essex Insurance Company and Genesee General Agency, Inc. (collectively, "the insurance defendants"), on SCSI's claims stemming from Essex's refusal to provide SCSI coverage under a commercial general-liability policy based on an alleged failure to timely notify Essex of the facts leading to the claim for coverage. In appeal no. 1140918, the insurance defendants cross-appealed the trial court's denial of their requests for costs. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, LLC entered into a contract with SCSI for provide floor-care and general janitorial services to multiple grocery stores in central Alabama. SCSI entered into a subcontract with Phase II Maintenance Systems, LLC, whereby Phase II became responsible for providing those services. That subcontract required Phase II to carry a minimum level of liability insurance and to list both SCSI and Winn-Dixie as "additional insureds" on such policies. Phase II contacted Alabama Auto Insurance Center ("Alabama Auto") for a policy; Alabama Auto in turn contacted Genesee, a managing general agency located in Georgia that connected independent agents like Alabama Auto with different insurance companies that provided the type of coverage being sought by the independent agent's customer. Ultimately, Genesee sent Alabama Auto a quote for a commercial general-liability policy issued by Essex that would meet Phase II's needs, and Alabama Auto presented that quote to Phase II. Phase II accepted the quote; Alabama Auto transmitted notice of that acceptance to Genesee; and Genesee, which held issuing authority for Essex, then issued Phase II the desired policy on behalf of Essex. In 2011, Beverly Paige was shopping at a Phase II-serviced Winn-Dixie in Montgomery when she allegedly slipped on a wet floor, fell, and was injured. A Phase II employee on duty at the store at the time of the fall reported the incident to Phase II's owner and president, William Wedgeworth, that same day, and Wedgeworth has given sworn testimony indicating that he separately notified both SCSI and Alabama Auto of the incident on the next available business day,and further specifically asked Alabama Auto to notify Genesee of the incident. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, citing several disputes of material fact that should have precluded the court's ultimate decision. As such, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the outcome for further proceedings. The cross appeal was rendered moot. View "Essex Insurance Company and Genesee General Agency, Inc. v. Southern Cleaning Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners Town of Summerdale, the City of Robertsdale, and Baldwin County Sewer Services, LLC ("BCSS") independently petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for certiorari review of a Court of Civil Appeals' decision. In it, the appellate court concluded that the petitioners lacked standing to file actions against the East Central Baldwin County Water, Sewer and Fire Protection Authority ("ECBC") and the Baldwin County Commission ("the county commission") seeking a judgment declaring that two amendments to the articles of incorporation of ECBC approved by the county commission (one in 2002 and the other in 2008) were void. The Supreme Court granted review except for Summerdale's challenge to the 2008 amendment. The Court concluded that petitioners had standing, and accordingly reversed the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals. View "Ex parte Baldwin County Sewer Services, LLC." on Justia Law