Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Eliot Hoff appealed a circuit court order that remanded the administration of the conservatorship of his grandmother, Susan Bibb Kidd, to the Jefferson Probate Court. In 2006, the probate court adjudged Kidd to be an incapacitated person and appointed Mark Goolsby as conservator of her estate. Sometime in August 2008, Goolsby sold some personal property in Kidd's estate to Anita Kidd Goyer, one of Kidd's three daughters. When another of Kidd's daughters, Susan Louis Hoff, and her son Hoff found out about the sale, they filed an objection in the probate court. Meanwhile, on September 29, 2009, Kidd died. On February 21, 2011, the probate court issued an order that, among other things, approved the August 2008 sale of Kidd's personal property to Goyer. The Hoffs promptly moved the probate court to reconsider. An initial hearing on their motion was held on June 8, 2011; however, the matter was continued and another hearing scheduled for September 15, 2011. On June 24, 2011, Goolsby petitioned the probate court to be appointed administrator of Kidd's estate because he could not conduct business as conservator after her death. The Hoffs thereafter also filed a motion to continue the hearing scheduled for September 15, 2011. The probate court ruled on those motions, setting the hearing on the Hoffs' motion to reconsider and denying Goolsby's motion to be appointed administrator of Kidd's estate. Instead, the probate court, on its own motion, appointed attorney Elizabeth W. McElroy, the general administrator for Jefferson County, as administrator of Kidd's estate. Hoff appealed the order entered by the circuit court remanding the administration of the conservatorship of his grandmother to the probate court, arguing that he had properly petitioned for removal. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded Hoff did not have standing to seek removal, that the circuit court's order of remand was properly entered. View "Hoff v. Goyer " on Justia Law

Defendant Noland Hospital Montgomery, LLC ("NHM"), petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its order denying NHM's motion for a summary judgment and to enter a summary judgment in NHM's favor. NHM contended that it was entitled to a summary judgment on the basis that the applicable statute of limitations for this wrongful-death action barred the claims asserted against it by Wheatton K. Pynes, individually and as executor of the estate of Houston Earl Pynes. "The disposition of this petition require[d] an interpretation of the interplay between Rule 9(h), Ala. R.Civ. P., relating to fictitiously named parties, and Rule 15(c), pertaining to the relation back of amendments to pleadings." Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Pynes v. Jackson Hospital" on Justia Law

Regions Bank ("Regions"), as sole trustee of the J.F.B. Lowrey Trust ("the Lowrey Trust"), appealed a circuit court's order that denied Regions' motion to award it attorney fees and costs. Sam G. Lowrey, Jr., and Shelby Lowrey Jones, two of the current beneficiaries of the Lowrey Trust ("the beneficiaries") cross-appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of Regions on their breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. The beneficiaries claimed that Regions failed to protect and preserve the assets of the Lowrey Trust, which consisted primarily of approximately 20,000 acres of timberland located in Monroe and Conecuh Counties and which have been the subject of much intra-family litigation. The trial court entered a detailed order in favor of Regions, rejecting the beneficiaries' claims of mismanagement of the trust assets and taxing costs against the beneficiaries. Regions filed a bill of costs and a supplemental bill of costs detailing all the expenses incurred in defending the claim, and attaching supporting documentation. The beneficiaries filed a motion to review taxation of costs and a motion to vacate the judgment. The trial court did not rule on the motions, and all post-trial motions were deemed denied by operation of law. Regions timely appealed, and the beneficiaries filed a cross-appeal. Upon review of the record of the five-day bench trial and the considerable documentary evidence, the Supreme Court held that there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision on the beneficiaries' breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. Thus, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Regions on that claim. The Court reversed the trial court's ruling on Regions' motion for attorney fees, and remanded this case back to the trial court for a hearing on Regions' attorney-fee motion to consider the reasonableness of the attorney fee. View "Regions Bank v.Lowrey" on Justia Law

Regions Bank, in its fiduciary capacity as trustee or cotrustee of various trusts, Delores Ancell, and David Puckett filed two permissive appeals, pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., to challenge the Jefferson Circuit Court's orders denying the trustees' motions to dismiss in part Ernest Kramer's and Kenyon R. Kirkland's complaints filed against the trustees. In his complaint, Kramer alleged that the trustees' management of the assets held by the Kramer revocable trust constituted a breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, wantonness, breach of contract, fraud, reckless misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, suppression, violation of the Alabama Securities Act. Finding that the trustees failed to support their argument with relevant legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's orders. View "Regions Bank v. Ernest Kramer " on Justia Law

Pamela Ruttenberg, Harold Ruttenberg's widow, and two of the Ruttenberg's three children, Warren Ruttenberg and Jodi Ruttenberg Benck appealed a final judgment of the probate court that granted the petition of Karl B. Friedman and Daniel H. Markstein III, the coexecutors of Harold's estate, for final settlement of the estate. Ruttenberg's third child, Don-Allen Ruttenberg, who had worked with his father in the family business, Just For Feet, Inc., and who was involved in civil litigation and criminal prosecution surrounding Just For Feet, did not object to the coexecutors' administration and settlement of his father's estate. Upon review of the record of the nine-day trial and the considerable documentary evidence, the Supreme Court held that there was substantial evidence to support the probate court's decision. The Court concluded that the probate court did not exceed its discretion. Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the probate court was affirmed. View "Ruttenberg v. Friedman" on Justia Law

The Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach, Virginia, appointed the Trust Company of Virginia (TCVA) as conservator of property owned by Amy Falcon Morris when that court declared Ms. Morris to be incapacitated in 2008. Ms. Morris died in 2011 in Alabama, and her will was admitted to probate in the Montgomery County Probate Court. The probate court entered orders compelling TCVA to turn over funds in the conservancy estate to the estate opened in the probate court and enjoining TCVA from expending funds without prior approval. TCVA moved to vacate those orders, and the probate court denied the motion. TCVA then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition or other appropriate writ to direct the probate court to vacate those orders on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction to enter those orders. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that in this case a writ of mandamus was the appropriate remedy by which to order a vacatur of the probate court's orders. Furthermore, because TCVA was not properly served with process or provided adequate notice of the proceeding before the probate court, the Supreme Court directed the probate court to vacate the contested orders concerning the assets to which TCVA was conservator. View "In re: Estate of Amy F. Morris" on Justia Law

Three appellate proceedings were consolidated for a single Supreme Court opinion. All three cases appealed the dismissal of their respective cases from the Etowah Circuit Court. The Appellants all sued Donald Stewart individually and as the trustee of the Abernathy Trust and the Abernathy Trust Foundation, in a line of cases arising out of a toxic tort action against Monsanto Company, its parent corporation and a spin-off. The Monsanto Corporations manufactured and disposed of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). A jury found the corporations liable on claims of wantonness, outrage, "suppression of the truth," negligence and public nuisance. After 500 trials on damages, the parties reached a settlement in 2003. $21 million was placed into a trust (the Abernathy Trust) established to pay health and education benefits for those Plaintiffs who qualified for assistance. Each plaintiff signed a retainer agreement and received and cashed his or her settlement check. Plaintiffs in this case challenged the settlement agreement and the award of attorneys fees. Further, they asked for a trust accounting regarding the use of the settlement funds. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the cases that asked for an accounting of the use of the trust's funds; one case was dismissed as moot; in the third case, the Court granted a writ of mandamus as to all portions of a circuit court order that sought review of the Abernathy trust document as compared to the terms of the settlement agreement. The circuit court was directed to lift any freeze of distributions from the trust. View "Bates v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Wade Tucker, the Wendell H. Cook, Sr. Testamentary Trust, and HealthSouth Corporation appealed a circuit court's partial summary judgment in favor of the Richard M. Scrushy Charitable Foundation. In 2009, the court entered a judgment against the Scrushy Foundation in favor of Plaintiffs for approximately $2.7 billion. As part of their efforts to collect on the judgment, Plaintiffs issued a process of garnishment to the Foundation. The Foundation responded to the garnishment by denying that it had possession or control of any belongings to Mr. Scrushy. Plaintiffs then contested the Foundation's response alleging, among other things, that Mr. Scrushy "dominated and controlled" the Foundation such that it was his alter ego. The Foundation did not respond to Plaintiffs' garnishment contest, but moved for summary judgment a few months later on all of Plaintiffs' claims. The Foundation maintained that Plaintiffs' actions were time barred. The Foundation’s motion did not address Plaintiffs' garnishment contest. Ultimately, the circuit court entered a summary judgment in favor of the Foundation concerning Plaintiffs’ clams brought under the Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (AUFTA), finding that Plaintiffs' claims under the statute were time-barred. With regard to the garnishment contest, the court entered summary judgment again, holding that Plaintiffs' claims arose from transfers Mr. Scrushy made to the Foundation rather than upon the Judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court exceeded its discretion by conducting a hearing on the Foundation's request for a summary judgment in Plaintiffs' garnishment contest on less than ten days' notice in violation of the rules of procedure and over Plaintiffs' objections. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Circuit Court's summary judgment "insofar as it considered the Plaintiffs' garnishment contest," and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tucker v. Richard M. Scrushy Charitable Foundation, Inc " on Justia Law

John McGee (Jack) appealed the grant of summary judgment and a judgment as a matter of law in favor of his brother Willis McGee individually and in his capacity as executor of their mother Elizabeth's estate. Wills appealed the trial court's denial of his request for attorney fees when his brother contested their mother's will. Shortly after Willis presented the will for probate, Jack filed suit to contest the will. He claimed it was not executed as required by law, Mrs. McGee lacked testamentary capacity, and that the will was the product of undue influence. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Willis on all counts of Jack's complaint except the undue-influence count, which was tried to a jury. However, at the close of Jack's case, the trial court entered a judgment as a matter of law (JML) in favor of Willis on that count, "with leave for [Willis] to prove reasonable costs and fees." Upon careful review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed part, and reversed part of the trial court's decision. The Court found that Jack presented no credible evidence to support any ground upon which he challenged his mother's will. Therefore, the Court concluded the trial court erred in refusing to award Willis fees and costs. The Court remanded the case with regard to an issue of whether Jack converted certain items from his mother's estate prior to her death, but in all other respects, affirmed the trial court's decisions. View "McGee v. McGee" on Justia Law

In May 2008, seven-year-old Jordan Alexander Robertson was placed in foster care at the home of Verlin Spurgeon and Carol Spurgeon. In June 2008, Jordan drowned in the Spurgeons' swimming pool. James Brakefield, as administrator of Jordan's estate, sued the Spurgeons, among others, in circuit court alleging that they had negligently and/or wantonly caused Jordan's death. The Spurgeons moved the circuit court for a summary judgment, alleging, among other things, that the claims were barred by the doctrines of parental, State, and State-agent immunity. The circuit court denied the motion. The Spurgeons petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss the claims against them. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted their petition in part and issued the writ to direct the circuit court to dismiss the negligence claims against the Spurgeons. In all other respects, the Court denied the petition. View "Brakefield v. Alabama Dept. of Human Resources" on Justia Law