Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Steven Kraselsky, personal representative of the estate of his deceased mother Marcia Kraselsky, sued Dr. Calderwood and Dr. Calderwood's employer, Huntsville Clinic, alleging that Marcia died as a result of Dr. Calderwood's order that Marcia be given Demerol in spite of the fact that Dr. Calderwood knew she had previously professed to having an allergy to Demerol. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Dr. Calderwood and Huntsville Clinic, and Steven appealed that judgment to the Supreme Court. "Assuming, arguendo, that Dr. Calderwood breached the standard of care by ordering that Demerol be administered to Marcia, and, noting again that Dr. Calderwood strongly contests that fact, the summary judgment entered by the trial court is nevertheless due to be affirmed because there is no evidence in the record indicating that the administration of the Demerol to Marcia proximately caused the decline in her health leading to her death." View "Kraselsky v. Calderwood" on Justia Law

Bessie Kirksey appealed a probate court order vacating its order discharging Kirksey as administrator ad litem of the estate of Kirksey's sister, Willie Mae Graves, deceased. Iris Johnson, Darryl Thomas, Dorothy McLemore, John McLemore, Jr., Jerrick McLemore, Frederick Pryor, Jr., Rafeal Santece Powell, Nyya Nicole Marshall, Brandon LeMar Marshall, and Jeffrey Sams (alleged heirs of Graves) cross-appealed the probate court's order insofar as it denied their motion to transfer the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court based on the alleged lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the probate court. The Supreme Court treated the cross-appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus, styled the case accordingly, dismissed the appeal, granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Kirksey v. Johnson et al." on Justia Law

The decedent died in Monroe County in Spring, 2013. She had three adult children who survived her: Alice Harper-Taylor, William C. Harper, and James R. Harper. The decedent's husband died in 2002. Alice filed in Monroe County a petition to probate a 1995 will allegedly executed by the decedent. In her petition, Alice acknowledged that there was in existence a 2007 will that purported to be the will of the decedent, but she challenged the validity of the 2007 will on several grounds, including lack of mental capacity and the existence of a reciprocal will by the decedent's husband that had been admitted to probate in 2002. The Monroe County probate judge recused himself from hearing the petition, and the Supreme Court appointed a special probate judge to hear the proceedings in Monroe County. Meanwhile, in early 2014, William filed a petition in Escambia County to probate a 2007 will allegedly executed by the decedent. Alice filed a motion to dismiss and/or to stay the proceeding in Escambia County until the proper venue for the probate proceeding was determined. The Escambia Probate Court admitted the 2007 will to probate and issued letters testamentary to William, as the personal representative named in the 2007 will. Alice appealed the Escambia Court's decision, while William filed a motion to dismiss Alice's petition to probate the 1995 will in Monroe County. The Monroe Probate Court granted William's motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Alice appealed the Monroe Probate Court's grant of the motion to dismiss her petition to probate the 1995 will (case no. 1130884). In case no. 1130587, Alice appealed the Escambia Probate Court's admission to probate the 2007 will, and in case no. 1130884, she appealed the Monroe Probate Court's order granting the motion to dismiss her petition to probate the 1995 will. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that venue in this case was proper in the Monroe Probate Court, therefore, the Court reversed the Escambia Court's judgment admitting the 2007 will. Furthermore, the Court concluded the Monroe Court erred in dismissing Alice's petition. The case was remanded to Monroe County for further proceedings. View "In the matter of the Estate of Alice Earle F. Harper" on Justia Law

Edward "Tiger" Ferguson, V. appealed a probate court's judgment awarding an omitted-spouse share of his stepfather's estate to Katina Critopoulos. Dimitrios Critopoulos (the decedent) died in 2012. The decedent had no children. His parents predeceased him, and he had no siblings. At the time of his death, the decedent was married to Katina. The couple had wed less than a year earlier. The decedent had a valid will at the time of his death, but the will, which was executed prior to their marriage, made no provision for Katina. The decedent's first wife, Dorothy Marie Hayes Critopoulos, had been married to the decedent for 35 years when she predeceased him in 2009. Dorothy had three children from a prior marriage: Crystal M. Hanawalt, Tiger, and Timothy Ferguson ("Tim"). Although the decedent did not adopt Crystal, Tiger, and Tim, it was undisputed that the three enjoyed a parent-child relationship with the decedent. Crystal, Tiger, and Tim were named as the residual legatees under the decedent's will. When the will was probated, Katina filed a petition for an omitted-spouse share. The probate court granted Katina's request. Tiger appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: the record showed that the amount of the transfers made during the marriage, along with the testimony that the decedent considered the terms of his will, the fact that Katina was not included in the will, the fact that the decedent did not change his will, and the fact that the will ultimately benefited Dorothy's children provided reasonable proof to satisfy Tiger's burden of proving an exception to the omitted-spouse share under the facts of this case. "[I]t was the main role of the probate court in this case to apply the law to the largely undisputed material facts." View "Ferguson v. Critopoulos " on Justia Law

Brandy Matthews and Joshua Taylor Matthews were married in 2004. In 2011, Brandy died as a result of gunshot wounds inflicted by Joshua. Brandy's death was determined to be a homicide. On the same date, Joshua died as a result of a self-inflicted gunshot wound. Brandy and Joshua both died intestate. Deborah Willingham (Brandy's mother) was appointed by the Probate Court as the administrator of Brandy's estate. Rodney Matthews (Joshua's brother) was appointed as the administrator of Joshua's estate. Willingham filed for a declaratory judgment, stating that there was a justiciable controversy between Brandy's estate and Joshua's estate as to their respective rights, duties, and liabilities based on Willingham's interpretation of section 43-8-253 ("the Slayer's statute). She contended that, upon application of the statute, Joshua would have been unable to inherit from Brandy, and that his property was to pass as if he had predeceased Brandy. Matthews filed a response to Willingham's motion for a summary judgment, arguing that the statute only addressed how Brandy's estate would pass but not how Joshua's estate would pass, and that it therefore would have no bearing on the administration of Joshua's estate. The trial court entered a summary judgment declaring that 43-8-253 applied to the passing of Brandy's estate but not to the passing of Joshua's. Willingham appealed that judgment to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that Willingham did not establish that the trial court erred in finding that 43-8-253 was not applicable to the administration of Joshua's estate. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Willingham v. Matthews" on Justia Law

Defendant Franklin Stephens appealed a circuit court order granting an injunction to plaintiff Hazel Colley. Franklin is nephew to Sara Dees and Colley. In late 2011, Dees was residing at Troy Health and Rehabilitation Center. On approximately January 15, 2012, Stephens checked Dees out of the center and moved her back into her house in Troy. Stephens and an unidentified female companion also moved into the house and began caring for Dees. Colley alleged that Stephens thereafter began restricting access to Dees, preventing Colley and Dees's friends from speaking with her on the telephone or visiting with her outside his or his female companion's presence. Colley, who lives in Opelika, alleged she had previously had a close relationship with her sister and had stayed with her for weeks at a time to help with her medical needs; however, she alleged once Stephens moved into Dees's house Stephens would no longer allow her to stay with Dees overnight. Throughout 2012, Stephens took steps to "assist" Dees: (1) in executing a durable power of attorney; drafting a new will (replacing Colley as executor of Dees' estate and naming himself sole heir); and adding himself to all of Dees' bank accounts. Dees died in early 2013; Stephens thereafter began exercising control of her accounts. As executor, Stephens submitted Dees' will to probate. Colley moved the probate and circuit courts to set aside the power of attorney and will executed in 2012 alleging Stephens procured them via fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence. The circuit court granted Colley's request for injunctive relief. On appeal, Stephens argues both that Colley failed to establish by competent evidence the four elements set forth in Alabama case law and that the circuit court's preliminary-injunction order did not comply with Rule 65(d)(2). In this case, the Supreme Court concluded that it was "clear on its face" that the circuit court's order did not comply with Rule 65(d)(2) because the circuit court failed to state its reasons for entering the preliminary injunction. "This noncompliance obviates the need to consider Stephens's other argument that there was insufficient evidence before the circuit court to merit the entry of a preliminary injunction." The injunction order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Stephens v. Colley " on Justia Law

The Boys and Girls Clubs of South Alabama, Inc. ("BGCSA"), sought a writ of mandamus to order the Baldwin Circuit Court to dismiss a declaratory-judgment action filed against it and The Community Foundation of South Alabama by the attorney general of Alabama, Fairhope-Point Clear Rotary Youth Programs, Inc. ("Rotary Inc."), and Ruff Wilson Youth Organizations, Inc. ("Wilson Inc.") In 1996, B.R. Wilson, Jr., one of the incorporators and a principal benefactor of BGCSA, executed a deed transferring to BGCSA approximately 17 acres of real estate. Contemporaneously with the execution of the deed, Wilson gave a letter to BGCSA that stated Wilson's intentions and stipulations concerning his gift of the property. The letter stated that BGCSA was "'free to ultimately dispose of this property,'" but that it was Wilson's "'desire and understanding that [BGCSA] will use the proceeds from any such disposition for [BGCSA's] facilities and/or activities in the Fairhope–Point Clear area.'" Wilson died in 1997. In 2010, the Eastern Shore Clubs filed an action in the Baldwin Circuit Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against BGCSA. The Eastern Shore Clubs alleged that BGCSA "ha[d] used," or, perhaps, was "anticipat[ing] using," the proceeds from the sale of the property for its own operations, rather than for the benefit of the Eastern Shore Clubs. In 2012, the Baldwin Circuit Court entered a judgment concluding Wilson's intent was that the Wilson funds should be used for the "exclusive benefit of the Fairhope and Daphne Clubs." The Baldwin Circuit Court ordered the disbursal of the remainder of the Wilson funds. This case was the third action that has come before the Supreme Court arising out the dispute between BGCSA and the Eastern Shore Clubs over the Wilson funds. The Supreme Court concluded Section 6-5-440 compelled dismissal of this case because another action involving the same cause and the same parties ("the Mobile action") was filed first. Therefore, the Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the Baldwin Circuit Court to vacate its most recent order in this case, and to enter an order dismissing this case. View "Alabama et al. v. Boys And Girls Clubs of South Alabama, Inc." on Justia Law

A series of appeals before the Alabama Supreme Court involved a challenge to the disposition of the estate of A.V. Campbell, Sr., who died in 1977. He had at least four children: A.V. Campbell, Jr., William J. Campbell, Sr., Ethel C. Taylor, and Archie Paul Campbell. His will was admitted to probate in 1977; those proceedings languished in the probate court until 2005. During this time, A.V., Jr., and Archie Paul Campbell died. Ethel was ultimately named the executrix of the estate. In 2005, Gladys Campbell, one of Archie Paul Campbell's descendants, filed a petition to remove the probate proceedings to the Baldwin Circuit Court. She alleged, among other things, that Ethel, as the executrix, had failed to have the estate's property devised under the terms of the will. After several hearings, in 2006, the circuit court issued a judgment that, among other things, distributed property according to the testator's will. Specifically, certain property was awarded separately to (1) Ethel, (2) to Paula and Gladys, and (3) to "the heirs at law of William J. Campbell[, Sr.]." Jewel appealed that judgment, and the Supreme Court affirmed without issuing an opinion. In 2009, the underlying action was filed in the Baldwin Circuit Court: plaintiffs purported to be the heirs of William J. Campbell, Sr. Some plaintiffs participated in the 2005 circuit court action; others did not. This new action was described as a "complaint to set aside judicial decree" and was alleged to be filed "pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent action to set aside the 2006 judgment. The plaintiffs contended that, as the heirs of William J. Campbell, Sr., they were also heirs of A.V. Campbell, Sr., and were thus entitled to certain ownership interests in the property distributed in the 2005 circuit court action. Furthermore, plaintiffs alleged that they had not all been "named as parties" in the 2005 circuit court action at the time of the final adjudication," and "not subject to" and "not bound by" the 2006 judgment, and they asked that it be set aside. After various motions and after granting a motion by the defendants to strike certain affidavit testimony filed by plaintiffs, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Ethel. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the appeal as being from a nonfinal judgment. Proceedings resumed in the trial court; Ethel and the remaining defendants moved for a summary judgment. In case no. 1110057, plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants. In case no. 1110104, Paula and Gladys cross-appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to strike. In case no. 1110057, Jewel Campbell, Acie A. Campbell, William J. Campbell, Jr., Roy J. Campbell, Eva Campbell, William C. Campbell, Kelly Calvert, and Amanda Givens appealed summary judgment in favor of Ethel C. Taylor, Paula Buettner, Gladys A. Campbell, Jason Bennett, and Mendi Bennett. In case no. 1110104, Paula Buettner and Gladys A. Campbell cross-appealed the denial of their motion to strike certain affidavits filed by plaintiffs in opposition to the defendants' summary judgment motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in case no. 1110057; its holding in case no. 1110057 rendered moot the cross-appeal in case no. 1110104. View "Campbell et al. v. Taylor et al. " on Justia Law

The State of Alabama, the Alabama Department of Finance, and the Comptroller of the State of Alabama, nonparties to the underlying action, appealed a circuit court order denying the State's motion to intervene as of right. Mrs. Frances Ann Yarbrough died intestate with no heirs that were in the line of descendant distribution. As a result, her assets escheated to the State of Alabama. The Supreme Court ordered the Estate to pay certain expenses of the Estate, and then to pay the balance of the Estate's funds to the State of Alabama. In that same order, the Court ordered the State of Alabama to pay the escheated funds to the St. Clair County's Circuit Clerk's office to be used by the Clerk 'to rehire some of the employees lost to proration.' The State, through its counsel Mr. Bledsoe, stated that the Estate's escheated funds must be used or applied in furtherance of education in accordance with the Alabama Constitution.Through counsel, Mr. Bledsoe, declared that there was no objection to disbursing the Estate's escheated assets to the Pell City Board of Education and the St. Clair County Board of Education. Based on that representation, the Estate moved the Supreme Court to Alter, Amend, or Vacate its earlier order to direct the State to pay the Estate's escheated assets to the Pell City Board of Education and the St. Clair County Board of Education. The State objected to the Supreme Court's order. In turn, the Supreme Court treated the objection as a Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate, filed it with the circuit clerk, and set the matter for a hearing. Because the State was not a party to this matter, the State did not receive direct notice of the hearing. The Estate's counsel, Ms. Williams, however, provided the State notice of the hearing by e-mail to Mr. Bledsoe. The State did not appear at the hearing, and the Supreme Court denied the relief requested by the State. The circuit court then denied the State's motion to intervene. Because the circuit court failed to follow the Supreme Court's order, it reversed the circuit court's order denying the State's motion to intervene. "The circuit court exceeded its authority in attempting to appropriate the escheated funds." All issues having been decided on both the motion to intervene and the underlying action, a judgment was rendered for the State. View "Alabama et al. v. Estate Yarbrough" on Justia Law

Mary Leila Beasley Schaeffer and the estate of Emma Glass Beasley appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding compensatory damages and punitive damages on mismanagement-of-trust and conversion claims in an action by William Poellnitz, as administrator of the estate of Edwin Glass Young, Adele Young Sommers, and Willard Young. The Beasleys raised five issues on appeal: (1) it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law (JML) on the mismanagement-of-trust claim; (2) it was entitled to a JML on the conversion claim; (3) punitive damages were not warranted, or in the alternative, the trial court improperly apportioned the punitive damages and that they were excessive and must be vacated or remitted; (4) it was entitled to a JML on the Youngs claim to a one-half ownership interest in the furnishings and heirlooms from the estate or to a reduction of the value of those furnishings and heirlooms; and (5) it was entitled to a JML on all of its counterclaims for moneys loaned to the Youngs. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying the Beasleys motions for a JML as to the mismanagement-of-trust claim. The Court also reversed the award of punitive damages with respect to that claim. The trial court also erred in denying the motion for a JML filed by Emma's estate as to the conversion claim. The Court affirmed as to the conversion claim against Mary, including the amount of the compensatory damages awarded the Youngs on that claim. However, because there was no clear and convincing evidence that Mary "consciously and deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice," the Court reversed the trial court's judgment insofar as it awarded punitive damages on the conversion claim against Mary, as well as against Emma's estate. The Court affirmed the judgment as to the Young branch's one-half interest in the furnishings and heirlooms in the house and on the Beasleys counterclaims for money loaned. View "Beasley v. Poellnitz" on Justia Law