Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Diversicare Leasing Corp. d/b/a Canterbury Healthcare Facility ("Canterbury") appealed an order denying its motion seeking to compel arbitration of a wrongful-death claim filed by Betty Hubbard, as the personal representative of the estate of Johnathan Hubbard. Johnathan was diagnosed with cerebral palsy when he was six months old, which caused him to be developmentally delayed and to suffer from a seizure disorder. Johnathan could not walk and was confined to a wheelchair his entire life. He could not speak; he could not feed, clean, or dress himself; he had no use of his hands; and he could not otherwise communicate his needs to others. Johnathan spent various periods of his life in residential-care facilities. Betty made all health-care decisions relating to Johnathan's care and executed all documents in furtherance of that care. Betty executed a number of documents upon Johnathan's admission to Canterbury, including the admission agreement and the arbitration agreement made the basis of this appeal. Johnathan was found unresponsive by the Canterbury staff in early 2011, and was transferred to a local hospital. Johnathan was diagnosed with sepsis; he died on February 21, 2011. Betty sued Canterbury asserting a wrongful-death claim. Canterbury moved the trial court to compel arbitration of Betty's wrongful-death claim and to stay the claim pending the arbitration. Betty argued in response to the motion to compel that she lacked the legal authority to bind Johnathan to the arbitration agreement because at the time the agreement was executed Johnathan was incapacitated and was 21 years old and had reached the age of majority, and she did not hold his power of attorney nor had she been appointed his personal representative or guardian by any court. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying Canterbury's motion to compel arbitration and to stay the proceedings. Canterbury appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Betty could not be bound to the arbitration agreement in her capacity as the personal representative of Johnathan's estate when she signed the arbitration agreement in what amounts to her capacity as Johnathan's relative or next friend. View "Diversicare Leasing Corp. v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

Larry Butler, individually and as executor of the Estate of Elizabeth S. Butler, appealed a circuit court judgment declaring void the will of Elizabeth S. Butler executed in October 2012, and setting aside the Probate Court's admission of that will to probate. Ned Butler, Sr. ("Ned"), and Elizabeth Butler ("Betty") were married and had three children, Ned N. Butler, Jr., Steve Butler, and Michael Robin Butler ("Robin"). In July 2008, after numerous discussions about their estate, Ned and Betty executed a document entitled The Butler Family Trust, a joint revocable living trust that contained provisions for the well being of themselves, their children, and their grandchildren. Ned and Betty executed wills identical in all material respects that provided that their assets pour over into The Butler Family Trust at their deaths. In September 2011, Ned and Betty executed new wills that were virtually identical to their July 2008 wills with the exception that different alternate executors were named. Ned died in late 2011. In October 2012, Betty executed a will in which she expressly revoked all other wills and codicils. The distribution of Betty's estate in this new will differed from the distribution of her estate as provided in The Butler Family Trust; Larry was named executor of her will. Betty died in late 2013. The Probate Court admitted Betty's 2012 will to probate in 2014. The following day, Ned Jr.'s children filed a complaint with the Circuit Court against Larry, individually and as executor of Betty's estate, contesting Betty's 2012 will. The circuit court set aside Betty's will and declared it void. Larry moved to vacate the circuit court's judgment, arguing that the court erred in applying 43-8-250, Ala. Code 1975, to the facts of this case because, as he contended, there was language in the Butler Family Trust prohibiting Betty from changing the trust after Ned's death, but that there was no language in either the Family Trust or Betty's earlier wills creating a contract that prohibited her from changing anything else. The circuit court denied the motion, and Larry appealed. Because the evidence did not establish that Betty entered into a contract not to revoke her will or a devise, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court's judgment declaring Betty's 2012 will to be void and setting aside the probate court's order to admit that will to probate because Betty had executed a contract not to revoke her 2011 will was erroneous. View "Butler v. Butler" on Justia Law

In 2011, 74-year-old Garnell Wilcoxon lived alone. He suffered a stroke, awoke on the floor of his bedroom covered in sweat, feeling sore and with no memory of how he got there. Wilcoxon was admitted to the Troy Regional Medical Center for analysis and treatment for approximately one year before he died. Following Wilcoxon's death, Brenda McFarland, one of Wilcoxon's daughters, filed a complaint as the personal representative for Wilcoxon's estate, asserting claims for : (1) medical malpractice; (2) negligence; (3) breach of contract; (4) negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention; and (5) loss of consortium. In its answer, Troy Health asserted, in part, that McFarland's claims were barred from being litigated in a court of law "by virtue of an arbitration agreement entered into between plaintiff and defendant." Troy Health then moved to compel arbitration, asserting that forms signed by one of Wilcoxon's other daughters, acting as his attorney-in-fact, contained a valid and enforceable arbitration clause. McFarland argued that "Wilcoxon did not have the mental capacity to enter into the contract with [Troy Health,] and he did not have the mental capacity to give legal authority to enter into contracts on his behalf with" relatives who initially helped admit him to Troy Health facilities when he first fell ill. According to McFarland, "[t]he medical records document that Wilcoxon was habitually and/or permanently incompetent." Therefore, McFarland argued, both a 2011 arbitration agreement and a 2012 arbitration agreement were invalid. The circuit court denied Troy Health's motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that McFarland failed to prove that Wilcoxon was mentally incompetent when he executed a 2012 durable power of attorney naming his other daughter as his attorney-in-fact, and also failed to demonstrate that Wilcoxon was "permanently incompetent" before that date, and because there was no other issue concerning the validity of the 2012 arbitration agreement. View "Troy Health and Rehabilitation Center v. McFarland" on Justia Law

Gerri Rogers appealed a Probate Court order removing her as the personal representative of the estate of Ilse Martha Nagel. Appellee Sigrid Hansen argued that Rogers's appeal should have been dismissed because dismissed because Rogers failed to post bond as required by section 12-22-24, Ala. Code 1975. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with Hansen and dismissed the appeal. View "Rogers v. Hansen" on Justia Law

In 2009, Christopher Wilson was working for the City of Sumiton. Christopher and his supervisor, Michael Carr, had been sent to mow grass on Bryan Road. Tony Henderson, the driver of the City's knuckle-boom truck, radioed Carr and asked him and a work crew to come and flag traffic for him while he was operating the knuckle-boom truck on Sullivan Road, "just over the knob." Carr, Christopher, and the crew went to Sullivan Road. While the knuckle-boom truck was backing up, part of it became stuck. The knuckle-boom was sticking out into the road perpendicular to the road; part of it was in the lane of travel on Sullivan Road for traffic coming from Sumiton. Carr testified that, when he received the call from Henderson, it was a situation that had to be attended to immediately and that he and Christopher did not have time to return to Bryan Road to get Christopher's safety vest. At some point, two of the crew who were near Christopher went to the city truck to get cigarettes and weren't monitoring the traffic. Christopher was standing on the side of the road next to the city truck, and he was "kind of" flagging traffic until the crew got their cigarettes. Frank Lemley had gotten off work that afternoon after working 16.5 hours at the Miller Steam Plant. Lemley testified that, as he topped the rise on Sullivan Road, he saw the knuckle-boom truck in the roadway. He testified that Christopher kept going and threw up both hands, thinking that Christopher said "Stop." He testified that he put on his brakes as soon as he saw Christopher and that he "locked [his] truck down and slid 23 feet." Lemley was not able to stop in time, and his vehicle struck Christopher, who later died of his injuries. Terry Wilson, Christopher's father, filed a wrongful-death action against Lemley. The defendant, Frank Lemley, appealed a trial court order granting Terry's motion for a new trial filed after a jury had returned a verdict in his favor. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the jury was presented with conflicting evidence. "When the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to Lemley and all reasonable inferences the jury was free to draw are indulged, it is easily perceivable from the record that the jury verdict in favor of Lemley as to the negligence and wantonness claims was supported by the evidence." View "Lemley v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Ruth Mary Higgins Baker ("Ruth") petitioned the Supreme Court for review the Court of Civil Appeals' affirmance, without an opinion, of the judgment of the Circuit Court which denied her petition to be appointed the personal representative of the estate of her mother Ruth G. Higgins. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court's judgment and, specifically, whether the circuit court had obtained jurisdiction over Higgins's estate. After careful consideration of the trial court and appellate court proceedings, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded the case for that court to dismiss the appeal and to instruct the circuit court to vacate its orders removing the matter from the probate court, denying Ruth's petition for appointment as the administrator with the will annexed of Higgins's estate and appointing another administrator instead. View "Ex parte Ruth Mary Higgins Baker." on Justia Law

C.B. Grant, the administrator of the estate of Phillip Frazier, filed a wrongful-death action. Mitarazza Davis, Frazier's widow, moved to intervene in the lawsuit, alleging that Grant had secured his appointment as administrator of the estate through fraud and requesting that the wrongful-death action be stayed pending the resolution of the dispute over the administration of the estate by the Lowndes Probate Court. The circuit court declared Grant's appointment as administrator of the estate void and declared Davis to be the rightful party to serve as administrator of the estate. The court stayed the wrongful-death action pending the Probate Court's appointment of Davis as the administrator of Frazier's estate. Grant petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its order and to lift the stay. After review, the Supreme Court granted the petition in part and denied it in part: the petition was granted insofar as it challenged the circuit court's purported exercise of jurisdiction over matters related to the appointment of an administrator and the administration of Frazier's estate. To the extent the circuit court's order declared the letters of administration issued to Grant to be void and declared Davis the proper administrator of Frazier's estate, the Supreme Court ordered the circuit court to vacate that part of its order. As to Grant's request for relief from the stay, however, the Supreme Court denied the petition. View "Ex parte C.B. Grant, as admin. of the Estate of Phillip Frazier" on Justia Law

Korie Saylor appealed the grant of summary judgment denying her claim for an elective share of the estate of her deceased husband, Woodie Saylor. Woodie and Korie married in October 2005. Woodie died in May 2011. In addition to Korie, Woodie was survived by Jonathan Saylor, an adult son from Woodie's previous marriage. Contemporaneously with the filing of the petition to probate Woodie's will, Jonathan, as personal representative of the estate, also filed a document executed by Korie. In that document, Korie acknowledged that she had received notice of the filing of the petition to probate Woodie's will, and she consented to the admission of the will to probate without further notice to her. Korie did not file a petition for an elective share within six months after the will was admitted to probate. Jonathan objected objected to Korie's request for an extension of time to file her petition for an elective share. The probate court entered an order granting Korie's request for an extension of time and an order allowing Korie's claim to take an elective share of the estate. The latter order did not adjudicate the amount of that elective share; it set a date on which the probate court would conduct a hearing to determine that amount and then enter a further order with respect thereto. In November 2012, the personal representative filed a motion for a summary judgment at the circuit court as to Korie's claim for an elective share, alleging that the probate court should have denied Korie's claim on grounds that her petition was not timely filed and that, under the circumstances presented, the probate court had no authority to extend the time for Korie to exercise her right of election. The Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court was correct in rejecting Korie's untimely petition for an elective share. View "Saylor v. Saylor" on Justia Law

Raymond Adams petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Autauga Circuit Court: (1) to remove Clifford Wayne Cleveland II ("Chip" or "Chip Cleveland") as coexecutor of the estate of Clifford Wayne Cleveland; (2) to vacate its order prohibiting the estate from hiring an attorney or a certified public accountant ("CPA"); (3) to compel Chip and his sister, Celeste Cleveland Minor, to produce property and assets of the estate that are in their possession; and (4) to impose sanctions on Chip and Minor. Upon careful consideration of the facts in record, the Supreme Court agreed with Adams that the circuit court erred in substituting Chip as a coexecutor of Cleveland's estate. However, because the circuit court had not yet ruled on Adams's motion to remove Chip as coexecutor, Adams did not demonstrate that the circuit court refused to perform an imperative duty. Similarly, Adams did not demonstrate that, at this time, he was entitled to a writ of mandamus, directing the circuit court to vacate its order prohibiting the hiring of an accountant or an attorney to assist with the administration of the estate, or to direct the circuit court to grant his motions to compel production of estate property and assets and to impose sanctions against Chip and Minor. Therefore, the Supreme Court denied Adams's petition for mandamus relief. View "In re: Cleveland II v. Raymond Adams" on Justia Law

Steven Kraselsky, personal representative of the estate of his deceased mother Marcia Kraselsky, sued Dr. Calderwood and Dr. Calderwood's employer, Huntsville Clinic, alleging that Marcia died as a result of Dr. Calderwood's order that Marcia be given Demerol in spite of the fact that Dr. Calderwood knew she had previously professed to having an allergy to Demerol. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Dr. Calderwood and Huntsville Clinic, and Steven appealed that judgment to the Supreme Court. "Assuming, arguendo, that Dr. Calderwood breached the standard of care by ordering that Demerol be administered to Marcia, and, noting again that Dr. Calderwood strongly contests that fact, the summary judgment entered by the trial court is nevertheless due to be affirmed because there is no evidence in the record indicating that the administration of the Demerol to Marcia proximately caused the decline in her health leading to her death." View "Kraselsky v. Calderwood" on Justia Law