Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Northstar Anesthesia of Alabama, LLC ("Northstar"), and Maria Bolyard, CRNA; Parkway Medical Clinic, Inc., d/b/a Parkway Medical Center ("Parkway"); and Jeffrey Markham, M.D. ("Dr. Markham") (collectively referred to as "appellants"), filed three petitions for a permissive appeal of Circuit Court orders denying their motions for a summary judgment in a wrongful-death action brought by Paula Noble ("Paula"), as personal representative of the estate of Thomas Noble ("Thomas"). Thomas died in late 2011. In early 2012, Paula was appointed personal representative of Thomas' estate. When the business of the estate had closed, Paula petitioned to be discharged as personal representative. Then in 2013 (three days before the statute of limitations was set to run), Paula filed a wrongful-death action against the appellants. A month after filing her complaint, and having become aware of the fact that she lacked the representative capacity to maintain the wrongful-death action because she had been discharged and released as the personal representative of Thomas's estate before she commenced the action, Paula filed a petition to "re-open" Thomas's estate "so that she [could] continue as Personal Representative" for purposes of pursuing the wrongful-death action she filed. Appellants moved to dismiss, citing Paula's capacity to bring suit on behalf of the estate. After review, the Supreme Court found that Paula's initial complaint was a nullity. As a result, appellants were not under an obligation to raise the affirmative defense of capacity because the filing of Paula's complaint was "an act or proceeding in a cause which the opposite party may treat as though it had not taken place, or which has absolutely no legal force or effect." As such, the Court reversed the circuit court's order denying appellants' summary-judgment motions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Markham v. Noble" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over who was the proper beneficiary of an individual retirement account ("IRA") owned by decedent Edward F. Dees, Sr. ("Dees"). Timothy Dees, Edward Dees, Jr., and Donna Dees Maddox, Dees's adult children, appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Dees's surviving spouse, Martha Lafaye Dees. Martha cross-appealed the dismissal of her claims against Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, the financial-services firm that managed the IRA. The children argued that it was their father's intent to pass the funds in the IRA to his natural children. They contended that, because no copy of a signed IRA agreement had been produced, there was no evidence indicating that Dees had assented to any default-beneficiary provision. Thus, they argued, the funds in the IRA should have passed through Dees's estate. In her cross-motion for a summary judgment, Martha argued that the default-beneficiary provisions of the IRA agreement applied. Specifically, she argued that, even if Dees had originally executed a beneficiary-designation form naming the children as contingent beneficiaries, there was uncontradicted evidence that Dees had executed a new beneficiary-designation form naming her as the sole beneficiary. The trial court concluded that neither side had established that Dees had provided Morgan Stanley with a beneficiary-designation form and that, therefore, the default provisions of the IRA agreement applied. Thus, in accordance with those provisions, the trial court ordered Morgan Stanley to distribute the proceeds of the IRA to Martha. The court dismissed all remaining claims sua sponte, including Martha's tort claims against Morgan Stanley. After review of the trial court record, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded there were "a myriad" of genuine issues of material fact that made summary judgment improper in this case. As such, summary judgment granted to Martha was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Dees v. Dees" on Justia Law

Richard Watters petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to vacate its order denying his motion for a summary judgment as to count one of an amended complaint filed by Michael Gamble, in Gamble's capacity as administrator of the Estate of Barbara Ruth Findley Long ("Long"), deceased. Count one asserted a legal-malpractice claim against Watters under the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act ("the ALSLA"), alleging breach of a fiduciary duty. This proceeding involved title to real property located in Conecuh County, which was owned by Robert Findley at the time of his death. Long retained Watters & Associates, of which Watters was a partner, to represent her "in obtaining estate assets" of Findley, her deceased father. Watters filed suit seeking a declaration of Long's ownership in family property located in Conecuh County. The Circuit Court declaring that Long owned a one-sixth interest (approximately 30 acres) in the Conecuh County property Shortly thereafter, Long discharged Watters from any further representation in the declaratory-judgment action. Watters filed an attorney's lien against the Conecuh property to secure the payment of his attorney fees. Family members eventually quitclaimed their interests to Long. Taxes for 2006 weren't paid on the property, and Long's cousin Larry Findley purchased the property at a tax sale. According to Watters, Long asked him for a loan to redeem the property from the tax sale. Watters told Long that Langley would not record the quitclaim deed if Long repaid the loan within 30 days of redeeming the property; that, in the event the deed was recorded, any claim Watters might have against Long for services rendered regarding her deceased father's estate would be satisfied; and that Watters and Long agreed to terms concerning the loan arrangement. This arrangement was never reduced to writing. Long executed a quitclaim deed prepared by Watters, conveying title to the Conecuh property to "Langley & Watters, LLP." In 2010, Watters submitted to the Conecuh Probate Court a letter, enclosing "his client's" application for redemption of the Conecuh property. Long died on April 2, 2013, and a few months later, the Conecuh Probate Court appointed Gamble as administrator of Long's estate. Gamble filed a complaint against Watters, asserting claims of legal malpractice among other things. After review of this case, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Watters had another adequate remedy (i.e., an appeal) other than a writ of mandamus. Therefore, the Court denied relief. View "Ex parte Richard L. Watters." on Justia Law

These matters involved the administration of an estate. In case no. 1141293, Raymond Adams, the executor of the estate of Clifford Wayne Cleveland, appealed the preliminary injunction issued against him at the request of the beneficiaries of the estate, Clifford Wayne Cleveland II ("Chip") and Celeste Cleveland Minor. In case no. 1140732, Adams petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court: (1) to require the beneficiaries of the estate to produce certain materials disclosing the assets and liabilities of the estate; (2) to vacate its order prohibiting Adams from hiring attorneys and accountants to assist him with the administration of the estate; (3) to vacate its order requiring Adams to produce certain corporate documents; and (4) to sanction the beneficiaries; and (5) to direct the trial judge to recuse himself from further presiding over the underlying case. The decedent Cleveland died with of assets whose estimated value was between $2 million and $3 million; however, those assets were significantly encumbered, rendering the estate potentially insolvent. In 1140732, the Supreme Court denied the petition, and consequently, reversed and remanded in 1141293: "Chip and Minor's argument fails to acknowledge the language of Rule 65(d)(2) as well as the numerous decisions of this Court reaffirming that the requirements of Rule 65(d)(2) are mandatory. [. . .] the trial court's order does explain what issue the trial court intends to resolve during the term of the injunction, it wholly fails to state the specific grounds on which the injunction itself issued. That omission, alone, requires reversal of the trial court's order, regardless of the potential underlying merit." View "Adams v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

Liberty National Life Insurance Company petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Civil Appeals' decision: (1) holding, as a matter of first impression, that 27-14-3(f), Ala. Code 1975, required an insurable interest in a life-insurance policy to exist at a point other than the time at which the policy becomes effective; and (2) reversing the trial court's dismissal of the complaint filed by Misty Ann Barton, as administratrix of the estate of Benjamin H. Miller, Jr, in which Barton alleged that Liberty National was negligent in allowing Leanne Miller, Benjamin Jr.'s stepmother, to substitute herself as beneficiary of an insurance policy insuring the life of Benjamin Jr. The Court granted Liberty National's petition, and, affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals. Barton alleged that Liberty National was negligent in allowing Leanne to name herself as beneficiary of an insurance policy that was owned by Benjamin Sr. at his death and, pursuant to the terms of the policy, payable to Benjamin Jr.'s estate. The Court found that the policy was not produced or viewed by the trial court, nor had any discovery ensued concerning ownership of the policy, and who exactly had the right to effect a beneficiary change. Accordingly, in viewing the allegations of Barton's complaint most strongly in Barton's favor, it appeared to the Supreme Court that Barton could, under certain circumstances, maintain a cause of action against Liberty National alleging negligence on its part in allowing Leanne, either as personal representative of Benjamin Sr.'s estate or individually, to substitute herself as beneficiary on the policy insuring Benjamin Jr.'s life. The Court affirmed that portion of the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion reversing the trial court's order dismissing Barton's complaint. The Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment insofar as it interpreted section 27-14-3(f) to require an insurable interest in personal insurance to exist at any point beyond the time the policy of insurance becomes effective. View "Ex parte Liberty National Life Insurance Company." on Justia Law

L.D. Owen III, as guardian ad litem for Wanda L. and Wesley A. Schlumpf ("Owen"), minor children, appealed a probate court order allowing the sale of real property held by the estate of James W. Schlumpf ("the decedent"). The decedent died intestate in 2014. James's two children, Wanda and Wesley, both of whom were under the age of majority, were the decedent's only surviving heirs. John Schlumpf, the decedent's brother, had legal custody of the Schlumpf children. At the time of the decedent's death, he owned real property in Baldwin County that he used as his personal residence. The probate court granted letters of administration for the decedent's estate to Romaine Scott. Scott decided to sell the decedent's real property and petitioned the probate court for permission; Owen and John objected to the petition for sale. The probate court entered an order granting Scott the authority to sell the property for the offered purchase price of $450,000. After the probate court entered the order for sale, it granted Scott's petition to resign as the administrator of the estate. The probate court appointed Harry M. D'Olive, Jr., as successor to Scott. Owen then appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that the probate court erred in ordering the sale of the property: upon the decedent's death, the Schlumpf children inherited the property subject to a mortgage on the property. Because the mortgagee did not file a claim against the estate, the mortgage was not a debt that could justify forcing the sale of the property to satisfy that mortgage. In the event the mortgage was not satisfied by the Schlumpf children, then the mortgagee had the remedy of foreclosure available if such an action became necessary to satisfy the debt. View "Schlumpf v. D'Olive" on Justia Law

Virginia Ladd appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Margaret Stockham, as personal representative of the estate of Herbert Stockham, deceased (appeal no. 1140365). Stockham cross-appealed the circuit court's denial of her motion for reimbursement of costs and attorney fees (appeal no. 1140407). Ladd was a beneficiary of three trusts that each held preferred and common stock in SVI Corporation ("SVI") (collectively, "the trusts"). Ladd sued Stockham for actions taken when Stockham served on the Board of Directors for SVI. After review of the specific facts entered in the circuit court record, the Alabama Supreme Court found no reversible error as to the grant of summary judgment in case 1140365. The Court concluded Stockham demonstrated that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying her request for reimbursement of costs and attorney fees. In case no. 1140407, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying Stockham's motion for the reimbursement of costs, attorney fees, and litigation expenses and remanded the case for the circuit court to reconsider Stockham's motion. View "Stockham v. Ladd" on Justia Law

Norman Ussery appealed a circuit court order dismissing his action in a will contest against Alan Terry ("Alan"), as executor of the estate of Donald R. Terry ("Donald"). Ussery argued that the circuit court's dismissal of his complaint conflicted with "Hons v. A. Bertolla & Sons," (537 So.2d 456 (Ala. 1988)), a case in which the Alabama Supreme Court interpreted the application of sections 43-8-199 and -200, Ala. Code 1975, included in the will-contest provisions of the Code. Alan argued in response: (1) that Ussery appealed as to only one of two grounds that Alan said were the circuit court's bases for dismissal; (2) that the circuit court ruled that joinder of indispensable parties was not possible and that Ussery failed to appeal that ruling; (3) that the circuit court correctly dismissed the will contest pursuant to the joinder requirements under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure; and (4) that "Hons" should have been overruled to the extent that it held that absent parties could be joined beyond the six-month period prescribed by 43-8-199. The Supreme Court disagreed with Alan's contentions on appeal, and reversed the circuit court. "After Ussery filed his complaint, the circuit court first should have determined whether it was a proper complaint under the provisions of 43-8-199. Then, if it was determined that the complaint met the statutory requirements, the circuit court, upon appropriate motion, should have joined 'interested parties' who were absent." View "Ussery v. Terry" on Justia Law

Emma Carter Hardy, acting on behalf of the estate of Julius Carter, Sr., appealed a final order entered by the Montgomery Circuit Court against her and in favor of Julius Hardin in a will contest. Hardy was the daughter of Julius Carter, Sr.; Hardin was the son of Thelma Carter Malone, who was also Carter's daughter. Hardy filed a petition with the Probate Court for letters of administration as to Carter's estate. Hardy alleged in the petition that Carter had died "leaving no Last Will and Testament, so far as [Hardy] knows or believes," and that the only asset of Carter's estate was a parcel of real property located in Montgomery County. The parcel of real property consisted of approximately 180 acres that Carter had farmed. At a hearing for the final settlement of the estate, Hardin filed a letter challenging the estate's administration. The Supreme Court found that the probate court noted Hardin failed to prove fraud as he alleged at the final settlement hearing. The Court therefore concluded the circuit court erred by reversing the probate court and rendering judgment in Hardin's favor. Accordingly, the circuit court was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Hardy ex rel. the Estate of Julius Carter, Sr. v. Hardin" on Justia Law

These appeals before the Supreme Court were the result of a family dispute that occurred following the death of Mr. B.J. Kirkley in 2011, concerning his will and his interest in Kirkley LLC.Karen Ann Kribel Kirkley, individually and as personal representative of the estate of B.J. Kirkley; Holly Muncie; and J. Alexander Muncie III ("Alex"), as trustee of the Karen Ann Kribel Kirkley Testamentary Trust appealed a circuit court's "order regarding granting of new trial" in favor of Donna Jo Kirkley Phillips and Kirkley, LLC (appeal no. 1130812). Donna Jo and Kirkley LLC cross-appealed the same order, but also filed a motion to dismiss the appeal filed by the estate plaintiffs on the basis that the order was not a final order and that the monetary judgment in the case has been satisfied (appeal no. 1130850). The Supreme Court agreed that the circuit court's order was not final, so the appeals were dismissed. View "Kirkley v. Phillips" on Justia Law