Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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In this case, a purchase agreement provided provided that the parties were obligated to close a real-estate sale unless the buyer -- Lafayette Land Acquisitions II, LLC ("Lafayette Land") -- rejected the deal in writing before the end of the due-diligence period. Although the parties disputed when that period began, and how long it lasted, it was undisputed that Lafayette Land never rejected the deal. Therefore, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the parties were obligated to close. Because the Circuit Court held otherwise, judgment was reversed and remanded. View "Lafayette Land Acquisitions II, LLC v. Walls" on Justia Law

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Sheryl Lyne, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Robert L. Kawzinski, filed suit against Debra Ann Kawzinski ("Debra Ann") to quiet title to a piece of real property to which Lyne and Debra Ann both claimed an ownership interest. Lyne further requested that the circuit court require the property to be sold and the proceeds divided among the rightful owners of the property. The circuit court entered a summary judgment in favor of Lyne. Debra Ann appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court dismissed Debra Ann's appeal as untimely filed. View "Kawzinski v. Lyne" on Justia Law

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Michael Upchurch, his brother David Upchurch, and his nephew Jason Upchurch owned several pieces of real property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. They signed a contract to sell the properties to third parties. However, before closing, Michael died. In this declaratory-judgment action, Michael's widow Carol Upchurch, individually and as the executor of Michael's estate, asserted, among other things, a claim to one-third of the proceeds from that sale. David and Jason filed a motion for a summary judgment, which the circuit court granted. The Alabama Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, Michael, David, and Jason's decision to enter into a contract to sell the properties severed their joint tenancy and that, as a result, Michael's estate was entitled to one-third of the proceeds from the sale of properties. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the trial court's judgment and remand the case for the entry of a judgment in favor of the estate. View "Upchurch v. Upchurch" on Justia Law

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Desiree Million owned property in Mentone, Alabama that bordered property owned by Steve Carpenter and Colleen Duffley. A boundary-line dispute arose; Million, acting pro se, ultimately filed suit against Carpenter, Duffley, and several other defendants who were involved in the dispute. Among others, Million named Albert Shumaker as a defendant; Shumaker, an attorney, had been retained by Carpenter and Duffley in relation to the boundary-line dispute and had sent, on behalf of Carpenter and Duffley, a cease-and-desist letter to Million. Upon Shumaker's motion, the circuit court entered an interlocutory order dismissing Shumaker from the action. Million, again acting pro se, appealed the circuit court's interlocutory order. The Alabama Supreme Court dismissed Million's appeal as having been taken from a nonfinal judgment. View "Million v. Shumaker" on Justia Law

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Allie Construction, Inc., obtained writs of garnishment against the estate of Willard Mosier one day shy of the 20th anniversary of obtaining a judgment against his widow Debra Mosier, a beneficiary of his estate. The Alabama Supreme Court found Allie Construction properly commenced an enforcement action, and that action should be allowed to proceed. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Supreme Court found the circuit court erred. The circuit court judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Allie Construction, Inc. v. Mosier" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs were owners of different lots in a subdivision. They sought an injunction to prevent Trevor Cole from subdividing his lot. The circuit court entered a summary judgment in favor of the lot owners and issued the injunction. On appeal, Cole argued: (1) the restrictive covenants should not have been enforced for various equitable reasons (because of the "relative hardship" enforcing the covenants would allegedly impose upon him; because the "character of the neighborhood" has allegedly changed "radically" since the covenants were adopted; and because a majority of the other property owners in the subdivision, including some of the lot owners, have waived enforcement of the covenants); (2) that he should have been provided certain discovery before the entry of the summary judgment; and (3) that necessary or indispensable parties to the action were absent. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected each of these arguments and affirmed. View "Cole v. Davis, et al." on Justia Law

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Defendants Levorn and Levern Davis appealed a circuit court's judgment in favor of the estate of Henry Brim. In 2006, Brim sold property to Levern, executing a promissory note and mortgage for a principal of $56,000. The interest rate was 7% per year, and payments were to be made monthly. The final installment was scheduled to be August 2045. On April 16, 2015, Levern executed a quitclaim deed in which he transferred his interest in the property to his brother, Levorn. In 2017, Brim filed suit, alleging defendants were in default on the promissory note and mortgage. Defendants denied they were in default and disputed the balance owed on the note. Brim asked the trial court to enter a judgment declaring that defendants were in default; to determine the amount still owed on the promissory note; and to authorize Brim to foreclose the mortgage. Brim died in 2019; Darryl Hamilton, as the personal representative to Brim's estate, was substituted as plaintiff. Defendants unsuccessfully challenged Hamilton's substitution into the promissory note action. The circuit court thereafter found defendants were in default on the promissory note and mortgage, the amount owed was $26,125.50; and that Hamilton could proceed with foreclosure proceedings. Defendants argued on appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court that the trial court erroneously denied their motion to reconsider the order substituting Hamilton as the plaintiff and to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., because the motion for substitution was not filed until nearly 31 months after the filing of the suggestion of death. The Supreme Court found after review of the trial court record that the trial court exceeded its discretion when it denied defendants' motion to reconsider and dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. The trial court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the trial court to set aside its order substituting Hamilton as plaintiff, set aside its order finding defendants in default of the note and mortgage, and to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1). View "Davis v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

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Philip and Jennie Bowling purchased their house via a promissory note in 1986. The loan was secured by a mortgage, which was eventually assigned to U.S. Bank National Association ("U.S. Bank"). A little over a decade later, the Bowlings began missing loan payments. Litton Loan Servicing, LP ("Litton"), the original servicer for the loan, sent the Bowlings several notices of default between July 1999 and June 2011, before eventually transferring service of the loan to another entity, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC ("Ocwen"). In September 2011, Ocwen allegedly notified the Bowlings that they were in default. Ocwen then scheduled a foreclosure sale, which took place in October 2012. A company called WGB, LLC ("WGB"), purchased the Bowlings' house at the foreclosure sale, but the Bowlings refused to vacate the property. A few weeks later, WGB filed an ejectment action against them. The Bowlings answered by asserting that they had not defaulted on the loan and that the foreclosure sale was invalid. The Bowlings also named as third-party defendants U.S. Bank, Ocwen, and Litton (collectively, "the banks"), alleging that the banks had mishandled the loan, the foreclosure sale, and related matters. In total, the Bowlings asserted 15 third-party claims against the banks. Rule 54(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure gives a trial court discretion to certify a partial judgment as final, and thus immediately appealable, even though some piece of the case remains pending in the trial court. This appeal stemmed from a Rule 54(b) certification. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the Jefferson Circuit Court exceeded its discretion in certifying its partial judgment as immediately appealable. Because an improper Rule 54(b) certification cannot support an appeal on the merits of the underlying judgment, the Supreme Court dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Bowling v. U.S. Bank National Association, et al." on Justia Law

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Milton Turner died on July 25, 2018. On September 20, 2018, Mildred Williamson petitioned for letters of administration of Turner's estate in the probate court. In her petition, Williamson asserted that Turner had died intestate and that Williamson was Turner's only surviving heir. In 2019, Williamson, individually and in her capacity as the personal representative of Turner's estate, entered into a contract agreeing to sell to Matthew Drinkard and Jefferson Dolbare ("the purchasers") real property belonging to the estate for $880,650. The real-estate sales contract specified that the closing of the sale was to occur on or before May 31, 2019. On February 7, 2019, Williamson, individually and in her capacity as personal representative of Turner's estate, executed a deed conveying other real property that was part of Turner's estate to Marcus Hester. On February 13, 2019, Callway Sargent, alleging to be an heir of Turner's, filed a claim of heirship in Turner's estate. Sargent also moved for injunctive relief in which he acknowledged the February 7, 2019, deed, but asserted that Williamson had agreed to sell and had conveyed real property belonging to Turner's estate without the approval of the probate court, and requested that the probate court enjoin "Williamson from engaging in any further administration of [Turner's] estate until so ordered by [the probate court]." Williamson petitioned to have the case removed fro probate to the circuit court. From February 28, 2019, to March 18, 2019, a number of individuals came forward, all claiming to be Turner's heirs. Williamson moved to have the circuit court approve the pending property sales. Williamson and the purchasers did not close on the sale of the property that was the subject of their real-estate sales contract by May 31, 2019, as required by the contract. Some of the purported heirs petitioned the circuit court to stay or vacate the order approving the purchasers contact until matters regarding the heirs was resolved. Drinkard and Dolbare filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings regarding the administration of Turner's estate, but the circuit court denied the motion. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of the purchasers' motion to intervene in the administration of Turner's estate. View "Drinkard, et al. v. Perry, et al." on Justia Law

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Defendant Merlyn Clay appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Charles Chavis, Clay's grandfather. The dispute concerned Clay's purchase of real property from Chavis and Clay's alleged failure to fulfill certain requirements of a sale contract for the real property executed by the parties. The Alabama Supreme Court found there were several discrepancies between the stated terms of the sale contract and the terms the parties agreed were part of the transaction, as well as discrepancies between the stated terms of the sale contract and the performance of the parties. "Those discrepancies are crucial to the outcome of this dispute because Chavis's claims are premised on the contention that Clay breached the sale contract by failing to provide a promissory note and a mortgage and by ceasing to make monthly loan payments to Chavis. Yet, under the terms of the sale contract, Chavis likewise did not provide the deed to the river property in a timely manner, and the sale contract does not expressly state that Clay had to make monthly loan payments. Those discrepancies are also crucial to the relief granted to Chavis by the circuit court." Judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further findings and proceedings. View "Clay v. Chavis." on Justia Law