Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Shelby County Board of Equalization petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, or, in the alternative, a writ of prohibition, to direct the Shelby Circuit Court to dismiss as untimely an appeal filed by Central Shelby LTD. challenging a final ad valorem tax assessment issued by the Board. In response to Central Shelby's objection to the Board's 2013 assessed value of real property owned by Central Shelby, the Board entered a final ad valorem assessment. The clerk of the Shelby Circuit Court mailed a copy of the notice of appeal to the Board, which received the notice on July 8, 2013. Thereafter, the Board moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Central Shelby had not filed with the secretary of the Board its notice of appeal within 30 days of the final assessment as, the Board contended, section 40-3-25 requires. The trial court, without stating the findings on which its decision was based, denied the Board's motion. In response, the Board filed this petition alleging that, as a result of the alleged untimely notice to it of Central Shelby's appeal, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying appeal. Central Shelby faulted the circuit clerk for her alleged untimely mailing of the notice of appeal to the secretary of the Board. The Supreme Court concluded the appealing taxpayer is charged with the responsibility of filing the notice of appeal with the secretary of the Board. As a result of Central Shelby's failure to comply with the provisions of 40-3-25, its appeal was not perfected and the trial court's jurisdiction was never invoked. The Supreme Court therefore granted the Board's petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying the Board's motion to dismiss and to dismiss Central Shelby's appeal as untimely. View "Central Shelby LTD. v. Shelby County Board of Equalization" on Justia Law

Howard Ross petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals affirming summary judgments in favor of West Wind Condominium Association, Inc. and Joseph London III. Ross owned four condominium units within the West Wind community. Ross and West Wind agreed that West Wind would accept maintenance and repair work from Ross in lieu of his paying the condominium association's monthly dues. West Wind informed Ross in September 2006 that further work would not be necessary and that he should start paying the dues. Ross paid his dues monthly starting in December 2006. When Ross made his payments for April and May 2007, West Wind rejected those payments and sent Ross a letter through its attorney disputing Ross's charges for the maintenance and repair work that Ross had performed. Through his own attorney, Ross submitted an itemized list of charges for his work done for West Wind, but Ross never received any further correspondence from West Wind. In 2007, West Wind recorded instruments in the office of the Probate Judge of Madison County claiming liens on Ross's four condominium units. In early 2008, West Wind published notice of a foreclosure sale on Ross's units in a local newspaper and continued publishing the notice for four weeks. A month later, West Wind conducted foreclosure sales on Ross's four condominium units and was the highest bidder on all of them. That same day, the auctioneer executed foreclosure deeds conveying the four units to West Wind. West Wind then conveyed two of the units to Jimmy Spruill and Cynthia Spruill, one unit to Joseph London III (who was president of West Wind), and one unit to Delvin Sullivan. Ross sued West Wind, London, Sullivan, and the Spruills alleging claims of wrongful foreclosure and seeking redemption of the properties. Ross sought an order setting aside the foreclosure sales, as well as redemption of the four condominium units. Ross claimed that West Wind had foreclosed on his units without giving him proper notice and that he had not learned of the foreclosures until after they had occurred. The trial court entered a default judgment against Sullivan, but it entered summary judgments in favor of London and the Spruills. West Wind also moved for a summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that it had the right to foreclose based on Ross's unpaid dues. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment for West Wind and London, and that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that Ross had waived the argument that he had presented substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he had received proper notice. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ross v. West Wind Condominium Association, Inc." on Justia Law

Charles Gower petitioned the Supreme Court to vacate an arbitration award in favor of Turquoise Properties Gulf, Inc., Caribe Realty, Inc., Larry Wireman, and Judy Ramsey Wireman(collectively, "Turquoise"). The underlying dispute arose from Gower's preconstruction agreement to purchase a condominium unit in a complex developed by Turquoise. The arbitrator's decision was based in large part on Turqoise's successfully raising a statute-of-limitations defense to Gower's claims. The Supreme Court found that Turquoise expressly argued, and then abandoned, one specific statute-of-limitations defense and then it never again urged the arbitrator to apply a statute of limitations to the various claims actually brought by the claimants. Through its arguments, Turquoise distilled the issues and arguments submitted to the arbitrator for consideration. Gower argued, and the Supreme Court agreed, that Turquoise "affirmatively chose to forgo any statute of limitations defense to the [c]laimants' ... claims and therefore did not submit [the] same to the Arbitrator for decision." Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that because the issue of the applicability of a statute of limitations was not submitted to the arbitrator for decision, the arbitrator exceeded his powers in applying a statute of limitations to Gower's claims. The Court reversed the judgment entered on the arbitrator's award, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Gower v. Turquoise Properties Gulf, Inc., et al. " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in this case to the extent that it concluded Parker Towing was not entitled to indemnity for $25,000 it paid landowners in settlement of landowners' claims against it. The landowners sued Parker Towing and Triangle Aggregates, Inc. stemming from their claims of breach of contract pertaining to properties they originally leased to Parker, which were subsequently purchased by Triangle. Parker argued it was not liable for the landowners' claims following its sale of the properties to Triangle. However, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment with respect to its conclusion that Triangle was not required to indemnify Parker Towing for its attorney fees and other litigation expenses incurred to defend against the claims asserted against Parker Towing for breaches of the agreements with the landowners. The fees and expenses incurred by Parker Towing as a result of those breaches were covered by the indemnification agreement between Parker Towing and Triangle. View "Parker Towing Company, Inc. v. Triangle Aggregates, Inc. " on Justia Law

The Alabama Department of Transportation ("ALDOT") and its director, John Cooper, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss all claims filed against them by Asphalt Contractors, Inc. ("ACI"). Trichloroethylene ('TCE') and other chemicals were used by ALDOT since the early 1970s. TCE was used extensively by ALDOT as a degreaser and/or cleaning agent and/or as a solvent. TCE is now contained in shallow groundwater in North Montgomery. Since at least April 2009, ALDOT has pumped groundwater into a Dewatering Pond and from there onto a Transfer Pond and then to the South Pond. A portion of the South Pond and wetland area used in ALDOT's remedial efforts is being discharged onto ACI's property. In 2010, ACI demanded that ALDOT immediately cease all dumping of contaminated water on ACI's property. However, the dumping of TCE-laden water onto ACI's property continued to the date of ACI filing its lawsuit. The complaint asserted trespass to realty and inverse condemnation and made claims for injunctive relief. ACI requested damages for the full fair-market value of its property, consequential and incidental damages, compensatory damages, punitive and exemplary damages, expenses, costs, interest, and attorney fees. ALDOT and Cooper filed a motion to dismiss the complaint arguing qualified immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss ALDOT as a party to this action. Conversely, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss as to ACI's inverse-condemnation claim against Cooper in his official capacity. Further, the trial court properly refused to dismiss ACI's claim for injunctive relief against Cooper. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus in part and denied it in part. View "Asphalt Contractors, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Transportation " on Justia Law

Jeffery and Allison Rhodes petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to dismiss the ejectment action filed against them by the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"). The Supreme Court found that the defect in the foreclosure process alleged by the Rhodeses did not implicate Fannie Mae's standing to bring the ejectment action against the Rhodeses or, in turn, the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain that claim. The only basis upon which the Rhodeses sought interlocutory mandamus relief from the order of the trial court denying their motion to dismiss the complaint against them was an alleged lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the trial court as a result of the alleged lack of standing. Because the problem alleged by the Rhodeses did not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court had no basis on which to consider this petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Federal National Mortgage Association v. Rhodes" on Justia Law

Sandra Chavers sued the City of Mobile seeking damages based on claims of negligent maintenance, continuing trespass, continuing nuisance, and inverse condemnation, all related to that part of the City's storm water-drainage system that abutted her property. After the Circuit Court entered a summary judgment in favor of the City, Chavers appealed. After careful review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Chavers repeatedly notified the City of damage to her property, and an inspector came to her home after she complained. After that visit, the inspector recommended that repairs be made to certain aspects of the City's drainage system, including an open concrete-lined ditch. The record indicated that those repairs were not made until well after Chavers had filed a notice of claim and had sued the City. The Court concluded the evidence in the Circuit Court record was sufficient to withstand a motion for a summary judgment based on the City's allegation that there was no evidence to support a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment as to the inverse-condemnation claim and as to the negligent-maintenance, nuisance, and trespass claims insofar as Chavers requested damages based on the cracking and uneven settling of her house. The Court reversed the summary judgment as to the negligent- maintenance, nuisance, and trespass claims insofar as Chavers requested damages for sinkholes allegedly caused by the City's negligent maintenance of the open concrete-lined ditch. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Chavers v. City of Mobile " on Justia Law

Foundation Bank petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the circuit court to vacate its order staying the Bank's attempted redemption in the probate court of certain property. The property at issue consisted of two parcels of contiguous property located in Autauga County, which included equipment for outdoor entertainment opportunities for the community. Emerald Falls, LLC, and its only member, Alice L. Smith owned the property originally. In 2010, Rob Riddle purchased the property at a tax sale as a result of Emerald Falls' failure to pay the ad valorem taxes on the property. Riddle assigned his interest in the property to CMC Properties, LLC. Riddle then sent notice to Working Capital No. 1, LLC, the mortgagee of the property, advising Working Capital that he had purchased the property. Riddle then filed a complaint against Emerald Falls alleging that Emerald Falls had abandoned the property and that Riddle was entitled to immediate possession. The circuit court entered a consent order, in which Emerald Falls and Riddle acknowledged that Riddle had purchased the property subject to the redemption rights of Emerald Falls, that Riddle had made improvements to the property, and that Riddle was entitled to be reimbursed for those improvements. Riddle sent written notification to the Bank, after discovering that Working Capital had assigned its mortgage on the property to the Bank as additional security for a line of credit held by the Bank. The Bank sent CMC written notice of its intent to redeem the property. CMC moved to stay the redemption, arguing that a resolution had not been reached between the parties with regard to the amount necessary to redeem the property. When the Bank attempted to redeem the property by depositing with the probate court the amount it believe to be owing, but the probate court denied the redemption. Finding that the Bank was within its right to redeem the property, the Supreme Court granted the Bank's petition and issued the writ. View "CMC Properties, LLC v. Emerald Falls, LLC" on Justia Law

Two petitions for a writ of mandamus came before the Supreme Court. Both sought review of orders that found plaintiffs lacked of standing and, in turn, found the trial courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. In case no. 1111567, U.S. Bank National Association ("U.S. Bank"), sought a writ to require the Walker Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed by Walker County. In case no. 1111370, MERSCORP, Inc. ("MERSCORP"), and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") sought a writ to require the Barbour Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed by Barbour Probate Judge Nancy Robertson. Upon careful consideration of the underlying trial court cases, the Supreme Court concluded that these cases did not fall within the subject-matter-jurisdiction exception to the general rule that the Supreme Court would not engage in mandamus review of a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss. The Court therefore denied the request for mandamus relief in both of the cases. View "Robertson v. MERSCORP, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004, the Baldwin County Commission passed a resolution recognizing the Fair Association's planned construction of a multimillion dollar coliseum at the Association's new fairgrounds site in Baldwin County. The Commission resolved to provide long-term funding for the Fair Association for a period of 10 years, beginning in the County's 2005 fiscal year. In 2008, the County and the Fair Association entered into a real-estate sale and purchase agreement for the conveyance of the coliseum property to the County. The purchase agreement provided that the County would be "released and relieved from paying [the Fair Association]the Seventy Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00), annual payment...." Following conveyance of the coliseum property, the parties entered into a lease agreement for the property. Despite the parties' agreement to discontinue the annual $75,000 payment to the Fair Association, the County made two additional payments in 2009 and in 2010. Each additional payment was presented to the County Commission as part of the "County Commission Accounts Payable Payments" and approved by the Commission along with payments to other vendors. The County asserted the two payments were made by mistake and sued the Association to recover the payments. After a hearing on the matter, the circuit court granted the Fair Association's motion for a judgment on the pleadings. The County appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Baldwin County v. Baldwin County Cattle & Fair Association, Inc. " on Justia Law