Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

America's Home Place, Inc. ("AHP") appealed a Circuit Court order denying AHP's motion to compel arbitration of the claims brought by the plaintiff below, Gregory Rampey. In August 2012, Rampey and AHP entered into a contract, the terms of which provided that AHP would construct a house for Rampey in Chambers County. AHP constructed the house; however, after he took possession of the house, Rampey began to notice "settlement and sinking of the foundation," which, according to Rampey, resulted in significant structural and other damage to the house. AHP attempted to stabilize the foundation and to repair the damage to the house that had occurred as a result of the unstable foundation; those efforts were unsuccessful. Upon review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying AHP's motion to compel arbitration. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the order denying the motion to compel arbitration and to enter an order granting AHP's motion to compel arbitration. View "America's Home Place, Inc. v. Rampey" on Justia Law

At a March 1, 2011 foreclosure sale, Thomas Curtain, Sr. purchased a parcel of real property in Mountain Brook, for $295,000. The foreclosed mortgagors were Charles and Concetta Givianpour, Cameron Givianpour's parents. During their ownership of the property, the Givianpours leased the property to Amy Newell. After Curtain foreclosed on the property, he filed a complaint against Newell in the Jefferson Circuit Court in which he demanded possession of the property, as well as "damages for wrongful retention of said real property." Newell filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Curtain filed a motion with the bankruptcy court seeking relief from the automatic stay; the bankruptcy court granted the motion and lifted the stay. The Circuit Court entered a summary judgment in favor of Curtain, awarding him possession of the property and damages. The bankruptcy court discharged Newell's debt, including any rent owed for continued possession of the property. Cameron Givianpour presented Curtain with a demand for lawful charges for the purpose of redeeming the property. Curtain presented Givianpour a statement which included the purchase price, interest, insurance, and ad valorem taxes on the property. The statement also included a charge for payment of rent on the property for tenant Newelll. Givianpour did not tender the redemption funds to Curtain. Instead, Givianpour filed a complaint against Curtain seeking to redeem the property. In his complaint, Givianpour alleged that the rent charge constituted an illegal or exaggerated charge for which no legal basis existed. Givianpour stated that because of the allegedly unlawful charge he was "unable to ascertain the true amount of the lawful charges owed" and that he "need[ed] the Court's assistance to determine the amount of lawful charges properly owed." Givianpour did not pay any of the redemption funds to the circuit court. Curtain moved to dismiss, alleging that, among other things, that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Givianpour had failed either to tender the amount for redemption or to pay the amount for redemption to court with the filing of his complaint. The circuit court entered an order denying Curtain's motion for a judgment on the pleadings but granting his motion to dismiss Givianpour's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Givianpour filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the circuit court's judgment, emphasizing that the parties disagreed as to whether the rent charge was a "lawful charge." The Supreme Court concluded that the rent charge on Curtain's statement for redemption constituted an unlawful charge, that such an unlawful charge, over which there was a bona fide disagreement, constituted a valid excuse for failure to tender the redemption amount or to pay it into court, and that payment of the amount not in dispute is not required to invoke the jurisdiction of the circuit court to settle the disputed amount. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Givianpour v. Curtain, Sr." on Justia Law

In 1999, Cooper and Robert L. Flowers formed C&F Enterprises, LLC. C&F owned a parcel of property in Huntsville, upon which it built a shopping center known as College Plaza. Pursuant to an "Amended and Restated Operating Agreement," MTA, Inc. became a member of C&F. The operating agreement provided that MTA, Flowers, and Cooper each owned a one-third interest in C&F. C&F borrowed $650,000 from the Southern Development Council, Inc. ("SDC"), a community-development program; that debt was memorialized by a promissory note. On the same day, SDC assigned the note to the Small Business Administration ("the SBA"). Cooper and Flowers personally guaranteed the indebtedness owed under the note. A few years later, C&F received a foreclosure letter with respect to the note. Counsel for MTA sent Cooper a letter informing him of MTA's intent to exercise its right of first refusal pursuant to section 16 of the operating agreement. In 2012, MTA filed a complaint against Cooper and Flowers, alleging multiple issues, but of pertinence for this appeal, the complaint alleged a count of contribution and "demand[ed] judgment in [MTA's] favor and against Cooper in the amount of $270,902.00, and Flowers in the amount of $270,902.00." In the alternative, "[MTA] demand[ed] judgment in its favor and against Cooper and Flowers for their individual pro rata contribution shares as determined at trial." Cooper filed a motion to dismiss; the trial court denied the motion. Cooper then answered the complaint. Thereafter, MTA filed a motion for a summary judgment against Cooper and Flowers. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting MTA's summary-judgment motion. Because genuine issues of material fact still remained at the time the trial court granted summary judgment, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in this respect. The trial court's order was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Cooper v. MTA, Inc." on Justia Law

First United Security Bank and its wholly owned subsidiary, Paty Holdings, LLC (collectively, "the bank"), brought suit to recover excess funds received by Tuscaloosa County from the tax sale of real estate owned by Wayne Allen Russell, Jr., and on which First United had a mortgage. The bank foreclosed on its mortgage after the tax sale but before the demand for excess proceeds was made. The issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is an "owner" entitled under 40-10-28, Ala. Code 1975, to receive the excess proceeds from a tax sale of the real property foreclosed upon. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bank was entitled to the excess tax-sale proceeds. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "First United Security Bank v. McCollum" on Justia Law

Sara Crossfield appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Limestone County Commission in her action to reverse the Commission's decision to vacate a portion of Dogwood Flats Road in Limestone County. In early 2013, the Commission proposed to vacate a portion of Dogwood Flats Road. Crossfield's property did not abut the portion of Dogwood Flats Road proposed to be vacated; it abutted Dogwood Flats Road approximately 400 feet north of the portion of the road that the Commission proposed to vacate. At a hearing on the matter, Crossfield alleged that she was a "party affected by the vacation of a portion of Dogwood Flat[s] Road" and asked the trial court to set aside the vacation of the road. Crossfield alleged, among other things, that the Commission had obstructed her access to Piney Creek, east and south of Crossfield's property. The Commission moved to dismiss, arguing Crossfield was not affected by the vacation and therefore lacked standing to appeal the Commission's decision regarding Dogwood Flats. The trial court granted the Commission's motion for a summary judgment and dismissed Crossfield's appeal. Crossfield's evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to her as the nonmovant, did not create a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude a summary judgment for the Commission. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Commission. View "Crossfield v. Limestone County Commission " on Justia Law

Jean S. Gray appealed two circuit court orders in an action filed against Larry Bain and Sharon Johnston in which Gray sought a judgment declaring that she owned a parcel of land and an injunction preventing Bain and Johnston from asserting any rights to the parcel. The Supreme Court concluded after review that the trial court erred in granting a Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion filed by Bain and Johnston that set aside a settlement of the action. View "Gray v. Bain" on Justia Law

David Childers and Robert DeShawn Childers ("Shawn") appealed the Circuit Court's judgment quieting title in a certain piece of real property, on which is situated a house, in Leroy Darby. The trial court admitted into evidence the deposition of David, who testified that he had purchased the property at issue at a foreclosure sale in 1995. He stated that he had repaired the house, had cleaned up the yard, and had used the surrounding land to train his horses from 1995 through 2003 or 2004. He explained that he had filed a deed reflecting his ownership of the property but that he had never paid taxes on the property because he had been informed by the "tax office" that he was exempt from taxes because he was 65 years old and totally disabled. According to David, his son Shawn has lived on the property since 2000. Evidence was also presented indicating that the deed filed by David was not for the property at issue but for an adjoining one-acre lot. Additionally, a mortgage-foreclosure deed indicating that the one-acre lot owned by David had been foreclosed on in 2004 was admitted into evidence, and additional evidence was admitted indicating that that property had subsequently been sold several times. After considering the testimony and other evidence, the trial court quieted title in the real property, including the house, in Darby. Shawn and David moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, arguing, among other grounds, that the trial court had erred in quieting title in Darby because, they asserted, the evidence did not establish that Darby was in peaceable possession of the property. The trial court denied the motion, and Shawn and David appealed. The Supreme Court's review of the evidence established that the trial court erred in quieting title in Darby because the evidence did not establish that Darby was in peaceable possession of the property. Darby's testimony that he had only driven past the property several times but had never walked the property or obtained actual possession of the property established that he was not in actual possession of the property. The evidence further established that, although Darby had legal title to the property, Shawn was living on the property. Therefore, because Shawn was in actual possession of the property, the evidence did not establish that Darby had constructive possession of the property. The record, however, did not establish that either Shawn or David had peaceable possession of the property or that either Shawn or David had acquired title to the property by adverse possession. Therefore, the record did not support a judgment quieting title in either Shawn or David. View "Childers v. Darby " on Justia Law

The Boys and Girls Clubs of South Alabama, Inc. ("BGCSA"), sought a writ of mandamus to order the Baldwin Circuit Court to dismiss a declaratory-judgment action filed against it and The Community Foundation of South Alabama by the attorney general of Alabama, Fairhope-Point Clear Rotary Youth Programs, Inc. ("Rotary Inc."), and Ruff Wilson Youth Organizations, Inc. ("Wilson Inc.") In 1996, B.R. Wilson, Jr., one of the incorporators and a principal benefactor of BGCSA, executed a deed transferring to BGCSA approximately 17 acres of real estate. Contemporaneously with the execution of the deed, Wilson gave a letter to BGCSA that stated Wilson's intentions and stipulations concerning his gift of the property. The letter stated that BGCSA was "'free to ultimately dispose of this property,'" but that it was Wilson's "'desire and understanding that [BGCSA] will use the proceeds from any such disposition for [BGCSA's] facilities and/or activities in the Fairhope–Point Clear area.'" Wilson died in 1997. In 2010, the Eastern Shore Clubs filed an action in the Baldwin Circuit Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against BGCSA. The Eastern Shore Clubs alleged that BGCSA "ha[d] used," or, perhaps, was "anticipat[ing] using," the proceeds from the sale of the property for its own operations, rather than for the benefit of the Eastern Shore Clubs. In 2012, the Baldwin Circuit Court entered a judgment concluding Wilson's intent was that the Wilson funds should be used for the "exclusive benefit of the Fairhope and Daphne Clubs." The Baldwin Circuit Court ordered the disbursal of the remainder of the Wilson funds. This case was the third action that has come before the Supreme Court arising out the dispute between BGCSA and the Eastern Shore Clubs over the Wilson funds. The Supreme Court concluded Section 6-5-440 compelled dismissal of this case because another action involving the same cause and the same parties ("the Mobile action") was filed first. Therefore, the Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the Baldwin Circuit Court to vacate its most recent order in this case, and to enter an order dismissing this case. View "Alabama et al. v. Boys And Girls Clubs of South Alabama, Inc." on Justia Law

The Reserve is a subdivision in Madison County that comprises four smaller communities or subdivisions. One of the subdivisions or communities within The Reserve is named Oak Grove. Each of the four plaintiffs owns a house in Oak Grove, and all four are members of The Reserve Subdivision Home Owners' Association ("the HOA"). Gulf Coast Development, LLC was the original owner and developer of The Reserve. Gulf Coast filed a "Declaration of Protective Covenants for The Reserve Subdivision" in the Madison Probate Court. In August 2012, DL Horton, Inc. purchased the assets of Breland Homes, LLC, including lots 13 and 26 in Oak Grove. Pursuant to a licensing agreement, Horton acquired the right to use the trade name "Breland Homes." Horton, doing business under that trade name, submitted an application for construction-design review to The Reserve Architectural Review Committee ("the ARC") concerning lots 13 and 26 in Oak Grove. The ARC notified Horton that the plan submitted with its application "was not approved for construction" because it was not aesthetically comparable to other houses in Oak Grove, and recommended an immediate cease construction order. Horton responded by stating that, given that the ARC had previously approved the same construction plan, Horton planned to proceed with the construction plan submitted. The HOA then sent a letter demanding that Breland cease further construction. Plaintiffs then filed a complaint against Breland, Gulf Coast, and the HOA seeking a judgment declaring that Gulf Coast did not have power to "veto" the actions of the ARC, that Breland was in violation of the protective covenants in the Declaration, and that "the Board ha[d] the power to take action as it deem[ed] necessary to remedy such violations." Plaintiffs also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court dismissed plaintiffs' appeal when the trial court denied them relief: review of the nonfinal summary judgment in favor of Gulf Coast and of the summary judgment entered in favor of Horton and Breland required resolution of whether Gulf Coast had authority to approve the construction applications for lots 13 and 26 in Oak Grove when the same applications had already been denied by the ARC. Horton, Breland, and Gulf Coast presented the same arguments in their summary-judgment motions and the same defenses to the plaintiffs' claims. Although the summary judgment in favor of Breland and Horton was before the Supreme Court on appeal, the summary judgment in favor of Gulf Coast was not. Because the threshold issue in the judgment before this Court is identical to the threshold issue in a claim still pending before the trial court, the Supreme Court concluded that the claims were "so closely intertwined that separate adjudication would pose an unreasonable risk of inconsistent results." View "Grant et al. v. Breland Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

Bryant Bank appealed the grant of partial summary judgment in favor of defendants Talmage Kirkland & Company, Inc., d/b/a Kirkland & Company ("TKC"), and Quentin Ball and Jason Stoutamire, appraisers for TKC. This case arose out of an appraisal of real property conducted by TKC for Bryant Bank in the course of Bryant Bank's consideration of a loan application submitted by Wallace Seafood Traders, Inc. ("WST"), in September 2007 for the purchase of the property, which WST was renting and out of which it was operating its business. The Bryant Bank employees responsible for approving WST's loan application suspected that the value of the property might have been overstated in TKC's appraisal. However, Bryant Bank approved WST's loan application and issued the loan to WST. Ultimately, WST defaulted on the loan. Bryant Bank obtained another appraisal of the property from a different appraisal firm; this new appraisal indicated that the property had a value that differed drastically from that which TKC had appraised. Bryant Bank sued the defendants, alleging breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation arising from its reliance on TKC's appraisal report in issuing the loan to WST. In their partial-summary-judgment motion, the defendants argued that Ball and Stoutamire were entitled to a summary judgment as to the breach-of-contract claim because they were acting as agents of a disclosed principal, Bryant Bank. As to the negligent misrepresentation claim, the defendants argued that they were entitled to a summary judgment in their favor because: (1) the opinion of value expressed in TKC's appraisal report could not serve as the basis of a negligent-misrepresentation claim; (2) Bryant Bank had not relied upon TKC's valuation; and (3) the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court concluded the Bank presented substantial evidence that it relied on TKC's appraisal of the property, and that each of the arguments defendants raised in their partial-summary-judgment motion did not warrant the entry of a summary judgment in their favor with respect to the Bank's negligent misrepresentation claim. Therefore, Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bryant Bank v. Talmage Kirkland & Company, Inc." on Justia Law