Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants Branch Banking & Trust Company ("BB&T"), Rusty Winfree, and Todd Fullington appealed a circuit court judgment entered in favor of Rex Nichols ("Sonny") and Claudene Nichols on the Nicholses' claims against appellants and on BB&T's counterclaim against the Nicholses. In late 2005, Sonny began talking to Winfree about obtaining financing from Colonial Bank ("Colonial"), Winfree's employer, for the purchase of approximately 500 acres of real property in Stapleton, Alabama. The Nicholses intended to develop the Stapleton property into a subdivision. In February 2006, the Nicholses executed a loan agreement with Colonial, in which Colonial agreed to lend the Nicholses close to $2.8 million to purchase the property. Sonny testified that in late 2007, as the maturity date on the note approached, he began contacting Colonial regarding renewing the loan; he further testified that, around the same time, Winfree became slow to communicate with him. Sonny also testified that before the February 27, 2008, maturity date on the promissory note, he spoke to Fullington about renewing the loan, with Colonial carrying the interest going forward. A few weeks later, the Nicholses were notified that Colonial would not carry the interest on the loan or provide additional funds for development of the property. Colonial ultimately renewed the terms of the note until Colonial failed in August 2009. The FDIC assumed control of its assets and liabilities. The FDIC sold many of Colonial's assets and liabilities to BB&T, including the Nicholses' loan. Fullington was hired by BB&T; Winfree was not. In early November 2009, BB&T informed the Nicholses that it would not lend them additional funds to develop the property. The Nicholses stopped making interest payments on the loan in November 2009. On March 10, 2010, the Nicholses sued the appellants and fictitiously named defendants, alleging fraud, reformation, negligence, wantonness, and breach of fiduciary duty against all appellants. Against BB&T, the Nicholses also alleged a claim of unjust enrichment and sought damages on a theory of promissory estoppel. The appellants separately moved the circuit court to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. BB&T also filed a counterclaim, alleging that the Nicholses had defaulted on their obligations under a June 2009 promissory note and seeking damages related to that default. The circuit court denied the motions to dismiss the complaint but granted a motion to strike the request for a jury trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in entering a judgment in favor of the Nicholses on their claims against the appellants and on BB&T's counterclaim against them. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded with instructions to the circuit court to enter a judgment in favor of the appellants on the Nicholses' claims against them and in favor of BB&T on its counterclaim against the Nicholses and to determine the damages to be awarded on the counterclaim. View "Branch Banking & Trust Company v. Nichols" on Justia Law

Paul R. Steinfurth and Paul C. Steinfurth (collectively, "the guarantors") appealed the denial of their postjudgment motion requesting that a judgment entered against them and in favor of Ski Lodge Apartments, LLC, be amended insofar as the judgment held that the guarantors had waived their personal exemptions under 6-10-123, Ala. Code 1975. On or about February 13, 2009, Styles Manager, LLC purchased from Vintage Pointe Apartments, LLC an interest in an apartment complex located in Montgomery. As part of this transaction, Styles Manager executed a promissory note promising to pay Vintage Pointe $800,000. Paul C. signed the promissory note in his official capacity as "manager" of Styles Manager. As security for the performance of the payment of the promissory note, the guarantors, in their individual capacities, executed a "guaranty of payment and performance" of the promissory note. Styles Manager defaulted on the promissory note in 2011. Pursuant to the note, the entire principal amount and all accrued interest was then due on February 13, 2011. Neither Styles Manager nor the guarantors cured the default. Accordingly, on September 27, 2012, Ski Lodge sued the guarantors, alleging breach of the guaranty agreement, in order to collect the outstanding debt on the promissory note. Ski Lodge requested $804,333.36, together with additional accrued interest, in damages. In its complaint, Ski Lodge did not expressly allege that the guarantors had waived their right to a personal exemption. However, Ski Lodge did attach to its complaint copies of the loan documents, which included the promissory note and the guaranty agreement, and stated that each was "incorporated herein by reference." The guarantors filed an answer and counterclaims against Ski Lodge alleging misrepresentation and suppression. The guarantors moved to dismiss Ski Lodge's suit against them, then filed a Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to alter, amend, or vacate the circuit court's judgment insofar as the circuit court held that the "judgment is entered pursuant to Alabama law with a waiver of exemptions, according to the terms expressed in the [p]romissory [n]ote and [the] [g]uaranty [agreement] which are the subject matter of this action, as the same were incorporated and adopted into the complaint." The guarantors argued that "waiver was not properly [pleaded]" and that the guaranty agreement did "not provide for waiver of exemptions by" the guarantors. The circuit court ultimately denied the guarantors' postjudgment motion, leading to this appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court's holding that the guarantors waived their personal exemptions was in error. Accordingly, the Court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Steinfurth v. Ski Lodge Apartments, LLC" on Justia Law

Roland and Sandra Crouch appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of North Alabama Sand & Gravel, LLC, now operating as Alliance Sand & Gravel, LLC, and Austin Powder Company ("Austin Powder") on the Crouches' claim asserting property damage resulting from Alliance Sand & Gravel's blasting operations. The Crouches sued Alliance Sand & Gravel and Austin Powder (collectively, "Alliance"), seeking compensation for damage to their property, which, they say, was caused by Alliance's blasting operations. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Alliance on the Crouches' trespass claim. The Court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Alliance on the Crouches' claims alleging an abnormally dangerous activity, wantonness, and nuisance, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Crouch v. North Alabama Sand & Gravel, LLC" on Justia Law

Edwin B. Lumpkin, Jr. appealed several Circuit Court orders dismissing three cases he had initiated challenging property-tax assessments made by the Jefferson County Board of Equalization and Adjustments. Lumpkin owned and operated Metro Mini Storage, a chain of self-storage facilities with locations throughout the Birmingham metropolitan area. In 2012, Lumpkin received notice from Jefferson County regarding the assessed value of three of his properties located in that county. Believing the assessed values of these properties to be too high, Lumpkin elected to protest their valuation, and the Board heard his arguments. Acting pro se, Lumpkin filed three appeals in the Jefferson Circuit Court (one for each of the three locations), arguing that the Board's decisions did not reflect the true market value of the properties and that a reduction in assessed value was warranted based on the evidence he had presented. Because Lumpkin's appeals are governed by section 40-3-25 and because he failed to comply with all the requirements of section 40-3-25 for perfecting his appeals, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court properly dismissed the cases. View "Lumpkin, Jr. v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Tender Care Veterinary Hospital, Inc. ("TCVH"), appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of First Tuskegee Bank on breach-of-fiduciary-duty and fraud claims stemming from a construction loan TCVH received from First Tuskegee in September 2004. The gravamen of those claims was that TCVH was injured by First Tuskegee's alleged insistence that TCVH use PJ Construction as the general contractor on the project although PJ Construction was not licensed as a general contractor in Alabama, that PJ Construction's work product was below what one would expect from a properly licensed general contractor, and that using PJ Construction resulted in delays, cost overruns, and, TCVH argued, the ultimate failure of its business. However, because TCVH's claims accrued in approximately July 2005 and TCVH did not formally assert them until after it initiated this action in April 2009, those claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations that governed them. Accordingly, the summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of First Tuskegee was affirmed. View "Tender Care Veterinary Hospital, Inc. v. First Tuskegee Bank " on Justia Law

In 2004, Paint Rock Turn, LLC purchased a sod farm and related farm equipment. To partially finance the purchase, Paint Rock borrowed $1,706,250 from First Jackson Bank. The loan was secured by a mortgage on the sod farm and a security interest in the equipment used on the farm. By February 2009, reflecting in part a drop in demand for sod caused by the collapsing market for new homes, Paint Rock had defaulted on the loan. In early 2009, Paint Rock filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The filing of the petition operated as an automatic stay and precluded First Jackson from foreclosing on the sod farm or retaking the equipment. The bankruptcy petition was dismissed later that year, and a few months later, First Jackson moved forward with its intent to foreclose by publishing the first of three notices of a foreclosure sale on the Paint Rock property. On the morning of the scheduled sale, Paint Rock filed a second bankruptcy petition, which stayed the sale. This second petition was dismissed a month later for failure to file the proper schedules and statements. First Jackson published another notice that the foreclosure sale was rescheduled for December 30, 2009. December 26, Paint Rock filed a third bankruptcy petition. Four days later, the bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay, expressly finding that Paint Rock misused the bankruptcy process to "hinder and delay First Jackson's efforts to foreclose its mortgage and security agreement." First Jackson was the high bidder at the sale, purchased the property, and sent Paint Rock a letter demanding possession of the sod farm. In early 2010, First Jackson filed an ejectment action. The same day, Paint Rock demanded access to the farm to recover "emblements in the form of sod which is being grown on the real property recently foreclosed upon ...." Paint Rock also requested the return of its equipment. First Jackson denied Paint Rock's request. Paint Rock, relying on a section of the Alabama Code that permits a tenant at will to harvest its crop, counterclaimed for damages for harm suffered as the result of being unable to harvest the sod. Paint Rock also sought damages for conversion of "plats of sod" contained on the sod farm. First Jackson sold the sod farm to Mrs. Goodson, subject to any claim Paint Rock may have to the emblements growing on the property. Paint Rock filed a joint third-party complaint against First Jackson and Mr. and Mrs. Goodson, alleging conversion and detinue, as well as the emblements claim. After the trial court denied motions for a summary judgment filed by First Jackson and the Goodsons, the case proceeded to trial. At the close of Paint Rock and Jones's case, the trial court granted a motion for a JML filed by First Jackson and the Goodsons on Paint Rock's counterclaim for emblements on the ground that Paint Rock was not an at-will tenant. After Paint Rock withdrew its detinue claims and the trial court granted a JML on the wantonness claims, leaving only the conversion and negligence claims. The jury awarded Paint Rock damages against First Jackson for conversion of a sod cutter and cut sod that had been loaded on a tractor-trailer when First Jackson took possession of the property. The jury also awarded Paint Rock damages against the Goodsons for conversion of business property and equipment. Paint Rock appealed the JML in favor of the defendants on the emblements claim; First Jackson cross-appealed the judgment awarding Paint Rock damages for conversion of the cut sod. The Supreme Court affirmed with regard to Paint Rock's emblements claim, but reversed on the conversion of the cut sod claim. View "Paint Rock Turf, LLC v. First Jackson Bank et al. " on Justia Law

America's Home Place, Inc. ("AHP") appealed a Circuit Court order denying AHP's motion to compel arbitration of the claims brought by the plaintiff below, Gregory Rampey. In August 2012, Rampey and AHP entered into a contract, the terms of which provided that AHP would construct a house for Rampey in Chambers County. AHP constructed the house; however, after he took possession of the house, Rampey began to notice "settlement and sinking of the foundation," which, according to Rampey, resulted in significant structural and other damage to the house. AHP attempted to stabilize the foundation and to repair the damage to the house that had occurred as a result of the unstable foundation; those efforts were unsuccessful. Upon review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying AHP's motion to compel arbitration. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the order denying the motion to compel arbitration and to enter an order granting AHP's motion to compel arbitration. View "America's Home Place, Inc. v. Rampey" on Justia Law

At a March 1, 2011 foreclosure sale, Thomas Curtain, Sr. purchased a parcel of real property in Mountain Brook, for $295,000. The foreclosed mortgagors were Charles and Concetta Givianpour, Cameron Givianpour's parents. During their ownership of the property, the Givianpours leased the property to Amy Newell. After Curtain foreclosed on the property, he filed a complaint against Newell in the Jefferson Circuit Court in which he demanded possession of the property, as well as "damages for wrongful retention of said real property." Newell filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Curtain filed a motion with the bankruptcy court seeking relief from the automatic stay; the bankruptcy court granted the motion and lifted the stay. The Circuit Court entered a summary judgment in favor of Curtain, awarding him possession of the property and damages. The bankruptcy court discharged Newell's debt, including any rent owed for continued possession of the property. Cameron Givianpour presented Curtain with a demand for lawful charges for the purpose of redeeming the property. Curtain presented Givianpour a statement which included the purchase price, interest, insurance, and ad valorem taxes on the property. The statement also included a charge for payment of rent on the property for tenant Newelll. Givianpour did not tender the redemption funds to Curtain. Instead, Givianpour filed a complaint against Curtain seeking to redeem the property. In his complaint, Givianpour alleged that the rent charge constituted an illegal or exaggerated charge for which no legal basis existed. Givianpour stated that because of the allegedly unlawful charge he was "unable to ascertain the true amount of the lawful charges owed" and that he "need[ed] the Court's assistance to determine the amount of lawful charges properly owed." Givianpour did not pay any of the redemption funds to the circuit court. Curtain moved to dismiss, alleging that, among other things, that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Givianpour had failed either to tender the amount for redemption or to pay the amount for redemption to court with the filing of his complaint. The circuit court entered an order denying Curtain's motion for a judgment on the pleadings but granting his motion to dismiss Givianpour's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Givianpour filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the circuit court's judgment, emphasizing that the parties disagreed as to whether the rent charge was a "lawful charge." The Supreme Court concluded that the rent charge on Curtain's statement for redemption constituted an unlawful charge, that such an unlawful charge, over which there was a bona fide disagreement, constituted a valid excuse for failure to tender the redemption amount or to pay it into court, and that payment of the amount not in dispute is not required to invoke the jurisdiction of the circuit court to settle the disputed amount. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Givianpour v. Curtain, Sr." on Justia Law

In 1999, Cooper and Robert L. Flowers formed C&F Enterprises, LLC. C&F owned a parcel of property in Huntsville, upon which it built a shopping center known as College Plaza. Pursuant to an "Amended and Restated Operating Agreement," MTA, Inc. became a member of C&F. The operating agreement provided that MTA, Flowers, and Cooper each owned a one-third interest in C&F. C&F borrowed $650,000 from the Southern Development Council, Inc. ("SDC"), a community-development program; that debt was memorialized by a promissory note. On the same day, SDC assigned the note to the Small Business Administration ("the SBA"). Cooper and Flowers personally guaranteed the indebtedness owed under the note. A few years later, C&F received a foreclosure letter with respect to the note. Counsel for MTA sent Cooper a letter informing him of MTA's intent to exercise its right of first refusal pursuant to section 16 of the operating agreement. In 2012, MTA filed a complaint against Cooper and Flowers, alleging multiple issues, but of pertinence for this appeal, the complaint alleged a count of contribution and "demand[ed] judgment in [MTA's] favor and against Cooper in the amount of $270,902.00, and Flowers in the amount of $270,902.00." In the alternative, "[MTA] demand[ed] judgment in its favor and against Cooper and Flowers for their individual pro rata contribution shares as determined at trial." Cooper filed a motion to dismiss; the trial court denied the motion. Cooper then answered the complaint. Thereafter, MTA filed a motion for a summary judgment against Cooper and Flowers. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting MTA's summary-judgment motion. Because genuine issues of material fact still remained at the time the trial court granted summary judgment, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in this respect. The trial court's order was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Cooper v. MTA, Inc." on Justia Law

First United Security Bank and its wholly owned subsidiary, Paty Holdings, LLC (collectively, "the bank"), brought suit to recover excess funds received by Tuscaloosa County from the tax sale of real estate owned by Wayne Allen Russell, Jr., and on which First United had a mortgage. The bank foreclosed on its mortgage after the tax sale but before the demand for excess proceeds was made. The issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is an "owner" entitled under 40-10-28, Ala. Code 1975, to receive the excess proceeds from a tax sale of the real property foreclosed upon. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bank was entitled to the excess tax-sale proceeds. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "First United Security Bank v. McCollum" on Justia Law