Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ben E. Keith Company, Inc. ("BEK"), appealed a circuit court order entering summary judgment in favor of Lyndon Southern Insurance Company ("Lyndon") on Lyndon's complaint for a declaratory judgment. On December 14, 2018, Felicia Edwards and Robert Allen Marak were involved in a motor-vehicle accident in Dadeville. Felicia was driving a 2009 Toyota Camry automobile that was owned by Annette Edwards and insured by Lyndon. Marak was driving a tractor-trailer that was owned by BEK. As a result of the accident, BEK incurred damage to its tractor-trailer. BEK sued Felicia and Annette claiming negligence and wantonness against both Felicia and Annette and a claim of negligent entrustment against Annette. BEK later amended the complaint to add a negligent-maintenance claim against Annette. Lyndon filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment against Felicia, Annette, and BEK, asserting the policy it issued to Annette excluded coverage for "[a]ny operator of a vehicle who is not listed as a driver on the Policy Applications, Declarations, and/or added by Endorsement who is under the age of twenty-five and is either a Family Member or resides in the same household as the Named Insured" and for "[a]n operator of a vehicle who is an unlicensed driver or whose driving privileges have been terminated or suspended." BEK argued the trial court erroneously granted Lyndon's motion for a summary judgment because Lyndon did not produce substantial admissible evidence to establish that Felicia was a noncovered person under the policy that insured Annette's vehicle at the time of the accident. Specifically, it contended Lyndon did not produce substantial admissible evidence to establish that Felicia did not have a valid driver's license at the time of the accident or to establish Felicia's age and residence at the time of the accident. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concurred Lyndon did not produce substantial evidence to establish that Felicia did not have a valid driver's license at the time of the accident and did not produce substantial evidence to establish that Felicia was under the age of 25 and resided in Annette's household at the time of the accident. Therefore, Lyndon did not shift the burden of proof to BEK. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Lyndon's motion for a summary judgment. Judgment was therefore reversed. View "Ben E. Keith Company, Inc. v. Lyndon Southern Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Amy Williamson petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in her favor based on State-agent immunity. Twenty-year-old Re.W. was a student in the CrossingPoints program, a collaborative program between the University of Alabama, the Tuscaloosa City Board of Education, and the Tuscaloosa County Board of Education that served college-aged students with mental disabilities. Williamson was a teacher in the program and an employee of the Tuscaloosa City Board of Education, and Amy Burnett was a "para-educator" with the program. In 2015, Williamson and Burnett transported Re.W. and three other students to various businesses to submit job applications. While Williamson and Burnett took two students into a Lowe's home-improvement store to submit applications, Re.W. and a male student stayed in the CrossingPoints van. Re.W. stated that, during the short time that the others were inside the store, the male student touched her on her breast and between her legs. In 2019, Re.W., by and through her parents and next friends, Ro.W. and V.W., sued Williamson on counts of negligent, wanton, and/or willful failure to perform ministerial acts and the tort of outrage. Williamson filed an answer to the complaint denying the material allegations and asserted multiple affirmative defenses. Williamson later moved for summary judgment, asserting, among other things, that Re.W.'s claims were barred by the doctrine of State-agent immunity. Because the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Williamson established that, at the time of the incident, she was performing a discretionary function, and because the Court concluded Re.W. did not present any evidence to establish that an exception to State-agent immunity applied, Williamson established that she was entitled to State-agent immunity. Accordingly, the petition for the writ of mandamus was granted and the trial court directed to vacate its order denying Williamson's motion for a summary judgment, and directed to enter a summary judgment for Williamson. View "Ex parte Amy Williamson." on Justia Law

At approximately 10:15 p.m., on November 16, 2015, Michael Cannon and Zachary Lucas were involved in a motor-vehicle accident on an unlit portion of Interstate 22 in Alabama when Cannon's vehicle collided with Lucas and the motorcycle he had been riding. In 2017, Lucas filed a complaint against Cannon alleging negligence and wantonness/recklessness and seeking damages for the various injuries he allegedly had sustained as a result of that accident. Lucas proceeded to trial solely on his negligence claim. After a four-day trial in 2019, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Lucas and awarded him $18 million in compensatory damages. Cannon filed a motion for a judgment as a matter of law, for a new trial, or for a remittitur, asserting, among other things, that the trial court had erred by refusing to permit Cannon to present evidence of Lucas's 2018 conviction for presenting a forged drug prescription. After Lucas responded, the trial court conducted a hearing. Thereafter, the motion was denied by operation of law. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in granting Lucas's motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding his 2018 conviction for presenting a forged drug prescription. Because the trial court erred in ruling that Cannon could not present such evidence at trial, the Court concluded it also erred in denying Cannon's motion for a new trial. View "Cannon v. Lucas" on Justia Law

Dwayne Harris appealed a circuit court order dismissing his counterclaim against Dubai Truck Lines, Inc., pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. On February 18, 2018, three vehicles were involved in an accident in Jefferson County, Alabama: a vehicle owned by Dubai and driven by Jose Martinez, one of Dubai's employees; a vehicle driven by Harris; and a vehicle driven by Annika Schaefer. Schaefer's vehicle was insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. On February 28, 2019, Schaefer and State Farm, as subrogee of Schaefer sued Dubai and Martinez. According to Dubai, it was not served with the complaint until June 2020, after the expiration of the applicable two-year statute-of- limitations period. On August 7, 2020, Dubai filed an answer denying all liability for the accident and adding Harris as a third-party defendant pursuant to Rule 14, Ala. R. Civ. P. Dubai specifically impleaded Harris to allege that Harris's negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. On November 13, 2020, Harris filed a counterclaim against Dubai, alleging that Martinez, Dubai's employee, had been negligent and/or wanton in causing the accident, that Harris had suffered injuries as a result of the accident and that Dubai was vicariously liable for those injuries. Dubai then moved to dismiss the counterclaim, alleging Harris' counterclaim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Alabama Supreme Court found Harris's counterclaim was compulsory, and not subject to a statute-of-limitations defense. Thus, there was no basis for the circuit court to dismiss Harris's counterclaim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). View "Harris v. Dubai Truck Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

Melvin James appealed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Assurance America Insurance Company ("Assurance") on its complaint for a declaratory judgment. In February 2019, Bernardino Mejia and James were involved in a motor-vehicle accident in Montgomery, Alabama. Mejia was driving a 2003 Chrysler Town and Country minivan, and James was driving a 2004 Toyota Camry automobile. As a result of the accident, Mejia's three children were ejected from the Town and Country. One of Mejia's children died, and the other two were seriously injured. James was also injured as a result of the accident. Mejia was arrested, and, on September 23, 2019, he was indicted for one count of reckless murder and four counts of first- degree assault as a result of the accident. He was incarcerated on those charges. In April 2019, James sued Mejia, ALFA Insurance Corporation, USAA Casualty Insurance Company, and various fictitiously named defendants for negligence, negligence per se, wantonness, and breach of contract. Mejia moved to stay the civil proceeding until the accident-related criminal proceedings against him were concluded; this motion was granted. Assurance sought the summary judgment motion at issue here, against Mejia and James. Assurance contended Mejia was not the named insured under the Assurance policy that covered the Town & Country he was driving, and that policy excluded coverage for injury or damage caused by an insured vehicle when driven by a person who was not listed as a driver on the declarations page of the policy and who did not have a valid driver's license. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding Assurance did not produce substantial, admissible evidence to establish Mejia did not have a valid driver's license at the time of the accident and therefore did not shift the burden of proof to James. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Assurance's motion for a summary judgment. View "James v. Assurance America Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Jane Doe ("Doe"), individually and as mother and next friend of her minor children, Judy Doe and John Doe, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court to vacate its August 18, 2020, order staying all discovery in this case. On August 25, 2019, Doe was dropping off her children to stay with a friend at the Campus Evolution Villages apartments in Tuscaloosa. Doe alleged that, while she was in the common area of the apartments, Tereza Jones assaulted her and raped her in front of her children and then fled the scene. Jones was later arrested and was being prosecuted by the State of Alabama for first-degree rape. Doe sued Jones civilly for assault and battery, invasion of privacy, and the tort of outrage; Doe sued the various property management entities for negligence and/or wantonness. Doe moved for the entry of a default against Jones. Defendants Gulf South and Pinnacle jointly moved to stay discovery pending the criminal proceedings against Jones. On August 18, 2020, the trial court granted the motion to stay. On that same date, it denied Doe's motion for the entry of a default against Jones. The Alabama Supreme Court found Gulf South and Pinnacle, both corporations, filed the motion to stay based on speculation that Jones might later invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to discovery in this civil action. Gulf South and Pinnacle did not have their own Fifth Amendment privilege to assert, and the Court found they could not assert Fifth Amendment protections on behalf of Jones. Therefore, the Court concluded the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting their motion for a stay. Thus, the Court concluded Doe established a clear right to mandamus relief. Her petition was granted and the trial court directed to vacate its August 18, 2020 order staying the case. View "Ex parte Jane Doe, individually and as mother and next friend of her minor children, Judy Doe and John Doe." on Justia Law

John Dee and Brenda Peterson appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital ("Triad") on the Petersons' claims asserted in their medical-malpractice action. John was admitted to Flowers Hospital ("the hospital") in August 2014 for treatment of abdominal pain and fever that was caused by colitis. John was suffering from chronic lymphocytic leukemia, end-stage renal disease, and diabetes. While he was admitted to the hospital in August 2014, John had a peripherally inserted central catheter ("PICC line") in his left shoulder. According to the Petersons, after John had suffered "constant pain and aggravation" around the area where the PICC line was inserted, a doctor agreed to have the PICC line removed the following morning. The Petersons asserted that, a nurse, Matthew Starr, was busy with other patients to immediately remove the line. The Petersons contended that another doctor was then called, that the doctor advised the nurses treating John to take out the PICC line, and that the nurses refused. The Petersons asserted that Starr "abandoned" John. Thereafter, John experienced a deep vein thrombosis ("DVT") in his upper left arm, which caused swelling and tissue necrosis. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the Petersons did not make an argument supported by sufficient authority to demonstrate the trial court erred. "They failed to present expert medical testimony from a similarly situated health-care provider to establish the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard, and proximate causation linking the actions of hospital staff to John's injury." View "Peterson v. Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital" on Justia Law

Patrick Jackson appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Voncille Allen, as the personal representative of the estate of Valerie Allen ("the estate"), and Penn Tank Lines, Inc. ("PTL"). In 2016, Jackson was injured in an automobile accident while receiving training and riding as a passenger in a tractor-tanker trailer commercial motor vehicle ("the CMV") driven by Valerie Allen ("Allen"). Allen died as a result of the accident. Jackson was an employee of PTL and was being trained by Allen at the time of the accident. Allen owned the CMV, and PTL was leasing the vehicle from Allen, who worked for PTL, delivering fuel, under an independent-contractor agreement. Jackson received medical treatment for his injuries after the accident, and PTL's workers' compensation insurance covered the costs of the treatment. In 2018, Jackson sued the estate and PTL, alleging claims of negligence and "gross negligence and/or wantonness" against the estate and a claim of negligent or wanton hiring, training, and supervision against PTL; in addition, Jackson sought to hold PTL vicariously liable for Allen's actions through the doctrine of respondeat superior. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court affirm the judgment insofar as the trial court determined that PTL was entitled to complete immunity from Jackson's claims against it pursuant to the exclusive-remedy provisions of Workers' Compensation Act. The Court reversed insofar as the trial court determined, as a matter of law, that Allen was PTL's agent under the purview of the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Act. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. Allen" on Justia Law

Steve Lands appealed summary judgment entered in favor of Betty Ward d/b/a Lucky B's Trucking ("Lucky B") in a suit he filed seeking damages for injuries sustained on the job. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Lucky B on both of Lands's claims against it -- negligence and wantonness -- because it held that Lucky B did not owe Lands a duty. Tennessee Valley Land and Timber, LLC ("TVL&T"), contracted with Lands to haul timber for processing at various locations in the Southeast. Kenneth Ward, the owner of TVL&T, provided Lands with a 1994 Peterbilt 379 Truck ("the truck") to make the deliveries. According to Lands, when Kenneth first provided the truck, he told Lands that it was sometimes difficult to start. If the truck would not start, Kenneth instructed Lands to use a "hot-wire" method, which required Lands to use a 12-inch piece of partially exposed wire to "jump" the truck while its ignition was left in the on position. Although TVL&T allowed Lands to use the truck for work, the truck was owned by Lucky B. After a delivery, Lands had to hot-wire the truck to start it. Lands put the truck in neutral, engaged the parking brake, and got out of the truck to use the hot-wire method. With both feet on the front-wheel axle and a cigarette lighter in hand, he lifted the hood and connected the 12-inch piece of wire to the firewall solenoid. The truck jumped back to life and sent Lands to the ground. The truck then rolled over Lands, severing the muscles in the lower half of his leg. Lands sued Lucky B, TVL&T, and other entities for negligence and wantonness. The essence of Lands's claims was that Lucky B, as the owner of the truck, had a duty under statute, regulation, and common law to inspect the truck and maintain it in safe condition. By failing to inspect and maintain it, he argued, the truck fell into disrepair and triggered the sequence of events that caused his injuries. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded Lands made out a prima facie case of negligence. While questions about causation and his own possible negligence remained, the Court found Lands was entitled to have those questions answered by a jury. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's summary judgment on that claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. With respect to Lands' wantonness claims, the Court found no evidence of heightened culpability required to prove wantonness. Judgment as to that claim was affirmed. View "Lands v. Ward d/b/a Lucky B's Trucking" on Justia Law

Jackson Hospital & Clinic, Inc. ("Jackson Hospital") appealed the denial of its postjudgment motion seeking a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial following the entry of a judgment on a jury verdict against Jackson Hospital and in favor of plaintiff, Cameron Murphy. In February 2011, Murphy, after experiencing back pain, was referred for treatment to Dr. Margaret Vereb, a board-certified urologist employed by Jackson Hospital. Dr. Vereb determined that Murphy had kidney stones and recommended a ureteroscopy procedure to remove the stones. During that procedure, Dr. Vereb used a glidewire to establish the correct surgical path to Murphy's kidneys through his urinary tract. Dr. Vereb then used a laser to break the kidney stones into smaller fragments for removal. Following an uneventful period of recovery, the surgery was deemed successful, and Murphy was released. During a postoperative evaluation two days later, it was reported that Murphy had been experiencing pain, but he was assured that such symptoms were normal. Murphy was prescribed pain medication and discharged. In June 2011, however, Murphy experienced painful urination and blood in his urine. An X-ray performed at that time revealed that a piece of the glidewire used during the ureteroscopy procedure remained lodged in Murphy's bladder. Upon seeking treatment from another urologist, a 5.6 centimeter glidewire fragment was removed from Murphy's bladder. Murphy subsequently sued both Dr. Vereb and Jackson Hospital alleging claims under the Alabama Medical Liability Act ("the AMLA"). The Alabama Supreme Court found Murphy presented no evidence -- in the form of expert testimony or otherwise -- that Jackson Hospital breached the applicable standard of care in any manner, Murphy failed to present evidence substantiating an essential element of his defective-equipment claim against Jackson Hospital, and therefore the jury's verdict on that claim was unsupported. Therefore, Jackson Hospital was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law in its favor. The judgment entered on the jury's verdict against Jackson Hospital was reversed. View "Jackson Hospital & Clinic, Inc. v. Murphy" on Justia Law