Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants April Steele Benton and John Benton and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"), petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Bibb Circuit Court to vacate its July 18, 2016, order denying the Bentons' and State Farm's motion to transfer this action from the Bibb Circuit Court to the Shelby Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. In 2014, April Steele Benton, a resident of Bibb County, and Amir Alan Ebrahimi, a resident of Shelby County, were involved in a two-vehicle collision in Shelby County. Following the collision, Ebrahimi was transported from the scene of the accident by Regional Paramedical Services to the University of Alabama at Birmingham Medical Center ("UAB"), where he received treatment for his injuries. Ebrahimi filed a complaint in the Bibb Circuit Court against April Steele Benton; John Benton, the owner of the car April was driving; and State Farm, Ebrahimi's underinsured-motorist carrier. The Bentons filed a motion to transfer the action to Shelby County based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Bentons argued in their motion that Shelby County had a stronger connection to the case because: (1) the accident occurred in Shelby County; (2) the Pelham Police Department, located in Shelby County, investigated the accident; (3) Ebrahimi resided in Calera, located in Shelby County; (4) the first responders, employees of Regional Paramedical Services, were located in Shelby County; (5) Ebrahimi was treated at UAB, which was closer to Shelby County than to Bibb County; and (6) the only connection this action has with Bibb County was the fact that the Bentons, resided there. The Supreme Court found that the trial court should have granted the Bentons' motion for a change of venue, and accordingly, issued the writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to deny the motion and transfer the action to Shelby County. View "Ex parte Benton et al." on Justia Law

Wayne Morrow filed a permissive appeal to the Circuit Court's order denying his request for a judgment declaring that the $100,000 cap on damages in section 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, applied to Morrow, a municipal employee who was sued in his individual capacity. In 2009, Alice Yu sought to have Alabama Power Company restore electrical service in her name at a commercial building she was leasing. The premises had been without power for approximately eight months. The City of Montgomery sent Morrow to perform an electrical inspection of the premises and clear the premises for service before electrical service was restored. Keandarick Russell, a minor, was staying with his great-grandmother, who lived next door to the premises. Russell was playing on the concrete pad on which the air-conditioning system was located and was electrocuted when he came in contact with a chain-link fence adjacent to the premises. When the incident occurred, wires from an uncovered junction box at the electrical source had come in contact with a portion of the fence, and, as a result, the fence had become electrified. Russell was electrocuted when he touched the fence. Shameka Caldwell, as Russell's mother and next friend, filed a wrongful-death action against multiple defendants, including Morrow and Yu for two fictitiously named defendants. In the amended complaint, Caldwell alleged that Morrow had negligently, recklessly, and/or wantonly inspected the premises and had negligently, recklessly, and/or wantonly allowed electrical service to be restored to the premises. In his answer, Morrow asserted that he was entitled to State immunity, to State-agent immunity, and to qualified immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the plain language of 11-47-190 did not limit the recovery on a claim against a municipal employee in his or her individual capacity, the $100,000 statutory cap on recovery would not apply to Caldwell's claims against Morrow. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Morrow's request for a judgment declaring that it would. View "Morrow v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Clarke Circuit Court to vacate its order denying State Farm's motion to transfer this case to the Mobile Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. The underlying action arose from an automobile accident that occurred in Mobile County in 2010. Sandra Banks, a resident of both Clarke and Mobile Counties, sued Robert Spray, a resident of Baldwin County, and State Farm. Banks alleged that she suffered injuries as a result of the wrongful, negligent, and/or wanton conduct of Spray when the vehicle he was driving and owned struck her vehicle. Additionally, Banks alleged that at the time of the accident she had a policy of insurance with State Farm, which included uninsured-/underinsured-motorist coverage, and that she was due proceeds under her coverage. Because both the "convenience of parties and witnesses" and the "interest of justice" prongs of the doctrine of forum non conveniens compelled the transfer of this case from Clarke County to Mobile County, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to transfer the action. Therefore, the Court granted State Farm's petition and issued a writ directing the Clarke Circuit Court to vacate its order and to enter an order granting the motion.View "Banks v. Spray" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an accident that occurred on the Mobile River. Groton Pacific Carriers, Inc., and International Tanker Management Holding LTD. ("ITM") appealed a judgment in favor of Carl Jackson, as personal representative of the estate of Carl L. Williams, deceased, and as next friend of Camren Lamarcus Williams, Jayden Eugene Williams, and Cartez Labruce Williams, minors; and Edward L. Purdue. Purdue and Williams were working for Mo-Bay Shipping Services, Inc. as line handlers. In 2008, they were dispatched by Mo-Bay to meet the ocean-going tanker MT Glenross. They were to use a Mo-Bay boat to transport the Glenross's steel mooring lines from where the Glenross was anchored to shore-side bollards located a few hundred yards away. The accident occurred while Purdue and Williams were handling one of the Glenross's mooring lines. As a result of either a mechanical problem with the ship's winch or improper operation of the winch by the Glenross's crew, the mooring line continued to be reeled in, and the boat Williams and Purdue were in, which was connected to the line, was pulled out of the water and up the side of the Glenross's hull. Williams and Purdue held onto the boat as it was lifted from the water. The boat, however, broke free from the line, fell into the river, and capsized. Williams and Purdue, who were not wearing life vests, fell into the water. Purdue was able to climb atop the capsized boat and was rescued. Williams, who could not swim, drowned. Count one of the complaint alleged that Purdue and Williams were "Jones Act seamen" and asserted a Jones Act claim against Mo-Bay. Count one additionally alleged general maritime-law claims of negligence and unseaworthiness against Groton Pacific, ITM, and Cypress. Count one also made an alternative claim that Purdue and Williams were longshoremen and/or harbor workers entitled to recover from Groton Pacific, ITM, and Cypress under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Count two of the complaint asserted claims under Alabama law, including a wrongful-death claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Jackson and Purdue. The jury also found Purdue and Williams guilty of 25% comparative fault. On appeal, Groton Pacific and ITM argued that the trial court erred in ruling before trial that Williams and Purdue were harbor workers. Groton and ITM argue that that ruling led the trial court into a number of subsequent legal errors, including incorrectly charging the jury, particularly with respect to the type of damages available, and refusing to allow the jury to apportion any fault to Mo-Bay. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that Williams and Purdue were harbor workers. The case therefore was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Groton Pacific Carriers, Inc. v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Respondents Reed Collar and Bonnie Collar, as the parents of Gilbert Collar, sued the University of South Alabama in connection with Gilbert's death. In October 2012, Gilbert was a student at the University. At some point while he and a few other students were talking, Gilbert was given a substance that was believed to have included illegal drugs. Gilbert had a sudden and immediate reaction to the substance: the reaction caused him either to become extremely hot or to believe that he was very hot. Gilbert lost the ability to fully understand his actions and to reason. As a result, Gilbert took off his clothes and began running into and out of traffic on the campus of the University. At some point during his reaction, Gilbert went to the University's police station and began hitting the windows. Gilbert started to walk away from the building but came back and started hitting the door of the station. An officer came out of the station through the door with his weapon drawn. After the officer called to Gilbert, Gilbert started to advance toward the police station and "immediately began acting in an erratic manner." When Gilbert was a few feet from the officer ("and for unexplainable reasons"), the officer shot Gilbert. The trial court entered an order denying the Chief of University Police's motion to dismiss. The Chief filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to reverse the trial court. The Supreme Court found that the Chief had a clear legal right to the dismissal of counts one and three of the complaint against him. Therefore, the Court granted his petition. View "Collar v. University of South Alabama" on Justia Law

In late 2005 or early 2006, Corey Culverhouse began constructing a house for himself on a five-acre lot in Hartford. He obtained a policy from Alfa Mutual Insurance Company to insure the house during the remainder of the construction process and after construction was completed. In 2009, a minor fire damaged the kitchen of the house. Culverhouse submitted a claim to Alfa, which paid for a remediation company to clean and repair the smoke damage caused by the fire. During this process, Culverhouse moved out of the house and into a barn on his property. After about two weeks of living in the barn, Culverhouse moved into a house he was constructing for eventual sale across the road from his house. Later that year, another fire damaged the house. This time, the fire could not be extinguished, and the house, its contents, and an adjacent swimming pool were completely destroyed. Culverhouse promptly informed Alfa. Alfa immediately questioned the Culverhouse's claim because he had not submitted with his claim an inventory of the contents of the house and supporting documentation, and he had not submitted any evidence supporting the large claim he had submitted for loss of use in the two-month period prior to the second fire. Culverhouse ultimately sued Alfa for payment of the claim. A hearing on the summary-judgment motion was held on in 2013, and the trial court granted Alfa's motion and dismissed each of Culverhouse's claims; the trial court also dismissed an Alfa counterclaim as moot. Culverhouse thereafter retained a new attorney and, on moved the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate its order. The trial court granted Culverhouse's motion in part and amended its summary-judgment order so as to exclude Culverhouse's breach-of-contract claim from the judgment, leaving it as the only remaining claim in the case. Alfa's argument on appeal did not relate to the merits of Culverhouse's breach-of-contract claim. Rather, it concerned only whether the trial court acted properly by amending its summary-judgment order to resurrect that claim in response to Culverhouse's motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "ALFA Mutual Insurance Co. v. Culverhouse " on Justia Law

Defendants Dr. Gerald Hodge and Tombigbee Healthcare Authority d/b/a Bryan W. Whitfield Memorial Hospital separately petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing the Marengo Circuit Court to dismiss the claims asserted against them by Gertha and David Tucker. In 2012, Gertha sued Dr. Hodge, Tombigbee, and others, alleging claims under the Alabama Medical Liability Act. Gertha alleged that Dr. Hodge performed a hysterectomy on her in 2005; that Dr. Hodge negligently failed to account for and to remove a surgical hemostat clamp from her abdomen; she did not discover the presence of the clamp until 2011 when she first started experiencing pain; and that as the proximate result of the negligent failure to remove the clamp she was made to suffer pain, life- threatening medical problems, including severe infections, and mental anguish. "Although the situation with which [the Supreme Court was] presented here [did] not involve the statute-of-limitations defense in the context of fictitious-party practice and the relation-back doctrine, the defendants . . . [were] faced with the extraordinary circumstance of having to further litigate this matter after having demonstrated from the face of the plaintiff's complaint a clear legal right to have the action against them dismissed based on the four-year period of repose found in 6-5-482(a). Having concluded that an appeal pursuant to Rule 5 or an appeal from a final judgment following further litigation is not an adequate remedy in this case, [the Court] conclude[d], based on the particular circumstances of this case, that mandamus is necessary in order to avoid the injustice that would result from the unavailability of any other adequate remedy."View "Tucker, Jr. v. Tombigbee Healthcare Authority " on Justia Law

Michelin North America, Inc. ("Michelin"), petitioned the Supreme Court for writs of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court: (1) to vacate its order allowing plaintiff Betty Brown to conduct an on-site inspection of Michelin's Ardmore, Oklahoma, tire-manufacturing facility (case no. 1121330); and (2) to vacate its order compelling Michelin to answer certain interrogatories and to comply with certain document requests propounded by Brown (case no. 1121341). Brown and her husband, George were traveling in Mobile when the tire mounted on the rear passenger side of their 1992 Ford Explorer sport-utility vehicle failed, causing an automobile accident in which George was killed and Brown was injured. Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court granted Michelin's petition in case no. 1121330 and granted the petition in part in case no. 1121341. View "Brown v. Michelin North America, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Deborah Voltz, Jasmin Voltz, and Princess Turner appealed a circuit court order dismissing their action against Cameron Dyess. Plaintiffs filed their complaint against Dyess alleging Dyess had negligently and wantonly caused an automobile accident in which the plaintiffs were injured. Plaintiffs attempted service of process on Dyess by certified mail. This service of process was returned unclaimed. A few days later, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. A few months later, plaintiffs attempted to serve the amended complaint on Dyess, this time through personal service by the sheriff. A month after that, without giving notice to plaintiffs, the trial court entered an order dismissing the case for lack of service. On the same date, plaintiffs filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the order of dismissal. After making their motion, the sheriff's summons was returned indicating nonservice. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion to alter, and dismissed the case. Plaintiffs appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding the trial court erred when it dismissed the action without giving at least 14 days' notice to the plaintiffs that their case was subject to dismissal for failure to effect service. View "Voltz v. Dyess " on Justia Law