Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Austal USA, LLC filed two petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the Mobile Circuit Court to dismiss certain claims asserted against it by plaintiffs Michael Keshock, Martin Osborn, Richard Fitzgerald, Tyrone Lucas, Riley Bodiford, Tommie Brandon, Justin Reed, and William White. Austal operates a shipyard in Mobile that builds naval vessels. Each of the plaintiffs is an employee of Austal who claims to have been injured while working in the course of his or her employment. Specifically, each plaintiff claimed to have been injured by a tool known as a "Miller saw." After a review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court concluded that Austal did not show a clear legal right to the relief sought. Accordingly, the Court denied Austal's petitions. View "Ex parte Austal USA, LLC." on Justia Law

Teachers Becky Ingram and Nancy Wilkinson petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion for a summary judgment based on State-agent immunity as to all claims asserted against them in an action filed by a female student, L.L., by and through her mother, and to enter a summary judgment in their favor. At the time of the incident at issue, L.L. was an 11-year-old eighth-grade student, suffering from spina bifida, and paralyzed from the waist down. She is confined to a wheelchair; she does not have full use of her arms and hands; she requires a urinary catheter; and she wears a diaper. L.L. also has significant mental impairment. The other eighth-grade student involved in the incident was described as having mental retardation. In 2007 when the incident underlying this case occurred, Ingram was the eighth-grade science teacher and Wilkinson was a teacher's aide assigned to Ingram's class. M.M. had a history of aggressive behavior toward teachers and other students. The incident in question happened when the teachers assisted L.L. in going to the bathroom. In a moment after lunch when students returned to classes, a moment passed when M.M. was unaccounted for, and L.L. was in the bathroom by herself. L.L. was discovered partially undressed and exposed, because M.M. had “messed with her.” L.L., by and through her mother, originally filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against the Tuscaloosa City Board of Education, Sterling, and Ingram, alleging violations of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983; Title IX; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; and the Americans with Disabilities Act. She also brought several Alabama state-law claims. The federal district court entered a summary judgment in favor of all defendants on L.L.'s federal claims. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court found that by the written policy requiring that students be escorted back to their classrooms by teachers, Ingram reportedly did escort the students back to their classroom, and the Court found no basis for holding Wilkinson, who served merely as an aide to the classroom teacher, liable to the same degree as Ingram. Therefore the Court overturned the circuit court’s judgment with respect to Wilkinson, but declined to overturn the circuit court's decision to deny with respect to Ingram. View "Ex parte Ingram" on Justia Law

Betty Collins appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants Ricardo Herring, D.C., and Herring Chiropractic Center, LLC. Collins sought damages for alleged medical malpractice with respect to treatment of knee, shoulder and back pain. Collins's knee was treated with a cold pack. The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to Collins, indicated that the cold pack had been in the refrigerator for seven days, that it had not been thawed when Collins arrived for her appointment, and that it was hard on the day of her treatment in contrast to her treatment on other visits. Collins felt heat when the cold pack was removed from her knee. Collins developed blisters on her knee following the treatment and later scarring. In their summary-judgment motion, defendants argued that Collins had not produced any evidence demonstrating that Dr. Herring's treatment fell below the applicable standard of care. The defendants argued that Collins failed to present testimony from a similarly situated expert witness because Collins had not designated an expert witness as required under the Alabama Medical Liability Act to testify that Dr. Herring breached his duty of care in treating Collins.The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. "In the instant case, the procuring and application of the cold pack was within the exclusive control of the defendants, and no evidence was presented indicating that Collins contributed to her injuries. Blistering and subsequent scarring does not ordinarily occur following the application of a cold pack, absent negligence. The causative relationship between Collins's injury and the defendants' acts are such that it can be readily understood, to the extent that a layperson can reliably determine the issue of causation without independent expert testimony to assist in that determination." View "Collins v. Herring Chiropractic Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Melissa Bain, in her capacity as the personal representative of the estate of her deceased husband Christopher Heath ("Heath"), appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Colbert County Northwest Alabama Health Care Authority d/b/a Helen Keller Hospital ("HKH"). Dr. Preston Wigfall was the emergency-room physician working at the hospital on the night Heath was taken to the emergency room. Dr. Wigfall ordered certain tests to be run, but he was unable to determine from the results of those tests the cause of Heath's symptoms. Heath was discharged approximately six hours after his arrival with an "unspecified" diagnosis with instructions to follow up with his primary-care physician. Approximately 20 days after his visit to the emergency room at the hospital, Heath died when a 45-millimeter ascending aortic aneurysm dissected. Bain, in her capacity as the personal representative of Heath's estate, filed a medical-malpractice action against HKH and several other defendants, arguing that that the emergency-department nurses at the hospital and Dr. Wigfall breached the applicable standards of care when they treated Heath; that Dr. Wigfall, at all relevant times, was acting within the line and scope of his duties and employment as an actual or apparent agent or employee of HKH; and that HKH was vicariously liable for the actions of its nurses and Dr. Wigfall. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Bain failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of HKH as to all of Bain's claims and affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Bain v. Colbert County Northwest Alabama Health Care Authority" on Justia Law

Sherri Hurst and Brenda Ray had been friends and neighbors for approximately 20 years before the incident that is the basis of the underlying action. One day in 2013, Ray telephoned Hurst and asked her to accompany her to a Wal-Mart. Ray was taking Nona Williams, her elderly aunt, to purchase Williams's medication and other merchandise that day, in preparation for Williams's move to Ohio. Williams testified that Ray asked Hurst to accompany them to the Wal-Mart because "both [Ray] and I had limited mobility, and [Ray] wanted [Hurst] to come along in case either of us needed help moving around." When they arrived at the Wal-Mart, Ray pulled her vehicle along the curb in front of the store to allow Williams to get out of the vehicle at the entrance. After Williams got out of the vehicle, Ray asked Hurst to stand with Williams on the curb while she parked the car. Hurst then began to get out of the vehicle, but, before she had completely exited the vehicle, Ray pulled the vehicle forward, causing Hurst to fall to the ground. Hurst sustained injuries when the back tire of the vehicle ran over her leg. Hurst sued Ray's estate ("the estate"), alleging negligence and seeking to recover damages for her injuries. The estate answered the complaint, raising as a defense, among other things, the Alabama Guest Statute. The estate moved for a summary judgment, arguing that Hurst's negligence claim was barred by the Guest Statute. The trial court entered an order granting the estate’s motion and denying Hurst’s cross-motion for a summary judgment. The Alabama Supreme Court found that the Guest Statute did not apply in this matter, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hurst v. Sneed" on Justia Law

Warren and Johanna Grimes appealed a declaratory judgment holding that a liability policy issued by Alfa Mutual Insurance Company ("Alfa") did not provide coverage for a user of an automobile who did not have the express permission of the owner or drivers covered by the policy. Teresa Boop added liability coverage and uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage for a pickup truck to her automobile insurance with Alfa. Boop also added her minor son as a driver under the policy. Amy Arrington was operating the pickup truck when it collided with a vehicle owned and occupied by the Grimeses. Both of the Grimeses suffered personal injuries as a result of the collision. The Grimeses’ insurer, Liberty Mutual, sued Arrington, alleging negligence and wantonness and seeking recovery of damages for the Grimeses' vehicle. Later the Grimeses sued Arrington and Boop, alleging negligence, wantonness, and negligent entrustment, and seeking damages for their personal injuries. Arrington filed answers, arguing that she was a covered person under the terms of Boop's policy with Alfa and that Alfa, therefore, should provide her with a defense in the Grimeses' action and in Liberty Mutual's action. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not err in its conclusion that the Alfa policy did not provide coverage for a user of a motor vehicle who did not have the express permission of the owner or drivers who were covered. View "Grimes v. Alfa Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Tenax Corporation ("Tenax") and Tenax Manufacturing Alabama, LLC ("Tenax Alabama"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Conecuh Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor in John Dees's tort action against them. Tenax and Tenax Alabama contend that they were immune from Dees's tort claims under the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act. Furthermore, Tenax Alabama contended that it was entitled to a summary judgment because it was not a legal entity when Dees was injured. Finding that Tenax and Tenax Alabama demonstrated a clear legal right to mandamus relief, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ directing the circuit court to enter summary judgment in their favor. View "Ex parte Tenax Corp." on Justia Law

Adam Hilyer appealed a circuit court order denying his request to set aside a default judgment entered against him in a suit brought by Betti Fortier, mother and next friend of minor M.M. In 2013, Hilyer was backing a tractor-trailer rig used to transport logs into his private driveway on Kennedy Avenue. At the time, Hilyer was blocking both lanes of traffic on Kennedy Avenue. M.M., a minor, was driving Fortier's van and was traveling westbound on Kennedy Avenue. M.M.'s vehicle collided with Hilyer's trailer, and M.M. sustained injuries. The circuit court entered its default judgment against Hilyer in the amount of $550,000. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying Hilyer's Rule 55(c) motion to set aside the default judgment. The Court found questions of fact remained about service of the complaint, and miscommunications between insurers, adjusters investigators and lawyers, were not a result of Hilyer's "own culpable conduct." The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hilyer v. Fortier" on Justia Law

Kimberly Stinnett appealed the dismissal of her claim against Karla Kennedy, M.D., alleging the wrongful death of her unborn previable child. Based on its previous holdings, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in dismissing Stinnett's claim alleging wrongful death based on the death of her previable unborn child. The Court found the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the doctor on lack-of-proof-of-causation grounds. Furthermore, the Court found no basis to affirm summary judgment based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Accordingly, the trial court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Stinnett v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Petitioners VEL, LLC ("VEL"); Montgomery Drug Co., Inc. ("MDCI"); Robert Stafford; and Erica Greene sought mandamus relief. William Kilgore sought to fill his prescription for ropinirole, a drug used to treat the symptoms of Parkinson's disease, at the Adams Drugs pharmacy in Montgomery. Instead of filling Kilgore's prescription with ropinirole as prescribed, the employees working at the pharmacy filled Kilgore's prescription with risperidone. After having taken risperidone instead of ropinirole for several days, Kilgore began experiencing negative health consequences and sought medical assistance at the emergency room of Baptist Medical Center South. At the time Kilgore's prescription was improperly filled at the Adams Drugs pharmacy, VEL and MDCI each owned and operated at least one Adams Drugs pharmacy in Montgomery. Kilgore and Patricia Kilgore Kyser, as guardian and conservator of Kilgore (collectively, "plaintiffs"), filed the original complaint in the action against "VEL, LLC, d.b.a. Adams Drugs, and/or Adams Drugs Good Neighbor Pharmacy," and several fictitiously named defendants, seeking damages for Kilgore's injuries that plaintiffs alleged were caused by defendants' alleged negligence and wantonness. A month after the statute of limitations expired, VEL moved to dismiss, asserting that it "has no relation or connection with any of the claims stated against it in [the plaintiffs'] complaint." Plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint to list parties that were previously listed fictitiously. Several months after VEL's motion to dismiss, MDCI moved to dismiss, arguing the statute of limitations had expired, plaintiffs were suing the wrong entity, and that the amended complaint did not relate back to the original. VEL renewed its motion to dismiss, also arguing plaintiffs sued the wrong entity. The trial court ultimately denied the motions, and petitioners filed this mandamus action. After review, the Supreme Court granted petitioners' petition in part and denied it in part. The Court granted the petition insofar as they requested a writ directing the trial court to vacate its order denying MDCI's summary-judgment motion and to enter an order granting MDCI's summary-judgment motion. The Court denied insofar as they requested the circuit court vacate its order denying VEL's, Stafford's, and Greene's summary-judgment motions and to enter an order granting those motions. View "Ex parte VEL, LLC, et al." on Justia Law