Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Industrial Warehouse Services, Inc. ("IWS"), petitioned for writs of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its order denying IWS's motion for a protective order concerning certain discovery requested by Chapman Wilson, as administrator of the estate of Janie Holt Wilson ("Wilson"), and by Olivia Taylor, as administrator of the estate of Willie James Taylor, Jr. ("Taylor"), and to enter a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. In 2017, a truck driven by an employee of IWS, collided with a vehicle driven by Willie James Taylor, Jr. ("Willie"); Janie Wilson ("Janie") was a passenger in the vehicle. Willie and Janie died from injuries incurred as a result of the accident. The circuit court consolidated the resulting lawsuits. Wilson and Taylor requested that IWS respond to several interrogatories and produce numerous documents. Before responding to the discovery requests, IWS notified Wilson and Taylor that they had requested "materials from IWS ... that are proprietary to IWS and contain confidential information and/or trade secrets" and requested that the parties develop an agreed-upon protective order. The parties then engaged in negotiations over the language of the proposed protective order. IWS did not object to producing any of the requested discovery but sought to limit the use of the discovered information to the litigation of these consolidated cases. Wilson's and Taylor's trial attorneys sought to use the discovery for purposes beyond the instant litigation. The Alabama Supreme Court determined IWS was entitled to partial mandamus relief: a movant's failure to present evidence in support of the motion for a protective order is not, in and of itself, a reason to deny such a motion. Wilson and Taylor's argument that IWS was required to present evidence proving that the requested discovery contained information that was a trade secret or confidential was not convincing to the Court. The circuit court was instructed to vacate that portion of its order denying IWS's motion for a protective order regarding the information contained in IWS's bills of lading and to enter an order pursuant to Rule 26(c)(7) concerning that information, and as to that portion of the order its petitions are granted. However, IWS did not demonstrate a clear legal right to mandamus relief with respect to that portion of the circuit court order concerning the information contained in operations and safety manuals. View "Ex parte Industrial Warehouse Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Industrial Warehouse Services, Inc. ("IWS"), petitioned for writs of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its order denying IWS's motion for a protective order concerning certain discovery requested by Chapman Wilson, as administrator of the estate of Janie Holt Wilson ("Wilson"), and by Olivia Taylor, as administrator of the estate of Willie James Taylor, Jr. ("Taylor"), and to enter a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. In 2017, a truck driven by an employee of IWS, collided with a vehicle driven by Willie James Taylor, Jr. ("Willie"); Janie Wilson ("Janie") was a passenger in the vehicle. Willie and Janie died from injuries incurred as a result of the accident. The circuit court consolidated the resulting lawsuits. Wilson and Taylor requested that IWS respond to several interrogatories and produce numerous documents. Before responding to the discovery requests, IWS notified Wilson and Taylor that they had requested "materials from IWS ... that are proprietary to IWS and contain confidential information and/or trade secrets" and requested that the parties develop an agreed-upon protective order. The parties then engaged in negotiations over the language of the proposed protective order. IWS did not object to producing any of the requested discovery but sought to limit the use of the discovered information to the litigation of these consolidated cases. Wilson's and Taylor's trial attorneys sought to use the discovery for purposes beyond the instant litigation. The Alabama Supreme Court determined IWS was entitled to partial mandamus relief: a movant's failure to present evidence in support of the motion for a protective order is not, in and of itself, a reason to deny such a motion. Wilson and Taylor's argument that IWS was required to present evidence proving that the requested discovery contained information that was a trade secret or confidential was not convincing to the Court. The circuit court was instructed to vacate that portion of its order denying IWS's motion for a protective order regarding the information contained in IWS's bills of lading and to enter an order pursuant to Rule 26(c)(7) concerning that information, and as to that portion of the order its petitions are granted. However, IWS did not demonstrate a clear legal right to mandamus relief with respect to that portion of the circuit court order concerning the information contained in operations and safety manuals. View "Ex parte Industrial Warehouse Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Muscle Shoals ("the City") petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing the Colbert Circuit Court to vacate its denial of the City's motion for a summary judgment as to claims asserted against it by Reginald Harden stemming from injuries Harden sustained from falling through a grate at Gattman Park, a City-owned park. Because Harden failed to present substantial evidence in response to the City's properly supported motion for a summary judgment - evidence indicating that one of the two exceptions to municipal immunity detailed in 11-47-190 is implicated in this case- the Alabama Supreme Court felt compelled to conclude that the trial court erred in denying the City's motion. The City was thus entitled to immunity from Harden's action under 11-47-190, and the trial court’s order denying the City's motion for a summary judgment was vacated. View "Ex parte City of Muscle Shoals" on Justia Law

In this personal-injury action, the DeKalb-Cherokee Counties Gas District ("DC Gas") appealed a circuit court order denying DC Gas's renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") or, in the alternative, for a new trial. Plaintiff Timothy Raughton, an employee of the City of Fort Payne, was working at the city landfill. One of his duties on that day was to tell users of the landfill where to dump their refuse. Neal Ridgeway, in his capacity as an employee of DC Gas, drove a dump truck to the landfill. The bed of the dump truck contained bricks and concrete blocks that had been collected from a site on which DC Gas planned to have constructed an office building. While Ridgeway dumped the contents of the truck at the landfill, Raughton stood next to the truck. In an effort to dump the remaining debris, while Ridgeway performed a maneuver, the side wall of the truck bed fell from the truck, striking and injuring Raughton. There was no evidence in this case indicating that the clutch-release maneuver violated any formal safety standards. Raughton sued DC Gas, alleging negligence and wantonness. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of DC Gas on Raughton's wantonness claim, but his negligence claim proceeded to trial. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Raughton in the amount of $100,000. The trial court entered a judgment on that verdict and denied DC Gas's renewed motion for a JML. DC Gas appealed. After review of the circuit court record, the Alabama Supreme Court determined there was no evidence indicating that the side wall of the dump truck had become detached in the past or that DC Gas's agents knew that it might become detached. Moreover, no evidence was presented clearly showing how the side wall was attached to the truck or showing exactly why and how it had become detached. Thus, there was no evidence presented indicating that an inspection would have revealed that it might become detached and, therefore, that an inspection would have prevented the accident. Accordingly, the Court concluded that DC Gas could not be held liable based on its alleged negligence (failure to properly inspect the truck). Based on the foregoing, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment denying DC Gas's renewed motion for a JML, and rendered judgment in favor of DC Gas. View "DeKalb-Cherokee Counties Gas District v. Raughton" on Justia Law

Stephen Hrobowski, one of two named defendants in a civil action pending with the Lowndes Circuit Court, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to vacate its August 30, 2017, order denying Hrobowski's motion for a change of venue and to enter an order transferring this action to the Montgomery Circuit Court on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Alabama Supreme Court determined it was undisputed: that the accident that was the subject of the action occurred in Montgomery County; that the accident was investigated by law-enforcement personnel based in Montgomery County; and that both the plaintiff and the other named defendant resided there at all pertinent times. Even assuming, that there might be some question as to whether Hrobowski remained domiciled in Lowndes County, the fact that a defendant resides in a particular forum does not, for purposes of the interest-of-justice prong of 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code 1975, outweigh the forum where the tortious conduct occurred. The Supreme Court held the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying Hrobowski's motion for a change of venue based on the interest-of-justice prong of the forum non conveniens statute. Therefore, the Court granted Hrobowski's petition and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Lowndes Circuit Court to vacate its August 30, 2017, order denying Hrobowski's motion and to enter an order transferring the underlying action to Montgomery County. View "Ex parte Stephen Hrobowski." on Justia Law

International Creative Management Partners, LLC, d/b/a ICM Partners ("ICM"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to vacate its order denying ICM's motion to dismiss the action filed against it by Jordan Pardue, a minor, and Terrie Pardue, individually and as Jordan's mother and next friend (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Pardues"), on the basis that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over it and to issue an order granting its motion. ICM is a talent agency, and its clients perform at various venues across the globe. Jordan attended a concert by an ICM client, Cannibal Corpse, at Soul Kitchen Hall in Alabama. The Pardues state in their response to ICM's petition that, during the concert, "the crowd became violent and Jordan ... was thrown to the ground, suffering a spinal cord injury." The Pardues alleged in their complaint that it was, or should have been, foreseeable "that patrons attending Cannibal Corpse concerts exhibit violent behavior, including ... forming 'mosh pits' and/or dancing, running[,] jumping or otherwise physically contacting other patrons during the concert." The Pardues state that Jordan's total medical bills for treating the injuries Jordan incurred at the concert exceed $1.2 million. After review, the Supreme Court determined that other than arranging the booking of Cannibal Corpse, ICM had no involvement with the actual performance by Cannibal Corpse at Soul Kitchen Music Hall where Jordan incurred the injuries that were the basis of this action. For this reason alone it appears that ICM had no activity in Alabama giving rise to the episode-in-suit. “Moreover, assuming that ICM did engage in activity in Alabama, it does not appear that ICM's activity gave rise to the episode-in-suit.” The Court concluded the exercise of jurisdiction over ICM did not comport with fair play and substantial justice, and that ICM demonstrated a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus directing the Mobile Circuit Court to vacate its order denying ICM's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and to enter an order dismissing ICM from the underlying action. View "Ex parte International Creative Management Partners, LLC, d/b/a ICM Partners." on Justia Law

Gloria Austill and Mary Ella Etheridge appealed a circuit court order granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. John Krolikowski, a senior medical examiner with the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences ("the ADFS"). They challenged the order insofar as it denied their motion to compel certain discovery. The Baldwin County District Attorney's Office authorized the ADFS to perform an autopsy on the decedent based on potential civil and/or criminal litigation against the nursing home where the decedent resided before his death. Dr. Krolikowski conducted the autopsy on the decedent, at which time the brain was saved and "fixed" in formalin. Following the autopsy, the decedent's body was transported to Radney Funeral Home in Mobile. While the decedent's body was at the funeral home, Mary Ella and Gloria ("plaintiffs") requested that the decedent's brain be referred to the University of Alabama Hospital in Birmingham ("UAB") for a neuropathological examination. Plaintiffs then learned that the brain had not been returned to the body; it had been retained by Dr. Krolikowski. Plaintiffs then sued Dr. Krolikowski, individually, as well as other fictitiously named parties, alleging that, following the autopsy, Dr. Krolikowski, without any compelling or legitimate reason, "harvested the decedent's entire brain without the family's permission and preserved it in his office for his own use." Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages based on claims of negligence and/or wantonness, trespass, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of implied contract, and the tort of outrage. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded plaintiffs failed to demonstrate, by way of their Rule 56(f) motion and affidavit in support thereof, that the discovery they requested was crucial to the issue of State-agent immunity, the trial court properly denied their motion to compel. Additionally, because plaintiffs did not challenge the merits of the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Dr. Krolikowski, the summary judgment was affirmed. View "Austill v. Krolikowski" on Justia Law

Defendant Cheryl Price and Greg Lovelace petitioned for mandamus relief. Price was formerly the warden at Donaldson Correctional Facility ("the prison"), which was operated by the Alabama Department of Corrections ("the DOC"). Lovelace was a deputy commissioner of the DOC in charge of construction and maintenance. Plaintiff Marcus Parrish was a correctional officer employed by the DOC. Parrish was supervising inmate showers in a segregation unit in the prison. Parrish left the shower area briefly to retrieve shaving trimmers, and, when he returned, inmate Rashad Byers had already entered a shower cell, which had an exterior lock on it. Byers indicated that he was finished with his shower, and Parrish told him to turn around to be handcuffed, then approached Byers's shower door with the key to the lock on the door in his hand. Byers unexpectedly opened the door, exited the shower cell, and attacked Parrish. During the attack, Byers took Parrish's baton from him and began striking Parrish with it. Parrish was knocked unconscious, and he sustained injuries to his head. Parrish sued Price and Lovelace in their official capacities. Parrish later filed an amended complaint naming Price and Lovelace as defendants in their individual capacities only (thus, it appears that Price and Lovelace were sued only in their individual capacities). Parrish alleged that Price and Lovelace willfully breached their duties by failing to monitor the prison for unsafe conditions and by failing to repair or replace the allegedly defective locks. Price and Lovelace moved for a summary judgment, asserting, among other things, that they are entitled to State-agent immunity. The trial court denied the summary-judgment motion, concluding, without elaboration, that genuine issues of material fact existed to preclude a summary judgment. Price and Lovelace then petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, arguing that they were immune from liability. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded Price and Lovelace established they were entitled to State-agent immunity. Accordingly, the Court directed the trial court to enter a summary judgment in their favor. View "Ex parte Cheryl Price & Greg Lovelace." on Justia Law

In 2014, Shaundalyn Elliott, a resident of Montgomery County, was injured in an automobile accident in the City of Hayneville in Lowndes County. On February 23, 2017, Elliott filed this lawsuit at the Lowndes Circuit Court against her automobile insurer, Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"), seeking uninsured-motorist benefits related to the accident. Elliot alleged that the accident was caused by a "phantom driver," whose location was unknown. Allstate filed a motion to transfer the action from the Lowndes Circuit Court to the Montgomery Circuit Court. Elliott petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Lowndes Circuit Court to vacate its order transferring this case to the Montgomery Circuit Court. In this case, the Supreme Court found that Lowndes County and Montgomery County had connections to this action. The accident, injuries, and police investigation occurred in Lowndes County. On the other hand, Elliott resided in Montgomery County, where she sought treatment for her injuries resulting from the accident and where the parties' contractual dealings arose. Under the specific facts of this case, Lowndes County's connection to the accident was not "little" or "weak," and Montgomery County did not have a significantly stronger connection to the case to justify a transfer of this case under the interest-of-justice prong of § 6-3-21.1. Therefore, the Court held the trial court erred in transferring this action to the Montgomery Circuit Court. View "Ex parte Shaundalyn N. Elliott." on Justia Law

Tombigbee Healthcare Authority d/b/a Bryan W. Whitfield Memorial Hospital ("the hospital") petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Marengo Circuit Court to vacate its order compelling the hospital to respond to certain discovery requests and to enter a protective discovery order in its favor. T.N., A.V., O.J., and I.P. (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the plaintiffs") brought this action against the hospital, and its radiological technician, Leland Bert Taylor, Jr., who they allege sexually assaulted them while they were patients of the hospital. Along with their complaint, the plaintiffs served the hospital with written discovery requests seeking, among other things, information concerning "other incidents" involving Taylor; its investigation into their allegations of sexual assault by Taylor; and its hiring, training, supervision, and retention of Taylor and the termination of his employment. The hospital objected to the plaintiffs' requests, contending that the requests were protected by certain discovery privileges. The plaintiffs filed a motion to compel discovery; after a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and denied a request for a protective order. The Alabama Supreme Court denied relief. The hospital failed to demonstrate that the quality-assurance privilege applied to claims arising out of allegations of sexual acts that are wholly unrelated to medical treatment or that investigations related to allegations of sexual assault are undertaken to improve the quality of patient care. "Given the discretion afforded the trial court with respect to discovery matters, we conclude that the hospital has failed to meet its burden of proving the existence of the privilege afforded by 22-21-8 and the prejudicial effect of disclosing the information the plaintiffs seek." View "Ex parte Tombigbee Healthcare Authority d/b/a Bryan W. Whitfield Memorial Hospital." on Justia Law