Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On June 23, 2019, a multi-vehicle accident occurred on Interstate 59 in Birmingham, Alabama. John Daniels, Jr. lost control of his car after being struck by another vehicle and crashed into the concrete median, where his car was subsequently hit by other vehicles. Nicholas Raynard Smith, Jr., riding a motorcycle with a companion, approached the accident scene and collided with Daniels’s car, suffering severe injuries. There was conflicting evidence about whether the streetlights near the accident site were operational at the time, but it was undisputed that two specific streetlights were not working when first responders arrived. Smith alleged that the City of Birmingham was responsible for maintaining those streetlights and had been on notice of lighting problems in the area.Smith filed suit in the Jefferson Circuit Court, asserting claims of negligence and negligent hiring, training, supervision, and/or retention against the City. The court dismissed Smith’s wantonness and recklessness claims, leaving only the negligence-based claims. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing it was entitled to municipal and substantive immunity. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that factual questions remained regarding the City’s notice of the lighting issue and whether the inoperable streetlights proximately caused Smith’s injuries.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the City’s petition for a writ of mandamus. The Court held that the City was entitled to substantive immunity on Smith’s negligence claim, concluding that a municipality’s voluntary maintenance of streetlights for public safety does not create a legal duty to individual motorists. The Court also noted Smith’s concession that his negligent hiring, training, supervision, and/or retention claim should be dismissed. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Alabama granted the City’s petition and directed the circuit court to enter summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Ex parte City of Birmingham PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS" on Justia Law

The case concerns an automobile accident that occurred in rural Tuscaloosa County, Alabama, on January 3, 2024. James Godwin, a resident of Dallas County and employee of Talton Communications, Inc., was driving a company vehicle when he was rear-ended by Desi Bernard Peoples, a resident of Fayette County. Godwin subsequently filed suit in the Dallas Circuit Court against Peoples, his employer Talton, and Penn National Security Insurance Company, which provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. Godwin’s claims included negligence and wantonness, a claim for uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits, and a workers’ compensation claim against Talton. Godwin received all medical treatment for his injuries in Dallas County, where he and his wife reside and work.After the complaint was filed, Penn National moved to sever the workers’ compensation claim and to transfer the remaining claims to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, arguing that transfer was warranted for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice under Alabama’s forum non conveniens statute, § 6-3-21.1. The Dallas Circuit Court denied the motion to sever but ordered the workers’ compensation claim to be tried separately. The court also denied the motion to transfer, finding insufficient evidence that Tuscaloosa County was a significantly more convenient forum or that Dallas County had only a weak connection to the case.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed Penn National’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel transfer. The Court denied the petition, holding that Penn National failed to meet its burden of showing that Tuscaloosa County was significantly more convenient or that Dallas County’s connection to the case was weak. The Court emphasized that the plaintiff’s choice of venue is entitled to deference when both venues are proper and that the evidence presented did not justify overriding that choice. View "Ex parte Penn National Security Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A Georgia corporation operates several hospitals and clinics in west Georgia and, through an affiliated entity, also operates a small hospital and clinics in east Alabama. An Alabama resident sought treatment at the Alabama hospital and was subsequently transferred by ambulance to the corporation’s Georgia facility for a heart-catheterization procedure. The procedure was performed by a Georgia-based physician employed by the corporation, who is not licensed in Alabama and has never practiced there. The patient alleges that the physician’s negligence during the procedure in Georgia caused him to suffer renal failure and require further medical intervention. The patient sued both the corporation and the physician in the Randolph Circuit Court in Alabama, asserting claims under both Alabama and Georgia medical liability statutes and alleging the corporation’s vicarious liability for the physician’s actions.The physician and the corporation moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Alabama court lacked personal jurisdiction over them and that venue was improper. The circuit court dismissed the claims against the physician for lack of personal jurisdiction but denied the corporation’s motion to dismiss. The corporation then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss the claims against it.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the corporation was not subject to general jurisdiction in Alabama, as it was neither incorporated nor had its principal place of business there. However, the Court found that specific personal jurisdiction existed because the patient’s treatment began at the Alabama facility operated by the corporation, and the subsequent care in Georgia was sufficiently related to the corporation’s activities in Alabama. The Court also concluded that the corporation had not demonstrated a clear legal right to dismissal based on improper venue, as it had not adequately addressed whether Alabama’s venue statute applied to claims brought under another state’s law. The petition for a writ of mandamus was denied. View "Ex parte Tanner Medical Center, Inc." on Justia Law

A woman named Susan Bonner was involved in a car accident in Cherokee County, Alabama, where her vehicle ended up submerged in a creek. After being rescued by bystanders, one of whom was a volunteer firefighter from a different department, Bonner received CPR until Howard Guice, a volunteer firefighter and EMT with the Cedar Bluff Volunteer Fire Department (CBVFD), arrived. Guice, who was not dispatched to the scene and was outside his department’s service area, advised that resuscitative efforts should cease and reported a death over his radio. Paramedics arrived shortly after, found Bonner still had signs of life, and continued CPR, but she died two days later from anoxic encephalopathy.Carol Rogers, as administratrix of Bonner’s estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Guice, the CBVFD, and others, alleging that Guice’s actions were negligent and that the CBVFD and its parent municipality, the Town of Cedar Bluff, were vicariously liable. The Cherokee Circuit Court found that the CBVFD was not a separate legal entity but a subordinate part of the Town. Relying on the Supreme Court of Alabama’s prior decision in Hollis v. City of Brighton, the court held that both Guice and the Town were immune from liability under Alabama’s Volunteer Service Act (VSA) and entered summary judgment in favor of the Town.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment. The Court held that the CBVFD is a subordinate entity of the Town, not a separate nonprofit, and that under the VSA, volunteer firefighters are immune from liability for negligence. Consequently, the Town cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of its volunteer firefighters when they are immune under the VSA. The Court also clarified that municipalities cannot be held liable for wanton conduct by their volunteers. View "Rogers v. Cedar Bluff Volunteer Fire Department" on Justia Law

Daniel Flickinger, a litigator at Wainwright, Pope & McMeekin, P.C. (WPM), posted conservative commentary on his personal social media, including a controversial post about George Floyd. Lawrence Tracy King, a partner at King Simmons Ford & Spree, P.C., sent a screenshot of Flickinger’s post—paired with a professional photo from WPM’s website—to WPM partners, expressing concern about the post’s impact on the firm’s reputation. The WPM partners, after reviewing Flickinger’s social media activity and discussing with King, asked Flickinger to resign, which he did. Flickinger alleged that the screenshot misrepresented his post as being made in his professional capacity and falsely associated his views with WPM.Flickinger sued King and the King law firm for defamation, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with a business relationship. The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed all claims, but the Supreme Court of Alabama previously reinstated the tortious interference claim, remanding for further proceedings. On remand, the King defendants moved for summary judgment, submitting affidavits from WPM partners stating their decision to terminate Flickinger was based solely on their independent review of his public posts, not on King’s actions. Flickinger sought to compel production of King’s cell phone records and to continue the summary judgment hearing, but the circuit court denied both motions and granted summary judgment for the King defendants, finding no genuine issue of material fact on causation.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed summary judgment for the King law firm, holding King’s actions were outside the scope of his employment and did not benefit the firm. However, the Court reversed summary judgment for King, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding causation and justification. The case was remanded for further proceedings against King, while the denial of Flickinger’s discovery and continuance motions was affirmed. View "Flickinger v. King" on Justia Law

Faya Rose Toure sued the City of Selma, Chief of Police Spencer Collier, and police officer Devon McGuire following her arrest for fourth-degree theft of property and attempting to elude. Toure claimed McGuire and Collier committed assault and battery, false arrest, unlawful imprisonment, invasion of privacy, negligence, wantonness, abuse of legal process, unreasonable seizure, and defamation/libel. She also accused the City of negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and fostering a custom of police abuse. Toure sought $1,000,000 in compensatory damages and $3,000,000 in punitive damages.The defendants filed for summary judgment, citing peace-officer and State-agent immunity. They provided evidence including deposition testimonies, incident reports, and body camera footage showing McGuire witnessed Toure removing a campaign sign and subsequently attempting to elude him. Toure argued she removed the sign believing it was illegally placed and felt intimidated by McGuire, who was in an unmarked vehicle. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City but denied it for McGuire and Collier.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It found that McGuire and Collier were performing discretionary functions within their law enforcement duties, entitling them to immunity. The court determined that McGuire had at least arguable probable cause for Toure's arrest, and Toure failed to provide substantial evidence that McGuire or Collier acted willfully, maliciously, or beyond their authority. Consequently, the court held that McGuire and Collier were entitled to peace-officer and State-agent immunity and directed the trial court to enter summary judgment in their favor. The petition for a writ of mandamus was granted, and the writ was issued. View "Ex parte McGuire" on Justia Law

Daniel Flickinger, a full-time litigator at Wainwright, Pope & McMeekin, P.C. (WPM), posted conservative political commentary on his personal social media. In June 2020, he posted a controversial message about George Floyd's death. Lawrence Tracy King, a partner at King Simmons Ford & Spree, P.C. (the King law firm), sent this post to Flickinger's supervising attorney, Lonnie Wainwright, expressing concern. Wainwright and other WPM partners, who were not familiar with social media, reviewed Flickinger's posts and asked him to resign, which he did.Flickinger sued King and the King law firm for defamation, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with a business relationship. The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed his claims, but the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the dismissal of the tortious interference claim and remanded the case. The King defendants then moved for summary judgment, arguing there was no substantial evidence that their actions caused Flickinger's damages. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the King defendants, concluding that the WPM partners' decision to terminate Flickinger was based on their independent review of his social media posts.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the summary judgment for the King law firm, finding that King's actions were not within the scope of his employment and did not benefit the firm. However, the court reversed the summary judgment for King, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether King's actions were a substantial factor in Flickinger's termination and whether King was justified in sending the post. The case was remanded for further proceedings. The court also upheld the denial of Flickinger's motion to compel King's cellular-telephone records and his motion to continue the summary-judgment hearing. View "Flickinger v. King" on Justia Law

Yadira Ordonez, individually and as mother and next friend of her minor daughter, S.C.O., sued Capitol Farmers Market, Inc. (CFMI) in the Montgomery Circuit Court seeking damages for injuries S.C.O. sustained from hot soup purchased at Capitol International Market. CFMI moved for summary judgment, claiming it did not operate the market. Ordonez opposed the motion and requested more time for discovery. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CFMI, and Ordonez appealed.The trial court entered summary judgment for CFMI, finding that CFMI did not operate the grocery store or the deli where the incident occurred. Ordonez argued that more discovery was needed, particularly the deposition of CFMI's owner, John Yim, to test the veracity of his statements. The trial court denied Ordonez's motion for a continuance to conduct further discovery and granted summary judgment to CFMI.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and found that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying Ordonez's motion for a continuance under Rule 56(f) to take Yim's deposition. The court noted that the health department records and other evidence raised questions about CFMI's assertions that it had no employees and did not operate the grocery store or deli. The court concluded that Yim's deposition was critical to Ordonez's opposition to the summary judgment motion. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ordonez v. Capitol Farmers Market, Inc." on Justia Law

In December 2021, Officer Shelton Davis of the Montgomery Police Department, while pursuing a fleeing suspect, collided with Madilyn Shuford's vehicle at an intersection in Montgomery. Officer Davis was responding to a woman's plea for help, who claimed a man was trying to kill her. The suspect, Eugene Osborne Jr., fled in a vehicle, prompting Officer Davis to pursue him with activated lights and sirens. During the pursuit, Officer Davis slowed down at a red light but collided with Shuford's vehicle when she pulled into the intersection.Shuford sued the City of Montgomery and Officer Davis, alleging negligence and wanton conduct, and claimed the City was vicariously liable. The City and Officer Davis moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under § 6-5-338, Ala. Code 1975, and Ex parte Cranman. They provided evidence, including Officer Davis's affidavit and body camera footage, showing he was performing his duties with activated lights and sirens. Shuford opposed, arguing Officer Davis did not use proper signals and took unreasonable risks.The Montgomery Circuit Court denied the summary judgment motion without explanation. The City and Officer Davis petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to vacate the denial and grant summary judgment based on immunity.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the petition, holding that Officer Davis was entitled to immunity as he was performing his law enforcement duties and exercising judgment. The court found no substantial evidence from Shuford to refute this. Consequently, the City was also entitled to immunity. The trial court was directed to enter summary judgment in favor of the City and Officer Davis. View "Shuford v. City of Montgomery" on Justia Law

In the summer of 2023, Sharonda Smith's minor child, K.S., participated in a summer program at a school operated by the Jefferson County Board of Education. On June 5, 2023, K.S. fell asleep on a bus driven by "Mr. Josh" and suffered significant emotional distress, dehydration, and other personal injuries. Smith filed a lawsuit on May 10, 2024, against the Board, "Mr. Josh," and 10 fictitiously named defendants. The Board moved to dismiss the claims against it, citing State immunity.The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed the claims against the Board on August 1, 2024, but allowed Smith additional time to identify and serve "Mr. Josh." Smith issued subpoenas to the Board for records related to the incident, which the Board moved to quash, arguing the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court denied the motion and ordered the Board to comply with the subpoenas. Smith later identified "Mr. Josh" as Joshua Dunn and added his estate as a defendant. The Board petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to vacate the discovery orders and dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the only named defendant in the initial complaint, the Board, was entitled to State immunity, and "Mr. Josh" was a fictitiously named defendant. The court granted the Board's petition in part, directing the circuit court to vacate its discovery orders and refrain from issuing further orders against the Board. However, the court denied the Board's request to dismiss the entire action, as the Board, a nonparty, did not demonstrate a clear legal right to such relief. View "Ex parte Jefferson County Board of Education" on Justia Law