Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

South Alabama Brick Co., Inc., d/b/a Riley-Stuart Supply Co. ("SAB"), appealed a Circuit Court's judgment in the amount of approximately $12.6 million in favor of J. Gregory Carwie, as temporary conservator of Benito Perez, who suffered catastrophic injuries when he fell through a skylight in the roof of a warehouse owned and operated by SAB. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the condition at issue here was a preexisting condition of SAB's facility. SAB hired an independent roofing contractor, Cooner Roofing, with previous experience repairing the roof of that facility, to make repairs determined by that contractor to be necessary and appropriate. Under the circumstances of this case, SAB was not legally responsible for warning Cooner Roofing's employees of the risks of working on that roof. Because of the Court's disposition of the issue of liability, it did not reach SAB's arguments relating to the damages awarded against it. View "South Alabama Brick Co., Inc. v. Carwie" on Justia Law

Rock Wool Manufacturing Company ("Rock Wool") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the circuit court") to vacate its order denying Rock Wool's motions to dismiss a complaint filed against it by Palmer and Jessie Cason, and to enter a new order dismissing the Casons' complaint. This matter started over Palmer Cason's work as a furnace operator for Rock Wool. A furnace exploded and he suffered injuries. At some point before the explosion, Rock Wool had caused certain safety equipment called "explosion doors" to be removed from the furnace Palmer was operating. The "explosion doors" had the capacity at least to mitigate injury to the operator in the event of an explosion. Rock Wool persuasively argued that the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act applied here to bar the Casons' claims against it; thus, Rock Wool demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief sought. View "Ex parte Rock Wool Manufacturing Company." on Justia Law

In November 2010, Rodney Williams and Elmer Fleming were employed at KW Plastics Recycling Division, LLP (KWPRD). Williams was employed as a supervisor in the shipping department, and Elmer was training to become a shipping supervisor. KWPRD shipped recycled-resin pellets in tanker-trailers hauled by semi-tractors. Williams was killed and Fleming suffered permanent traumatic brain injury when the two men were run over by the tanker-trailer. Fleming, by and through his wife and guardian, and Williams’ family, appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Sanders Lead Company, Inc., Roy Baggett, and Donnie Glover on the plaintiffs' claims alleging that they "affirmatively undertook [a duty] to inspect for, identify and provide remedies to correct jobsite safety hazards" on KWPRD’s premises, and that the defendants negligently and wantonly performed the undertaken duty to inspect. After review, the Supreme Court found that defendants' summary-judgment motion failed to challenge the existence of evidence establishing the element of proximate causation as to the wrongful-inspection claims and, therefore, did not support the summary judgment, which was expressly grounded on the lack of evidence establishing the element of proximate causation as to the plaintiffs' wrongful-inspection claims. The Court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiffs' wrongful-inspection claims in these consolidated appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fleming v. Sanders Lead Company, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006, plaintiff Robert Kyle Morris, a licensed insurance agent, was working for his father's independent insurance agency, the Morris Insurance Agency ("Morris Insurance"). At some point, Morris contacted one of the Farmers entities about becoming a Farmers agent. Morris testified that he initially became interested in working as a Farmers agent because Farmers had a policy whereby a Farmers agent could place insurance with a different company if a customer was not eligible for insurance issued by Farmers or if Farmers refused to underwrite a policy for the customer. He further testified that he had not been looking to disaffiliate himself from his father's insurance agency and that he had told a Farmers recruiter that he did not want to cut off the working relationship he had with his father. Morris also testified that, when he agreed to become a Farmers agent, he signed several different agreements; that nothing in any of those agreements or documents indicated that his relationship with his father's agency constituted a conflict of interest; that the documents given to him did not say anything contrary to what he had been told by any recruiter, or that any representations made to him by the agents of Farmers were false. Despite signing an agent agreement, and having been recruited, Morris' contract was ultimately terminated for conflict of interest. Morris sued Farmers, arguing that Farmers had fraudulently induced him to become a Farmers agent. The trial court ruled in Morris' favor, and Farmers appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court found Morris did not blindly rely on oral representations and ignore the terms of his contract. "The only information contrary to what Morris had been told was buried in a 200-page manual among dozens of other documents provided for training modules, and even longtime Farmers employees were not aware of the existence of the statement." Morris presented sufficient evidence of fraudulent inducement for the matter to be decided by the jury. Farmers' postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law, but the trial court did not make any findings regarding Farmers' request for a remittitur of the punitive-damages award. The Court remanded this case for the trial court to conduct a hearing on the punitive-damages award. View "Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Morris" on Justia Law

Federal Insurance Company appealed a circuit court order denying its motion to compel arbitration of the breach-of-contract claim asserted against it by Kert Reedstrom. In 2008, Reedstrom entered into a written employment agreement with Marshall-Jackson Mental Health Board, Inc., d/b/a Mountain Lakes Behavioral Healthcare ("MLBHC"), to begin serving as its executive director in Guntersville. During the course of Reedstrom's employment with MLBHC, MLBHC held an executive-liability, entity-liability, and employment-practices-liability policy issued by Federal Insurance that generally protected certain MLBHC officers and employees described as "insureds" in the policy from loss for actions committed in the course of their employment with MLBHC. It was undisputed that Reedstrom was an "insured" covered by the Federal Insurance policy. The Federal Insurance policy contained an arbitration provision. A separate endorsement to the Federal Insurance policy further highlighted the arbitration provision and explained that its effect was that any disagreement related to coverage would be resolved by arbitration and not in a court of law. In July 2010, MLBHC terminated Reedstrom's employment and, in December 2010, Reedstrom sued MLBHC alleging that his termination constituted a breach of his employment contract. MLBHC asserted various counterclaims against Reedstrom based on his alleged misconduct while serving as executive director. Thereafter, Reedstrom gave Federal Insurance notice of the claims asserted against him and requested coverage under the terms of the Federal Insurance policy. Federal Insurance ultimately denied his claim and refused to provide him with counsel to defend against MLBHC's claims. A jury returned a verdict awarding Reedstrom $150,000 on his claim against MLBHC and awarding MLBHC $60,000 on its claims against Reedstrom. Consistent with its previous denial of his request for coverage, Federal Insurance refused Reedstrom's request to satisfy the judgment entered against him. Reedstrom sued Federal Insurance, asserting one claim of breach of contract and seeking $72,000 in damages ($60,000 for the judgment entered against him and $12,000 for the attorney fees he incurred in defending those claims). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court did not articulate its rationale for denying the motion to compel arbitration. The denial was apparently based on the court's resolving at least one of the arbitrability issues raised by Reedstrom in his favor and against Federal Insurance. However, because the subject arbitration provision delegated to the arbitrators the authority to resolve such issues, the trial court erred by considering the waiver and nonsignatory issues raised by Reedstrom instead of granting the motion to compel arbitration and allowing the arbitrators to resolve those issues. View "Federal Insurance Company v. Reedstrom" on Justia Law

The Alabama Corrections Institution Finance Authority ("ACIFA") and its ex officio vice president Kim Thomas appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding $5 million in compensatory damages to Albert Wilson, Donald Simmons, Rufus Barnes, Bryan Gavins, Joseph Danzey, and a class of current and former nonexempt correctional officers employed by the Alabama Department of Corrections ("ADOC"). The correctional officers sued ADOC and its commissioner alleging ADOC was violating its own regulations and state law in the manner in which it: (1) compensated correctional officers for overtime; (2) restricted the way correctional officers were allowed to use earned leave; and (3) paid correctional officers the daily subsistence allowance provided by law. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment in favor of the correctional officers, finding that there was a lack of substantial evidence in support of the officers' claims against ACIFA and against Thomas as ex officio vice president of ACIFA. As such, defendants were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. View "Alabama Corrections Institution Finance Authority v. Wilson et al." on Justia Law

This case involved Barbara Johnson's claim against the City of Mobile in which she alleged retaliation based on several complaints and lawsuits she filed against the City under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("the ADA"). Johnson, an African-American woman over 40 years of age, began working for the City in 1996. Johnson previously filed several complaints and lawsuits against the City pertaining to her employment with the City. In 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2012, Johnson filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("the EEOC") complaints against the City alleging various forms of discrimination. Johnson also unsuccessfully sued the City in 2007, 2008, and 2010. Johnson filed the underlying action in 2013, alleging that, in violation of Title VII and the ADA, the City retaliated against Johnson because she had filed discrimination charges against the City with the EEOC. Johnson's deposition testimony indicated that in 2008 or 2009 Johnson had surgery to correct a problem with her toe. As a result of her surgery, Johnson was "taken off of work" for what "could have been a month." Johnson's time off work to recover from her injury was preapproved by the City, and she was paid for her time off. Once Johnson returned to work, she had to wear a boot to protect her toe, and her doctor "wanted [her] on light duty." Johnson's supervisor, Terrell Washington, informed Johnson that there was no light duty available at that time so Johnson remained at home on paid leave. Once Johnson returned to work, Johnson was ordered by her physician to wear a certain kind of shoe that did not comply with the City's dress code: the City required Johnson to wear black shoes, but her physician-prescribed shoes were white. Johnson subsequently received an unsatisfactory-annual performance rating from Washington for the period ending June 8, 2010. Thereafter, Johnson used the MCPB's appellate process for review of her unsatisfactory-performance rating. Ultimately, the MCPB affirmed Johnson's rating. Johnson received a "Letter of Determination" concerning the complaint she filed against the City from the EEOC. The Department of Justice did not elect to sue on Johnson's behalf, but advised that she was free to file suit on her own. The underlying matter in this appeal is the suit Johnson filed with regard to her EEOC complaint. The matter ended with judgment entered in favor of the City. After review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment on the merits and its denial of Johnson's post-judgment motions. The Court also affirmed the trial court's decision to award the City attorney fees. However, the Court reversed the judgment insofar as it set the amount of the fees, and remanded the case for recalculation of fees with reasons supporting the recalculation. View "Johnson v. City of Mobile" on Justia Law

Before 2010, Azin Agah was employed at the University of South Alabama ("USA") as a professor engaged in scientific research. Agah's position was a tenure-track professorship. In early 2010, USA's vice president for Health Sciences, Ronald Franks, notified Agah that she would not be reappointed to her professorship because of alleged research misconduct. Agah sued Amber Bartlett and Julio Turrens. Bartlett was a student of Agah's, and she reported her concerns regarding Agah's research to Turrens, who was a professor and associate dean at USA. Agah sought compensatory and punitive damages against the defendants for the alleged theft and conversion of her computerized electronic-research data and the alleged theft and conversion of her animal-research logbook and intentional interference with a contractual property right arising out of the termination of her employment by USA. Agah also sued "R.T., W.B.D., R.F.," whose names were "known and unknown" and who, according to Agah, played a role in the theft of her research, "the defamation of the Plaintiff's character, and the intentional interference with the Plaintiff's property right of employment." After the lawsuit had been filed, and after a period of discovery, Agah gave names to the initials previously listed in her original complaint: Richard Talbott, William Brad Davis, and Ronald Franks. She would also add Dusty Layton and others who were involved in the review of Agah's research. The petitioners (Talbott, Ballard, and Layton) each filed a motion to dismiss. Each argued, among other things, that, with the exception of the conversion and detinue claim, Agah's remaining claims accrued in February 2010 when her employment was terminated, that Agah's amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint, and that the remaining claims asserted in the amended complaint were time-barred. They also argued that they were entitled to immunity with respect to Agah's claims alleging tortious interference with contractual rights, tortious violations of her procedural and substantive due-process rights, and conversion and detinue, because, they argued, they were sued in their individual capacity and lacked the authority to grant Agah her requested injunctive relief. Following a hearing, the trial court denied all three motions. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that petitioners demonstrated a clear legal right to the dismissal of Agah's amended complaint against them. Agah's amended complaint did not relate back to her original complaint; thus, all of her claims against the petitioners, with the exclusion of her conversion and detinue claim, were barred by the statute of limitations. Furthermore, Agah's conversion and detinue claim against the petitioners in their individual capacities sought relief that the petitioners could not provide. Therefore, the trial court was directed to vacate its order denying the petitioners' motion seeking dismissal of the claims against them. View "Ex parte Richard Talbott et al." on Justia Law

Brenda Franks was a former nontenured employee of the Choctaw County Public School System. Before the 2008-2009 school year, Franks had been employed as a full-time counselor in the school system for three years when her contract was not renewed. For the 2008-2009 school year, Franks was offered and accepted a part-time, temporary position as a vocational counselor starting in February 2009. She signed an employment contract acknowledging that the position was temporary. She also signed a "Letter of Understanding Concerning Temporary Employment." Franks worked pursuant to the contract for five months. The superintendent notified Franks, in writing, of her intention to recommend that the School Board members cancel the contract because of a "justifiable decrease in jobs in the system." The Board members approved the recommendation to cancel the contract. Franks did not contest the cancellation. In July 2010, the Board members posted a vacancy for a business-education teacher. Franks applied for the position, but was not hired. Franks sued the Board and Superintendent, asserting that the Board members had terminated her employment based on a reduction in force ("RIF"), but that she was entitled to be hired for the teaching position pursuant to the RIF policy. Franks sought to be instated to that position, with backpay, interest, and restoration of progress toward tenure. However, Franks died prior to the conclusion of this suit. Petitioners Ronald Hampton, Darry Phillips, Wayne Taylor, Isaac Johnson, and Sharon Sheppard, the individual members of the Choctaw County Board of Education, and Sue Moore, the superintendent of the Choctaw County Public School System sought an order compelling the Choctaw Circuit Court to vacate its denial of their summary-judgment motion and to enter summary judgment in their favor on the ground that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims because of plaintiff's death and the petitioners' immunity. The Supreme Court concluded that the superintendent and the Board members demonstrated immunity and established a clear legal right to a summary judgment on the claims asserted against them in their official capacities. Therefore, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued a writ directing the Choctaw Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the petitioners' summary-judgment motion and to enter a summary judgment on all the claims asserted against the superintendent and the Board members. View "Ex parte Ronald Hampton, et al." on Justia Law

The Alabama Corrections Institution Finance Authority ("ACIFA") and its ex officio vice president Kim Thomas appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding $5 million in compensatory damages to Albert Wilson, Donald Simmons, Rufus Barnes, Bryan Gavins, Joseph Danzey, and a class of current and former nonexempt correctional officers ("the correctional officers") employed by the Alabama Department of Corrections ("ADOC"). The correctional officers originally filed suit alleging that ADOC was violating its own regulations and state law in the manner in which it: (1) compensated correctional officers for overtime; (2) restricted the way correctional officers were allowed to use earned leave; and (3) paid correctional officers the daily subsistence allowance provided by law. The plaintiffs also sought class certification on behalf of all other similarly situated correctional officers employed by ADOC and requested injunctive relief, as well as money damages, to include backpay with interest, punitive damages, and litigation costs and expenses, including attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment entered on the jury's verdict: "Suffice to say, [the correctional officers] failed to present substantial evidence of a connection between ACIFA and the supervision of the correctional officers or how the correctional officers are paid. Without evidence indicating that ACIFA had anything to do with the personnel policies at issue or how correctional officers' pay is determined and distributed or the funds that are used to pay correctional officers, ACIFA cannot be held liable for the harms the correctional officers allege they suffered. Because of the lack of substantial evidence in support of the claims made by the correctional officers against ACIFA and against Thomas as ex officio vice president of ACIFA, the defendants were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on those claims." View "Alabama Corrections Institution Finance Authority v. Wilson" on Justia Law