Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

PT Solutions Holdings, LLC ("PT Solutions"), petitioned for a writ of mandamus seeking an order directing the Barbour Circuit Court to vacate its order denying PT Solutions' motion to dismiss the underlying complaint filed by Laurie White based on an outbound forum selection clause and to grant the motion to dismiss. PT Solutions hired White as the clinic director of its Eufaula location. In September 2014, PT Solutions revised the employment agreements for its clinic directors. The letter agreement described a bonus structure, and included a noncompete clause. The agreement also contained a forum-selection clause, selecting Fulton County, Georgia as proper venue for disputes between the parties. White voluntarily resigned her position as clinic director of PT Solutions' Eufaula clinic and became clinic director for Eufaula Physical Therapy (EPT). She also recruited the office manager and two physical therapists who were working at PT Solutions' Eufaula clinic to come work at EPT. Because of White's actions on behalf of EPT, PT Solutions' counsel sent White a cease-and-desist letter in which he asserted that White had violated the noncompetition agreement. In response, White sued PT Solutions and fictitiously named defendants in the Alabama Circuit Court seeking a judgment declaring that the noncompetition agreement was unenforceable. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court found that White failed to clearly establish that enforcement of the forum-selection clause would be either unfair or unreasonable. PT Solutions demonstrated a clear legal right to have the action against it dismissed on the basis that venue in the Barbour Circuit Court was, by virtue of the forum-selection clause, improper. The circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying PT Solutions' motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted PT Solutions' petition and granted the writ. View "Ex parte PT Solutions Holdings, LLC." on Justia Law

Southern States Police Benevolent Association, Inc. ("SSPBA"), and three of its members, all of whom were employed as police officers by the City of Auburn (collectively, "plaintiffs"), sued Alabama Governor Robert Bentley and the other members of the Board of Control of the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama ("the ERSA"); David Bronner, the chief executive officer and secretary-treasurer of the Retirement Systems of Alabama ("the RSA") and the ERSA; and Thomas White, Jr., the State comptroller (referred to collectively as "the State defendants"), in their representative capacities. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and a judgment declaring that participants in the pension plan the ERSA operated could make retirement contributions and receive increased retirement benefits based upon their "earnable compensation," which term, the police plaintiffs argued, rightly included payments received for overtime worked. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the State defendants, and the police plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, because "earnable compensation" as defined in code section 36-27-1(14), was compensation received for working "the full normal work-time." The Court agreed with the State defendants that, before the amendment of 36- 27-1(14) in 2012, earnable compensation did not properly include overtime payments, regardless of the past practice of the ERSA. "Moreover, although the 2012 amendment to 36-27-1(14) allows overtime payments to be included within earnable compensation to a limited extent . . . we find no support in the language of the statute for the police plaintiffs' argument that the legislature intended to differentiate between mandatory overtime and voluntary overtime and to make mandatory overtime part of a member's annual base compensation and thus not subject to the 120 percent limit." View "Southern States Police Benevolent Association, Inc., et al. v. Govenor Robert H. Bentley et al." on Justia Law

The State of Alabama Board of Education ("SBOE") and several of its executive directors petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss claims filed against them by respondent Sharper Adams and numerous employees of the Birmingham Board of Education (BBOE). Petitioners sought to have all claims dismissed with prejudice on immunity grounds. The BBOE failed to submit a financial-recovery plan to the SBOE by an April 2, 2012, deadline, and its minimum-reserve fund remained underfunded. Once complete, the financial-recovery plan included, among other things, a reduction in force ("RIF"), which required that the jobs of the respondents, among others, be eliminated. The circuit court determined that petitioners had violated the respondents' federal due-process rights by depriving them of their property interest without due process of law because, the circuit court concluded, the petitioners failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Students First Act ("the SFA"). Specifically, the circuit court concluded that the SFA, a state law, required that the respondents receive notice of the fact that the implementation of the RIF would result in the termination of their employment positions with the BBOE and that the petitioners failed to give the respondents such notice. Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that the respondents' federal due-process rights had been violated. After review, the Supreme Court granted petitioners' petition in part, and denied it in part. The Court granted the petition with regard to claims against the individual administrators in their official capacities, finding they were entitled to immunity. The Court denied the petition with regard to claims agains the SBOE. View "Ex parte State of Alabama Board of Education et al." on Justia Law

John Boman appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Gadsden. Boman worked as a Gadsden police officer from 1965 until he retired in 1991. Following his retirement, Boman elected to pay for retiree health coverage through a group plan offered by Gadsden to retired employees. This retired-employee-benefit plan was also administered by Blue Cross and provided substantially similar benefits to those Boman received as an active employee. In 2000, however, Gadsden elected to join an employee-health-insurance-benefit plan ("the plan") administered by the State Employees' Insurance Board ("the SEIB"). When Boman turned 65 in 2011, he was receiving medical care for congestive heart failure and severe osteoarthritis of the spine. After his 65th birthday, Blue Cross began denying his claims for medical treatment based on the failure to provide Blue Cross with a "record of the Medicare payment." However, Boman had no Medicare credits. Boman was hired before March 31, 1986, and, although Gadsden did begin participation in the Medicare program in 2006, Boman's employee group had not opted to obtain Medicare coverage before Boman retired. Consequently, Boman never paid Medicare taxes and did not claim to have Medicare coverage. The SEIB ultimately determined that the plan was the secondary payer to Medicare. Boman sued Gadsden, asserting that it had broken an agreement, made upon his employment, to provide him with lifetime health benefits upon his retirement. Boman also sued the members of the SEIB charged with administering the plan, challenging the SEIB's interpretation of the plan. Finding no reversible error in the grant of summary judgment to Gadsden, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Boman v. City of Gadsden" on Justia Law

Before the incident that precipitated this lawsuit, Jeff Cottles had worked as a track switchman for Norfolk Southern Railway Company for seven years. The process of "throwing" a switch involves pulling the handle up, moving it in an arc from right to left, stopping in the upright position, and then continuing to move the handle down and to the left. Cottles testified that the track 4 switch was harder to throw than the other switches in the Daikin plant. One early morning during his shift, Cottles attempted to throw the track 4 switch again. This time when he pushed the handle down the switch suddenly froze about one foot from the ground, and, according to Cottles, he felt pain in his back and neck. Within a week of the incident, Cottles's pain from his injuries had become so severe that he was unable to continue his job. He was diagnosed with bulging disks in his neck and a pinched nerve in his back. Cottles has not been able to return to work since rotator cuff surgery. It was undisputed that Daikin, not Norfolk Southern, owned the tracks and switches inside its plant. Regardless of who was notified, Daikin itself was required to address the issue and then to notify Norfolk Southern that the problem had been fixed. After Norfolk Southern received word from Daikin that maintenance had been performed, a Norfolk Southern track inspector would inspect the switch to confirm that the repairs had been completed. Cottles filed a Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) action against Norfolk Southern alleging that Norfolk Southern "failed to provide [Cottles] with a reasonably safe place to work" and that, as a result, Cottles sustained permanent damage to his neck and his back. In addition to his claims of negligence, Cottles asserted that Norfolk Southern was strictly liable under the Federal Safety Appliance Act ("FSAA") and/or "applicable FRA standards." Norfolk Southern moved for summary judgment, contending that Cottles' own testimony that he had thrown the track 4 switch three to six times earlier during his shift "without incident" and the fact that his own visual inspection before each throw had not revealed any defects in the switch demonstrated that Norfolk Southern had no notice that the track 4 switch was defective. At the hearing on Norfolk Southern's motion for a summary judgment, Cottles's counsel conceded that Cottles' strict liability claim under the FSAA should have been dismissed. The trial court later entered summary judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern on the FELA claims too. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that Cottles presented substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Norfolk Southern negligently failed to provide him with a reasonably safe workplace. Accordingly, the Court reversed summary judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern, and remanded the action to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Cottles v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

Lincare Inc. and one of its employees, Angela Stewart, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its denial of their motion to dismiss certain tort claims asserted against them in the complaint filed by former Lincare employee Sandra Martin and to enter an order dismissing those claims and, as to any claims not subject to dismissal, to vacate its denial of their motion to strike Martin's jury demand as to those claims and to enter an order granting that motion. Stewart was Martin's supervisor. According to the allegations in Martin's complaint, in 2014, Martin submitted a letter of resignation to Stewart. Martin alleged that she resigned because Stewart had created "a difficult work environment." Martin's action alleged a claim for workers' compensation benefits against Lincare, a claim of assault and battery against Stewart and Lincare, and a tort-of-outrage claim against Stewart and Lincare. After review of Lincare and Stewart's arguments, the Alabama Supreme Court granted their petition with respect to the trial court's failure to dismiss Martin's tort claims because those claims were subsumed under the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. The petition was denied with respect to the motion to dismiss Martin's tort-of-outrage claim against Stewart, and with respect to the trial court's failure to strike Martin's jury demand regarding her claims against Stewart. View "Ex parte Lincare Inc." on Justia Law

Jason Elkins and his wife Paula appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Stanley Maguire, Gabriel Collins, and Jeff Carroll. TDY Industries, LLC ("TDY"), hired Jason as a screener operator in 1998. Jason Elkins operated various pieces of machinery in the course of his employment, including a "manipulator." While he was operating the manipulator to dump powder from a drum, the manipulator rose and hit him under the chin and then descended and hit him in the head. Jason filed a workers' compensation action against TDY seeking benefits for his work-related injury. He later amended his complaint to add Paula as a plaintiff and to sue his co-workers Maguire, Collins and Carroll based upon the theory that the co-employees removed a safety device and that the removal of that safety device proximately caused Jason's injury. The trial court granted TDY's motion to dismiss counts two through five of the Elkinses' complaint as amended as to TDY. On that same day, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the co-employees as to count two of the Elkinses' amended complaint. The trial court certified the judgment as to count two as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. After the trial court entered its Rule 54(b) order, and the Elkinses appealed the summary judgment in favor of the co-employees. The Alabama Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court: (1) for the trial court to make an interlocutory order of December 28, 2015, a final judgment as to the co-employees relative to counts three, four, and five pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.; (2) for the trial court to adjudicate the remaining claims against all parties, thus making the interlocutory order of December 28, 2015, final and appealable; or (3) for the trial court to take no action, in which event the appeal would be dismissed as being from a nonfinal judgment. View "Elkins v. Carroll" on Justia Law

Petitioners Interstate Freight USA, Inc., Interstate Specialized, Inc., Interstate Freight, Inc. (collectively referred to as "the Interstate companies"), Charles Browning, and Donald Raughton, Sr., filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to direct the Baldwin Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to transfer the underlying action to the St. Clair Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. The plaintiff in the underlying action, Kevin Vogler, was hired as a vice president/general manager for Interstate Specialized and Interstate Freight USA. Vogler sued, alleging that: in December 2013, he was working for another company and had become interested in acquiring the transportation branch of the Interstate companies; that he had entered into negotiations with Browning, the president of Interstate Freight USA and Interstate Specialized, and Raughton, a business consultant for the Interstate companies; that Browning and Raughton were acting on behalf of the Interstate companies; that the parties had agreed that "Vogler could acquire a minority interest in the trucking business over a two year period and, after two years of employment with the Interstate companies, would have the option of buying out the interest of Defendant Browning"; that Browning and Raughton had made representations to him regarding his salary and benefits; and that, based on those representations, Vogler left his previous employment and entered into separate employment contracts with Interstate Specialized and Interstate Freight USA. In early 2014, however, the businesses were shut down for "financial reasons," and Vogler's position was terminated. Petitioners moved to dismiss Vogler's complaint, or in the alternative, for a change of venue. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Baldwin County was the proper venue, but that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying the motion for change of venue on the "interest-of-justice" prong of the forum non conveniens statute. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to transfer this case to the St. Clair Circuit Court. View "Ex parte Interstate Freight USA, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The former athletic director of Alabama State University sued his former employer for what he claimed was wrongful discharge from his duties, and for withholding monies from his paycheck. Disputes arose between the parties over the director, Stacy Danley's travel expenses. Any non-authorized expenses charged to his corporate credit card were reimbursed through payroll deduction. Danley won at trial, and the University appealed the verdicts and the damages awards. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court for miscalculation of the damages awards, but affirmed in all other respects. View "Alabama State University et al. v. Stacy Danley" on Justia Law

South Alabama Brick Co., Inc., d/b/a Riley-Stuart Supply Co. ("SAB"), appealed a Circuit Court's judgment in the amount of approximately $12.6 million in favor of J. Gregory Carwie, as temporary conservator of Benito Perez, who suffered catastrophic injuries when he fell through a skylight in the roof of a warehouse owned and operated by SAB. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the condition at issue here was a preexisting condition of SAB's facility. SAB hired an independent roofing contractor, Cooner Roofing, with previous experience repairing the roof of that facility, to make repairs determined by that contractor to be necessary and appropriate. Under the circumstances of this case, SAB was not legally responsible for warning Cooner Roofing's employees of the risks of working on that roof. Because of the Court's disposition of the issue of liability, it did not reach SAB's arguments relating to the damages awarded against it. View "South Alabama Brick Co., Inc. v. Carwie" on Justia Law