Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Jerry Elliott sought workers' compensation benefits from his employer, International Paper Company, Inc. (IP). He petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to quash a Court of Civil Appeals' writ of mandamus directed to the Conecuh Circuit Court. Plaintiff lived in Conecuh County for over 15 years and for 21 years worked as a machine operator at the plywood-manufacturing plant owned by IP located in Butler County. In 2007, he allegedly sustained an injury to his shoulder while at work. He filed an action at the Conecuh Circuit Court seeking workers' compensation benefits. IP filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff's action or, in the alternative, to transfer the case to Butler County. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motions to dismiss or to transfer. IP then filed a petition for the writ of mandamus at the Court of Civil Appeals to review the trial court's denial of its motion. The Court of Appeals granted the writ directing the Conecuh Court to transfer the case to Butler County. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court's decision was in error, and quashed the writ that was issued transferring venue to Butler County. View "Elliott v. International Paper Co., Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the application of a six-year statute of limitations to a claim of "wantonness." Plaintiff William Walker filed suit against Capstone Building Corporation (Capstone) and several fictitiously named parties. Capstone had been the general contractor on a construction job on which he worked. While working at the construction site, Plaintiff stepped onto a manhole cover which flipped over, causing him to fall into the hole. Plaintiff asserted that Capstone had been responsible for providing a safe work environment at the site, but it failed to do so. Plaintiff alleged that Capstone's failure to secure the manhole cover constituted "negligence" or "wantonness." Alabama law provides that wanton conduct must be commenced within six years. Capstone moved to dismiss the claims, asking the Supreme Court to change Alabama case law in favor of a two-year limitation for this case. The Supreme Court engaged in an extensive review of the trial record and the applicable law. The Court overruled its previous holding in "McKenzie v. Killian" which mandated the six-year limitation on claims for wantonness, finding that if it "did not ... overrule 'McKenzie,' [the Court] would be enshrining in out law an erroneous decision." The Court found that "the law in Alabama concerning the proper legal analysis of wantonness was not settled and was in fact based on confusing and inconsistent discussions of causality rather than culpability." The Court applied its change prospectively to litigants as to whom the six-year limitations had begun but had not yet expired. To this end, the Court found that Plaintiff's case was timely filed under the McKenzie rule. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision that dismissed Plaintiff's wantonness claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Walker v. Capstone Building Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner Willard Ryals appealed a trial court's order enforcing a creditor's judgment against him in favor of Respondent Lathan Company, Inc. (Lathan). In 2004, Lathan sued Ryals Construction Company for breach of a construction sub-contract. The contract called for Ryals to obtain workers' compensation insurance for the project. Lathan claimed it made an advance payment for the insurance. When Ryals failed to get the insurance, Lathan sued. No one appeared on behalf of Ryals on the trial date. A default judgment was entered on behalf of Lathan. Two years later, Lathan tried to collect on its default judgment by serving a post-judgment discovery request on Ryals Construction. The request went unanswered. Lathan filed a motion for sanctions, naming "Ryals Real Estate," Willard Ryals and Ryals Construction Company. Through counsel, Willard Ryals moved to strike the motion for sanctions which the trial court granted. Lathan then amended its complaint to substitute Willard Ryals with fictitious parties. Rather than re-allege the allegations of its first complaint, Lathan sought to hold Ryals Real Estate and Willard Ryals liable as alter egos for the judgment it held against Ryals Construction Company. After a bench trial, the trial court determined that Lathan's amended complaint did not technically substitute Willard Ryals and Ryals Real Estate for fictitiously named parties in the original complaint; it added them and asserted a new cause of action. The court found that Willard Ryals and Ryals Construction were liable for the creditor judgment. Willard Ryals appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Lathan's amended complaint. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as void: "The trial court's attempt to treat Lathan's amended complaint as a new action was in words only and was not sufficient to commence a new action." Accordingly, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter its judgment against Willard Ryals and Ryals Real Estate. View "Ryals v. Lathan Company, Inc." on Justia Law