Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The City of Gadsden and certain members of the State Employees' Insurance Board appealed two circuit court orders that granted injunctive relief to John Boman. Boman worked as a Gadsden police officer from 1965 until he retired in 1991. In 2000, Gadsden elected to join the 'Local Government Health Insurance Plan,' a health benefit plan administered by the Board. When Boman turned 65 in 2011, he was receiving medical care for congestive heart failure and other ailments. After his 65th birthday, Blue Cross began denying his claims for medical treatment based on the failure to provide Blue Cross with a 'record of the Medicare payment.' However, Boman had no Medicare credits. When the dispute over coverage arose, Boman sought review by the Board. The Board denied Boman's request for an appeal. Boman and 18 other active and retired Gadsden police officers sued Gadsden, alleging, among other things, that they had 'been deprived of Social Security and Medicare protection which other police officers have been provided' and that, after 20 years of service, they were being required to pay a higher pension charge or percentage of base pay than their counterparts who were hired after April 1, 1986. In 2011, Boman filed a 'motion for immediate relief for medical care.' The Supreme Court found that the circuit court issued preliminary injunctive relief against Gadsden without requiring Boman to give security and without making any specific findings. As such, the Supreme Court had "no alternative but to reverse" the preliminary injunction issued against Gadsden and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Gadsden v. Boman " on Justia Law

Two police officers and the City of Birmingham petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its judgment denying the petitioners' motion for a summary judgment and to enter a judgment in their favor based on State-agent immunity. Officers with the Birmingham Police Department (BPD) responded to a vehicle fire, as did James Higginbotham, a firefighter employed by the Birmingham Fire and Rescue Service (BFRS). The officers sustained injuries as a result of an accident between the first responders. The injured officers sued Higginbotham, the City, and several fictitiously named defendants, asserting claims of negligence and wantonness against Higginbotham and vicarious liability against the City. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the petitioners demonstrated a clear legal right to a summary judgment based on State-agent immunity. Therefore, the Court granted the petition and issue the writ directing the circuit court to enter a summary judgment for one of the officers and for the City as to its liability based on the claims against that officer. View "In re: Whatley v. Higginbotham" on Justia Law

The City of Bessemer and Bessemer City Councillors Jimmy Stephens, Dorothy Davidson, Sarah W. Belcher, and Albert Soles sought a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to dismiss a claim alleging bad-faith failure to pay legal bills and costs stemming from a complaint filed by former City Councillor Louise Alexander and the law firm of White, Arnold & Dowd, P.C. ("WAD"). The City councillors also sought to have a racial-discrimination claim dismissed. The plaintiffs alleged that in 2006 and 2007 Alexander received three donations from a Tuscaloosa real-estate developer, which were properly used for charitable projects in her district. In this same period (according to the complaint), Davidson and Belcher, received similar donations from the same individual for charitable projects in their respective districts. According to the complaint, beginning in the early spring of 2007, plaintiff Alexander opposed several projects the donor had proposed to the City and, the donor "vowed to retaliate." The complaint alleged that because of the donor's complaint to the Attorney General, a five-count indictment against Alexander was filed in August 2008 alleging violations of the Alabama Ethics Law. The complaint asserted that similar charges were not brought against Davidson and Belcher. WAD represented Alexander during her criminal proceedings. Alexander was ultimately acquitted. Alexander and WAD alleged that the City had a "policy and practice" of paying legal fees for city officials charged with crimes relating to their official duties if and when they were found not guilty. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus relief as it related to the bad-faith claim against the City. The Court denied the petition with regard to plaintiffs' claim against the City councillors regarding the racial discrimination claim: the councilors did not demonstrate entitlement to legislative immunity, and whether they were entitled to qualified immunity was a question requiring further consideration of facts outside of the pleadings. View "Alexander v. City of Bessemer" on Justia Law

Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc. sought a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order compelling discovery of a post-accident investigation report related to an accident that occurred at the Birmingham facility of Schnitzer Southeast, LLC (a subsidiary). In 2008, Jason Jackson had part of his leg amputated as a result of a workplace accident that occurred at Schnitzer Southeast's metal-recycling facility in Birmingham. After the accident, Schnitzer Steel instigated a post-accident investigation. Josephine Cetta, who was a safety director at Schnitzer Steel at the time of Jackson's accident, conducted the investigation. Cetta testified in her deposition that in-house counsel at Schnitzer Steel reviewed and edited the report. She also testified that in-house counsel marked the report as privileged. Sometime after the accident but before Cetta's report was created, Jackson filed a worker's compensation claim with Schnitzer Southeast. In September 2010, Jackson and his wife, Latonya Jackson, filed a separate action against Schnitzer Steel and certain of its employees, seeking additional recovery for the injuries Jackson suffered. The trial court ordered Schnitzer Steel to produce, among other things, "reports of safety inspections." Here, the evidence before the Supreme Court indicated that, although anticipation of litigation may not have been the sole factor for preparing the report, it was "a significant factor" in the company's decision to have the report prepared. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion by ordering Schnitzer Steel to produce the report, which was prepared in reasonable anticipation of litigation. Therefore, the Court granted Schnitzer Steel's petition and issued the writ. View "Jackson v. Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

Jessica Eastman, as the dependent widow of David Bentley, and on behalf of Bentley's three minor children, appealed a judgment entered in favor of R. Warehousing and Port Services Inc. On appeal to the Supreme Court, she argued: (1) that she was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on R. Warehousing's affirmative defense based on the "loaned-servant" doctrine; and (2) she was entitled to a new trial because counsel for R. Warehousing implied during opening statements that she had recovered workers' compensation benefits from Richway Transportation Services,Inc. in violation of the collateral-source rule. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Eastman v. R Warehousing & Port Services, Inc. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Fernando Rodriguez-Flores appealed the dismissal of his claims of retaliatory discharge and fraud brought against his former employer, U.S. Coatings, Inc. He worked as a painter. He stated that he suffered on the job injuries from paint-fume inhalation and other maladies. He sued the employer for workmans' compensation benefits, asserting retaliatory discharge and fraud based on his physical complaints and subsequent treatment. The trial court dismissed his complaint. Finding that the trial court did not err with regard to dismissing Plaintiff's fraud claim, the Supreme Court affirmed to that regard. However, the Court concluded the trial court erred with regard to the retaliatory-discharge claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Rodriguez-Flores v. U.S. Coatings, Inc. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Stanford Isbell sued M&J Materials, Inc. seeking workmans' compensation benefits. He also sought compensatory and punitive damages based on his claim of a retaliatory discharge. M&J denied liability, specifically averring that Plaintiff's employment was terminated for violating a workplace prohibition of carrying firearms. The parties settled their differences with regards to the workmans' compensation claims, leaving the retaliatory discharge to be heard by the trial court. The jury found in Plaintiff's favor, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in its analysis of the facts in record and the applicable law. Accordingly, the appellate court's judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "M & J Materials, Inc. v. Isbell" on Justia Law

Tommy Wiley appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of Bohannon Services, Inc. As a Bohannon employee, Wiley suffered a shoulder injury as a result of a work-related accident. Wiley filed a complaint requesting that the trial court set the issue of his right to receive total-disability benefits for an immediate hearing, order Bohannon to pay a 15% penalty and award any other benefits to which Wiley may be entitled. At a hearing, counsel for both parties informed the trial court that a settlement had been reached, and the terms of the settlement agreement were read into the record. Both parties were to separately file a proposed settlement agreement and obtain approval from the trial court. According to Bohannon, Wiley had failed to file a proposed settlement agreement as required by the trial court and had refused to sign the proposed settlement agreement submitted to the trial court by Bohannon. Wiley filed a response to Bohannon's motion in which he averred that he did not agree with certain provisions of the proposed settlement agreement that was submitted to the trial court by Bohannon, and he requested that the trial court set the matter for a hearing. The trial court entered an order purporting to grant Wiley's postjudgment motion to set aside the settlement agreement, provided that Wiley reimburse Bohannon for any settlement proceeds that Wiley had received and all costs and attorney fees that Bohannon had incurred during the course of this action. Subsequently, Wiley filed a motion requesting relief from the court's prior order and for leave to amend his original complaint. After a hearing, the trial court found that Wiley had failed to comply with the requirements of the set-aside order and therefore denied Wiley's requests for relief and enforced the previously entered settlement agreement. Wiley filed a motion styled as a "motion for new trial or in the alternative motion for relief from judgment or order and motion to alter, vacate or amend pursuant to Rule[s] 59 and 60," but that too was denied. Wiley then appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Wiley did not timely file a notice of appeal. Accordingly, the Court dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Wiley v. Bohannon Services, Inc. " on Justia Law

The Alabama Insurance Guaranty Association ("AIGA") filed an action against Mercy Medical Association, and Catholic Health East, Inc. ("CHE"), seeking to recover money it had paid on behalf of Mercy Medical and CHE on workers' compensation claims filed by employees of Mercy Medical as well as a judgment declaring its right to reimbursement of statutory benefits to be paid on the employees' claims in the future. AIGA, Mercy Medical, and CHE each moved for a summary judgment. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Mercy Medical and CHE, determining: (1) that the 2000 AIGA Act applied because it was in effect at the time of the insolvency of Reliance National Insurance Company (CHE's workers' compensation insurer), and at the time the workers' compensation judgment was entered against Mercy Medical; (2) that the 2009 AIGA Act did not apply retroactively because the 2009 amendments to the AIGA Act substantively changed the law; and (3) that under the 2000 AIGA Act, Mercy Medical's net worth did not exceed $25,000,000, so AIGA could not recover any amounts it had paid on behalf of Mercy Medical. AIGA appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the applicable law governing the vesting of AIGA's right to reimbursement of claims paid was the law in effect on the date of the insurer's insolvency. Further, the Court also concluded that the addition of the net-worth definitions in the 2009 AIGA Act were substantive and did not apply retroactively in this case. Finally, the Court concluded that AIGA was not entitled to reimbursement from Mercy Medical or CHE because, under the 2000 AIGA Act, Mercy Medical's net worth did not exceed $25,000,000 and the payments were not made on behalf of CHE. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Mercy Medical and CHE. View "Alabama Insurance Guaranty Association v. Mercy Medical Association" on Justia Law

The president of the University of South Alabama and several hospital administrators petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate an order that denied their motion for summary judgment, and to enter an order granting their motion. The underlying suit arose from a contract dispute between the University and the former dean of the College of Medicine, Dr. Richard Teplick. Changes in duties to University Hospital administration lead to the elimination of certain positions and a reassignment of Dr. Teplick's duties. Dr. Teplick was unhappy with the reassignment and the University's substitution. Dr. Teplick sued the University and administration in their official and individual capacities alleging among other things, a violation of his due process rights, bad faith, emotional distress, punitive damages, backpay and reinstatement (or "front pay" in lieu of reinstatement). The University answered Dr. Teplick's complaint, raising among other defenses, immunity under Article I of the Alabama Constitution. The University moved for summary judgment. The trial court entered an order denying the University's motion without making any findings of fact or conclusions of law. In a lengthy review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court concluded the University demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief they requested. The Court granted the petition for the writ and directed the circuit court to enter summary judgment in the University's favor. View "In re: Teplick v. Moulton" on Justia Law