Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jimmy Walker petitioned for mandamus relief following the circuit court's denial of his motion for summary judgment. While plaintiff Jeremy Deason was was incarcerated, he participated in a Department of Corrections work-release program and was assigned to an inmate construction detail; Walker, who was employed as a "carpenter supervisor" with DOC's Correctional Industries Division, served as Deason's work-release supervisor. In 2010, Deason suffered an on-the-job injury when scaffolding he and Walker were dismantling collapsed. Before both Deason and Walker's ascent onto the scaffolding, Walker had performed a visual inspection of the scaffolding and the "mud plates," which prevent scaffolding from settling, in order to assess the stability of the scaffolding; according to Walker, the scaffolding appeared secure before Deason started ascending. As a result of his injuries, Deason sued, among other defendants, numerous DOC officials, including Walker, whom Deason sued only in his individual capacity. Specifically, as to Walker, Deason contended that Walker "started climbing the scaffold on the same side as [Deason] knowing that the scaffold was not set up properly for workers to climb the same side at the same time." The Supreme Court granted relief: "the record is devoid of any evidence indicating - and Deason does not establish - either that Walker violated any applicable DOC rule or regulation governing his conduct or that Walker was acting 'willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, [or] in bad faith' in the exercise of judgment in regard to the scaffolding when Deason was injured. Therefore, Walker has successfully demonstrated that he is entitled to State-agent immunity as to Deason's tort claims." View "Ex parte Jimmy Walker." on Justia Law

The Escambia County Board of Education terminated the employment of John Lambert, a tenured teacher, as the band director at Flomaton High School for leaving a pistol in his school office, which was locked. During the course of his teaching career and military service, Lambert was never charged with neglect of duty, insubordination, or failure to perform duties in a satisfactory manner. Before this incident, no school board had ever taken disciplinary action against Lambert, nor had Scott Hammond, the principal of Flomaton High School, ever disciplined Lambert. Before getting on a bus for a band trip where the students were waiting for Lambert to join them, Lambert placed a small bag on the desk in his office. The bag contained personal items, including clothing, tools, Lambertís checkbook, and 10 20-dollar bills in a folded bank envelope. The bank envelope was in the side pocket of the bag, which was zipped. Lambert placed the bag in his office because he did not want to leave it in his truck overnight while he was away on the trip. According to Lambert, he forgot that a loaded .380 automatic pistol and an additional loaded magazine were in a small case at the bottom of the bag. Both the case containing the pistol and the bag were zipped. The bag was black, and it was impossible to identify the contents of the bag from the exterior of the bag. Lambert, who had a permit for the pistol, testified that both his office door and the door to the band room were locked when he left for the band contest at approximately 8:00 a.m. Around noon that same day, a school custodian notified school administrators that a gun was found on school premises. Only Lambert, the custodian, and the principal had keys to Lambert's office. Lambert acknowledged the pistol was his, and discovered that $80 was missing from the bag. Lambert was placed on administrative leave, then later terminated. He appealed the Board's decision. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the decision of the hearing officer. The Supreme Court, however, reversed. "In light of the fact that this Court has resolved, as a material question of first impression, the standard of review a hearing officer is to apply to an employer's decision to terminate the employment of a tenured teacher, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remand the cause to that court to, in turn, reverse the judgment of the hearing officer and remand the cause to him with instructions to review the sanction imposed against Lambert under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review as that standard [was] articulated in this opinion." View "Ex parte John Lambert." on Justia Law

The plaintiff in the underlying case, Brian Barze, sought a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to set aside an order sealing a motion to stay filed by one of the defendants, James Holbrook. Barze filed suit against Sterne Agee Group, Inc., and Holbrook, the then CEO of Sterne Agee. Barze included claims of promissory fraud and fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, conversion, and defamation. In his complaint, Barze alleged that, in spring 2009, Sterne Agee had approached him about leaving his old company and becoming the chief financial officer ("CFO") of Sterne Agee and that Holbrook had told him that, if he joined Sterne Agee, Sterne Agee would pay him severance pay of at least one year's salary and bonus if the job with Sterne Agee did not work out. Barze alleged that he relied on Holbrook's promises and representations when he agreed to accept the job at Sterne Agee and when he left his former employer and gave up his opportunities there. Barze asserted that, after he started working with Sterne Agee, he was presented with an employment agreement to sign; that Holbrook assured him that the employment agreement was signed by all employees; that Holbrook assured him that Holbrook could and would take care of Barze and honor their oral agreement regarding the severance pay of at least one year's salary and bonus; and that Holbrook told Barze that he was committed to Barze as the long-term CFO of Sterne Agee. Barze asserted that, in reliance on Holbrook's assertions, he signed the employment agreement. Upon review of the dispute, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not comply with the controlling case law procedure set forth in "Holland v. Eads" (614 So.2d 1012 (Ala. 1993)), it exceeded its discretion when it granted Holbrook's motion and directed the circuit clerk to seal Holbrook's motion to stay the underlying civil action. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted the petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its July 23, 2014, order granting Holbrook's motion for leave to file his motion to stay under seal and sealing Holbrook's motion to stay. View "Ex parte Barze." on Justia Law

The Retirement Systems of Alabama ("RSA"), the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama ("TRS"), the Public Education Employees' Health Insurance Plan ("PEEHIP"), the Public Education Employees' Health Insurance Fund ("PEEHIF"), the Board of Control of TRS ("the TRS Board"), the Board of Control of PEEHIP ("the PEEHIP Board"), David Bronner, as chief executive officer of RSA and as secretary-treasurer of TRS and PEEHIP, and various members of the TRS Board and of the PEEHIP Board in their official capacities ("the PEEHIP defendants") sought mandamus review of the Circuit Court's denial of their motion to dismiss the claims filed against them by James Burks II, Eugenia Burks, Martin Hester, Jacqueline Hester, Thomas Highfield, Carol Ann Highfield, Jake Jackson, and Melinda Jackson, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals ("the public-education plaintiffs"). PEEHIP, which is managed by the PEEHIP Board, provided group health-insurance benefits to public-education employees in Alabama. The public-education plaintiffs alleged that a policy adopted by the PEEHIP Board in 2009 changed the amounts participants and their eligible dependents, and this change violated Article V, section 138.03, Alabama Constitution of 1901, as well as the public-education plaintiffs' rights to equal protection, due process, and freedom of association under the Alabama Constitution, the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The public-education plaintiffs also alleged that the 2009 policy violated Alabama public policy and their right to family integrity as protected by the Alabama Constitution. The public-education plaintiffs sought relief in the form of: (1) a judgment declaring "[the PEEHIP defendants'] practice of denying an allotment for insurance benefits to educators who are married to another educator and who have dependent children to be unconstitutional, discriminatory and unlawful under both State and Federal law"; (2) an injunction preventing the PEEHIP defendants from "denying an allotment for insurance benefits to educators whose spouse is also an educator in the public school system and who have dependent children"; (3) restitution of "amounts ... unlawfully withheld and/or ... amounts [the public-education plaintiffs] have paid for insurance that they would not have paid absent [the PEEHIP defendants'] unlawful conduct" or other equitable relief; and (4) costs and attorney fees. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Alabama Supreme Court granted the petition in part, denied in part, and issue a writ to direct the circuit court to dismiss all the public-education plaintiffs' claims against RSA, PEEHIP, the PEEHIP Board, PEEHIF, TRS, the TRS Board, the members of the TRS Board, and Bronner, in his capacity as chief executive officer of RSA and as secretary-treasurer of TRS; to dismiss all the public-education plaintiffs' state-law claims against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP; and to dismiss the public-education plaintiffs' claims against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP, for monetary relief, pursuant to § 1983. The petition was denied with regard to the public-education plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief, pursuant to section 1983, against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP. The PEEHIP Board and Bronner were entitled to immunity from the state law claims, but not to immunity from the Eleventh Amendment claims for prospective injunctive relief under section 1983. View "Ex parte The Retirement Systems of Alabama et al." on Justia Law

On or about August 1, 2006, the University of Southern Alabama (USA) hired Azin Agah, a cell biologist, as a tenure-track employee, to teach biochemistry and to research the abnormalities in the extracellular matrix and angiogenesis associated with the pathogenesis of scleroderma. In 2010, USA did not reappoint Agah based on alleged research misconduct. In 2011, Agah sued several department members at the College of Allied Health Professions at USA and chairman of the two ad hoc committees that evaluated Agah, and other fictitiously named parties, alleging theft of electronic computer data and her research logbook and intentional and malicious interference with her contractual relationship with USA and seeking recovery of chattels in specie for the electronic data and her research logbook. On March 21, 2013, Agah amended her complaint adding USA and others as defendants and adding various claims. The only claim in her amended complaint that specifically named USA as a defendant "[sought] a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and monetary damages against USA for the breach by USA of [her] tenure track employment contract with USA." As a state school, USA argued it was immune from civil actions and petitions the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to dismiss it from Agah's suit. Additionally, Amber Bartlett, a student who worked under Agah's supervision in USA's research laboratory and a defendant in the same underlying action, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to issue an order quashing the subpoena issued to Alabama Psychiatric Services, P.C. ("APS"), ordering production of her mental-health records. The Court granted the petitions and issued the writs. USA and Bartlett have established that they had a clear, legal right to the relief they have requested. USA was entitled to absolute sovereign immunity from Agah's civil action, and the trial court was directed to enter a judgment of dismissal for USA. Bartlett was entitled to confidentiality of her mental-health records, and the trial court was directed to enter an order quashing Agah's subpoena for Bartlett's mental-health records from APS. View "Ex parte University of South Alabama" on Justia Law

Richard M. Gilley sued his former employer, Southern Research Institute ("SRI"), seeking compensation he alleged he was owed as a result of his work leading to SRI's procurement of United States Patent No. 5,407,609. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of SRI, and Gilley appealed that judgment to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court found that because Gilley did not timely assert a claim based on a January 2005 transaction in his complaint and because the money received by SRI in a July 2007 transaction was not intellectual-property income subject to sharing under the SRI awards policy, the summary judgment entered by the trial court was proper and was therefore affirmed. View "Gilley v. Southern Research Institute" on Justia Law

The City of Florence, the Civil Service Board of the City of Florence ("the CSB") and Keith McDaniel appealed separately a circuit court judgment after a jury rendered its verdict in favor of William T. Ezell. In mid 2011, two positions for promotion to the job of battalion chief became available within the Florence Fire and Rescue Department. Benjamin Cochran, Melvin Brown, Tim Clanton, John T. Muse, McDaniel, and Ezell applied for the positions. The CSB conducted interviews with the candidates on September 1, 2011. Afterward, it promoted Cochran and McDaniel to the two battalion-chief positions. On September 12, 2011, Ezell filed a two-count complaint against the City and the CSB in the Lauderdale Circuit Court. A month later, the City and the CSB filed an answer in which they denied Ezell's allegations. They also asserted that Ezell had failed to join certain indispensable parties. The City and CSB simultaneously filed a motion to dismiss count 1 of the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing that all six applicants were indispensable parties. They then asked that count 1 of the complaint be dismissed or that Ezell be required to add Cochran, Brown, Clanton, Muse, and McDaniel as defendants. The trial court ordered Ezell to amend his complaint to make Cochran, Brown, Clanton, Muse, and McDaniel parties to the suit. Ezell amended count 1 of his complaint and also added the other applicants as defendants. The City and the CSB filed an answer to the amended complaint in which they denied Ezell's allegations and argued that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The jury returned the following verdict: "We are not reasonably satisfied that the decision of the [CSB] was correct and we find that the following 2 individuals should be promoted to Battalion Chief (pick two) ... Benjamin Cochran ... William Ezell." The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict and ordered that the status quo be maintained during the pendency of any appellate proceedings. The City, the CSB, and McDaniel filed posttrial motions, which the trial court denied. McDaniel appealed to the Supreme Court (docketed as case no. 1130372). The City and the CSB also appealed to the Supreme Court (docketed as case no. 1130373). Because Ezell failed to demonstrate that he had a right to appeal the CSB's decision, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain his appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed these appeals with instructions to the trial court to vacate its judgment. View "City of Florence v. Ezell" on Justia Law

The circuit court entered a judgment finding that Lisa Hanvey had suffered a compensable injury caused by her exposure to chemical fumes during the course of her employment with Madison Academy, Inc. The trial court awarded Hanvey permanent-total-disability benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court granted Hanvey's petition for a writ of certiorari to review whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's judgment awarding Hanvey benefits for a permanent total disability under the Act. After review, the Supreme Court concluded there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's determination that Hanvey was permanently and totally disable. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment and remanded the case back to that court for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Lisa Hanvey." on Justia Law

Peter Ferrari was employed by DR Horton, Inc. - Birmingham as a land-acquisition manager for its Gulf Coast division. DR Horton asserted that it gave Ferrari confidential information concerning its business and land-acquisition strategies, including its geographical markets for expansion, and that it empowered Ferrari to arrange land purchases for DR Horton. DR Horton asserted that it received information that Ferrari had supplied third parties with confidential information from DR Horton without DR Horton's permission, including DR Horton's planned land acquisitions, future real estate developments, markets for expansion, and plans for construction. DR Horton also claimed it received information that Ferrari had benefited from DR Horton land acquisitions apart from his employment compensation. DR Horton asked for the tax returns of the Ferrari, his wife, his business Ferrari Capital Partners, LLC, and the entities that allegedly received DR Horton's confidential information: FH Properties, LLC; P6 Holdings, LLC; and Prince 5 Holdings, LLC (collectively, Ferrari defendants) in order to verify his assertions, but Ferrari refused to provide such information. DR Horton subsequently contacted those defendant third parties. Brad Zeitlin agreed to meet with DR Horton representatives to discuss real-property transactions involving DR Horton and Ferrari. According to a witness present during the interview, Zeitlin admitted that he had benefited financially from "tying up" property DR Horton wanted to purchase and then selling it to DR Horton. wanted. DR Horton terminated Ferrari's employment. DR Horton filed a verified petition requesting preaction discovery from the Ferrari defendants. The trial court granted the petition. The Ferrari defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to order the trial court to vacate its order and to dismiss DR Horton's Rule 27(a) petition. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing on DR Horton's Rule 27(a) petition before granting the petition. Given that DR Horton expressly sought preaction discovery not for the purpose of perpetuating evidence, but for the purpose of evaluating its claims against the Ferrari defendants, the Court granted the Ferrari defendants' petition for a writ of mandamus, and instructed the trial court to dismiss DR Horton's petition for preaction discovery. View "Ex parte Peter Ferrari et al." on Justia Law

Tonya Denson, a member of the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama ("the ERSA"), and Venius Turner, a member of the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama ("the TRSA"), brought this action on behalf of themselves, individually, as well as similarly situated members of the Retirement Systems of Alabama ("the RSA") against:(1) David Bronner, in his official capacities as chief executive officer and secretary-treasurer of the ERSA, the TRSA, and the RSA and (2) the officers and members of the respective boards of control of the TRSA and the ERSA, in their official capacities (referred to collectively as "the RSA defendants"). Plaintiffs argued the RSA defendants violated their fiduciary duties with respect to their management of their respective retirement systems, and investments of the plans' assets. The RSA defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the trial court denied. The RSA defendants then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court, asking it direct the trial court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss and to grant the motion. Upon review of the trial court record and arguments by the parties, the Supreme Court granted the RSA defendants' petition. The Court directed the trial court to vacate its order refusing to dismiss the complaint and to grant the RSA defendants' motion to dismiss: "The doctrines of sovereign immunity and separation of powers require that the judicial branch honor that delegation and not take upon itself the task of reviewing the investment strategies and decisions of the boards of control, at least not under the circumstances presented here." View "Ex parte David Bronner, et al." on Justia Law