Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law

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Paul Irwin, Jr., appealed a final judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing his claim for injunctive relief against the Jefferson County Personnel Board ("the Board") and the City of Trussville ("Trussville"). This case arose from Trussville's desire to hire a police chief following the retirement of its former chief. Trussville interviewed Irwin and two other candidates from a certified list of candidates. Trussville did not hire Irwin or any other candidate from the certified list supplied by the Board in January 2017. Instead, Trussville returned the list to the Board and requested that the Board administer a new test for the position of Police Chief II. On January 23, 2017, the Board "expired" the eligibility list. On January 27, 2017, the Board also approved Trussville's request to hire a provisional police chief until such time as a new assessment examination could be administered and a new eligibility list generated. On March 1, 2017, Irwin sued the Board and Trussville, contending that, once the Board issued to Trussville a certified list of eligible candidates for the position of police chief, Trussville was required to hire a candidate from that list and had no discretion to leave the position unfilled. The complaint sought only injunctive relief. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the specific actions Irwin sought to enjoin –- the administration of a new examination for the position of Trussville's police chief and the appointment of a candidate to the position of police chief who was not on the January 2017 certified list –- have since occurred. Accordingly, it was impossible to provide Irwin the relief he requested. Irwin's appeal was dismissed. View "Irwin v. Jefferson County Personnel Board" on Justia Law

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Alfa Insurance Corporation, ALFA Mutual General Insurance Corporation, ALFA Life Insurance Corporation, and ALFA Specialty Insurance Corporation (collectively, "Alfa") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus seeking review of an order entered by the Montgomery Circuit Court on December 18, 2015. Although Alfa set forth three issues for review, the Supreme Court reviewed only one: whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to enter the December 18, 2015, order and whether it exceeded its discretion by not setting that order aside. R.G. "Bubba" Howell, Jr., and M. Stuart "Chip" Jones were insurance agents for an Alfa insurance agency in Mississippi. Their agency agreements with Alfa included an arbitration provision, as well as a provision requiring Howell and Jones to purchase "errors and omissions" insurance coverage. In 2012, Alfa accused Howell and Jones of selling competing products in contravention of their agency agreements; Howell and Jones, however, alleged that their actions had been approved by Alfa. Regardless, Alfa forced Howell to resign his position as an Alfa agent on December 31, 2012, and discharged Jones on January 1, 2013. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court exceeded its discretion in entering the December 18, 2015, order compelling discovery pretermitted discussion of the other, two discovery issues. View "Ex parte Alfa Insurance Corporation et al." on Justia Law

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Alfa Insurance Corporation, ALFA Mutual General Insurance Corporation, ALFA Life Insurance Corporation, and ALFA Specialty Insurance Corporation (collectively, "Alfa") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus seeking review of an order entered by the Montgomery Circuit Court on December 18, 2015. Although Alfa set forth three issues for review, the Supreme Court reviewed only one: whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to enter the December 18, 2015, order and whether it exceeded its discretion by not setting that order aside. R.G. "Bubba" Howell, Jr., and M. Stuart "Chip" Jones were insurance agents for an Alfa insurance agency in Mississippi. Their agency agreements with Alfa included an arbitration provision, as well as a provision requiring Howell and Jones to purchase "errors and omissions" insurance coverage. In 2012, Alfa accused Howell and Jones of selling competing products in contravention of their agency agreements; Howell and Jones, however, alleged that their actions had been approved by Alfa. Regardless, Alfa forced Howell to resign his position as an Alfa agent on December 31, 2012, and discharged Jones on January 1, 2013. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court exceeded its discretion in entering the December 18, 2015, order compelling discovery pretermitted discussion of the other, two discovery issues. View "Ex parte Alfa Insurance Corporation et al." on Justia Law

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Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC, d/b/a GCR Tires & Service ("Bridgestone"), appealed a circuit court order denying Bridgestone's motion to compel arbitration of an employment-related dispute. Ottis Adams began working as a sales representative for Bridgestone or a related entity in May 2006 and that he resigned or his employment was terminated in August 2016. At some point at or around the time he was hired, Adams signed a document entitled "New Employee Agreement and Acknowledgment of the Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Employee Dispute Resolution Plan" ("the agreement"), which stated that Adams agreed to the terms of the employee-dispute-resolution plan, fully titled, the "BFS Retail & Commercial Operations, LLC, Employee Dispute Resolution Plan" ("the EDR Plan"). The EDR Plan contained an arbitration provision. After leaving Bridgestone in 2016, Adams went to work for McGriff Tire Company, Inc. ("McGriff"). At some point thereafter, McGriff's principal, Barry McGriff, received a letter written on the letterhead of Bridgestone's corporate parent, asserting that Adams signed a noncompetition and nonsolicitation agreement with his previous employer, that his employment with McGriff violated that agreement, and that Adams allegedly had violated a duty of loyalty by selling tires for McGriff while still employed by Bridgestone. The letter also suggested that Adams may have disclosed, or might disclose, "confidential information and trade secrets." The letter stated that Bridgestone was planning to commence legal action against Adams and concluded with a suggestion that McGriff might be named as a defendant in that action if the matter was not resolved. Adams asserts that, because of the accusations in the letter, McGriff terminated his employment. Adams sued Bridgestone and related entities, alleging Bridgestone interfered with his business relationship with McGriff and had defamed him via the letter to Barry McGriff. Adams subsequently voluntarily dismissed all defendants except Bridgestone. Bridgestone filed an answer and a counterclaim. In its counterclaim, Bridgestone averred that Adams, while still employed by Bridgestone, had taken actions for McGriff's benefit and had "feigned acceptance" of an employment agreement he never actually signed that included a noncompetition provision. Although Bridgestone did not mention arbitration or the EDR Plan in its answer or counterclaim, approximately three months after filing those pleadings, it amended its answer to assert arbitration as a defense, and it filed a motion to compel arbitration of all claims pursuant to the terms of the EDR Plan. The trial court denied Bridgestone's motion to compel, and Bridgestone appealed. After review of the record, the Alabama Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in denying Bridgestone's motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the EDR Plan. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC v. Adams" on Justia Law

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Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC, d/b/a GCR Tires & Service ("Bridgestone"), appealed a circuit court order denying Bridgestone's motion to compel arbitration of an employment-related dispute. Ottis Adams began working as a sales representative for Bridgestone or a related entity in May 2006 and that he resigned or his employment was terminated in August 2016. At some point at or around the time he was hired, Adams signed a document entitled "New Employee Agreement and Acknowledgment of the Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Employee Dispute Resolution Plan" ("the agreement"), which stated that Adams agreed to the terms of the employee-dispute-resolution plan, fully titled, the "BFS Retail & Commercial Operations, LLC, Employee Dispute Resolution Plan" ("the EDR Plan"). The EDR Plan contained an arbitration provision. After leaving Bridgestone in 2016, Adams went to work for McGriff Tire Company, Inc. ("McGriff"). At some point thereafter, McGriff's principal, Barry McGriff, received a letter written on the letterhead of Bridgestone's corporate parent, asserting that Adams signed a noncompetition and nonsolicitation agreement with his previous employer, that his employment with McGriff violated that agreement, and that Adams allegedly had violated a duty of loyalty by selling tires for McGriff while still employed by Bridgestone. The letter also suggested that Adams may have disclosed, or might disclose, "confidential information and trade secrets." The letter stated that Bridgestone was planning to commence legal action against Adams and concluded with a suggestion that McGriff might be named as a defendant in that action if the matter was not resolved. Adams asserts that, because of the accusations in the letter, McGriff terminated his employment. Adams sued Bridgestone and related entities, alleging Bridgestone interfered with his business relationship with McGriff and had defamed him via the letter to Barry McGriff. Adams subsequently voluntarily dismissed all defendants except Bridgestone. Bridgestone filed an answer and a counterclaim. In its counterclaim, Bridgestone averred that Adams, while still employed by Bridgestone, had taken actions for McGriff's benefit and had "feigned acceptance" of an employment agreement he never actually signed that included a noncompetition provision. Although Bridgestone did not mention arbitration or the EDR Plan in its answer or counterclaim, approximately three months after filing those pleadings, it amended its answer to assert arbitration as a defense, and it filed a motion to compel arbitration of all claims pursuant to the terms of the EDR Plan. The trial court denied Bridgestone's motion to compel, and Bridgestone appealed. After review of the record, the Alabama Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in denying Bridgestone's motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the EDR Plan. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC v. Adams" on Justia Law

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Defendant Cheryl Price and Greg Lovelace petitioned for mandamus relief. Price was formerly the warden at Donaldson Correctional Facility ("the prison"), which was operated by the Alabama Department of Corrections ("the DOC"). Lovelace was a deputy commissioner of the DOC in charge of construction and maintenance. Plaintiff Marcus Parrish was a correctional officer employed by the DOC. Parrish was supervising inmate showers in a segregation unit in the prison. Parrish left the shower area briefly to retrieve shaving trimmers, and, when he returned, inmate Rashad Byers had already entered a shower cell, which had an exterior lock on it. Byers indicated that he was finished with his shower, and Parrish told him to turn around to be handcuffed, then approached Byers's shower door with the key to the lock on the door in his hand. Byers unexpectedly opened the door, exited the shower cell, and attacked Parrish. During the attack, Byers took Parrish's baton from him and began striking Parrish with it. Parrish was knocked unconscious, and he sustained injuries to his head. Parrish sued Price and Lovelace in their official capacities. Parrish later filed an amended complaint naming Price and Lovelace as defendants in their individual capacities only (thus, it appears that Price and Lovelace were sued only in their individual capacities). Parrish alleged that Price and Lovelace willfully breached their duties by failing to monitor the prison for unsafe conditions and by failing to repair or replace the allegedly defective locks. Price and Lovelace moved for a summary judgment, asserting, among other things, that they are entitled to State-agent immunity. The trial court denied the summary-judgment motion, concluding, without elaboration, that genuine issues of material fact existed to preclude a summary judgment. Price and Lovelace then petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, arguing that they were immune from liability. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded Price and Lovelace established they were entitled to State-agent immunity. Accordingly, the Court directed the trial court to enter a summary judgment in their favor. View "Ex parte Cheryl Price & Greg Lovelace." on Justia Law

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James Wood, a retired circuit court judge, appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of: the State of Alabama; Luther Strange, in his capacity as Attorney General for the State of Alabama; David Bronner, in his capacity as chief executive officer of the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama; the Board of Control of the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama ("the Board of Control"); and Thomas White, Jr., in his capacity as Comptroller for the State of Alabama. At issue were increases in the rates of contributions judges and justices are required to pay into the Judicial Retirement Fund ("the Fund"), pursuant to section 12- 18-5, Ala. Code 1975. The Fund was established under the provisions of Act No. 1163, Ala. Acts 1973, codified at section 12- 18-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, to provide retirement benefits to qualified judges and justices. Judge Wood was serving his second official term when increases in contribution rates took effect. Judge Wood retired on January 15, 2013. In June 2012, Judge Wood, individually, and on behalf of a purported class of "all members" of the Fund, sued the State defendants, alleging that the mandatory increases in contributions to the Fund reduced Judge Wood's net pay without affording him any additional retirement benefits. He alleged that the increases in contributions violated the Judicial Compensation Clause of Art. VI, section 148(d), Constitution of Alabama of 1901 ("the Compensation Clause"). In his complaint, Judge Wood sought a judgment declaring the Act unconstitutional as violative of the Compensation Clause. Because Judge Wood's claim for money damages was not shown to be within the Alabama Supreme Court's subject-matter jurisdiction and his claim for prospective injunctive relief was moot, also defeating subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court did not address the constitutionality of the Act. Accordingly, the Court held the trial court's judgment upholding the Act against Judge Wood's constitutional challenge was void. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal, vacated the summary judgment in favor of the State defendants, and dismissed the action for failure to establish subject-matter jurisdiction as to the claim for monetary damages and on the basis of mootness as to the claim for prospective injunctive relief. View "Wood v. Alabama" on Justia Law

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Jami Johnston appealed a judgment entered in favor of Castles and Crowns, Inc. ("Castles"). Castles was a children's clothing company formed by Julie Vickers and Amy Bowers. Brandi Stuart, Johnston's sister, worked for Castles from 2006 until 2011. From 2009 to 2010, while she was working with Castles, Stuart had 7,149 pounds of Castles' clothing shipped either to Johnston or to consignment companies used by Johnston. In January 2011, Vickers terminated Stuart's employment based on issues with her performance. In April 2011, Castles sued Stuart and Johnston, alleging conversion; civil conspiracy; "willfulness, negligence, and wantonness"; trespass to chattel; and unjust-enrichment against Johnston and Stuart. It also asserted fraudulent-misrepresentation and suppression claims against Stuart. Johnston answered, also asserting a counterclaim against Castles and a third-party complaint against Vickers. In her counterclaim and third-party complaint, Johnston alleged claims of defamation; "negligence, wantonness, and willfulness"; conspiracy; and tortious interference with business and contractual relations. She also sought recovery against Castles under the theory of respondeat superior. In this case, the trial court instructed the jury to consider Castles' unjust-enrichment claim against Johnston if it did not find against Johnston on the conversion and conspiracy claims. The jury found against Johnston on both the conversion and conspiracy claims. However, it then considered the unjust-enrichment claim and found against Johnston on that claim as well. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the jury's verdict was inconsistent with the trial court's instructions and "was obviously the result of confusion on the part of the jury." After it had discharged the jury, the trial court acknowledged the inconsistency in the jury's verdict. The trial court attempted to cure that inconsistency by setting aside the award in favor of Castles on the unjust-enrichment claim. However, the Supreme Court found the trial court's attempt to reconcile the inconsistency in the jury's verdict was based on mere speculation about the jury's intent. Additionally, the jury failed to follow the trial court's instructions, and Johnston moved for a new trial on that ground. The Supreme Court concluded Johnston was entitled to a new trial because the jury failed to follow the trial court's instructions. For these reasons, the trial court erred when it denied Johnston's motion for a new trial. View "Johnston v. Castles & Crowns, Inc." on Justia Law

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Jewels by Park Lane, Inc. ("JBPL"), and Kathy Cassidy, the national director for JBPL, sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss an action against them on the ground of improper venue arising out of a forum-selection clause, and to enter an order dismissing the case. JBPL was a multilevel marketing company that sold jewelry through independent contractors who host parties offering JBPL's jewelry line for sale. Jennifer Miller became a “director” for LBPL. Miller sued JBPL and Cassidy, alleging JBPL promised to employ her for a 12-month period and to pay her $4,000 a month for that period. Miller set out claims alleging account stated, open account, breach of contract, and fraud. Miller sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees. The employment agreement contained a “forum selection clause” in which any disputes between the parties would be settled in accordance with the laws of Illinois. Miller admitted that the director agreement contained a forum selection clause but argued that she would not have entered into the agreement but for the fraud perpetuated by JBPL and Cassidy. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded JBPL and Cassidy have shown a clear legal right to have the action against them dismissed on the basis that venue in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court was, by application of the outbound forum-selection clause, improper. The trial court exceeded its discretion in denying their motion to dismiss Miller's action. View "Ex parte Jewels by Park Lane, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2015, RPM Cranes and its owner Muhammad Wasim Ali sued the defendants CraneWorks, Inc. and its owners, David Upton ("David") and Steve Upton ("Steve"), and Russell Brooks, Rick Yates, and Casey Markos, alleging that Brooks, Yates, and Markos had violated their employment agreements by going to work for CraneWorks and that CraneWorks' hiring of Brooks, Yates, and Markos likewise violated those employment agreements. David and Steve were named as defendants by virtue of their ownership of CraneWorks. RPM and Ali sought monetary damages and injunctive relief. The trial court entered a permanent injunction in favor of RPM and Ali and against the defendants. The Alabama Supreme Court found the injunction at issue in defendants' appeal was not specific in its scope: the order stated that the defendants were "permanently restrained and enjoined from contacting, in any way, whatsoever, any of those clients which are now clients of RPM Cranes." The order failed, however, to specify which clients were included in the injunction. RPM and Ali introduced no evidence as to who RPM's clients were or whether it had developed any clients of its own that Yates and Brooks did not bring onboard as a result of their previous jobs with other entities. In other words, the injunction was broad and vague rather than "specific in [its] terms." The Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Brooks v. RPM Cranes, LLC" on Justia Law