Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In May 2005, Autrey Nichols purchased a Yanmar model 2210BD tractor from Northside Motors, LLC. The Yanmar tractor came equipped with a front-end loader and a "bush hog" attachment. The Yanmar tractor did not have a rollover-protection structure ("ROPS"). In 2008, Randy Nichols, the plaintiff and Autrey's brother, used the Yanmar tractor to bush hog a neighbor's property. The particular area of the property Randy was to bush hog was a field that contained a hill, the slope of which increased as he moved toward the center of the field. Randy did not "walk" the field to inspect the terrain before bush hogging the field. Randy stated that when operating the tractor, he looked forward and it appeared that the right front tire suddenly "took a dip," causing the tractor to roll over. Randy was thrown from the tractor. Randy suffered severe injuries, including an amputated right arm, a crushed hip and leg, and various other injuries. Before the accident, Randy had more than 30 years' experience operating tractors and other heavy equipment. Randy had operated the subject Yanmar tractor approximately 15 to 20 times without incident before the accident. After purchasing the tractor, Autrey purchased an English-language version of the operator's manual for the tractor. The operator's manual explained that the Yanmar model 2210BD tractor was a gray-market tractor that was originally manufactured for sale in Japan and that was subsequently purchased used by a dealer or broker and imported into the United States. The manual also contained information and warnings on the risk of rollovers, particularly while operating the tractor on slopes; stability issues and the need for ballasts when operating the tractor with a front-end loader; the importance of a ROPS; and the need to inspect unfamiliar terrain before operating the tractor. Autrey did not provide Randy with the manual and did not discuss with him any information contained in the manual. Additionally, the frontend loader and bush hog attachment that accompanied the Yanmar tractor when it was purchased also came with operator manuals, and each was affixed with English warning decals. At the close of Randy's evidence, Yanmar America moved the trial court for a preverdict judgment as a matter of law ("JML"), which the trial court denied. Yanmar America renewed its motion for a preverdict JML at the close of all the evidence, which the trial court also denied. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Randy and against Yanmar America awarding Randy $900,000 in damages. Yanmar America moved the trial court for a postverdict JML or, in the alternative, for a new trial which were also denied. Yanmar America appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that Randy failed to establish by substantial evidence that Yanmar America participated in an activity that increased his risk of harm over any risk of harm that would have existed had Yanmar America chosen not to warn potential users of the gray-market tractors in this case. Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying Yanmar America's motions for a JML on Randy's failure-to-warn claim. View "Yanmar America Corporation v. Nichols " on Justia Law

Robert E. Anderson, M.D. and Selma Doctors Clinic, PC, d/b/a Selma Doctors Clinic ("SDC") petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order granting plaintiff Barbara Craig's Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion, and to reinstate the final judgment entered in favor of Dr. Anderson and SDC. This matter stemmed from a medical-malpractice/wrongful-death action filed by Barbara G. Craig as the administrator of the estate of her husband William Craig. Dr. Anderson performed hernia surgery on Mr. Craig at Vaughan Regional Medical Center ("VRMC"), following which, he died. Mrs. Craig sued Dr. Anderson, SDC, and VRMC alleging that the defendants were negligent in their care and treatment of Mr. Craig and that their conduct proximately caused his death. The trial court found that Mrs. Craig failed to qualify her expert on the applicable standard of care, and accordingly, was unable to establish that Dr. Anderson violated the applicable standard of care. Mrs. Craig filed a Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to vacate the judgment or for a new trial. In the motion, Mrs. Craig contended that the trial court erred in excluding the expert's testimony. The trial court denied this motion, but granted her Rule 60(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., in which she argued that Dr. Anderson had committed perjury and had perpetrated a fraud upon the trial court by testifying that he had performed an ulcer surgery when, in fact, he had not done so. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting Mrs. Craig's Rule 60(b)(3) motion. The Court therefore granted Dr. Anderson's request and issued the writ. View "Craig v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Following a two-day trial in May 2013, a Bullock County jury returned a $450,000 verdict in favor of Michael Shepherd on a breach-of-warranty claim he asserted against Barko Hydraulics, LLC. Shepherd purchased a Barko 495ML knuckle boom loader ("the 495ML loader") from G&S Equipment Company in 2008 for use in his logging operation. In November 2010, when the 495ML loader had approximately 4,300 hours on its clock, Shepherd transported it to G&S Equipment for repairs after the hydraulic pumps began making noise. G&S Equipment confirmed that the hydraulic pumps had failed and notified Shepherd that the needed repairs, costing approximately $10,000, would not be covered under the warranty because the warranty period had expired. At Shepherd's request, G&S Equipment contacted Barko, which confirmed that it would not authorize or reimburse G&S Equipment for making the needed repair because of the expiration of the warranty. At that point, Shepherd told G&S Equipment that he could not afford to pay for the repairs to the 495ML loader, nor could he continue to meet his obligation to Wells Fargo (the bank that lent him the purchase money for the loader). He left the loader with G&S Equipment, notified Wells Fargo of its location, and of his intention to make no further payments on it. Wells Fargo subsequently repossessed the loader, sold it, and obtained a $124,184 deficit judgment against Shepherd. Shepherd then sued Barko, G&S Equipment, and Cummins Mid-South, LLC, the manufacturer of certain component parts of the 495ML loader, asserting fraud, negligence and/or wantonness, and multiple breach-of-warranty claims. Shepherd sought both compensatory damages for lost profits and mental anguish and punitive damages. Ultimately, G&S Equipment and Cummins Mid-South were dismissed from the action, and, during the course of the trial, all of Shepherd's claims against Barko except a breach-of-express-warranty claim were withdrawn or dismissed. Barko's subsequent postjudgment motion renewing its previous motion for a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial was denied by the trial court. Barko then appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Court concluded the trial court erred in not granting Barko's postjudgment motions. The case was remanded for entry of an order granting Barko's motion for a new trial. View "Barko Hydraulics, LLC v. Shepherd " on Justia Law

The issue in these four appeals was whether the $100,000 statutory cap of 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, applied when a peace officer, acting outside his employment, was sued in the officer's individual capacity. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the $100,000 statutory cap did not apply when a peace officer, acting outside his employment, was sued individually. "The limitation on recovery in the second sentence of 11-47-190 is intended to protect the public coffers of the municipality, not to protect municipal employees from claims asserted against them in their individual capacity. [. . .] We recognize that municipal employees were not the intended subject of the legislature's enactment of 11-17-190, and we also recognize that the legislature is better suited to speak comprehensively on the individual liability of municipal employees." View "Alabama Municipal Insurance Corporation v. Willie Allen " on Justia Law

Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company ("Penn National") was sued by Jacob Walker, an employee of its named insured, seeking underinsured-motorist ("UIM") benefits following an automobile accident. After settling the claims against it, Penn National filed a cross-claim against Michael Bradford, the alleged tortfeasor, asserting a subrogation theory of recovery. The trial court dismissed the cross-claim on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations, and Penn National appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company v. Bradford " on Justia Law

In 2011, Elizabeth Morton, a resident of Greene County, and Annie Watkins, a resident of Jefferson County, were involved in a motor-vehicle collision in Jefferson County. Watkins was treated at a hospital in Jefferson County and subsequently received medical treatment at four health-care facilities located in Jefferson County. In 2013, Watkins filed a complaint in Greene County against Morton, asserting claims arising out of the 2011 collision. Morton filed a motion to transfer this case to the Jefferson Circuit Court pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Watkins responded, and the Greene Circuit Court entered an order denying Morton's motion, stating: "After review of [Watkins's] response, the Motion to Transfer Venue of defendant [. . .] is hereby denied. . ." Morton then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the writ: Jefferson County had a significantly stronger connection to this case than did Greene County, "which is connected to this case only by the fact that Morton resides there –- a connection this Court has characterized as 'weak.' Morton has met her burden of showing that transfer of this action to Jefferson County is justified in the interest of justice." View "Watkins v. Morton " on Justia Law

Frank Gillis, M.D. appealed a $5,000,000 judgment entered on a jury verdict against him in favor of Joey Frazier, as executor of the estate of his mother, Florine Bryant, in a wrongful-death/medical-malpractice case. Bryant died in 2005. The case against Dr. Gillis was first tried in October 2010. At the close of Frazier's case, Dr. Gillis moved for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML"), arguing that his alleged negligence was not the proximate cause of Bryant's death. The trial court entered a JML in Dr. Gillis's favor. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial. The case was retried in June 2012. At the conclusion of the retrial of the case, the jury awarded Frazier $5,000,000 in damages for the wrongful death of his mother. Dr. Gillis filed a motion seeking, alternatively, a JML, a new trial, or a remittitur of the damages award. The parties engaged in posttrial discovery. Frazier sought the production of evidence related to a potential bad-faith claim by Dr. Gillis against his liability-insurance carrier, ProAssurance Indemnity Company, Inc. ProAssurance produced certain documents from its claim file for in camera review by the trial court. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and subsequently denied Dr. Gillis's postjudgment motions. Dr. Gillis appealed. After Dr. Gillis filed his appeal from the trial court's denial of his postjudgment motions, Dr. Gillis asked the Supreme Court for permission to file a motion with the trial court for relief from the trial court's judgment under Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Frazier opposed Dr. Gillis's motion. The Supreme Court entered an order staying the appeal and allowing Dr. Gillis to file a Rule 60(b) motion, and remanded the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting a "Hammond/Green Oil" hearing concerning the jury's punitive-damages award. The trial court denied Dr. Gillis's Rule 60(b) motion as time-barred. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment denying Dr. Gillis relief under Rule 60(b). The Court also reversed the trial court insofar as it considered the potential bad-faith and/or negligent-failure-to-settle claim against Dr. Gillis's liability-insurance carrier. On remand, the trial court was ordered to conduct a Hammond/Green Oil hearing without consideration of the potential bad-faith claim and without consideration of Dr. Gillis's wife's portion of jointly owned assets. View "Gillis v. Frazier" on Justia Law

International Refining & Manufacturing Co. d/b/a IRMCO, among others, and GE Betz, Inc., among others, separately sought mandamus relief from the trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment and a motion to dismiss. Bell Carr, Jr., and approximately 320 other former employees at a manufacturing plant operated by Arvin Industries d/b/a Arvin–Meritor, Inc. sued Arvin–Meritor and six individual defendants, also former employees at the plant, where automotive mufflers were manufactured. The complaint alleged that up until the closing of the plant in May 2002, the employees suffered harm from "exposure to toxic and dangerous chemicals" that were flushed from the manufacturing machines and eventually circulated into a large pit, which the employees were responsible for draining and cleaning. In addition to these seven defendants, the original complaint fictitiously named 40 other defendants in the caption and in the body of the complaint. Defendants argued that mandamus was appropriate because certain claims of wantonness were governed by a two-year statute of limitations and were time-barred because those claims did not relate-back to the date of filing of the original complaint. Although a two-year statute of limitations on wantonness claims may have been in place at the time the employees' claims arose, the six-year statute of limitations adopted in "McKenzie v. Killian" (887 So. 2d 861 (Ala. 2004)) was in place at the time the former employees asserted those claims against the defendants in the first amended complaint. Defendants did not demonstrate that the trial court failed to comply with any prior mandate of the Supreme Court, nor have they demonstrated a clear legal right to the dismissal of the wantonness claims against them by way of a summary judgment. View "Carr v. Arvin Industries" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Mary Hall, the personal representative of the estate of Adolphus Hall, Sr., and Anaya McKinnon, the personal representative of the estate of Wanzy Lee Bowman appealed the Jefferson Circuit Court's order dismissing their complaint filed against Environmental Litigation Group, P.C., a law firm ("ELG"). The plaintiffs filed a complaint in against ELG, requesting a declaratory judgment and alleging one count of unjust enrichment and one count of breach of contract. The plaintiffs asserted those claims on behalf of the estates they represented and on behalf of "others similarly situated as a class action pursuant to Rule 23," Ala. R. Civ. P. In the 1990s, ELG agreed to represent hundreds of clients who had been exposed to asbestos, including Adolphus Hall and Bowman; ELG entered into an attorney-employment agreement with each client; pursuant to that agreement, ELG agreed to "take all legal steps necessary to enforce the said tort claim," and in return ELG would receive 40% of amounts collected from any settlement or judgment as its fee; the agreement also permitted ELG to reimburse itself for reasonable expenses related to the clients' claims. The "crux" of the plaintiffs' claims is that ELG breached the attorney-employment agreement by allegedly taking as an attorney fee more than 40% of the settlement proceeds. ELG filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' appeal, arguing that the Supreme Court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' appeal because "[o]nly the Alabama State Bar has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute between the parties." The Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint, and affirmed the denial of ELG's motion to dismiss. View "Hall v. Environmental Litigation Group, P.C. " on Justia Law

The City of Midfield, Officer Jason Davis, and Sgt. Otis Brown petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor, based on State-agent immunity, on claims filed against them by Patrick Williams ("Patrick") and Elizabeth W. McElroy, as successor administratrix of the estate of Willie Lee Williams. Police engaged a suspect in a high speed chase following a traffic stop. The driver struck Patrick's vehicle. The collision caused the truck to flip over several times. Willie Lee died at the scene, and Patrick suffered severe injuries. Patrick and the estate sued the driver alleging claims of wrongful death, negligence, and wantonness. Patrick and the estate also sued the Midfield defendants, alleging various negligence claims. The Midfield defendants moved the circuit court to dismiss the claims against them, alleging, among other things, that Officer Davis and Sgt. Brown were entitled to police-officer immunity, and that because the officers were immune from suit, the claims against Midfield also failed. The circuit court denied the motion, and the Midfield defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for mandamus relief, which was denied in May 2012. While the Midfield defendants' first mandamus petition was pending, Patrick and the estate amended their complaint, alleging negligence per se against Midfield for the negligence of Sgt. Brown, claims of negligent supervision and training against Midfield, and claims of general negligence against Officer Davis and Sgt. Brown and, derivatively, against Midfield. In May 2013, the Midfield defendants filed a motion for a summary judgment, again arguing, among other things, that Officer Davis and Sgt. Brown were immune from suit and that the claims against Midfield were too. The circuit court denied the motion, and the Midfield defendants appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court erred in denying the Midfield defendants' motion for summary judgment, granted their petition, and issued the writ. View "Williams v. City of Midfield" on Justia Law