Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Adam Dan Hilyer appealed the denial of his motion to set aside a default judgment entered against him and in favor of plaintiff Betti Fortier. In 2013, Hilyer was backing a tractor-trailer rig used to transport logs into his private driveway. At the time, Hilyer was blocking both lanes of traffic on Kennedy Avenue. M.M., a minor, was driving Fortier's van and was traveling westbound on Kennedy Avenue. B.D., M.M.'s brother; R.W., M.M.'s fiancé; and B.H., a friend of B.D.'s, were also in the vehicle. M.M.'s vehicle collided with Hilyer's trailer, and M.M. sustained injuries. In early 2014, the trial court entered a judgment against Hilyer in the amount of $550,000 and found "that the proposed settlement of the claim of the minor, M.M. is just, fair, reasonable, in keeping with the evidence, and is in the minor's best interest." A month later, Hilyer filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, finding that Hilyer, in his motion to set aside the default judgment, met the threshold showing of each of the three "Kirtland" factors. Additionally, Hilyer supported his motion with affidavits and copies of correspondence. Fortier submitted evidence in support of her opposition to the motion to set aside that controverted the facts and evidence submitted by Hilyer. However, after conducting a hearing and taking the matter under advisement, the trial court allowed the motion to set aside to be denied by operation of law without any indication that the denial of the motion was the product of due deliberation and without any indication that the denial was based upon a consideration of the Kirtland factors. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the denial by operation of law of Hilyer's motion to set aside the default judgment and remanded this case for the trial court to consider the Kirtland factors in determining whether to set aside the default judgment. View "Hilyer v. Fortier" on Justia Law

Dorothy Crusoe and her granddaughter, Erica Boyd, by and through her mother and next friend, Latricia Witherspoon (collectively, "Crusoe"), appealed a circuit court order denying their motion for a new trial. This case stemmed from an automobile accident that occurred in Bessemer. Crusoe sued Davis under a negligence theory seeking damages for medical expenses and for past and future pain and suffering. Dorothy Crusoe additionally sought damages for lost wages. After hearing the evidence and being instructed on negligence, the jury returned a verdict for Davis. Crusoe filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. She appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in not allowing the policeman who prepared the accident report to testify as to the contents of that report, which testimony, Crusoe alleged, would refute Davis's testimony that her vehicle was not in motion at the time of the accident. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Crusoe v. Davis" on Justia Law

Travelers Home and Marine Insurance Company ("Travelers") appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Dianne and Martin Gray in the Grays' action arising from injuries Dianne suffered as the result of a motor-vehicle accident. In 2010, Lawana Coker and Dianne were involved in a motor-vehicle accident in Elmore County; Coker was without motor-vehicle insurance at the time of the accident. Two years later, the Grays filed in the trial court a three-count complaint naming as defendants Coker and Travelers and a fictitiously named defendant. Travelers answered the complaint, denying the material allegations therein and asserting certain affirmative defenses. Coker, however, failed to answer the complaint. In 2013, the Grays moved the trial court to enter a default judgment in their favor and against Coker, requesting that the trial court assess damages in the amount of $500,000 for Dianne and $50,000 for Martin. The Grays' motion requested no relief as to Travelers. Shortly thereafter, the Grays filed a new summary-judgment motion in which, for the first time, they sought relief against Travelers. The Grays did not base their summary judgment motion against Travelers on the ground that there was no genuine issue of fact as to whether tortious conduct by Coker caused them to suffer injury. Instead, they based their summary-judgment motion against Travelers solely on the fact that they previously had obtained a default judgment against Coker. In this regard, the Grays argued that they were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law against Travelers because, they said, "Travelers as a party defendant had notice and adequate opportunity to intervene and present any defenses and arguments necessary to protect its position with respect to the entry of or the amount of damages in the Default Judgment. By failing to do so, Defendant Travelers legally is bound by the judgment." After review, the Supreme Court reversed: because Travelers as the Grays' UM carrier, was not bound by the default judgment entered against Coker, Travelers was not required to submit evidence in opposition to a motion for a summary judgment that relied solely on that default judgment. Consequently, the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of the Grays and against Travelers. View "Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co. v. Gray" on Justia Law

The circuit court entered a judgment finding that Lisa Hanvey had suffered a compensable injury caused by her exposure to chemical fumes during the course of her employment with Madison Academy, Inc. The trial court awarded Hanvey permanent-total-disability benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court granted Hanvey's petition for a writ of certiorari to review whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's judgment awarding Hanvey benefits for a permanent total disability under the Act. After review, the Supreme Court concluded there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's determination that Hanvey was permanently and totally disable. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment and remanded the case back to that court for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Lisa Hanvey." on Justia Law

Sarah Grimes appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Kristen Saban in Grimes's civil action against Saban seeking damages for assault and battery. The skirmish arose after a night of drinking in Saban's apartment. The parties were arguing at one another. Saban locked herself in her bedroom and posted things to Facebook about Grimes to which Grimes took exception. Saban eventually opened the bedroom door to show Grimes she removed the post. With Grimes at the threshold, the door opened and "a physical altercation ensued." Grimes argued on appeal that the circuit court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of Saban because, she said, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Saban acted in self-defense. The Supreme Court concluded that there still remained genuine questions of material fact in this case, reversed the summary judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Grimes v. Saban" on Justia Law

One of the defendants in this case, Robert Bosch LLC, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Etowah Circuit Court to vacate or, in the alternative, to amend the provisions of its order granting the request for production of Bosch's "air bag system Electronic Control Unit" ("ECU") filed by plaintiff Dorothy Kilgo, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Ernest Ronald Kilgo, Jr. In 2011, Kilgo and her husband "Ron" were passengers in a 2008 PT Cruiser that Ron's stepson was driving in Etowah County. While they were waiting for an oncoming motor vehicle to pass through an intersection so that they could make a left turn, the Kilgos' vehicle was struck from behind by another motor vehicle. The impact of that collision propelled the Kilgos' vehicle into the intersection, where it was struck head-on by an oncoming motor vehicle. Ron, who was sitting in the front passenger-side seat, suffered severe injuries and died several days later as a result of those injuries. The front passenger-seat air bag failed to deploy during either the rear or the head-on collisions, and the front passenger-side seatbelt "pretensioner," which is supposed to cause the seat belt to "lock" immediately after a collision, did not activate. However, one of the two front driver-side air bags deployed during the collisions, and the front driver-side seat-belt pretensioner was activated as well. Kilgo thereafter filed a wrongful-death lawsuit, naming several defendants, including, among others, Bosch, who designed and manufactured the ECU in the Kilgos' vehicle. Sometime thereafter, Kilgo served a notice of taking the deposition of a corporate representative of Bosch. The trial court entered an order denying Bosch's motion to amend the protective order and, in that order, required Kilgo to "submit a proposed Order including safeguards it will employ to review the requested discovery." In 2014, Kilgo submitted to the trial court a proposed protective order. On the following day, the trial court entered an amended protective order, which required Bosch to produce the entire algorithm for inspection by Kilgo's two experts, subject to 12 confidentiality and disclosure safeguards set forth in the order. After review, the Supreme Court granted Bosh's petition and issued the writ: the trial court was directed to vacate its protective order and to enter a more comprehensive and restrictive protective order with regard to the algorithm. View "Ex parte Robert Bosch LLC." on Justia Law

Progressive Direct Insurance Company petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Wilcox Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Progressive's motion to transfer this action from the Wilcox Circuit Court to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. The underlying action stemmed from a motor-vehicle accident that occurred in Tuscaloosa County in 2010, between an automobile driven by Ira Robinson and an automobile driven by Amber Clayton. In 2012, Robinson filed a complaint in the Wilcox Circuit Court against Clayton, a resident of Tuscaloosa, and Progressive, a foreign corporation doing business in both Tuscaloosa and Wilcox Counties. In his complaint, Robinson alleged that he was a resident of Wilcox County and that he had suffered injuries as a result of the negligent and/or wanton conduct of Clayton when the vehicle she was driving collided with the vehicle he was driving. Additionally, Robinson alleged that at the time of the accident he had a policy of insurance with Progressive, which included uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage. Progressive filed a motion to transfer the action to Tuscaloosa County, alleging that venue in Wilcox County was improper because, it claimed, the accident occurred in Tuscaloosa County and both Robinson and Clayton resided in Tuscaloosa County at the time of the accident. Alternatively, Progressive claimed that the action was due to be transferred to Tuscaloosa County on the ground of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that, based on the evidence before the trial court at the time of its ruling, it should have granted Progressive's motion for a change of venue. View "Ex parte Progressive Direct Insurance Company." on Justia Law

Defendant Linda Manning petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Macon Circuit Court to vacate its order denying her motion to transfer this action to the Montgomery Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. In early 2014, Shannon Richardson filed a complaint in the Macon Circuit Court against Manning, stating claims of negligence and wantonness as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Montgomery County in October 2012. Richardson sustained injuries and was taken by ambulance to Baptist South Hospital in Montgomery after the accident. Law-enforcement personnel who responded to the accident worked in Montgomery County. At all material times, Richardson was a resident of Montgomery County, and Manning was a resident of Macon County. Manning filed a motion to transfer the action to Montgomery County based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying Manning's motion for a change of venue based on the interest-of-justice prong of the forum non conveniens statute. Accordingly, the Court granted Manning's petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to enter an order transferring the case from the Macon Circuit Court to the Montgomery Circuit Court. View "Ex parte Linda Manning" on Justia Law

Steven Kraselsky, personal representative of the estate of his deceased mother Marcia Kraselsky, sued Dr. Calderwood and Dr. Calderwood's employer, Huntsville Clinic, alleging that Marcia died as a result of Dr. Calderwood's order that Marcia be given Demerol in spite of the fact that Dr. Calderwood knew she had previously professed to having an allergy to Demerol. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Dr. Calderwood and Huntsville Clinic, and Steven appealed that judgment to the Supreme Court. "Assuming, arguendo, that Dr. Calderwood breached the standard of care by ordering that Demerol be administered to Marcia, and, noting again that Dr. Calderwood strongly contests that fact, the summary judgment entered by the trial court is nevertheless due to be affirmed because there is no evidence in the record indicating that the administration of the Demerol to Marcia proximately caused the decline in her health leading to her death." View "Kraselsky v. Calderwood" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Wright and Myron Allenstein filed separate complaints against A-1 Exterminating Company, Inc.; Terry Buchanan; Edward Wrenn; and David Wrenn (collectively, "A-1"). In the complaints, plaintiffs alleged that, on the date of the initial termite bonds they were issued, A-1 Exterminating promised to identify and recommend the appropriate services to protect the plaintiffs' houses or property from termites. Plaintiffs stated that in their contract with A-1, plaintiffs had paid for the initial service, the issuance of the termite bond, and annual renewal premiums. During subsequent periodic visits to the subject properties, A-1 sprayed liquids and either represented to plaintiffs or led plaintiffs to believe that those applications were treatments for termites. But in the last two years, A-1 had admitted that the periodic sprays were not to prevent or control termites; and that Buchanan, a State-licensed pest-control operator who worked for A-1 Exterminating, had admitted that the spray was a regular, watered-down pesticide that might only be strong enough to kill ants and possibly spiders. The two complaints included counts alleging fraud, including promissory fraud; breach of warranty; negligence, including negligence per se, and wantonness; breach of contract; and negligent training, supervision, and retention. It also included a request for "equitable relief, including unjust enrichment." The trial court entered an amended protective order in both cases. Plaintiffs then filed petitions for the writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court seeking a rescission. The Supreme Court found the protective orders overbroad: "the trial court should balance its interest in protecting A-1's right to a fair trial against the First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs and their attorneys. Further, any protective order in this regard must be narrowly tailored so that it uses the least restrictive means necessary to protect A-1's right to a fair trial." The Court granted plaintiffs' petitions for mandamus relief, and remanded the cases for further proceedings. View "Wright v. A-1 Exterminating Company, Inc., et al." on Justia Law