Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc. and Robert Shackelford, appealed the Circuit Court's order denying, in part, their motion to compel arbitration of the claims asserted against them by the plaintiffs Paul and Eleanor Jones. Specifically, defendants challenged the circuit court's refusal to compel arbitration of the plaintiffs' tort-of-outrage claim. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: the nonsignatory plaintiffs conceded that they were third-party beneficiaries of the agreement at issue here. The scope of the arbitration provision in the agreement was "indisputably" broad enough to encompass the plaintiffs' tort-of-outrage claim. Moreover, as the defendants noted, "[t]he events surrounding the change of beneficiary [on the Ameriprise accounts] form the basis for all of the [plaintiffs’] claims." Under this reasoning, the plaintiffs' tort-of-outrage claim is, like their other claims, subject to the arbitration provision in the agreement. The circuit court, therefore, improperly denied the defendants' motion seeking to compel arbitration of all of the plaintiffs' claims. View "Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc. v. Jones" on Justia Law

Riverstone Development Co., Inc. sued Garrett & Associates Appraisals, Inc. ("G&A Appraisals"), asserting negligence, wantonness, and conspiracy claims stemming from a July 2010 appraisal G&A Appraisals conducted on waterfront property Riverstone Development owned on Lake Guntersville. During the course of the eventual trial on those claims, the trial court entered a judgment as a matter of law in favor of G&A Appraisals on the negligence claim, and, at the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of G&A Appraisals on the wantonness and conspiracy claims. Riverstone Development appealed, arguing that the judgment as a matter of law was improperly entered on the negligence claim and that it is entitled to a new trial based on juror misconduct. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Riverstone Development Co., Inc. v. Garrett & Associates Appraisals, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Evangeline and Eladio Limon appealed the trial court's dismissal of their claims against defendants William Ellis Ogburn, Sr. ("Bill"), Sandra Sandlin, and William Ogburn ("Will"). The plaintiffs' daughter was, at all times pertinent to this case, a minor romantically involved with Will, who was also then a minor and who is Bill and Sandra's son. It was alleged that during the course of their relationship, plaintiffs' daughter became pregnant by Will and purportedly concealed from plaintiffs. In December 2011, defendants sought plaintiffs' permission to take the daughter on a trip to New York, under the guise of going to see Broadway shows and to meet some of Will's family. But, according to plaintiffs, the true purpose for the trip was for the daughter to obtain an abortion in New York (which had not enacted a parental-notification law applicable to minors seeking an abortion). The daughter had the abortion, and concealed that fact from plaintiffs. Plaintiffs ultimately found out about the nature of the New York trip. They sued defendants in 2014, alleging negligence, outrage, fraud and "interference with parental rights." The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' claims (except the fraud claim) as untimely. The trial court dismissed the fraud claim as lacking in specificity as required by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that dismissal of plaintiffs' claims on statute-of-limitations grounds was error. The Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Limon v. Sandlin" on Justia Law

On November 12, 2009, M.C. had an appointment to for physical therapy at Tallassee Rehabilitation, P.C. She was referred to Tallahassee Rehab by her physician for treatment of back pain. M.C. was seen by Kristopher Vanderwall, a physical therapist, whom she had never met. Vanderwall took her to a room, where he instructed her to put on a gown. M.C. took off her jacket and shirt and put on a gown. She did not take off her underwear or pants. Vanderwall returned to the room, unhooked M.C.'s bra and told her to lie on the table in the room; M.C. did as she was instructed, but, after she was on the table, Vanderwall started to move his hands over her body, removing her bra and the gown. Vanderwall then began to rub M.C.'s breasts, and he removed M.C.'s pants and panties and placed his fingers into her buttocks and genitals. Vanderwall testified that "any and all transactions and interactions" he had with M.C. were "in connection with the rendition of physical therapy services." M.C. filed a complaint against Vanderwall and Tallassee Rehab in which she sought money damages based on a claim of assault and battery against Vanderwall and a claim of negligent or wanton hiring against Tallassee Rehab. Vanderwall resisted certain discovery requests M.C. made in the course of litigation, and she moved for partial summary judgment and to compel discovery. The trial court granted these motions, and Vanderwall appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, dismissed Vanderwall's appeal and denied his petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Ex parte Kristopher Vanderwall." on Justia Law

Frank Kruse, administrator ad litem for the estate of Dansby W. Sanders, appealed the grant of summary judgment entered by the Mobile Circuit Court in favor of R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc., now known as Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC ("Vanderbilt"), in a wrongful-death action. Dansby was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2009; he sued numerous defendants in 2010, alleging that he had been exposed to asbestos through products manufactured and distributed by those defendants during the 37-year period he worked for Mobile Paint Company. Dansby filed an amended complaint naming Vanderbilt as a defendant because of its role as a supplier of industrial talc under the brand name "Nytal." After a thorough review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of Vanderbilt. "The trial court entered its judgment on a basis not contemplated by its own scheduling order and, in fact, not presented in the motion for a summary judgment filed in keeping with that order (and, in any event, Sanders subsequently presented substantial evidence contradicting that basis for the summary judgment)." Furthermore, the Court found that Sanders presented substantial evidence that Dansby was exposed to Nytal talc supplied by Vanderbilt during his employment at Mobile Paint, thus demonstrating a genuine issue of fact as to the issue actually raised in the motion for a summary judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Kruse v. Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC" on Justia Law

Before 2010, Azin Agah was employed at the University of South Alabama ("USA") as a professor engaged in scientific research. Agah's position was a tenure-track professorship. In early 2010, USA's vice president for Health Sciences, Ronald Franks, notified Agah that she would not be reappointed to her professorship because of alleged research misconduct. Agah sued Amber Bartlett and Julio Turrens. Bartlett was a student of Agah's, and she reported her concerns regarding Agah's research to Turrens, who was a professor and associate dean at USA. Agah sought compensatory and punitive damages against the defendants for the alleged theft and conversion of her computerized electronic-research data and the alleged theft and conversion of her animal-research logbook and intentional interference with a contractual property right arising out of the termination of her employment by USA. Agah also sued "R.T., W.B.D., R.F.," whose names were "known and unknown" and who, according to Agah, played a role in the theft of her research, "the defamation of the Plaintiff's character, and the intentional interference with the Plaintiff's property right of employment." After the lawsuit had been filed, and after a period of discovery, Agah gave names to the initials previously listed in her original complaint: Richard Talbott, William Brad Davis, and Ronald Franks. She would also add Dusty Layton and others who were involved in the review of Agah's research. The petitioners (Talbott, Ballard, and Layton) each filed a motion to dismiss. Each argued, among other things, that, with the exception of the conversion and detinue claim, Agah's remaining claims accrued in February 2010 when her employment was terminated, that Agah's amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint, and that the remaining claims asserted in the amended complaint were time-barred. They also argued that they were entitled to immunity with respect to Agah's claims alleging tortious interference with contractual rights, tortious violations of her procedural and substantive due-process rights, and conversion and detinue, because, they argued, they were sued in their individual capacity and lacked the authority to grant Agah her requested injunctive relief. Following a hearing, the trial court denied all three motions. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that petitioners demonstrated a clear legal right to the dismissal of Agah's amended complaint against them. Agah's amended complaint did not relate back to her original complaint; thus, all of her claims against the petitioners, with the exclusion of her conversion and detinue claim, were barred by the statute of limitations. Furthermore, Agah's conversion and detinue claim against the petitioners in their individual capacities sought relief that the petitioners could not provide. Therefore, the trial court was directed to vacate its order denying the petitioners' motion seeking dismissal of the claims against them. View "Ex parte Richard Talbott et al." on Justia Law

Diversicare Leasing Corp. d/b/a Canterbury Healthcare Facility ("Canterbury") appealed an order denying its motion seeking to compel arbitration of a wrongful-death claim filed by Betty Hubbard, as the personal representative of the estate of Johnathan Hubbard. Johnathan was diagnosed with cerebral palsy when he was six months old, which caused him to be developmentally delayed and to suffer from a seizure disorder. Johnathan could not walk and was confined to a wheelchair his entire life. He could not speak; he could not feed, clean, or dress himself; he had no use of his hands; and he could not otherwise communicate his needs to others. Johnathan spent various periods of his life in residential-care facilities. Betty made all health-care decisions relating to Johnathan's care and executed all documents in furtherance of that care. Betty executed a number of documents upon Johnathan's admission to Canterbury, including the admission agreement and the arbitration agreement made the basis of this appeal. Johnathan was found unresponsive by the Canterbury staff in early 2011, and was transferred to a local hospital. Johnathan was diagnosed with sepsis; he died on February 21, 2011. Betty sued Canterbury asserting a wrongful-death claim. Canterbury moved the trial court to compel arbitration of Betty's wrongful-death claim and to stay the claim pending the arbitration. Betty argued in response to the motion to compel that she lacked the legal authority to bind Johnathan to the arbitration agreement because at the time the agreement was executed Johnathan was incapacitated and was 21 years old and had reached the age of majority, and she did not hold his power of attorney nor had she been appointed his personal representative or guardian by any court. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying Canterbury's motion to compel arbitration and to stay the proceedings. Canterbury appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Betty could not be bound to the arbitration agreement in her capacity as the personal representative of Johnathan's estate when she signed the arbitration agreement in what amounts to her capacity as Johnathan's relative or next friend. View "Diversicare Leasing Corp. v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

Defendant Jimmy Walker petitioned for mandamus relief following the circuit court's denial of his motion for summary judgment. While plaintiff Jeremy Deason was was incarcerated, he participated in a Department of Corrections work-release program and was assigned to an inmate construction detail; Walker, who was employed as a "carpenter supervisor" with DOC's Correctional Industries Division, served as Deason's work-release supervisor. In 2010, Deason suffered an on-the-job injury when scaffolding he and Walker were dismantling collapsed. Before both Deason and Walker's ascent onto the scaffolding, Walker had performed a visual inspection of the scaffolding and the "mud plates," which prevent scaffolding from settling, in order to assess the stability of the scaffolding; according to Walker, the scaffolding appeared secure before Deason started ascending. As a result of his injuries, Deason sued, among other defendants, numerous DOC officials, including Walker, whom Deason sued only in his individual capacity. Specifically, as to Walker, Deason contended that Walker "started climbing the scaffold on the same side as [Deason] knowing that the scaffold was not set up properly for workers to climb the same side at the same time." The Supreme Court granted relief: "the record is devoid of any evidence indicating - and Deason does not establish - either that Walker violated any applicable DOC rule or regulation governing his conduct or that Walker was acting 'willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, [or] in bad faith' in the exercise of judgment in regard to the scaffolding when Deason was injured. Therefore, Walker has successfully demonstrated that he is entitled to State-agent immunity as to Deason's tort claims." View "Ex parte Jimmy Walker." on Justia Law

In 2011, 74-year-old Garnell Wilcoxon lived alone. He suffered a stroke, awoke on the floor of his bedroom covered in sweat, feeling sore and with no memory of how he got there. Wilcoxon was admitted to the Troy Regional Medical Center for analysis and treatment for approximately one year before he died. Following Wilcoxon's death, Brenda McFarland, one of Wilcoxon's daughters, filed a complaint as the personal representative for Wilcoxon's estate, asserting claims for : (1) medical malpractice; (2) negligence; (3) breach of contract; (4) negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention; and (5) loss of consortium. In its answer, Troy Health asserted, in part, that McFarland's claims were barred from being litigated in a court of law "by virtue of an arbitration agreement entered into between plaintiff and defendant." Troy Health then moved to compel arbitration, asserting that forms signed by one of Wilcoxon's other daughters, acting as his attorney-in-fact, contained a valid and enforceable arbitration clause. McFarland argued that "Wilcoxon did not have the mental capacity to enter into the contract with [Troy Health,] and he did not have the mental capacity to give legal authority to enter into contracts on his behalf with" relatives who initially helped admit him to Troy Health facilities when he first fell ill. According to McFarland, "[t]he medical records document that Wilcoxon was habitually and/or permanently incompetent." Therefore, McFarland argued, both a 2011 arbitration agreement and a 2012 arbitration agreement were invalid. The circuit court denied Troy Health's motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that McFarland failed to prove that Wilcoxon was mentally incompetent when he executed a 2012 durable power of attorney naming his other daughter as his attorney-in-fact, and also failed to demonstrate that Wilcoxon was "permanently incompetent" before that date, and because there was no other issue concerning the validity of the 2012 arbitration agreement. View "Troy Health and Rehabilitation Center v. McFarland" on Justia Law

Alfa Mutual General Insurance Company ("Alfa") petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to grant its motion seeking to realign the parties to the underlying litigation so that Alfa may "opt out" of participation in the trial. In October 2012, respondent Mark Trotter was injured when a "road sweeper" he was operating was struck by a vehicle being operated by Daniel Elijah Davis, an uninsured motorist. In October 2014, Trotter sued Alfa seeking to recover uninsured/underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits pursuant to a policy of insurance issued by Alfa to Trotter, which was in place at the time of the 2012 accident. Trotter did not include Davis as a codefendant in his action against Alfa. Alfa subsequently filed a third-party complaint adding Davis as a third-party defendant. Specifically, Alfa's third-party complaint alleged that, to the extent it was determined to be liable to Trotter for UIM benefits, then Alfa was subrogated to and entitled to recover the amount of that liability from Davis. Thereafter, Alfa filed a "Motion to Realign Parties" in which it asked to "opt out" of the litigation. Without explaining the findings on which its decision was based, the trial court denied Alfa's motion. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded after a review of the record, that Alfa has demonstrated a clear legal right to have its motion to realign the parties granted and to allow it to opt out of the underlying litigation. No authority is cited requiring that, in order to make the permitted election, Alfa must first release the right of subrogation to which it was also clearly entitled. View "Ex parte Alfa Mutual General Insurance Company." on Justia Law