Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case concerned the application of the relation-back doctrine to wrongful-death claims. The trial court allowed James O. Kidd, Sr., the personal representative of the estate of Madeline Kidd, to use relation back to sustain his claims against various health-care providers. Some of those providers, defendants Mobile Infirmary Association d/b/a Mobile Infirmary Medical Center, Dr. Roger Alvarado, Dr. Barbara Mitchell, and IMC-Diagnostic and Medical Clinic, P.C., sought review of the trial court's order by filing separate petitions for permissive appeals. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in permitting the relation-back doctrine, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mobile Infirmary Association v. Estate of Madeline Kidd" on Justia Law

Regions Bank appealed a final judgment dismissing its action against BP P.L.C., BP Corporation North America, Inc., and BP America Inc. (collectively, "BP"). In 2010, an explosion and fire occurred aboard the Deepwater Horizon, an offshore-drilling rig, located off the coast of Louisiana. The incident led to a massive discharge of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, which, in turn, spawned an expansive clean-up and response operation by BP and various governmental agencies. Regions owned coastal real property located in Baldwin County, Alabama. Regions filed this trespass action against BP in Alabama Circuit Court, alleging BP occupied Regions' property, without authorization, for its spill-response operation; that BP moved equipment and structures onto the property without permission; and that BP erected fences and barriers on the property, again, without permission. Regions further alleged that BP stored hazardous materials and waste on the property and that those hazardous materials and waste damaged the property. BP filed a Rule 12(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., "motion to dismiss" Regions' trespass action on the ground that it was subject to the class-action settlement approved in the multidistrict litigation (MDL) and, therefore, that dismissal was warranted on the basis of the doctrine of res judicata. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court found "clear and unequivocal" exceptions to the MDL economic-and-property-damage-settlement class, and concluded that Regions was not a member of the settlement class. Therefore, its trespass claim was not adjudicated as part of the MDL class-action settlement. Accordingly, the Court reversed the circuit court for dismissing Regions' action on the ground of res judicata. View "Regions Bank v. BP P.L.C. et al." on Justia Law

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for certiorari review of the Court of Civil Appeals' decision affirming the trial court's judgment ordering State Farm to pay an attorney fee based on a common-fund theory for the recovery of the moneys advanced by State Farm to James Ross Pritchard, Jr., pursuant to "Lambert v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.," (576 So. 2d 160 (Ala. 1991)). Pritchard sued Broderick McCants, State Farm (Pritchard's uninsured/underinsured-motorist ("UIM") insurer), and others seeking damages for injuries Pritchard suffered in an automobile accident with a vehicle being operated by McCants. Applying the Court's determination that a UIM insurer does not have a subrogation interest in a "Lambert" advance to the facts of this case, the Court held that State Farm did not have a subrogation interest in the $50,000 it advanced to Pritchard pursuant to "Lambert" and, consequently, that Pritchard's recovery from the tortfeasor of the "Lambert" advance did not create a common fund from which State Farm was required to pay its share of Pritchard's attorney fee. View "Ex parte State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company." on Justia Law

In 2004, Michael Britt purchased a Beneteau brand sailboat. Michael had insured the sailboat with St. Paul pursuant to a Seahorse Underwriters Boat Insurance Policy that provided coverage limits of $85,000 for "accidental direct physical loss of or damage to [the sailboat] ... except as specifically stated or excluded in this policy." From 2004 onward, the sailboat served as Michael's residence in Florida; Michael had no other established residence. In early September 2011, Michael telephoned Willis Britt, "Britt," his father, and told Britt that he had accepted a job driving a commercial truck and that he had to attend orientation for the new job in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Michael informed Britt that he planned to sail the sailboat from West Palm Beach, Florida, to Jacksonville, Florida, store the boat in Jacksonville, and rent a car in Jacksonville to drive to Oklahoma City for the orientation. On or around September 11, 2011, Michael set sail for Jacksonville. On September 15, 2011, the United States Coast Guard boarded the sailboat approximately one mile off the coast of Cape Canaveral, Florida, for a "cold hit" inspection. That inspection revealed that the sailboat was seaworthy. There was no evidence of any severe weather in the Cape Canaveral area on September 15, 2011, on which date, Michael was supposed to check in with his father upon arrival in Jacksonville, but never did. In October 2011, Britt contacted St. Paul to report the sailboat as lost. In 2012, Britt was appointed conservator of Michael's estate by the Chilton Probate Court. Shortly thereafter, Britt filed a claim with St. Paul for the lost sailboat. St. Paul sent Britt a letter in which it declined coverage for the sailboat. The Supreme Court found that the "mysterious-disappearance" exclusion in Michael's insurance policy was not ambiguous, nor did it conflict with the 30-day provision; rather, the policy, when read as a whole, could accommodate both provisions (one providing coverage and one excluding coverage). Because the Court held that the mysterious-disappearance exclusion was unambiguous and does not conflict with the 30-day provision, and because there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning the disappearance of the sailboat, the trial court should have entered a summary judgment in St. Paul's favor. View "St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Britt" on Justia Law

Defendant Jim Burke Automotive, Inc. petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Hale Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Jim Burke Automotive's motion to transfer the action to the Jefferson Circuit Court and to enter an order transferring the action. After Jim Burke Automotive had performed some repair work on a vehicle owned by Vulah and Andrew Smith, the vehicle was involved in an accident in Hale County. The Smiths sued Jim Burke Automotive at the Hale Circuit Court, asserting claims of negligent repair of the vehicle, wanton repair of the vehicle, breach of contract, and fraud. Andrew Smith also claimed damages for loss of consortium. Jim Burke Automotive moved to transfer the case to the Jefferson Court for improper venue, because the all repair work was performed in Jefferson County, and all the alleged acts or omissions giving rise the the Smiths' claims took place in Jefferson County. Upon review of Jim Burke Automotive's petition, the Supreme Court concluded it demonstrated a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus. The Court directed the Hale Court to vacate its order and transfer this action to Jefferson. View "Ex parte Jim Burke Automotive, Inc." on Justia Law

Jeffrey Johnson, by a through his aunt and next friend, Sue Thompson, appeals from the Mobile Circuit Court's dismissal of his action against Jim Reddoch, in his official capacity as commissioner of the Alabama Department of Mental Health ("ADMH"), Beatrice McLean, in her official capacity as director of Searcy Hospital, and McLean and fictitiously named defendants 1 through 8 in their individual capacities. Johnson also appealed the circuit court's quashing of a subpoena served on ADMH seeking records pertaining to Johnson. Johnson was a 40-year-old patient at Searcy who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. According to the complaint, Johnson's condition was so severe that Johnson was "required to be under constant 2-on-1 supervision by [ADMH] employees at Searcy Hospital." This supervision was supposed to be in place 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. In 2012, Johnson was severely beaten in his ward at Searcy. He collapsed and he was taken to University of South Alabama Hospital. Medical testing showed that, as a result of the beating, he suffered severe and life-threatening injuries, including internal bleeding, severe bruising to his face and body, a fractured nose, and several broken ribs. Johnson alleged Searcy's mental-health workers failed to keep him under the required constant supervision and failed to immediately report his injuries. After review of his complaint, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The circuit court correctly dismissed Johnson's claims against Reddoch and McLean in their official capacities. The circuit court erred in dismissing Johnson's claims against McLean and the fictitiously named defendants in their individual capacities. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of Johnson's subpoena for discovery served on ADMH. View "Johnson v. Reddoch" on Justia Law

U.S. Bank National Association ("USB"), successor in interest to Bank of America, N.A., which was the successor by merger to LaSalle Bank, National Association, as trustee for Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-4 ("the Trust"), and Bank of America, N.A. ("BOA"), separately appealed a $3.9 million judgment entered against them on trespass and wantonness claims asserted by Chester and Emily Shepherd. USB also appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of the Shepherds on its claims related to an alleged error in a mortgage executed by the Shepherds upon which the Trust had foreclosed. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed. "'Every single one of these cases . . . rejects the availability of negligence and wantonness claims under Alabama law under comparable circumstances to those identified by the [plaintiffs]. Every one of these cases undercuts the legal viability of [the plaintiffs' negligence and wantonness claims], and rejects the very arguments articulated by the [plaintiffs] in opposing dismissal of those causes of action. ... the mortgage servicing obligations at issue here are a creature of contract, not of tort, and stem from the underlying mortgage and promissory note executed by the parties, rather than a duty of reasonable care generally owed to the public. To the extent that the [plaintiffs] seek to hold defendants liable on theories of negligent or wanton servicing of their mortgage, [those negligence and wantonness claims] fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted.'" View "U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Shepherd" on Justia Law

Dr. Thomas A. Staner, a board-certified neurosurgeon and neurologist, performed a lumbar laminectomy on Wilfred Borden at Brookwood Medical Center. Two days later, he complained of excruciating pain in his lower back and legs. He was taken to the emergency room. A hematoma was discovered and causing compression of the cauda equina. As a result of the damage caused by the hematoma, Wilfred was permanently disabled and unable to work, suffered from constant pain, had problems walking, and suffered from incontinence of bladder and bowel and from impotence. Wilfred and Pam sued Dr. Staner, Alabama Neurosurgeons, P.C., Dr. Staner's practice, and Brookwood in the Jefferson Circuit Court. Wilfred asserted a claim under the Alabama Medical Liability Act against the defendants, and Pam asserted a claim based on loss of consortium. Brookwood filed a motion for a summary judgment. The trial court entered an order granting Brookwood's summary-judgment motion as to any claim alleging a duty and breach of the standard of care on the part of Brookwood's ER department. However, it denied the motion for a summary judgment as to the Bordens' claims against Brookwood based an alleged breach of the standard of care by Brookwood's medical/surgical nurses. At the close of the Bordens' evidence, Brookwood moved for a judgment as a matter of law. The trial court granted the motion as to the issue of future medical expenses but denied it as to the Bordens' remaining claims. Brookwood renewed its motion for a judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence, and the trial court denied that motion. After deliberating for approximately six hours, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Wilfred as to his medical malpractice claim and fixed damages at $5 million. It also found in favor of Pam as to her loss-of-consortium claim and fixed damages at $2.5 million. The trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict. Brookwood appealed. In this case, the Bordens did not present expert testimony to establish a breach of the applicable standard of care. Therefore, Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred when it denied Brookwood's motions for a judgment as a matter of law as to Wilfred's medical-malpractice claim. The case was remanded for the trial court to render judgment as a matter of law in favor of Brookwood. View "Brookwood Medical Center v. Borden" on Justia Law

Anita Marion sued Noland Hospital Birmingham, LLC, and Noland Health Services, Inc. (collectively, "Noland"), Walter R. Ross, Jr., M.D., and Bernis Simmons, M.D., seeking damages resulting from the death of her husband, Arthur Marion. In 2009, Arthur underwent a kidney-stone removal procedure. Dr. Taylor Bragg performed the procedure, and Simmons was the anesthesiologist. During the procedure, Arthur suffered a heart attack. Arthur was revived, but the heart attack caused him to suffer hypoxic encephalopathy, which left him in a non-responsive state. Arthur was transferred to Noland Hospital Birmingham and was admitted by Ross. Arthur remained at Noland Hospital until he was transferred back to the hospital that originally treated him to receive dialysis for renal failure. Arthur passed away shortly transfer. The essence of Anita's claim against Simmons was that he breached the applicable standard of care by failing to position Arthur properly during his kidney-stone-removal procedure, and that breach caused Arthur's blood to be unable to circulate properly, which in turn caused Arthur's heart attack and hypoxic encephalopathy. As to Ross, Anita claimed that he breached the applicable standard of care by prescribing Rocephin, an antibiotic, to treat an infection Arthur was developing. Arthur had a documented allergy to Ancef, which, like Rocephin, was a cephalosporin. Anita alleged that Ross failed to note Arthur's allergy, and that, if Dr. Ross had noted the allergy, he would not have prescribed a cephalosporin to treat Arthur's infection. As to Noland, Anita alleged the hospital breached the applicable standard of care by failing to train its nurses to check for contraindications to medications. On October 3, 2014, the third day of jury deliberations, Ross, Simmons, and Noland moved for a mistrial, arguing that the trial court (specifically, the court clerk) answered questions from the jury outside the presence of counsel. The court denied the motion. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Simmons but against Ross and against Noland. Noland and Ross each filed a postjudgment motion for a judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, for a new trial, or to alter or amend the judgment. In those motions, Noland and Ross argued again that they were entitled to a new trial because of the trial court's communications with the jury. The trial court denied the motions. Ross, Noland and Anita appealed, Anita explicitly stating in her notice of appeal that she was not challenging the jury's verdict as to Simmons; only that, if the Supreme Court reversed the judgments in her favor against Ross and Noland and remanded the case for a new trial, her claim against Simmons be reinstated too. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Anita made no attempt to address Ross's and Noland's allegations that the trial court instructed the jury as to the burden of proof outside the presence of the parties and counsel. Because the Court reversed as to Ross and Noland, the Court considered Anita's claim against Simmons, and declined her request. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Ross v. Marion" on Justia Law

Mid-Continent Casualty Company appealed a circuit court judgment declaring that it had a duty to defend its named insured, Advantage Medical Electronics, LLC, in a pending legal action against Advantage. This case centered on Mid-Continent's duty to defend Advantage in a South Carolina litigation. Based upon both the allegations in the complaint and the undisputed facts, the Circuit Court concluded that the policy exclusions did not allow Mid-Continent to evade its obligation to provide a defense under the CGL policy it had issued to Advantage, and it entered a final judgment in favor of Advantage. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mid-Continent Casualty Company v. Advantage Medical Electronics, LLC" on Justia Law