Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Alabama Title Loans, Inc., Accurate Adjustments, LLC and Kevin Sanders all appealed a trial court order that denied their motions to compel arbitration filed against them by Plaintiff Kimberly White. In 2009, Ms. White borrowed money from Alabama Title Loans (ATL), securing the loan with an interest in her automobile. ATL required Ms. White to surrender the title to the automobile. The title-loan agreement contained an arbitration clause. Ms. White subsequently paid off her loan and borrowed more money against her car several more times. In August 2009, Ms. White said she went to ATL ready to pay off her loan in full. In January 2010, ALT contracted with Accurate Adjustments to conduct a "self-help" repossession of Ms. White's automobile. The police were called, and Accurate and ATL were required to release the automobile when it could not produce the title they claimed gave them the right to repossess. Ms. White filed suit alleging multiple theories: assault and battery, negligence, wantonness, trespass, wrongful repossession and conversion. At trial, the court denied the title-loan parties' motion to compel arbitration without making any findings of fact. Based on the broad language of the arbitration clause in the title-loan agreements executed by Ms. White, the Supreme Court held that the trial court should have granted the title-loan parties' motions to compel arbitration. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Alabama Title Loans, Inc. v. White" on Justia Law

Thomasville Feed & Seed, Inc. (Thomasville Feed) petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Wilcox County Circuit court to transfer the action filed against it by Roy Saulsberry and Roy Saulsberry, Jr. (The Saulsberrys) to the Clarke Circuit Court. The Saulsberrys own and operate a cattle farm in Wilcox County. Thomasville Feed is located in Clarke County. In April 2010, the Saulsberrys sued Thomasville Feed in Wilcox County Circuit Court, alleging that fertilizer they purchased from Thomasville Feed was defective and that Thomasville Feed was liable for damages under Alabama tort law. Thomasville Feed moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that Thomasville Feed only does business in Clarke County, and that Clarke County had jurisdiction over it. The trial court denied Thomasville Feed’s motion to dismiss. Thomasville Feed then filed a motion to transfer the case to Clarke County, which the trial court denied. Thomasville subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for extraordinary relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that venue was proper in Clarke County. The Court vacated the Wilcox County order that denied Thomasville Feed’s motion to transfer, and issued the writ of mandamus to direct the court to transfer the case to Clarke County. View "Saulsberry v. Thomasville Feed & Seed, Inc." on Justia Law

The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Alabama certified a question to the State Supreme Court. The Court was asked whether the failure of an insured to give notice of a proposed settlement to an insurance company causes the insured to forfeit underinsured motorist coverage (UIM), regardless of the insured’s actual knowledge of that coverage, and regardless of prejudice to the insurance company if the insured has a copy of the policy that contains the coverage. In 2007, Delbert and Lou Ann Downey were stopped at an intersection on their motorcycle when a vehicle driven by Wyndell Thompson failed to stop and hit them. At the time of the accident, multiple insurance policies were in force. The Downeys had underinsured motorist coverage. The Downeys, in consideration of $10,000 and while represented by counsel (but without having notified Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Company that they were doing so), executed a general release to discharge Mr. Thompson and his insurance company from all liability arising out of the accident. Subsequently, and with different counsel, the Downeys notified Travelers of the accident for the first time and that they were making a claim under their underinsured motorist policy. Travelers denied the claim and the Downeys sued. The Supreme Court found that the Downeys were at all relevant times in possession of the policy, and it clearly provided UIM coverage. However, the Downeys did not meet the threshold of showing any condition under which their lack of notice could be excused. "In other words, the Downeys have ‘forfeit[ed]’ UIM coverage." View "Downey v. Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The United States Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation consolidated approximately 1800 cases involving claims that sought damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by exposure to welding fumes. Several dozen of these cases are governed by Alabama law, and the MDL court identified three issues of law that may be determinative in those cases. The Supreme Court responded in summary: (1) a plaintiff injured by long-term continuous exposure to a toxic substance is limited to recovering damages attributable to injuries occurring within the period of limitations; (2) a six-year statute of limitations applies to wantonness claims filed before the Court’s holding in "Ex parte Capstone" was released; and (3) a plaintiff injured by long-term continuous exposure to a toxic substance has the burden to establish what damages (if any) are attributable to his injuries occurring within the applicable limitation period. View "Jerkins v. Lincoln Electric Company" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the application of a six-year statute of limitations to a claim of "wantonness." Plaintiff William Walker filed suit against Capstone Building Corporation (Capstone) and several fictitiously named parties. Capstone had been the general contractor on a construction job on which he worked. While working at the construction site, Plaintiff stepped onto a manhole cover which flipped over, causing him to fall into the hole. Plaintiff asserted that Capstone had been responsible for providing a safe work environment at the site, but it failed to do so. Plaintiff alleged that Capstone's failure to secure the manhole cover constituted "negligence" or "wantonness." Alabama law provides that wanton conduct must be commenced within six years. Capstone moved to dismiss the claims, asking the Supreme Court to change Alabama case law in favor of a two-year limitation for this case. The Supreme Court engaged in an extensive review of the trial record and the applicable law. The Court overruled its previous holding in "McKenzie v. Killian" which mandated the six-year limitation on claims for wantonness, finding that if it "did not ... overrule 'McKenzie,' [the Court] would be enshrining in out law an erroneous decision." The Court found that "the law in Alabama concerning the proper legal analysis of wantonness was not settled and was in fact based on confusing and inconsistent discussions of causality rather than culpability." The Court applied its change prospectively to litigants as to whom the six-year limitations had begun but had not yet expired. To this end, the Court found that Plaintiff's case was timely filed under the McKenzie rule. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision that dismissed Plaintiff's wantonness claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Walker v. Capstone Building Corp." on Justia Law

The Town of Boligee appealed a circuit court judgment that denied it a declaration that certain acts by the Greene County Water & Sewer Authority (the Authority) were not properly authorized. In 2008, the Town brought suit complaining that the Authority's excavation, tree cutting and installation of water pipelines in Boligee's right-of-way were unlawful because the Authority did not obtain the town's permission first. The Town also sought tort damages to recover for all of the allegedly unauthorized excavation work. In 2003, the Town Council and the Authority had discussed building the pipeline, but ultimately voted against it. However, the Mayor signed a written agreement permitting the Authority to start construction. The trial court ruled that the Mayor had the authority to bind Boligee to the agreement, and dismissed its tort claims. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court found that although the Mayor is authorized to enter into and execute the type of contract at issue in this case, the Mayor was only allowed to do so to the extent directed by the Town council. The Court found the Mayor acted without authorization, and accordingly reversed the trial court's judgment. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Town Of Boligee v. Greene County Water & Sewer Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Branded Trailer Sales, Inc. (Branded) appealed a circuit court judgment that dismissed its case against Universal Truckload Services for lack of personal jurisdiction. A customer contacted Branded about having some flatbed trailers designed and manufactured. Branded contacted Universal for a recommendation for companies that could do the work. Universal recommended Liddell Trailers, LLC to design and manufacture the trailers. Branded entered into a contract with Liddell. The contract provided that Universal would buy several of the specially-designed trailers from Branded. Liddell later contacted Branded that the price for each trailer would increase from their previously-agreed cost, and that it would take longer for the components to be assembled. Branded would later learn that Universal negotiated a deal directly with Liddell to provide the same trailers at a lower price, excluding Branded from the agreement. Branded filed suit alleging that Universal and Liddell had intentionally interfered with the Branded-Liddell contract. Upon review, the Supreme Court found sufficient evidence that Branded made detailed assertions regarding its theories of personal jurisdiction, and the record reflected Branded presented that evidence to support those assertions. Therefore, the Court found that the trial court exceeded its discretion when it granted Universal's motion to dismiss. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Branded Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Universal Truckload Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Ninety-year-old Mary Shaw was admitted to the emergency room at the Mobile Infirmary Medical Center in 2008. After surgery, she developed pressure sores while a patient at the Center. She was transferred to Defendant Infirmary Health System, Inc.'s (IHS) long term acute care center. Within a day of her transfer, she died. The Shaw family wanted to sue IHS for its alleged negligent care of Ms. Shaw. According to the attorney, The Shaws' counsel called IHS's counsel to ask which entity the Shaws should sue. IHS's counsel allegedly told him to sue IHS, and "the identity of the proper parties would be sorted out later." Subsequently the Shaws filed suit against IHS, which went unanswered. The Shaws attempted to amend their complaint to reflect the proper legal entity to sue, but IHS moved to dismiss, citing the expiration of the statute of limitations applicable in wrongful-death cases. The trial court denied IHS's motion. IHS in turn petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel dismissal of the case. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Shaws' attorney did not exercise due diligence in attempting to ascertain the proper party to sue. The Court found that IHS established a clear right to have the wrongful-death action against it dismissed. Accordingly, the Court issued the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to enter judgment in IHS's favor. View "Shaw v. Infirmary Health System, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Brady Farr appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of Respondents The Gulf Agency, Orange Beach Insurance Agency and Lexington Insurance Company. Mr. Farr finished renovating his house in 2003. In 2004, he decided to sell his property to a developer who wished to turn the property into condominiums. In anticipation of the sale, Mr. Farr obtained a $1 million loan, secured by a mortgage. As part of the loan process, the mortgage company ordered an appraisal of the property. The property was appraised at $1.3 million and the improvements were valued at $313,000. In 2004, Mr. Farr contacted Orange Beach to insure the property against "total loss." Lexington, acting as Orange Beach's agent, submitted an insurance application for policy limits based on the appraisal to The Gulf Agency, who ultimately served as underwriter for the policy. In the fall of 2004, Mr. Farr was concerned that the policy limits were not sufficient to adequately cover a total loss of the property. In September, Mr. Farr's concerns were realized when Hurricane Ivan destroyed the property. He filed a claim with Orange Beach. In November, Mr. Farr sold his property for $1.18 million. The sales agreement was amended to reflect the total loss he suffered as a result of the hurricane. Lexington's adjuster visited the property to determine the cause of Mr. Farr's loss. The adjuster found the hurricane was the "proximate cause". Lexington subsequently paid Mr. Farr $50,000 for the damage. Alleging that the policy did not provide adequate coverage and that Lexington failed to pay the proper benefits under the policy, Mr. Farr sued the insurance companies for breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, negligence, conspiracy, and bad-faith failure to pay an insurance claim. The trial court granted the companies' motion for summary judgment, finding that some of Mr. Farr's claims were barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment pertaining to Mr. Farr's tort claims. The Court found that those claims were indeed barred by a statute of limitations. The Court however found that the breach of contract and bad faith claims should not have been dismissed through summary judgment. The Court affirmed part and reversed part of the lower court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Farr v. Gulf Agency" on Justia Law