Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Reginald Hayes appealed the circuit court's dismissal of his action against Jo Ann Henley both individually and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estate of her deceased husband Earl Hoyt Henley (Hoyt). Hayes sustained injuries when his automobile struck a horse on a highway. The horse rolled onto the roof of the automobile and the roof collapsed, breaking Hayes's neck and rendering him a quadriplegic. Hayes filed a multicount complaint against Mazda and against Henley, alleging that the horse he struck belonged to Hoyt and/or Henley and that Hoyt and/or Henley had allowed the horse to roam onto the highway thereby causing the accident. As to Mazda, Hayes alleged that the automobile was defectively designed and/or manufactured and that it was not crashworthy. The circuit court entered two orders in which it granted Henley's motions and dismissed the claims against Henley individually and as representative of the estate. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that "the circuit court's order disposing of Hayes's claims against Henley in her individual capacity is due to be affirmed. We cannot reach the same conclusion, however, as to the circuit court's disposition of all Hayes's claims against Henley in her capacity as personal representative of Hoyt's estate." The Court reversed the circuit court's ruling that the estate "knowingly and willfully" placed the horse upon the highway. View "Hayes v. Henley" on Justia Law

Stenum Hospital, Sue Hart, James Rider, Malte Peterson, Dr. Jens Dannenberg, Dr. Karl Ritter-Lang, Dr. Heiner Beese, and Dr. Hans-Georg Zechel, third-party defendants in an action pending in the Madison Circuit Court (collectively "the hospital parties"), petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to vacate its order that denied their motion to dismiss the third-party complaint filed against them by Madison Square Associates, Ltd. (Madison Square), ERMC II, L.P., CBL & Associates Properties, Inc., and CBL & Associates Management, Inc. (collectively "the mall parties"), and to enter an order dismissing the third-party complaint. In 2007, Elizabeth Duncan slipped and fell on a wet tile floor at Madison Square Mall. According to her second amended complaint, Ms. Duncan sustained a fracture to her left patella and "aggravated and/or sustained injuries to her spine, including her neck and back." She became partially paralyzed after she underwent disk-replacement surgery at Stenum, which is located in Germany. Ms. Duncan and her husband, John, subsequently sued the mall parties. Ms. Duncan alleged claims of negligence and wantonness resulting in the injuries she suffered when she fell; her husband alleged a claim of loss of consortium. The hospital parties argued that the dispositive issue presented by their petition for the writ of mandamus was whether the mall parties had standing to assert the claims made in the third-party complaint. The hospital parties maintained that the mall parties do not have standing; therefore, the hospital parties argued, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the petition, and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying the hospital parties' motion to dismiss the complaint. The Court concluded the mall parties lacked standing to assert the claims they asserted against the hospital parties in the third-party complaint. View "Duncan v. Madison Square Associates, Ltd." on Justia Law

Dallas County Sheriff Harris Huffman, Jr., and Deputy Sheriff Ernest Larry Donaldson petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss a complaint filed by Plaintiff Marie Jemison alleging multiple claims against them in their individual capacities. Plaintiff alleged that on August 23, 2008, she was traveling in Selma while, at the same time, Deputy Donaldson "was operating a motor vehicle in the line and scope of his agency and/or employment with the Dallas County Sheriff's Department." According to Plaintiff, as she entered the intersection of Lauderdale Avenue and Dallas Avenue, she was struck by Deputy Donaldson's vehicle and, as a result, sustained serious personal injuries. Jemison sued Deputy Donaldson, Donaldson's supervisor Sheriff Huffman, the Dallas County Sheriff's Department, and the Dallas County Commission. Among other claims, Plaintiff alleged negligence and wantonness against Deputy Donaldson for the manner in which he operated his vehicle, negligent entrustment and negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention against Sheriff Huffman, and vicarious liability against the Dallas County Sheriff's Department and the Dallas County Commission. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss all claims, asserting a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that under the circumstances of this case, Deputy Donaldson was acting in the line and scope of his employment and was entitled to State immunity. Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion to dismiss all claims against Deputy Donaldson and Sheriff Huffman. View "Jemison v. Donaldson" on Justia Law

Robert S. Grant Construction, Inc. (the corporation), Robert S. Grant (RSG), and Pam E. Grant (PEG) (collectively referred to as "the Grants") appealed an order striking their jury demands in an action commenced by Frontier Bank (the bank) against the Grants and others alleging breach of contract, fraud, and the fraudulent conveyance of real estate. This case arose out of a loan from the bank to the corporation. The loan ultimately involved a number of related agreements, including a construction-loan agreement between the corporation and the bank and a series of "continuing guaranties," whereby RSG personally guaranteed repayment of the loan. The Supreme Court was unable to reach the merits of the Grants' contentions, and dismissed the appeal because, despite the invocation of Rule 54(b), the trial court's order was not final and appealable. View "Robert S. Grant Construction, Inc. v. Frontier Bank " on Justia Law

April Mack, mother of "Baby Mack" appealed the grant of summary judgment in her action against Thomas Carmack and Matthew Taul for the wrongful death of her unborn child. In 2007, Mack and her fiancee Reginald Thomas (father of Baby Mack) needed to go to the grocery store, but were without transportation. Mack contacted Thomas Carmack and asked him to take her and Thomas to the grocery store. Carmack agreed to do so after Mack offered to pay for the trip. En route, Carmack's vehicle was struck by Taul's vehicle when Carmack "knowingly proceeded to turn left even though the traffic light was red . . . [in] violation of the law to do so." The force of the collision caused severe damage to Carmack's vehicle and injuries to Mack and Thomas. While hospitalized, Mack suffered a miscarriage. The trial court found that the state Wrongful Death Act did not allow for a cause of action for a nonviable fetus and entered summary judgment on behalf of Carmack. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding "it is an unfair and arbitrary endeavor to draw a line that allows recovery on behalf of a fetus injured before viability that dies after achieving viability but that prevents recovery on behalf of a fetus injured that, as a result of those injuries, does not survive to viability . . . We cannot conclude that 'logic, fairness, and justice' compel the drawing of such a line; instead, 'logic, fairness, and justice' compel the application of the Wrongful Death Act to circumstances where prenatal injuries have caused death to a fetus before the fetus has achieved the ability to live outside the womb." The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mack v. Carmack" on Justia Law

Faye Gilmer sued Crestview Memorial Funeral Home, Inc. ("Crestview"), Garland Jones, Barry Taul, and Mary Caldwell, alleging claims related to services Crestview had provided with regard to the funeral of Mrs. Gilmer's husband. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all the claims against them. Mrs. Gilmer appealed, and the Supreme Court: (1) affirmed the trial court's judgment as to the claims against Jones, (2) affirmed the negligent-supervision claim against Jones and Crestview, and (3) affirmed the negligent- or wanton-conduct claim against all the defendants. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment as to the tort-of-outrage, suppression, and breach-of-contract claims against Crestview, Taul, and Caldwell. The case was then remanded the case for further proceedings. Taul and Caldwell were eventually dismissed from the action. The trial court granted Mrs. Gilmer's motion for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") on the breach-of-contract claim. The suppression and tort-of-outrage claims were submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict in Crestview's favor on the tort-of-outrage claim and in Gilmer's favor on the suppression claim. Crestview appealed the trial court's judgment as to the breach-of-contract and suppression claims, as well as the compensatory-damages and punitive-damages awards. Upon re-review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remand the case for a new trial on the breach-of-contract and suppression claims: "Crestview presented substantial evidence creating a question of fact requiring resolution by the jury as to the materiality of the alleged breach of the contract, the trial court erred in entering a JML in favor of Gilmer with regard to that claim." Moreover, the Court was unable to determine from the lump-sum award of compensatory damages what damages were assessed with regard to the suppression claim and the breach-of-contract claim, respectively: "[t]herefore, we must reverse the trial court's judgment as to both claims and remand the case for a new trial on the suppression and breach-of-contract claims." View "Crestview Memorial Funeral Home, Inc. v. Gilmer" on Justia Law

Defendants Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company, L.P. (KKR), KKR Associates, KKR Partners II, and Crimson Associates, L.P., as well as several individuals, petitioned the Supreme Court for the writ of mandamus to direct a circuit court to vacate its order that denied their motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint because it lacked personal jurisdiction. The plaintiffs in this action were 46 individuals, partnerships, corporations, foundations, trusts and retirement and pension funds located throughout the country that invested in certain promissory notes issued as part of a leveraged recapitalization of Bruno's Inc., a supermarket-grocery business with its headquarters in Alabama. Plaintiffs contended that despite a negative due-diligence report from its forensic accountant, KKR decided to proceed with its acquisition of Bruno's. In order to achieve the recapitalization, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants made material, fraudulent misrepresentations to the Plaintiffs' investment money manger that induced them into purchasing the notes. Based on the torts allegedly committed by the individual defendants, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendants' motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court denied Defendants' application for the writ of mandamus, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "27001 Partnership v. Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., L.P." on Justia Law

Appellee Younus Ismail, M.D. appealed a trial court's denial of his motion for summary judgment pertaining to claims made by Appellants Randy and Joy Paradise. Mr. Paradise was treated in the emergency room of Highlands Medical Center, and a chest x-ray was ordered as part of his treatment. While in the radiology department, he fell and was injured. Mr. and Mrs. Paradise filed suit alleging negligence and wantonness stemming from Mr. Paradise's injuries. Dr. Ismail was the emergency room physician "in charge and control of [Mr.] Paradise's treatment." The Doctor filed a motion to dismiss the charges, arguing the claim was barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Upon review of the trial court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the claim was indeed time-barred as to Dr. Ismail. The Court vacated the trial court's order denying the Doctor's motion and remanded the case for the trial court to enter summary judgment in the Doctor's favor. View "Paradise v. Highlands Medical Ctr." on Justia Law

Appellee Compass Bank and Amy Hovis petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct a circuit court to dismiss an action filed in that court filed by Appellant Jerome Sirote based on Alabama's abatement statute. Appellant filed suit against the Bank and several of its employees alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, fraud, deceit, and violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Appellant alleged that the Bank improperly processed transactions in his deposit account and misstated material facts related to that account. The Bank moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court entered an order dismissing Appellant's federal claims with prejudice. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on the state law claims. The Bank moved to dismiss the remaining charges under the Abatement Statute, arguing that Appellant was barred from prosecuting two actions simultaneously in different courts if the claims alleged in each action arose from the same underlying operative facts. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the Bank's petition and issued the writ to direct the lower court to dismiss Appellant's state claims. View "Sirote v. Compass Bank" on Justia Law

Petitioner Delta International Machinery Corporation (Delta) sought a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate an order that granted Respondent Brandon Landrum access to "certain technology" in its control. Respondent was operating a portable bench saw manufactured by Delta. His hand came into contact with the sawblade and ended with injuries to his hand and amputation of his index finger. In 2007, Respondent sued Delta alleging the saw was defective and unreasonably dangerous. Though the parties agreed to a protective order which forbade certain confidential materials from being released to Respondent's expert witness who happened to be employed by one of Delta's competitors, the trial court allowed Respondent's expert to review certain technology in Delta's possession pertaining to design of safety features of the saw. The technology Respondent sought to discover had pre-dated technology that had been developed by a joint venture of all saw manufacturers, of which Delta was a part. Delta claimed that its "flesh-sensing" technology was not discoverable because it did not exist at the time Respondent's saw was manufactured, and pre-dated the joint venture. Delta objected to Respondent's discovery request as "irrelevant" and "confidential." The trial court granted Respondent's motion to inspect. Delta subsequently filed its petition to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the flesh-sensing technology was both a trade secret and was not relevant to Respondent's claims. As such, the Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in allowing discovery of that technology and in allowing access to the technology by Delta's competitor. The Court granted Delta's request for the writ, and directed the trial court directed the trial court to vacate its order granting Respondent's motion to inspect. View "Landrum v. Delta International Machinery Corp." on Justia Law