Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Injury Law
Hrynkiw v. Trammell
Dr. Zenko J. Hrynkiw and Zenko J. Hrynkiw, M.D., P.C., appealed a judgment entered in favor of Thomas and Barbara Trammell in their medical-malpractice action. In 2005, Dr. Hrynkiw, a neurosurgeon, performed fusion surgery on Thomas's spine to relieve pain in his lower back and pain and numbness in his right leg and foot caused by a herniated disk that was creating pressure on a nerve.
Immediately following the surgery, Thomas experienced weakness, numbness, and pain in his lower extremities. A second surgery provided Thomas no relief, and he was permanently partially disabled. In 2007, Thomas and his wife Barbara sued Dr. Hrynkiw, alleging negligent diagnosis, treatment and postoperative care. Barbara asserted a claim of loss of consortium. Dr. Hrynkiw raised two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by not granting Hrynkiw's judgment as a matter of law on the Trammells' claim relating to Dr. Hrynkiw's postoperative care because the Trammells failed to present substantial evidence that any of Thomas's injuries were probably caused by Dr. Hrynkiw's postoperative care; and (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony under the learned-treatise exception when, Hrynkiw says, the foundational requirements of Rule 803(18), Ala. R. Evid., were not met. Finding sufficient evidence to support the judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court.
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Webster v. Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC
Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC (Southeast), and Michael J. Smith petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Chambers Circuit Court to vacate its order that denied their motion to transfer the underlying action to Lee County on the ground of forum non conveniens. In 2011, a vehicle driven by Patricia Webster allegedly collided with timber that had come loose from a tractor-trailer rig owned by Southeast, driven by its employee Smith. She sued Southeast and Smith for negligence and wanton and reckless conduct. Southeast's principal office is located in Chambers County. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying Southeast and Smith's motion for a change of venue based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The court granted their petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the circuit court to transfer the case to Lee Circuit Court. View "Webster v. Southeast Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC" on Justia Law
Wolfe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a defendant in a civil case pending in the Escambia Circuit Court, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to dismiss the case on the ground that venue in Escambia County was improper or in the alternative, on the ground of forum non conveniens. This case arose from a in incident at Wal-Mart's Franklin, North Carolina store, wherein Escambia County resident Plaintiff Gloria Renee Wolfe was shopping with her sister. She was injured when a bolt of cloth fell from a display shelf and struck her upper body, including her neck and shoulder, exacerbating a preexisting condition in her cervical spine and also causing additional injuries. Upon returning home to Alabama, Gloria sought medical treatment from doctors in Mobile County, Escambia County, and Jacksonville, Florida. In 2010, Gloria and her husband sued Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and fictitiously named defendants. Gloria asserted claims of negligence and wantonness; her husband asserted a claim of loss of consortium. Wal-Mart resisted the complaint, arguing that it had been incorrectly named in the complaint and that it was filed in the wrong court. Wal-Mart East further asserted in its motion that because neither of its partners resided in Alabama and because Gloria's alleged injuries occurred in North Carolina, venue in Escambia County was improper. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., has not shown a clear legal right to the order to the trial court to dismiss the Wolfes' action on the ground that venue is improper in Escambia County and/or on the ground of forum non conveniens. View "Wolfe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law
Berry et al. v. City of Montgomery et al.
Several Citites and their employees, police officers J.J. Oglesby, J.M. Stewart, A.T. Caffey, Q.O. Commander, and N.W. McMahon petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on certain claims asserted against them by Plaintiffs Dashad Berry, Kamessa Williams, and Miguel Johnson. Plaintiffs' claims stemmed from a traffic stops conducted by the City officers. Each of plaintiffs suffer from a type of paralysis that inhibited their abilities to respond quickly and directly to officers' orders incident to the officers' initial investigations. Plaintiffs sued the City and the individual officers alleging assault and battery, wantonness, negligence, negligent hiring, negligent training and negligent supervision. A trial court entered an order denying the City and officers' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the City and officers argued they were immune to Plaintiffs' claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Officers Oglesby and McMahon showed a clear legal right to the relief sought, and, as to them, their petition was granted and the trial court was directed to enter a summary judgment in their favor. Officers Stewart, Commander, and Caffey failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief they sought, and, as to them, their petition was denied. However, the City has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought as to the claims against it based on the acts of Officers Stewart, Commander, and Caffey, and its petition was denied as to those claims. Finally, the City has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought based on the claims alleging negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and its petition was denied as to those claims. View "Berry et al. v. City of Montgomery et al." on Justia Law
Simmons v. DuBose Construction Company, L.L.C.
DuBose Construction Company, L.L.C., petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Court of Civil Appeals to vacate its order reversing a Montgomery Circuit Court ruling in the case. On February 14, 2005, James Simmons, an employee of DuBose Construction, sustained a medial meniscus tear in his right knee when he slipped and fell in a hole while working at a construction site. Simmons ultimately sued DuBose Construction in the Montgomery Circuit Court seeking workers' compensation benefits for his knee injury. The trial court entered a judgment in 2007, finding that Simmons had suffered a permanent partial disability to the body as a whole and a 15% permanent partial loss of his ability to earn and awarding benefits accordingly. However, the trial court dismissed Simmons' case, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. DuBose Construction subsequently appealed that judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals, arguing that the trial court had erred in awarding Simmons benefits. Upon review, the Supreme Court found DuBose Construction failed to establish that it had a clear legal right to the writ because the trial court's order dismissing Simmons's case was void as being outside the scope of the Court of Civil Appeals' remand order, and Simmons was accordingly entitled to a writ directing the trial court to enter a proper judgment in the case. View "Simmons v. DuBose Construction Company, L.L.C. " on Justia Law
McMahon v. Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A., et al.
Plaintiffs Jacklyn and Donald McMahon sued Defendants Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A.; Yamaha Motor Manufacturing Corporation of America; Yamaha Motor Co., LTD. ("the Yamaha defendants"); and Montgomery Outdoor Power Products, Inc., d/b/a Montgomery Yamaha-Honda. They asserted a products-liability claim under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine ("AEMLD"), as well as negligence, wantonness, breach-of-warranty, and loss-of-consortium claims. Jacklyn was injured in July 2007 when the 2007 Yamaha Rhino 660, a two-passenger off-road utility vehicle that the McMahons had purchased from Montgomery Yamaha-Honda, rolled over while she was driving it, resulting in injuries to her arms and legs when she extended them out of the vehicle in an attempt to support herself and/or the vehicle during the rollover. At the close of evidence, the McMahons withdrew their breach-of-warranty claim and the Yamaha defendants moved for a judgment as a matter of law on the remaining claims. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Yamaha defendants, the McMahons appealed the judgment on the negligence and wantonness claims. Upon further review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court found that the McMahons produced substantial evidence to support their wantonness claim and that the trial court accordingly erred by entering a judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Yamaha defendants on that claim. However, any error the trial court may have committed in entering a judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Yamaha defendants on the McMahons' negligence claim was harmless because the jury's verdict on their AEMLD claim established that their negligence claim would have been unsuccessful. View "McMahon v. Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A., et al. " on Justia Law
Kelley v. Burnell
Defendant Ralph Burnell petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Bibb Circuit Court to vacate its 2011 order that denied his motion to dismiss claims Plaintiff Christi Burry Kelley filed against him. In 2007 while she was an inmate at the Bibb County jail, Plaintiff slipped in the shower and was injured. Petitioner was the warden of the jail at the time. Plaintiff sued the warden, the jail, the sheriff's department, and the sheriff, alleging negligence and wantonness. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing among other things that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the claims against them under state immunity. The trial court dismissed as to the County, the jail and the sheriff's department and sheriff, but denied the motion as to Defendant. Defendant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that he was entitled to State immunity because he was being sued for money damages for actions that arose out of his performance of his duties as a deputy sheriff. Finding that Defendant established a clear legal right to the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against him, the Supreme Court issued the writ.
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Hamilton v. Scott
Amy Hamilton, individually and on behalf of her stillborn son, sued Dr. John Blakely Isbell, Dr. Steven Coulter, Dr. Warren Scott, and the Isbell Medical Group (IMG), as well as several fictitiously named defendants, claiming that their negligent and wanton acts had wrongfully caused the death of her son and also caused her to suffer emotional distress. The DeKalb Circuit Court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that a wrongful-death action could not be maintained for the death of an unborn child who died before he was viable. The trial court also held that Hamilton was not in the "zone of danger" and, thus, could not recover damages for emotional distress. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed in part, and affirmed in part. The Court found that in applying "Mack v. Carmack," ([Ms. 1091040, Sept. 9, 2011] _So. 3d_ (Ala. 2011)), the Court concluded that summary judgment, insofar as it held that damages for the wrongful death of a previable unborn child were not recoverable "must be reversed" for reconsideration of the defendants' summary-judgment motions.
View "Hamilton v. Scott" on Justia Law
In re: S.K.
The Montgomery County Board of Education (the Board), several of its members, and a teacher in the school system petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacated its order that denied their motion for summary judgment. Third-grade student "S.K." went to the restroom with two friends. Her teacher did not accompany them. S.K. claims that when she attempted to leave the restroom stall, the door jammed. She tried to climb over the door to get out of the stall but slipped and fell, cutting her face on a metal hanger on the back of the door. S.K. (by and through her mother Tetrina Capehart) sued the Board, its members individually and in their official capacities, and the teacher asserting negligence and wantonness claims, and sought compensatory and punitive damages. The Board and teacher argued that there were no genuine issues of fact, and that S.K. was contributorily negligent from "playing" in the restroom. The circuit court denied the Board's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Board demonstrated that under the state constitution, it had absolute immunity from suit for claims asserted against it. The Court granted the Board's petition and issued the writ to direct the circuit court to rule in the Board's favor.
View "In re: S.K." on Justia Law
Whited v. Wright Brothers Construction Company, Inc.
Wright Brothers Construction Company, Inc. and GIBCO Construction petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its order that denied their motion to transfer their case to another circuit court. In 2008, Rogers Whited was involved in a two-vehicle accident at a quarry located in Jefferson County. Both Whited and the driver of the other vehicle were employed by GIBCO, who, along with Wright Brothers, was engaged in a project at the quarry. In 2010 Whited filed a complaint against Wright Brothers, GIBCO, and Sharon Gilbert, the owner and president of GIBCO, in the Walker Circuit Court seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by the accident. In May 2010 Wright Brothers moved to transfer the action to Jefferson County, stating that Whited alleged in his complaint that he was a resident of Blount County, that the accident occurred in Jefferson County, and that therefore Jefferson County, not Walker County, was the proper venue for Whited's action. In June, Whited filed his response in opposition to Wright Brothers' motion, stating that he was a resident of Walker County, not Blount County. Contemporaneously with that response in opposition, Whited also filed an amendment to his complaint stating that his statement that he was a resident of Blount County was a "clerical error." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the proper venue for this case was Jefferson County, and that the trial court had "an imperative duty to transfer the case and refused to do so." Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted Wright Brothers' petition and issued the writ.
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