Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Alabama Insurance Guaranty Association (AIGA) sued the Water Works and Sanitary Sewer Board of the City of Montgomery, seeking, among other things, to recover money it had paid on behalf of the Board on a workers' compensation claim filed by one of the Board's employees. AIGA and the Board each moved for a summary judgment. The circuit court granted the Board's motion and entered a judgment limiting AIGA's recovery to the payments it had made on the workers' compensation claim during the two years immediately preceding the filing of the action and denying AIGA's request for attorney fees. AIGA appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment, concluding that AIGA's claims were subject to a six-year statute of limitations and that, therefore, the circuit court had erred in limiting AIGA's recovery to payments made within two years of the filing of the action. The Court of Civil Appeals remanded the case for the circuit court to reassess the damages award and to consider further AIGA's claim for attorney fees. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine, as a matter of first impression, which statute of limitations -- the two-year or the six-year -- applied to AIGA's claims. Upon review, the Court affirmed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment. View "Alabama Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Water Works & Sanitary Sewer Board of the City of Montgomery" on Justia Law

The Montgomery County Board of Education (the Board), several of its members, and a teacher in the school system petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacated its order that denied their motion for summary judgment. Third-grade student "S.K." went to the restroom with two friends. Her teacher did not accompany them. S.K. claims that when she attempted to leave the restroom stall, the door jammed. She tried to climb over the door to get out of the stall but slipped and fell, cutting her face on a metal hanger on the back of the door. S.K. (by and through her mother Tetrina Capehart) sued the Board, its members individually and in their official capacities, and the teacher asserting negligence and wantonness claims, and sought compensatory and punitive damages. The Board and teacher argued that there were no genuine issues of fact, and that S.K. was contributorily negligent from "playing" in the restroom. The circuit court denied the Board's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Board demonstrated that under the state constitution, it had absolute immunity from suit for claims asserted against it. The Court granted the Board's petition and issued the writ to direct the circuit court to rule in the Board's favor. View "In re: S.K." on Justia Law

Wright Brothers Construction Company, Inc. and GIBCO Construction petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its order that denied their motion to transfer their case to another circuit court. In 2008, Rogers Whited was involved in a two-vehicle accident at a quarry located in Jefferson County. Both Whited and the driver of the other vehicle were employed by GIBCO, who, along with Wright Brothers, was engaged in a project at the quarry. In 2010 Whited filed a complaint against Wright Brothers, GIBCO, and Sharon Gilbert, the owner and president of GIBCO, in the Walker Circuit Court seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by the accident. In May 2010 Wright Brothers moved to transfer the action to Jefferson County, stating that Whited alleged in his complaint that he was a resident of Blount County, that the accident occurred in Jefferson County, and that therefore Jefferson County, not Walker County, was the proper venue for Whited's action. In June, Whited filed his response in opposition to Wright Brothers' motion, stating that he was a resident of Walker County, not Blount County. Contemporaneously with that response in opposition, Whited also filed an amendment to his complaint stating that his statement that he was a resident of Blount County was a "clerical error." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the proper venue for this case was Jefferson County, and that the trial court had "an imperative duty to transfer the case and refused to do so." Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted Wright Brothers' petition and issued the writ. View "Whited v. Wright Brothers Construction Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Jim Walter Resources, Inc. (JWR) sought a petition for a writ of mandamus to direct the Tuscaloosa County Probate Court to record certain filings without the payment of a recording tax. Walter Energy, JWR's parent company, acquired Western Coal Corporation of Canada. As part of the acquisition, Walter entered into a credit agreement with Morgan Stanley, which required Walter's subsidiaries to execute contingent guaranties of Walter's financing debt in the event Walter defaulted. JWR secured its guaranty of Walter Energy's financing debt by executing mortgages on its real and leasehold properties. Also as part of the credit agreement, JWR was required to record the mortgages in the probate offices in the counties in which the properties were located. When JWR sought to record the mortgages and related UCC filings in Tuscaloosa, the Tuscaloosa County Probate Court refused to record the documents unless JWR paid the recordation tax. The probate judge maintained that there was no statutory requirement that under Alabama law that the debt being secured be the mortgagor's debt, and as such, because JWR was recording its financing statements for Walter's debt, JWR was still responsible for paying the tax. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that JWR's liability was contingent on Walter's default, and JWR's contingent guaranty did not constitute an unqualified promise to pay Walter's indebtedness under the credit agreement. The Court found the contingent guaranty was not within the scope of the applicable statute, and accordingly, the Court granted JWR's petition and issued the writ. View "Jim Walter Resources, Inc. v. McCollum" on Justia Law

Retired district judge M. John Steensland, Jr. appealed a judgment of the Alabama Court of the Judiciary (COJ) that publicly censured him for misconduct that preceeded his retirement. In 2008, Judge Steensland had begun to serve a six-year term when the Judicial Inquiry Commission (JIC) began an investigation based on complaints of his courtroom conduct and demeanor filed by several parties that had come before the judge in prior cases. In 2010 while the JIC's investigation was ongoing, the Judge voluntarily retired from office. On appeal, Judge Steensland did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence or the nature of the discipline imposed. He merely renewed the grounds he originally asserted in his motion to dismiss the complaint: the absence of jurisdiction and the application of the doctrine of condonation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the COJ did not err in entering its judgment against Judge Steensland, and accordingly affirmed that decision. View "Steensland, Jr. v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm'n" on Justia Law

Harry and Bettye Coughlin appealed a circuit court's judgment dismissing Sheriff Mike Hale from an action they filed against him and several others. In 2008, the Coughlins sued Hale, among others, seeking money damages for numerous claims arising out of an ongoing dispute between the Coughlins and their neighbors. Hale moved to dismiss, arguing the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over them based on sovereign immunity. The circuit court entered its final judgment in 2010 disposing of all remaining claims against all remaining parties. Four days after that final judgment, the Coughlins filed a postjudgment motion, which the circuit court denied. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Coughlins filed their notice of appeal more than two years after the judgment they were appealing had been entered. The Court concluded that this was an untimely filing and dismissed the appeal. View "Coughlin v. Hale " on Justia Law

Randy Fielding petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Walker Circuit Court to vacate its order denying his motion for summary judgment and to enter a summary judgment based on his claim to State immunity. In November 2004, Debra Jackson and Jerry Jackson sued Fielding, individually and in his capacity as a deputy sheriff, after he entered their property and shot their dog while on duty. The complaint alleged claims of negligence, wantonness, the tort of outrage, intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass to person, and trespass on property. The Jacksons sought "compensatory, actual, incidental, and punitive damages, plus attorney fees." Fielding moved for summary judgment, arguing that because he was acting within the line and scope of his employment as a sheriff's deputy at the time of the incident, he was entitled to State immunity from the Jacksons' suit. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Fielding established a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus. Therefore, the Court granted his petition and issue the writ. View " Jackson v. City of Cordova" on Justia Law

The University of South Alabama Medical Center and the University of South Alabama Children's and Women's Hospital appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Mobile County. The County filed a complaint seeking a judgment to interpret Act 83-501. In its complaint, the County asserted that the Act was indefinite and unclear as to which hospitals qualify for reimbursements and the amount of those reimbursements. The County named several hospitals as defendants, including the University of Southern Alabama Children's and Women's Hospital. The Hospitals answered the complaint asserting that the Act is not indefinite, and that Mobile County previously provided reimbursement for providing indigent care and that it could continue to do so "based on established procedures and precedence and the plain meaning of the Act." In its review, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no justiciable controversy; Mobile County only sought an advisory opinion in its declaratory-judgment complaint. The trial court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. The Court vacated the trial court's order and dismissed the case. View "Univ. of So. Alabama Med. Ctr. v. Mobile Infirmary Association" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute between the Alabama Commercial Mobile Radio Services ("CMRS") Board (CMRS Board) and T-Mobile South, LLC and PowerTel Memphis, Inc. (collectively, T-Mobile) two providers of wireless telephone services, regarding emergency "911" service charges for purchasers of prepaid wireless service. From May 2003 through May 2005, T-Mobile paid the 911 service charge on behalf of its prepaid CMRS connections. In June 2005, T-Mobile ceased paying the 911 service charge for its prepaid connections. but resumed paying the service charge in 2007. T-Mobile never collected the service charge from any of its prepaid customers. T-Mobile requested a refund of CMRS service charges it had paid the CMRS Board from May 2003 through May 2005. The CMRS Board denied the request. T-Mobile then filed a declaratory judgment action against the CMRS Board and the members of the CMRS Board individually and in their official capacities, seeking a judgment declaring that the service charge did not apply to prepaid wireless service. The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court subsequently denied. The trial court eventually entered an order denying T-Mobile's summary judgment motion and granting the Board's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the legislature's intent was to impose the service charge on all CMRS connections, including those provided by T-Mobile to its prepaid customers. And under Alabama law, T-Mobile was not excused from paying the service charges. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "T-Mobile South, LLC v. Bonet" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court pertained to the admissibility into evidence a child witness's prior inconsistent out-of-court statements. The Court granted certiorari to address this as an issue of first impression: whether a part of the Child Physical and Sexual Abuse Victim Protection Act conflicted with the Alabama Rules of Evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that an "inherent tension" existed between the Act and the Rules of Evidence insofar as it permitted a prior inconsistent out-of-court statement of a child witness to be considered substantive evidence of asserted facts when the rules considered those statements as hearsay. "M.L.H." was adjudicated a youthful offender based on the trial court's finding that he was guilty of first-degree sodomy, and he was sentenced accordingly. M.L.H. appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that M.L.H.'s prior out-of-court statements, although admissible as substantive evidence under the Act, were inadmissible as substantive evidence under the rules of evidence. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals, finding no conflict between the Act and the rules of evidence. The case was remanded for reassessment of the substantive admissibility of M.L.H.'s prior inconsistent out-of-court statements. View "M. L. H. v. Alabama" on Justia Law