Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
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This appeal arose from a dispute between the Alabama Commercial Mobile Radio Services ("CMRS") Board (CMRS Board) and T-Mobile South, LLC and PowerTel Memphis, Inc. (collectively, T-Mobile) two providers of wireless telephone services, regarding emergency "911" service charges for purchasers of prepaid wireless service. From May 2003 through May 2005, T-Mobile paid the 911 service charge on behalf of its prepaid CMRS connections. In June 2005, T-Mobile ceased paying the 911 service charge for its prepaid connections. but resumed paying the service charge in 2007. T-Mobile never collected the service charge from any of its prepaid customers. T-Mobile requested a refund of CMRS service charges it had paid the CMRS Board from May 2003 through May 2005. The CMRS Board denied the request. T-Mobile then filed a declaratory judgment action against the CMRS Board and the members of the CMRS Board individually and in their official capacities, seeking a judgment declaring that the service charge did not apply to prepaid wireless service. The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court subsequently denied. The trial court eventually entered an order denying T-Mobile's summary judgment motion and granting the Board's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the legislature's intent was to impose the service charge on all CMRS connections, including those provided by T-Mobile to its prepaid customers. And under Alabama law, T-Mobile was not excused from paying the service charges. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "T-Mobile South, LLC v. Bonet" on Justia Law

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The issue before the Supreme Court pertained to the admissibility into evidence a child witness's prior inconsistent out-of-court statements. The Court granted certiorari to address this as an issue of first impression: whether a part of the Child Physical and Sexual Abuse Victim Protection Act conflicted with the Alabama Rules of Evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that an "inherent tension" existed between the Act and the Rules of Evidence insofar as it permitted a prior inconsistent out-of-court statement of a child witness to be considered substantive evidence of asserted facts when the rules considered those statements as hearsay. "M.L.H." was adjudicated a youthful offender based on the trial court's finding that he was guilty of first-degree sodomy, and he was sentenced accordingly. M.L.H. appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that M.L.H.'s prior out-of-court statements, although admissible as substantive evidence under the Act, were inadmissible as substantive evidence under the rules of evidence. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals, finding no conflict between the Act and the rules of evidence. The case was remanded for reassessment of the substantive admissibility of M.L.H.'s prior inconsistent out-of-court statements. View "M. L. H. v. Alabama" on Justia Law

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Novus Utilities, Inc. sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court to direct the Cullman Circuit Court to dismiss negligence and private-nuisance claims against it as time-barred. Eleven property owners residing in Cullman County sued Defendants the Hanceville Water Works & Sewer Board and Southwest Water Company, alleging that the defendants had allowed approximately two million gallons of untreated raw sewage from the sewage-treatment facility operated by the Board to be discharged into waterways in Cullman County. They alleged that on January 21, 30, and 31, 2008, the sewage treatment facility released the untreated raw sewage, and that release created a health hazard and damaged and devalued their property. Novus was added as a defendant to the suit as a subsidiary of Southwest. Novus moved to dismiss claims against it. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court was correct in denying Novus' motion to dismiss, and denied its petition for a writ of mandamus to quash the trial court's judgment. View "Roberts v. Hanceville Water Works & Sewer Board" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Andrew Sutley petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Court of Civil Appeals to quash a May 2011 writ. In its opinion, the appellate court directed the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its December 2010 order that added the Alabama State Personnel Board as a party to Petitioner's administrative appeal. The underlying matter arose from Petitioner's dismissal from his job as an Alabama State Trooper. Petitioner moved to add the Board as respondent to his appeal at the circuit court. The circuit court granted that motion five months after the Board entered its final order upholding Petitioner's dismissal. The Board then petitioned the Court of Civil Appeals for a writ of mandamus to order the circuit court to dismiss Petitioner's case as untimely. Upon its review of the record, the Supreme Court found Petitioner did not have a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus to direct the appellate court to quash its writ of mandamus. Accordingly, the Supreme Court denied his petition. View "Sutley v. Alabama Dept. of Pub. Safety " on Justia Law

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Defendants the Colbert County Board of Education ("the Board"); and the individual members of the Board and members of the Colbert County High School appealed a trial court's judgment that granted Plaintiff Felecia James's motion for a preliminary injunction. On or about May 21, 2010, an incident occurred at Colbert County High School (CCHS) involving J.H., Plaintiff's minor child, and another minor enrolled in CCHS. The details of the incident were disputed, but they led the assistant principal of the school to suspend both students for three days for allegedly fighting on school property during school hours. Plaintiff appeared before the Board to discuss the situation. The Board apparently took no action, and Plaintiff "individually and as mother and guardian of J.H." sued the Board and the individually named defendants asserting state-law and federal-law claims She also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Board members in their official capacities were immune from the state-law claims filed against them insofar as those claims sought monetary damages. As such, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over those state-law claims against the officials in their official capacities. However, the Board members were not immune from Plaintiff's state-law claims insofar as she sought injunctive relief based upon the Board members' alleged fraud, bad faith, or actions that were beyond the Board members' authority or that were taken under a mistaken interpretation of law. The Court noted that the Board and its members were not immune from the federal-law claims filed against them. Based on the foregoing, insofar as the Board appealed the preliminary injunction against it based upon the state-law claims filed by Plaintiff, the Supreme Court dismissed their appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the Court reversed the preliminary injunction, the Court declined to order the trial court to vacate the preliminary injunction entered against the Board insofar as it was based on those claims. View "Colbert Cty. Bd. of Edu. v. James" on Justia Law

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In May 2008, seven-year-old Jordan Alexander Robertson was placed in foster care at the home of Verlin Spurgeon and Carol Spurgeon. In June 2008, Jordan drowned in the Spurgeons' swimming pool. James Brakefield, as administrator of Jordan's estate, sued the Spurgeons, among others, in circuit court alleging that they had negligently and/or wantonly caused Jordan's death. The Spurgeons moved the circuit court for a summary judgment, alleging, among other things, that the claims were barred by the doctrines of parental, State, and State-agent immunity. The circuit court denied the motion. The Spurgeons petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss the claims against them. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted their petition in part and issued the writ to direct the circuit court to dismiss the negligence claims against the Spurgeons. In all other respects, the Court denied the petition. View "Brakefield v. Alabama Dept. of Human Resources" on Justia Law

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The Boaz City Board of Education ("the Board") and its members Alan Perry, Fran Milwee, Roger Adams, Alan Davis, and Tony G. King (collectively "the Board members") petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its order that denied their motion to dismiss claims filed against them by Lisa and Donnie Tarvin and to enter an order dismissing the claims with prejudice. According to the complaint, Leland Dishman, the superintendent for the Board, struck kindergarden teacher Lisa Tarvin with a paddle. Dishman read a statement at a press conference, denying that the incident occurred. The Tarvins sued the Board, the Board members in their official capacities, and Dishman in his individual capacity, alleging claims of assault and/or battery, defamation, libel, and slander and sought monetary damages. The Board and the Board members moved to dismiss the claims against them, arguing that they were immune from suit under the State immunity doctrine. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Board and its members demonstrated that under the Alabama Constitution, they had immunity from the claims asserted against them, and "a clear legal right to have the claims… dismissed with prejudice." The Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Tarvin v. Dishman" on Justia Law

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Ashley Rich, district attorney of Mobile County, and the State filed separate petitions for a writ of mandamus directed to the Montgomery Circuit Court in an inverse-condemnation action filed by Jesse Griffin and others. Griffin filed the Montgomery action seeking compensation for property, namely electronic "bingo" machines and related equipment and money, previously confiscated by the State from Griffin's facility in Mobile County. Rich and the State each argued that the Montgomery Circuit Court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to interfere with the executive branch's enforcement of the criminal law, and without jurisdiction based on principles of sovereign immunity. In 2010, Griffin opened and operated a facility in containing 25 electronic devices Griffin promoted as lawful charitable bingo machines. That same day, members of the Governor's Task Force on Illegal Gambling seized the 25 machines, as well as other items, from the facility. The machines were transported to a state warehouse in Montgomery County to be stored temporarily. Upon review, the Supreme Court consolidated the petitions for the purpose of writing one Opinion, and granted them, issuing the writs. The Court concluded that neither the fact that the electronic-bingo machines were brought to Montgomery County to be temporarily stored nor the fact that Griffin filed the Montgomery action before the Mobile County district attorney filed the Mobile action erased the fact that the events in this case arose from a criminal action initiated by the investigation of the facility and the resulting seizure of the machines and other evidence, "[t]hus, Griffin's reliance on the duel-litigation statute and the compulsory-counterclaim rule is misplaced." The Court issued the writs and directed the circuit court to vacate its order in favor of Griffin. View "Griffin v. Bentley" on Justia Law

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Dallas County Sheriff Harris Huffman, Jr., and Deputy Sheriff Ernest Larry Donaldson petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss a complaint filed by Plaintiff Marie Jemison alleging multiple claims against them in their individual capacities. Plaintiff alleged that on August 23, 2008, she was traveling in Selma while, at the same time, Deputy Donaldson "was operating a motor vehicle in the line and scope of his agency and/or employment with the Dallas County Sheriff's Department." According to Plaintiff, as she entered the intersection of Lauderdale Avenue and Dallas Avenue, she was struck by Deputy Donaldson's vehicle and, as a result, sustained serious personal injuries. Jemison sued Deputy Donaldson, Donaldson's supervisor Sheriff Huffman, the Dallas County Sheriff's Department, and the Dallas County Commission. Among other claims, Plaintiff alleged negligence and wantonness against Deputy Donaldson for the manner in which he operated his vehicle, negligent entrustment and negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention against Sheriff Huffman, and vicarious liability against the Dallas County Sheriff's Department and the Dallas County Commission. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss all claims, asserting a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that under the circumstances of this case, Deputy Donaldson was acting in the line and scope of his employment and was entitled to State immunity. Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion to dismiss all claims against Deputy Donaldson and Sheriff Huffman. View "Jemison v. Donaldson" on Justia Law

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Defendant Alabama Power Company filed a petition for the writ of mandamus to ask the Supreme Court to direct the trial court to dismiss Plaintiff Capitol Container, Inc.'s claims against it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On appeal, Alabama Power argued the Alabama Public Service Commission (APSC) had exclusive jurisdiction over those claims Capitol filed, and Capitol failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before filing its action. Upon review of the record below, the Supreme Court found that Capitol indeed failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before filing its suit against the power company. The Court issued the writ. View "Capitol Container, Inc. v. Alabama Power Co." on Justia Law