Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
by
Mary Ann Wilkinson was employed by the Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama for several years, until the Board terminated her employment in December 2009. In July 2010, Wilkinson sued the Board, seeking compensation she alleged was due her pursuant to her employment contracts. The Board filed a motion to dismiss Wilkinsons complaint, in which it alleged that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., on the ground that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the Board, as a State agency, is immune from suit under Ala. Const. 1901, Art. I, sec. 14; that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., because it failed to state a claim; and that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., for improper venue. In its petition for a writ of certiorari, the Board argued this case presented an issue of first impression regarding whether the Board is a State agency that is entitled to section 14 immunity and whether the Board was entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Board of Adjustment. The Board argues that the Court of Civil Appeals erred when it concluded that the Board was not a State agency entitled immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Board was a State agency and therefore entitled to immunity pursuant to section 14, the courts of this State were without jurisdiction in this case, and the Board of Adjustment would have jurisdiction over Wilkinsons claims. For these reasons, the Court of Civil Appeals erred when it reversed the trial courts judgment dismissing Wilkinsons complaint against the Board and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wilkinson v. Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama" on Justia Law

by
Marcus Lydell Walker, an employee of the Macon County Sheriffs Department, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Macon Circuit Court to enter an order holding him immune from suit based on Art. I, sec. 14, Ala. Const. 1901. He further asked the Court to direct the Macon Circuit Court to dismiss the claims asserted against him by Miguel Harris. While acting within the scope of his duty for the Sherriffs Department, Walker and Harris were in a vehicle accident in which Harris was injured. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Walker demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief he sought. Therefore, the Court granted his petition and directed the circuit court to dismiss the claims asserted against Walker. View "Harris v. Walker" on Justia Law

by
The Fort Morgan Civic Association, Inc. and Charles Browdy, a resident of the unincorporated Fort Morgan area of Baldwin County and a member of the Association (collectively "the FMCA"), sued the City of Gulf Shores and its mayor and city council seeking a court order declaring the City's annexation of a 19.3-mile segment of the land on which Fort Morgan Road is located and the adjacent land to be invalid.1 Following a nonjury trial, the trial court held that the FMCA had failed to establish that the Fort Morgan annexation was invalid; it accordingly entered a judgment in favor of the City. The FMCA appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "because the FMCA submitted evidence at that trial indicating that two parcels of property included in the Fort Morgan annexation were owned by private individuals and because the City failed to submit any evidence indicating that those same parcels were owned by the State, the trial court exceeded its discretion in upholding the annexation." View "Fort Morgan Civic Association, Inc. v. City of Gulf Shores" on Justia Law

by
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, Southern Division certified a question to the Supreme Court: whether Ala. Code 11-81-3 (1975) required that an Alabama municipality refund or fund bond indebtedness as a condition of eligibility to proceed under Chapter 9 of Title 11 of the U.S. Code. Upon review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the legislature intended to authorize every county, city, town and municipal authority to file for Chapter 9, and therefore, they are not required to have indebtedness prior to filing for Chapter 9 protection. View "City of Prichard v. Balzer" on Justia Law

by
Appellants in this case were nine Alabama municipalities and the Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center Authority appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Appellees, sixteen online travel service companies and related entities (the "OTCs"). The issue was whether the OTCs were liable for paying the municipalities a lodgings tax under the local lodgings-tax ordinances of the respective municipal plaintiffs. After considering the record in this case, the briefs of the parties, and the trial court's order, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's reasoning in its summary judgment order, and therefore affirmed the judgment in favor of the OTCs. View "City of Birmingham v. Orbitz, LLC." on Justia Law

by
Several Citites and their employees, police officers J.J. Oglesby, J.M. Stewart, A.T. Caffey, Q.O. Commander, and N.W. McMahon petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on certain claims asserted against them by Plaintiffs Dashad Berry, Kamessa Williams, and Miguel Johnson. Plaintiffs' claims stemmed from a traffic stops conducted by the City officers. Each of plaintiffs suffer from a type of paralysis that inhibited their abilities to respond quickly and directly to officers' orders incident to the officers' initial investigations. Plaintiffs sued the City and the individual officers alleging assault and battery, wantonness, negligence, negligent hiring, negligent training and negligent supervision. A trial court entered an order denying the City and officers' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the City and officers argued they were immune to Plaintiffs' claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Officers Oglesby and McMahon showed a clear legal right to the relief sought, and, as to them, their petition was granted and the trial court was directed to enter a summary judgment in their favor. Officers Stewart, Commander, and Caffey failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief they sought, and, as to them, their petition was denied. However, the City has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought as to the claims against it based on the acts of Officers Stewart, Commander, and Caffey, and its petition was denied as to those claims. Finally, the City has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought based on the claims alleging negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and its petition was denied as to those claims. View "Berry et al. v. City of Montgomery et al." on Justia Law

by
The State Director of Finance Marquita Davis and the State Comptroller Thomas L. White, Jr. appealed a preliminary injunction entered by the Montgomery Circuit Court in response to a declaratory-judgment action brought by the Alabama Education Association (AEA); Alabama Voice of Teachers for Education (a political-action committee affiliated with the AEA (A-VOTE)); the Alabama State Employees Association (ASEA); and the State Employees Association Political Action Committee (a political-action committee affiliated with the ASEA (SEA-PAC). In 2010, the comptroller implemented a new policy regarding salary deductions. Under this new policy, the comptroller stopped executing salary deductions designated for contributions to SEA-PAC; the comptroller continued making deductions designated for the payment of dues to the ASEA. Likewise, the comptroller stopped executing salary deductions to a political-action committee affiliated with the Alabama State Troopers Association. Portions of an employee's salary no longer deducted as a result of this policy change were included in the employee's paychecks. The AEA and A-VOTE filed a complaint against the finance director and the comptroller in circuit court seeking a judgment declaring that deductions designated for the AEA that benefited A-VOTE were not prohibited by law and seeking a permanent injunction to force the comptroller to resume the previous practice of executing salary deductions designated for the AEA. The ASEA and SEA-PAC filed a motion to intervene as plaintiffs in the action. The circuit court ruled that, without the preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm through the actions of the finance director and the comptroller. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the injunction and ordered the circuit court dismiss the complaint: the action before the Court was one that challenged the practices adopted by the finance director and the comptroller based on their interpretation of Alabama statutory law as it existed before the the statutory authority under which they acted became effective. The Court concluded the injunction was moot. View "Davis v. Alabama Education Ass'n" on Justia Law

by
In these consolidated appeals, Carol Perdue, individually and as next friend and guardian of her daughter, Anna; William D. Motlow, Jr.; and Shane Sears (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the objectors"), all of whom were objecting class members in class-action litigation related to the Alabama Prepaid Affordable College Tuition ("PACT") Trust Fund a/k/a The Wallace-Folsom Prepaid College Tuition Trust Fund, appealed the trial court's judgment that approved a class-action settlement concluding the litigation. The objectors largely complained that as contributors or beneficiaries of the PACT fund, it was being mismanaged and underfunded to their detriment. While the case was pending, the Alabama Legislature changed the laws directly impacting the management and funding of the PACT program. The PACT Board responded to the change in the law by moving to dismiss the objectors' suit as moot. The issues on appeal before the Supreme Court involved terms of the settlement agreement: the objectors contended that the trial court permitted language in the agreement that ran afoul of the changed laws and disregarded objections of the complaining members of the class. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case: "[t]he scope of the objections in the trial court was not the narrow question whether the order should bind only the objectors, but, on the contrary, the issue presented [was] the broader question whether the trial court's judgment approving the settlement agreement [was] due to be affirmed. . . . the objectors are allowed to appeal that aspect of the trial court's order that affects them - 'the [circuit court's] decision to disregard [their] objections.' If the judgment [was] affirmed, the settlement agreement affects them in that it binds them, as members of the class, to terms of a settlement agreement inconsistent with 16-33C-19." View "Perdue v. Green" on Justia Law

by
Sacred Heart Health System, Inc., the defendant in a declaratory-judgment action filed by Infirmary Health System, Inc. (IHS) and South Baldwin Regional Medical Center appealed to the Supreme Court from one aspect of a final judgment entered by a circuit court in favor of IHS and South Baldwin. IHS and South Baldwin cross-appealed from another aspect of the trial court's judgment held in favor of Sacred Heart. The Supreme Court transferred the appeal and cross-appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals, and that court reversed the judgment of the trial court. Sacred Heart owns "Sacred Heart Medical Group" (SHMG) which consists of 143 multi-specialty physicians who practice in the area served by Sacred Heart. All SHMG physicians have uniform employment contracts with SHMG. Six of those physicians practice in southern Baldwin County. When the Baldwin County practice saw an increase in patients, Sacred Heart sought to expand existing leased space for additional physicians and facilities. The contested issue between the parties was whether the portion of the medical-building project Sacred Heart leased for its Baldwin County physicians to use was subject to Sacred Heart's first obtaining a "Certificate of Need" to expand its facilities from the State Health Planning and Development Agency (SHPDA). Finding that the trial did not engage in a five-part inquiry (as expressed in 22-21-260(6) Ala. Code 1975) on whether the proposed expanded practice required a CON in order to proceed, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Infirmary Health System v. Sacred Heart Health System, Inc." on Justia Law

by
Defendant Ralph Burnell petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Bibb Circuit Court to vacate its 2011 order that denied his motion to dismiss claims Plaintiff Christi Burry Kelley filed against him. In 2007 while she was an inmate at the Bibb County jail, Plaintiff slipped in the shower and was injured. Petitioner was the warden of the jail at the time. Plaintiff sued the warden, the jail, the sheriff's department, and the sheriff, alleging negligence and wantonness. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing among other things that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the claims against them under state immunity. The trial court dismissed as to the County, the jail and the sheriff's department and sheriff, but denied the motion as to Defendant. Defendant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that he was entitled to State immunity because he was being sued for money damages for actions that arose out of his performance of his duties as a deputy sheriff. Finding that Defendant established a clear legal right to the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against him, the Supreme Court issued the writ. View "Kelley v. Burnell" on Justia Law