Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The City of Irondale appealed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment which declared its annexation of a parcel of property owned by the Black Warrior-Cahaba Rivers Land Trust adjacent to the Cahaba River as void. The property at the time did not lie within the corporate limits of any municipality, but fell within the police jurisdiction on the City of Irondale and the City of Leeds. Leeds sought a judgment to declare the annexation as invalid. In entering a summary judgment in favor of Leeds, the trial court concluded that "the Cahaba River, under Alabama state law, is a public waterway" and that the conditions for finding contiguity across a public waterway were not met. Accordingly, the trial court concluded, Irondale's annexation of the Land Trust property was improper and void. Agreeing with the circuit court's conclusion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Irondale v. City of Leeds " on Justia Law

Miller Trucking, LLC, Ben Miller, and Miriam Miller ("the Miller plaintiffs) appeal a summary judgment in favor of APAC Mid-South, Inc. (APAC), Oldcastle Materials, Inc., and Steve Reynolds (defendants). The facts of this appeal were based on contracts between the Alabama Department of Transportation ("ADOT") and APAC and between APAC and Miller Trucking. ADOT hired APAC to provide aggregate materials for distribution to counties, and APAC, in turn, hired Miller Trucking to haul the aggregate materials to the counties purchasing the aggregate materials from the State. At issue in this appeal were adjustments to the compensation of APAC paid Miller Trucking based on the cost of fuel during the time of the contract. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of defendants and remanded the case for further proceedings. A genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a 2008 APAC-Miller Trucking contract and a 2009 hired-truck qualification agreement were modified to include fuel-price-adjustment agreements and, if so, what the terms of those agreements were. View "Miller Trucking, LLC, et al. v. APAC Mid-South, Inc., et al. " on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division certified a question to the Alabama Supreme Court: "Under Alabama law, is a 'Potentially Responsible Party' ('PRP') letter from the Environmental Protection Agency ('EPA'), in accordance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act ('CERCLA') provisions, sufficient to satisfy the 'suit' requirement under a liability policy of insurance?" The plaintiff in the underlying action is Alabama Gas Corporation ("Alagasco"). Defendants St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Company, and St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company are all direct and indirect subsidiaries of defendant Travelers Casualty and Surety Company. Upon review of the applicable statutory and case law authority, the Supreme Court answered the certified question in the affirmative. View "Travelers Casualty and Surety Company et al. v. Alabama Gas Corporation " on Justia Law

Anne Bates Gibbons appealed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Town of Vincent ("the Town"), the town's planning commission, and White Rock Quarries, LLC ("White Rock") (collectively, "appellees"). This matter stemmed from a zoning change impacting 86 acres of undeveloped land owned by White Rock that were annexed into the Town. Gibbons's complaint challenged the Town's rezoning of the land based on a rezoning application submitted by White Rock and its annexation of the 86 acres. White Rock sought the rezoning and annexation so that it could construct and operate a rock quarry on the property. Gibbons alleged that the Town did not satisfy the notice requirements of the applicable statutes that give municipal corporations in Alabama the power to enact zoning ordinances and that set out the requirements for enacting such ordinances in adopting a 2009 amendment. In the alternative, assuming that the 2009 amendment was validly adopted, Gibbons sought a declaration that White Rock's proposed use of the land was covered under section 5.5, not section 5.14.5, of the Town's zoning code. The circuit court ultimately granted appellees' motion for summary judgment, and Gibbons appealed. Finding that the Town complied with the applicable statutes in its annexation of the 86 acres, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the appellees. View "Gibbons v. Town of Vincent" on Justia Law

In case no. 1110439, the Town of Gurley ("the Town") appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of M & N Materials, Inc. ("M & N"), on M & N's inverse-condemnation claim against the Town. In case no. 1110507, M & N cross-appealed the trial court's judgment in favor of the Town and Stan Simpson on other claims. Based on the Supreme Court's review of the matter, the Court found that the applicable statute upon which M&N maintained did not support its claim of a regulatory taking. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of M & N on its inverse-condemnation claim and rendered a judgment in favor of the Town. The Court's conclusion pretermitted the other issues raised by the Town in case no. 1110439. In case no. 1110507, the Court found no error in the trial court's judgment and affirmed its decision. View "Town of Gurley v. M & N Materials, Inc. " on Justia Law

The Housing Authority of the Birmingham District ("HABD") appealed the judgment entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court which awarded Logan Properties, Inc., $350,000 on its inverse condemnation claim against HABD, as well as an additional $100,000 for litigation expenses, and awarding the intervening plaintiff Alamerica Bank $10,000 for litigation expenses. Logan Properties is a real-estate and property-management company that purchases, renovates, rents, and maintains single-family and multi-family residences. In January 2002, Logan Properties purchased "Patio Court," a 30-unit apartment complex for approximately $101,000. Logan Properties began renovating the vacant units in the complex with the plan of transferring current tenants into the newly renovated units until the entire complex was eventually renovated and leased. Logan Properties financed the purchase and rehabilitation of Patio Court by obtaining a construction loan from Alamerica Bank. In February 2003, Logan Properties obtained an adjacent parcel of property including a triplex unit with the same goal of renovating and leasing the units. Sometime in 2004, Logan Properties learned that HABD had obtained a federal grant to redevelop "Tuxedo Court," a multi- block public-housing complex located across the street from Patio Court. That project entailed the demolition of the existing Tuxedo Court housing complex and the construction of new housing in its place. After the plans for the Tuxedo Court project were made public, tenants started leaving Patio Court, telling Logan Properties that HABD was going to condemn Patio Court as part of the project. As residents in Tuxedo Court left as well, the general area deteriorated, and the vacant Patio Court apartments became the subject of theft and vandalism. Though Logan Properties had completely renovated 18 of the units, it eventually stopped renovation work, and, at trial conceded that the entire property had become unlivable. The parties tried to negotiate salvaging the area, but Patio continued to deteriorate. HABD subsequently initiated condemnation proceedings, and simultaneously filed a lis pendens notice on the properties. The probate court granted HABD's application for condemnation and appointed three disinterested commissioners to determine the compensation due Logan Properties for the condemnation of its property. The probate court failed to enter an order adopting the commissioners' report within a seven-day period required by statute and Logan Properties moved for a dismissal of the condemnation action. The probate court granted that motion and dismissed the action. Logan Properties then initiated an inverse-condemnation action against HABD, alleging that HABD had taken or injured property owned by Logan Properties. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that because no evidence was presented at trial indicating that HABD was responsible for a direct physical injury upon Logan Properties' property, that judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for the trial court to enter a judgment as a matter of law in favor of HABD. View "Housing Authority of the Birmingham District v. Logan Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

The Alabama Department of Corrections ("ADOC"), the Alabama Corrections Institution Finance Authority ("ACIFA"), and Kim Thomas, in his official capacities as the commissioner of ADOC and as ex officio vice president of ACIFA, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its May 2012 order denying their motion seeking a partial summary judgment and requested the court enter a new order granting their motion. In 2010, Albert Wilson, Rufus Barnes, Joseph Danzey, Bryan Gavins, and Donald Simmons, all of whom were employed by ADOC as correctional officers, sued ADOC and its then commissioner Richard Allen alleging that ADOC was violating its own regulations and state law in the manner in which it: (1) compensated correctional officers for overtime; (2) restricted the way correctional officers were allowed to use earned leave; and (3) paid correctional officers the daily subsistence allowance provided by law. The plaintiffs also sought class certification on behalf of all other similarly situated correctional officers employed by ADOC and requested injunctive relief, as well as money damages, to include backpay with interest, punitive damages, and litigation costs and expenses, including attorney fees. Because ADOC and Thomas, in his official capacity as commissioner of ADOC, were entitled to State immunity on those claims, the Court granted the petition as to ADOC and Thomas, in his capacity as commissioner of ADOC, and issued the writ. However, ACIFA and Thomas, in his official capacity as vice president of ACIFA, did not argue that they were entitled to State immunity on the claims asserted against them; rather, they argued that those claims lacked merit. That argument presented an insufficient basis upon which to issue a writ of mandamus, and the Supreme Court therefore denied the petition with regard to the those claims because ACIFA and Thomas had an adequate remedy on appeal. View "Wilson v. Thomas " on Justia Law

The Phenix City Board of Education ("the Board") sought mandamus relief from the Russell Circuit Court's denial of the Board's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment on claims brought against it by The Lisle Company, Inc. ("Lisle"). Because the Board is immune from suit pursuant to § 14, Ala. Const. 1901, the Supreme Court granted the Board's petition and issued the writ. View "Lisle Company, Inc. v. Phenix City Board of Education" on Justia Law

Respondents William Harris, in his official capacity as president of Alabama State University ("ASU"), and the individual members of ASU's Board of Trustees, in their official capacities as members of the Board, appealed a circuit court's order granting the petition filed by Felisa Owens seeking a writ of mandamus and declaratory relief as a result of the termination of her employment with ASU and awarding Owens full backpay and benefits. Upon review, the Court determined that Respondents were statutorily immune from suit for any claim for monetary damages. Therefore, the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Owens's claim for backpay and benefits. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's order with regard to the backpay issue, but affirmed the lower court in all other respects. View "Harris v. Owens " on Justia Law

Carson Sweeney petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order of May 26, 2011, insofar as the order granted Timmy Joe Holland's motion to strike Sweeney's demand for a trial by jury in Holland's trespass action against him. In 2010, Holland sued Sweeney, alleging that Sweeney had entered Holland's property and damaged it by, among other things, "remov[ing] trees, timber and other foliage, [and] soil"; "redirect[ing] water flow"; and "install[ing] drainage apparatuses." The complaint stated the following causes of action: "trespass - trespass to chattels," negligence, negligent supervision, and conversion. The circuit court ultimately entered an order that, among other things, granted in part and denied in part Holland's motion to strike Sweeney's answer and counter-complaint. In its order, the circuit court found that Sweeney's failure to file his answer and counter-complaint in a timely manner "was unreasonable and inherently prejudicial" to Holland and that "[g]ood cause has not been shown for said failure." Nonetheless, the circuit court denied Holland's motion insofar as it sought to strike Sweeney's answer and counter-complaint because, the circuit court said, "the interest of preserving a litigant's right of trial on the merits is paramount." However, the circuit court granted Holland's motion insofar as it sought to strike Sweeney's demand for a jury trial, concluding that Sweeney had "waived his right to demand a trial by jury." Sweeney filed a "motion for reconsideration, modification, new hearing, or in the alternative, motion to alter, amend or vacate" the order striking his jury-trial demand, which the circuit court denied. Sweeney then filed this petition for the writ of mandamus, seeking relief from the circuit court's order. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Sweeney demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief sought in his petition for the writ of mandamus. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Holland v. Sweeney" on Justia Law