Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Alabama Educational Television Commission and Ferris W. Stephens, Rodney D. Herring, Les Barnett, J. Holland, Dannetta K. Thornton Owens, Bebe Williams, and Gregory O. Griffin, Sr. (collectively, "the Commissioners"), petitioned the Supreme Court for the writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to dismiss claims brought against them by Allan Pizzato and Pauline Howland and to strike Pizzato and Howland's second amended complaint. In 2012, Pizzato requested certain materials from the Commission pursuant to the Open Records Act. Pizzato sued the Commission and the Commissioners alleging violations of the Open Meetings Act, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Pizzato also requested a judgment declaring that Stephens improperly held the office of assistant attorney general while he was serving as a commissioner. The Commissioners moved the circuit court to dismiss Pizzato's claims against them, arguing that Pizzato did not have standing to bring an Open Meetings Act claim, that the Open Meetings Act did not provide for the recovery of compensatory or punitive damages, and that the complaint failed to state a claim. Furthermore, the Commissioners argued that Pizzato's Open Records Act claim was moot because the requested documents had been produced. Because Pizzato and Howland did not establish standing to bring their action against the Commission and the Commissioners under the Open Meetings Act, the claims asserted in both the first amended and second amended complaints should have been dismissed. The Court therefore granted mandamus relief and issued the writ. View "Pizzato v. Alabama Educational Television Commission" on Justia Law

F.V.O., respondent in a dependency action, appealed a trial court's orders after a dispositional review hearing in a dependency case. A majority of the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the orders; the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Both arguments presented by the motherÐ-regarding the finding by the trial court as to the efforts made by DHR to reunite the mother and the children and the announcement of a new permanency plan--failed to adjudicate any rights of the mother from which an appeal would lie. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for that court to dismiss the mother's appeal and to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "F.V.O. v. Coffee County Department of Human Resources" on Justia Law

George Mason petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Macon Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment for him on the basis of State-agent immunity in an action filed against him by Kola Oyedepo, individually and as grandfather and next friend of Joshua Dosunmu. George Mason was a bus driver employed by the Macon County Board of Education. Joshua Dosunmu, a fifth-grade student in the Macon County school system, was a passenger on the school bus Mason was driving. After the bus had continued on its route, Dosunmu attempted to cross the highway. He was struck and injured by an automobile, driven by Janie Pearson Sellers. Oyedepo sued Mason and others alleging negligence and wantonness arising from Mason's alleged failure to properly supervise Dosunmu and/or his alleged failure to ensure that Dosunmu got off the bus at the appropriate school-bus stop. Mason moved for summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled to State-agent immunity because as a bus driver employed by the Macon County Board of Education at the time of the accident, he was exercising judgment in transporting and supervising students on the day of the incident. The Supreme Court concluded that Mason demonstrated that he was entitled to State-agent immunity as to the claims asserted against him in his individual capacity in Oyedepo's action. Therefore the Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Oyedepo v. Sellers" on Justia Law

Defendants Del Marsh, Gerald Dial, Jay Love, and Chad Fincher were members of the Alabama Legislature during its 2013 Regular Session. Defendants sought a writ of mandamus to order the Circuit Court to set aside its order denying their motion to dismiss an action against them filed by Lynn Pettway and to enter an order granting the motion. Pettway sued the defendants seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Pettway alleged that HB 84 was passed in violation of Rule 21 and Alabama's Open Meetings Act. In a second complaint, Pettway alleged that because defendants constituted a majority of the conference committee, the private meeting at which HB 84 was revised was a de facto meeting of the conference committee. Therefore, alleged Pettway, that meeting was an "unannounced executive session" and violated both the Open Meetings Act and Rule 21. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and to quash service. The circuit court denied the defendants' motion but issued a stay of the proceedings and certified the matter for the Supreme Court's review. Defendants responded with a petition for permissive appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R. Civ. P., or in the alternative, a writ of mandamus. After careful review, the Supreme Court concluded defendants were entitled to a writ of mandamus to order the circuit court to grant their motion to dismiss Pettway's second complaint on related grounds that legislators are immune from suit regarding acts undertaken within the scope of legitimate legislative activity and because the substance of Pettway's new complaint involved nonjusticiable claims. View "Pettway v. Marsh et al." on Justia Law

Two petitions for a writ of mandamus came before the Supreme Court. Both sought review of orders that found plaintiffs lacked of standing and, in turn, found the trial courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. In case no. 1111567, U.S. Bank National Association ("U.S. Bank"), sought a writ to require the Walker Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed by Walker County. In case no. 1111370, MERSCORP, Inc. ("MERSCORP"), and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") sought a writ to require the Barbour Circuit Court to dismiss an action filed by Barbour Probate Judge Nancy Robertson. Upon careful consideration of the underlying trial court cases, the Supreme Court concluded that these cases did not fall within the subject-matter-jurisdiction exception to the general rule that the Supreme Court would not engage in mandamus review of a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss. The Court therefore denied the request for mandamus relief in both of the cases. View "Robertson v. MERSCORP, Inc." on Justia Law

Hubert Norris appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the Fayette County Commission and the dismissal of his petition for a writ of mandamus. Because the trial court correctly held that, as a matter of law, Norris did not meet the statutory requirements to be appointed a supernumerary sheriff, Norris was not entitled to the mandamus relief he requested. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded trial court did not err in entering a summary judgment in favor of the Commission and in dismissing Norris's petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Norris v. Fayette County Commission " on Justia Law

AltaPointe Health Systems, Inc. ("AHS"), appealed a probate court order denying its petition for an award of expert-witness fees a civil-commitment proceeding. This case presented a matter of first impression for the Supreme Court. By disqualifying AHS from receiving expert-witness fees for the testimony of its employees, the Supreme Court concluded the Probate Court erred as a matter of law. When the probate court elicits testimony from an expert witness provided by AHS on the issue of civil commitment and the witness is an employee of AHS, a plain reading of section 22-52-14 entitles AHS to such fees as the probate court in its discretion determines are reasonable. View "AltaPointe Health Systems, Inc. v. Mobile County Probate Court " on Justia Law

Ann Whitty, Tratillia McCall, and other class-action plaintiffs filed suit against Montgomery County and Janet Buskey (in her capacity as Montgomery County Revenue Commissioner. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their case by the Montgomery Circuit Court. Whitty and McCall, on behalf of themselves and a purported class of similarly situated property owners, filed suit seeking class certification of Montgomery County property owners whose properties were sold because of delinquent ad valorem taxes, where the sales produced an excess over the taxes, interest, penalties and costs due. Following discovery, a question of standing arose with regard to the class representatives. The County and the revenue commissioner moved to dismiss and/or to strike amended complaints, arguing that Whitty and McCall lacked "standing" to pursue the claims in their original complaint and, therefore, that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action at its outset. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint insofar as it related to the claims alleged by Whitty and McCall. However the Court reversed the trial court's judgment insofar as it included a dismissal of the claims of the additional plaintiffs added by amendments to the original complaint. The trial court was not without subject-matter jurisdiction over claims originally alleged by McCall; therefore, the various amendments to the complaint adding additional plaintiffs were viable. View "Whitty et al. v. Montgomery County et al. " on Justia Law

In 2004, the Baldwin County Commission passed a resolution recognizing the Fair Association's planned construction of a multimillion dollar coliseum at the Association's new fairgrounds site in Baldwin County. The Commission resolved to provide long-term funding for the Fair Association for a period of 10 years, beginning in the County's 2005 fiscal year. In 2008, the County and the Fair Association entered into a real-estate sale and purchase agreement for the conveyance of the coliseum property to the County. The purchase agreement provided that the County would be "released and relieved from paying [the Fair Association]the Seventy Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00), annual payment...." Following conveyance of the coliseum property, the parties entered into a lease agreement for the property. Despite the parties' agreement to discontinue the annual $75,000 payment to the Fair Association, the County made two additional payments in 2009 and in 2010. Each additional payment was presented to the County Commission as part of the "County Commission Accounts Payable Payments" and approved by the Commission along with payments to other vendors. The County asserted the two payments were made by mistake and sued the Association to recover the payments. After a hearing on the matter, the circuit court granted the Fair Association's motion for a judgment on the pleadings. The County appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Baldwin County v. Baldwin County Cattle & Fair Association, Inc. " on Justia Law

The Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Prichard appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Board of Water and Sewer Commissioners of the City of Mobile d/b/a Mobile Area Water and Sewer Service System in a declaratory and injunctive relief action. The dispute centered on the Mobile Water Board's planned takeover of the water and sewer systems currently being operated by the Prichard Water Board. "Because Amendment No. 863 affected only Mobile County, the legislature should have followed the procedure in section 284.01 instead of the procedure in section 284, and that noncompliance with 284.01 invalidated Amendment No. 863 in spite of any compliance with section 284." The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court did not address all other arguments raised by the parties, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "The Water Works & Sewer Board of the City of Prichard v. The Board of Water & Sewer Commissioners of the city of Mobile" on Justia Law