Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, employees sued their employer alleging breach of contract, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and bad faith and the application of the doctrine of estoppel arising out of the defendants' recoupment of early retirement benefits they claimed the employees were not entitled to under the employer's retirement Plan. The employer filed a counterclaim seeking immediate repayment from the employees of the benefits, interest, and attorney fees arising out of the payment of the early-retirement benefits based on their fiduciary duty to the Plan. The factual underpinnings of the adjudicated claims were the same as those of the unadjudicated counterclaim of the defendants. The trial court's resolution of the employees' claims did not moot the defendants' counterclaim because the trial court had to decide whether immediate recoupment (less any amount already received through the actuarially reduced monthly benefits), interest, and attorney fees were owed the defendants for the early-retirement benefits received by the employees. The Supreme Court remanded the case to trial court to reconsider the facts relating to the recoupment of the benefits in determining the defendants' counterclaim, including determining whether the defendants were entitled to immediate recoupment, interest, and attorney fees. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court's certification of finality under Rule 54(b) was ineffective, and, because there was no final judgment, both the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Fuller v. Birmingham-Jefferson County Transit Authority" on Justia Law

Hubert Norris appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Fayette County Commission and the dismissal of his petition for a writ of mandamus. Norris held the office of Sheriff of Fayette County for consecutive four-year terms beginning June 1974 until his resignation in May 1989. As sheriff, Norris participated in the county's supernumerary sheriffs' benefit program. During his fourth term in office, Norris resigned pursuant to a plea agreement in federal court. As part of the agreement, Norris pleaded guilty to multiple federal felonies, including racketeering, bribery, and tax evasion. Norris was convicted and sentenced to 37 months in prison. Norris later received a full pardon from the Alabama State Board of Pardons and Paroles, which restored all of his civil and political rights that had been forfeited by virtue of his conviction. Several years later, the then-Governor appointed Norris as supernumerary sheriff of Fayette County. The Commission petitioned to have Norris excluded from office. The Fayette Circuit Court issued the writ, and Norris appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Norris was precluded from serving as supernumerary sheriff after having received a pardon. Norris ran for and was reelected as Sheriff of Fayette County several years later. Norris served as sheriff, and he contributed to the supernumerary sheriffs' benefit program for each of those years. The State of Alabama again petitioned for a writ of quo warranto, alleging that Norris had unlawfully held his office, but this time the circuit court ruled in favor of Norris. Norris ended up serving out his term as sheriff. But toward the end of that term, the Commission sought a legal opinion from the attorney general regarding the county's obligation to pay Norris any supernumerary sheriff's benefits. Norris filed with then Governor Bob Riley a written declaration seeking to become a supernumerary sheriff for Fayette County at the end of his term as sheriff; Norris stated in that declaration that he met all the requirements to be appointed as a supernumerary sheriff. Governor Riley commissioned Norris as supernumerary sheriff of Fayette County. The Commission sought another legal opinion from the attorney general regarding whether Norris's appointment by Governor Riley affected the status of Norris with regard to his supernumerary benefits. The attorney general advised the Commission that, because Governor Riley had already appointed Norris as supernumerary sheriff, the question was moot. Months later Governor Riley's chief legal advisor purported to rescind Norris's appointment after learning of his felony conviction. Norris responded by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus compelling payment of past and future supernumerary sheriff's benefits. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the Commission, concluding as a matter of law that Norris had not served as sheriff for the requisite number of years as required by law, and that Governor Riley's appointment of Norris as supernumerary sheriff was void ab initio; the trial court therefore dismissed Norris's petition for a writ of mandamus. Because the trial court correctly held that, as a matter of law, Norris did not meet the statutory requirements to be appointed a supernumerary sheriff, Norris was not entitled to the mandamus relief he requested. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in entering a summary judgment in favor of the Commission and in dismissing Norris's petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Norris v. Fayette County Commission " on Justia Law

Chad Jones petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying his motion for a summary judgment in an action filed against him by Latonya Hall, individually and as mother and next friend of Demetrius Hall, a minor, and Maurice Caffie, individually (collectively referred to as "Hall"), and to enter a summary judgment in his favor on the basis of State-agent immunity. Jones was employed as a physical-education teacher at Gresham Middle School and Demetrius Hall and Michael Boyd were students. A fight between the young men broke out during a school basketball game. According to Demetrius, he was guarding Boyd tightly when Boyd became angry and threw the basketball at him, striking him in the face with the ball. Demetrius responded by pushing Boyd and throwing a punch. After the two exchanged insults, another student unexpectedly shoved Demetrius into Boyd, and Boyd responded by "slamming" Demetrius into some nearby metal stairs and striking him in the head. Demetrius was seriously injured as the result of the altercation. Jones contends that he was at the opposite end of the gym when the altercation occurred. Hall sued Jones, Sokol, and Sammy Queen, (another school physical-education teacher) asserting claims of negligence and wantonness and alleging that the defendants had breached their duty to reasonably supervise Demetrius and Boyd by leaving them unattended for an extended length of time. Concluding that Jones failed to demonstrate that he had a clear legal right to the relief sought, the Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of mandamus. View " Hall v. Jones" on Justia Law

Roy Harbin started working as a police officer for the City in 1972. At that time, he started mandatory participation in the Policemen's and Firemen's Retirement Fund of the City of Gadsden ("the PFRF"). In 1975, the PFRF was modified by the Legislature, and a "sliding scale provision" was eliminated. The PFRF was modified again in 1980. In 2002, all PFRF funds were transferred to the Employees Retirement System of Alabama ("the ERS"), which then administered the retirement program for the City's police officers. Harbin retired in 2012 and received pension payments under the ERS. In 2007, Harbin sued the City, alleging breach of contract under the 1972 PFRF. He amended his complaint five time, with the last amendment in 2011. He eventually won on his breach of contract claim against the City. The City appealed the circuit court's denial of its motion to dismiss. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Harbin had no presented sufficient evidence to establish that Harbin had a contract with the city. The Court therefore concluded the City was entitled to summary judgment. View "City of Gadsden v. Harbin " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Patricia Working, Rick Erdemir, and Floyd McGinnis appealed a circuit court judgment that held that the Jefferson County Election Commission ("the JCEC"), Probate Judge Alan King, Circuit Clerk Anne-Marie Adams, and Jefferson County Sheriff Mike Hale were immune from liability as to the plaintiffs' attorney fees. In "Working I," the Supreme Court held that a February special election was invalid on state-law grounds, and that the Governor's appointment of George Bowman to fill a vacancy on the Election Commission was lawful. On remand to the circuit court, as the "prevailing parties," plaintiffs moved for attorney fees. The trial court denied their motion, and plaintiffs appealed. In "Working II," the Supreme Court addressed plaintiffs' that the trial court erred in denying their motion for mediation, and vacated the trial court's order denying the motion for an award of attorney fees and remanded the case. On remand, the trial court concluded that the JCEC defendants had not waived their immunity defense and that plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees against defendants was precluded by the Alabama Constitution as to plaintiffs' state-law claims. Plaintiffs then filed this third, appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded the case once again to the trial court for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the trial court's judgment on the issue of immunity and state-law claims, but remanded remand the case with instructions on the issue concerning section 6–6–20 and the federal-law claims. View "Working v. Jefferson County Election Commission" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, defendants the Alabama Department of Corrections, various department officials, and Governor Robert Bentley, appealed in case no. 1111588, the trial court's determination limiting certain deductions from work-release earnings for inmates. In case no. 1120264, Jerry Mack Merritt (as sole representative of the plaintiff class) cross-appealed, raising numerous challenges to the trial court's final judgment. After its review, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in case no. 1120264 as untimely filed; in case no. 1111588, the Court reversed and remanded. The Court found that the department's interpretation of section 14-8-6 as permitting its collection of charges, which were not incident to the inmate's confinement, in excess of a 40% withholding cap established by that statute was both reasonable and consistent with the statutory language. View "Thomas v. Merritt" on Justia Law

The Alabama Department of Transportation ("ALDOT") and its director, John Cooper, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss all claims filed against them by Asphalt Contractors, Inc. ("ACI"). Trichloroethylene ('TCE') and other chemicals were used by ALDOT since the early 1970s. TCE was used extensively by ALDOT as a degreaser and/or cleaning agent and/or as a solvent. TCE is now contained in shallow groundwater in North Montgomery. Since at least April 2009, ALDOT has pumped groundwater into a Dewatering Pond and from there onto a Transfer Pond and then to the South Pond. A portion of the South Pond and wetland area used in ALDOT's remedial efforts is being discharged onto ACI's property. In 2010, ACI demanded that ALDOT immediately cease all dumping of contaminated water on ACI's property. However, the dumping of TCE-laden water onto ACI's property continued to the date of ACI filing its lawsuit. The complaint asserted trespass to realty and inverse condemnation and made claims for injunctive relief. ACI requested damages for the full fair-market value of its property, consequential and incidental damages, compensatory damages, punitive and exemplary damages, expenses, costs, interest, and attorney fees. ALDOT and Cooper filed a motion to dismiss the complaint arguing qualified immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss ALDOT as a party to this action. Conversely, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss as to ACI's inverse-condemnation claim against Cooper in his official capacity. Further, the trial court properly refused to dismiss ACI's claim for injunctive relief against Cooper. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus in part and denied it in part. View "Asphalt Contractors, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Transportation " on Justia Law

Defendants Del Marsh, Gerald Dial, Jay Love, and Chad Fincher were members of the Alabama Legislature during its 2013 Regular Session. They sought a writ of mandamus to order the Circuit Court to set aside its order denying their motion to dismiss an action against them filed by Lynn Pettway and to enter an order granting the motion. The Alabama House of Representatives approved House Bill 84 ("HB 84"), and the bill was sent to the Senate, where the Senate Education Committee gave it a favorable report. During the third reading of HB 84 on the floor of the Senate, an amendment was proposed and approved, and HB 84 was passed by the Senate. The amended version of HB 84 was then sent to the House, but the House voted to "non concur," and HB 84 was sent to a conference committee. Pettway sued the defendants in the Montgomery Circuit Court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Pettway alleged that HB 84 was passed in violation of Rule 21 and Alabama's Open Meetings Act. The circuit court issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO") prohibiting the clerk of the House of Representatives from sending HB 84 to the governor for his signature, and the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court issued an order vacating the TRO, dismissing the underlying action, and dismissing the appeal on the ground that the dispute was not ripe for adjudication because HB 84 had not been signed into law or even taken on the color of law. The Supreme Court found that the defendants were entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the circuit court to grant their motion to dismiss Pettway's new complaint on the related grounds that legislators are immune from suit regarding acts undertaken within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity and because the substance of Pettway's new complaint involves nonjusticiable claims that would lead to "judicial second-guessing" of the legislature's internal actions, motivations, and procedural decisions regarding its actions. View "Pettway v. Del Marsh" on Justia Law

The Bessemer City Board of Education and Davis Middle School petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the petitioners' motion to dismiss the claim filed against them by John Doe, a minor, by and through his next friend, W.A. ("Doe"), and to enter an order dismissing with prejudice the claim against petitioners. The matter stemmed from a claim of negligence Doe raised against the school; Doe claimed he had been sexually abused by an unidentified person as a result of the negligence of petitioners. The Circuit Court denied petitioners motion based on qualified immunity grounds. After review, the Supreme Court found that petitioners demonstrated they were entitled to absolute immunity from Doe's action against them. Therefore the Court granted their petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Bessemer City Board of Education" on Justia Law

The City of Gadsden and certain members of the State Employees' Insurance Board appealed two circuit court orders that granted injunctive relief to John Boman. Boman worked as a Gadsden police officer from 1965 until he retired in 1991. In 2000, Gadsden elected to join the 'Local Government Health Insurance Plan,' a health benefit plan administered by the Board. When Boman turned 65 in 2011, he was receiving medical care for congestive heart failure and other ailments. After his 65th birthday, Blue Cross began denying his claims for medical treatment based on the failure to provide Blue Cross with a 'record of the Medicare payment.' However, Boman had no Medicare credits. When the dispute over coverage arose, Boman sought review by the Board. The Board denied Boman's request for an appeal. Boman and 18 other active and retired Gadsden police officers sued Gadsden, alleging, among other things, that they had 'been deprived of Social Security and Medicare protection which other police officers have been provided' and that, after 20 years of service, they were being required to pay a higher pension charge or percentage of base pay than their counterparts who were hired after April 1, 1986. In 2011, Boman filed a 'motion for immediate relief for medical care.' The Supreme Court found that the circuit court issued preliminary injunctive relief against Gadsden without requiring Boman to give security and without making any specific findings. As such, the Supreme Court had "no alternative but to reverse" the preliminary injunction issued against Gadsden and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Gadsden v. Boman " on Justia Law