Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants Del Marsh, Gerald Dial, Jay Love, and Chad Fincher were members of the Alabama Legislature during its 2013 Regular Session. They sought a writ of mandamus to order the Circuit Court to set aside its order denying their motion to dismiss an action against them filed by Lynn Pettway and to enter an order granting the motion. The Alabama House of Representatives approved House Bill 84 ("HB 84"), and the bill was sent to the Senate, where the Senate Education Committee gave it a favorable report. During the third reading of HB 84 on the floor of the Senate, an amendment was proposed and approved, and HB 84 was passed by the Senate. The amended version of HB 84 was then sent to the House, but the House voted to "non concur," and HB 84 was sent to a conference committee. Pettway sued the defendants in the Montgomery Circuit Court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Pettway alleged that HB 84 was passed in violation of Rule 21 and Alabama's Open Meetings Act. The circuit court issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO") prohibiting the clerk of the House of Representatives from sending HB 84 to the governor for his signature, and the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court issued an order vacating the TRO, dismissing the underlying action, and dismissing the appeal on the ground that the dispute was not ripe for adjudication because HB 84 had not been signed into law or even taken on the color of law. The Supreme Court found that the defendants were entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the circuit court to grant their motion to dismiss Pettway's new complaint on the related grounds that legislators are immune from suit regarding acts undertaken within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity and because the substance of Pettway's new complaint involves nonjusticiable claims that would lead to "judicial second-guessing" of the legislature's internal actions, motivations, and procedural decisions regarding its actions. View "Pettway v. Del Marsh" on Justia Law

The Bessemer City Board of Education and Davis Middle School petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the petitioners' motion to dismiss the claim filed against them by John Doe, a minor, by and through his next friend, W.A. ("Doe"), and to enter an order dismissing with prejudice the claim against petitioners. The matter stemmed from a claim of negligence Doe raised against the school; Doe claimed he had been sexually abused by an unidentified person as a result of the negligence of petitioners. The Circuit Court denied petitioners motion based on qualified immunity grounds. After review, the Supreme Court found that petitioners demonstrated they were entitled to absolute immunity from Doe's action against them. Therefore the Court granted their petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Bessemer City Board of Education" on Justia Law

The City of Gadsden and certain members of the State Employees' Insurance Board appealed two circuit court orders that granted injunctive relief to John Boman. Boman worked as a Gadsden police officer from 1965 until he retired in 1991. In 2000, Gadsden elected to join the 'Local Government Health Insurance Plan,' a health benefit plan administered by the Board. When Boman turned 65 in 2011, he was receiving medical care for congestive heart failure and other ailments. After his 65th birthday, Blue Cross began denying his claims for medical treatment based on the failure to provide Blue Cross with a 'record of the Medicare payment.' However, Boman had no Medicare credits. When the dispute over coverage arose, Boman sought review by the Board. The Board denied Boman's request for an appeal. Boman and 18 other active and retired Gadsden police officers sued Gadsden, alleging, among other things, that they had 'been deprived of Social Security and Medicare protection which other police officers have been provided' and that, after 20 years of service, they were being required to pay a higher pension charge or percentage of base pay than their counterparts who were hired after April 1, 1986. In 2011, Boman filed a 'motion for immediate relief for medical care.' The Supreme Court found that the circuit court issued preliminary injunctive relief against Gadsden without requiring Boman to give security and without making any specific findings. As such, the Supreme Court had "no alternative but to reverse" the preliminary injunction issued against Gadsden and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Gadsden v. Boman " on Justia Law

Two police officers and the City of Birmingham petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its judgment denying the petitioners' motion for a summary judgment and to enter a judgment in their favor based on State-agent immunity. Officers with the Birmingham Police Department (BPD) responded to a vehicle fire, as did James Higginbotham, a firefighter employed by the Birmingham Fire and Rescue Service (BFRS). The officers sustained injuries as a result of an accident between the first responders. The injured officers sued Higginbotham, the City, and several fictitiously named defendants, asserting claims of negligence and wantonness against Higginbotham and vicarious liability against the City. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the petitioners demonstrated a clear legal right to a summary judgment based on State-agent immunity. Therefore, the Court granted the petition and issue the writ directing the circuit court to enter a summary judgment for one of the officers and for the City as to its liability based on the claims against that officer. View "In re: Whatley v. Higginbotham" on Justia Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified two questions pertaining to Alabama law to the Alabama Supreme Court. The certified questions in this matter required the Court to determine the scope of certain provisions of the Act No. 2010-761, Ala. Acts 2010. The Supreme Court answered the first certified question in the affirmative and the second in the negative: (1) the "or otherwise" language in the Act is limited to the use of State mechanisms to make payments to organizations that use at least some portion of those payments for political activity; (2) the term "political activity" is not limited to electioneering activities, i.e., activities undertaken in support of candidates for elected offices. View "Alabama Superintendent of Education et al. v. Alabama Education Association" on Justia Law

The City of Bessemer and Bessemer City Councillors Jimmy Stephens, Dorothy Davidson, Sarah W. Belcher, and Albert Soles sought a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to dismiss a claim alleging bad-faith failure to pay legal bills and costs stemming from a complaint filed by former City Councillor Louise Alexander and the law firm of White, Arnold & Dowd, P.C. ("WAD"). The City councillors also sought to have a racial-discrimination claim dismissed. The plaintiffs alleged that in 2006 and 2007 Alexander received three donations from a Tuscaloosa real-estate developer, which were properly used for charitable projects in her district. In this same period (according to the complaint), Davidson and Belcher, received similar donations from the same individual for charitable projects in their respective districts. According to the complaint, beginning in the early spring of 2007, plaintiff Alexander opposed several projects the donor had proposed to the City and, the donor "vowed to retaliate." The complaint alleged that because of the donor's complaint to the Attorney General, a five-count indictment against Alexander was filed in August 2008 alleging violations of the Alabama Ethics Law. The complaint asserted that similar charges were not brought against Davidson and Belcher. WAD represented Alexander during her criminal proceedings. Alexander was ultimately acquitted. Alexander and WAD alleged that the City had a "policy and practice" of paying legal fees for city officials charged with crimes relating to their official duties if and when they were found not guilty. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus relief as it related to the bad-faith claim against the City. The Court denied the petition with regard to plaintiffs' claim against the City councillors regarding the racial discrimination claim: the councilors did not demonstrate entitlement to legislative immunity, and whether they were entitled to qualified immunity was a question requiring further consideration of facts outside of the pleadings. View "Alexander v. City of Bessemer" on Justia Law

Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation ("AMIC"), the defendant in an action pending at the Lamar Circuit Court filed by the City of Vernon on behalf of itself and other similarly situated entities, appealed the court's order that certified a class in that action. Vernon stated that it had reached an agreement with AMIC regarding individual claims and therefore no longer wished to pursue them. AMIC filed a response to Vernon's motion in which it argued that the Supreme Court should remand the case to the trial court with instructions to dismiss it because now the case was missing its named representative, and therefore the requirements for a class action could not be met. Vernon argued it had the right to withdraw from the pending litigation, but because the trial court certified the class, the litigation remains viable. Vernon requested time in which to allow the class to name a new representative. The Supreme Court agreed with Vernon that the trial court should have the opportunity to determine whether a new named plaintiff should be certified. "The trial court is the proper entity to decide whether to allow the class members to amend their complaint to substitute a new named plaintiff and to determine whether that plaintiff meets the adequacy requirements in Rule 23(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., so as to represent the class." As such, AMIC's appeal was dismissed, and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation v. City of Vernon et al. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Pavilion Development, L.L.C., sought to redeem certain foreclosed real property. In this appeal, it challenged the trial court's judgment assessing the "lawful charges" due the various parties holding a legal interest in the property. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court exceeded its discretion in certifying its judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., and thus proper for immediate appeal. As such, the Supreme Court dismissed this appeal. View "Pavilion Development, L.L.C. v. JBJ Partnership et al. " on Justia Law

Sandra Chavers sued the City of Mobile seeking damages based on claims of negligent maintenance, continuing trespass, continuing nuisance, and inverse condemnation, all related to that part of the City's storm water-drainage system that abutted her property. After the Circuit Court entered a summary judgment in favor of the City, Chavers appealed. After careful review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Chavers repeatedly notified the City of damage to her property, and an inspector came to her home after she complained. After that visit, the inspector recommended that repairs be made to certain aspects of the City's drainage system, including an open concrete-lined ditch. The record indicated that those repairs were not made until well after Chavers had filed a notice of claim and had sued the City. The Court concluded the evidence in the Circuit Court record was sufficient to withstand a motion for a summary judgment based on the City's allegation that there was no evidence to support a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment as to the inverse-condemnation claim and as to the negligent-maintenance, nuisance, and trespass claims insofar as Chavers requested damages based on the cracking and uneven settling of her house. The Court reversed the summary judgment as to the negligent- maintenance, nuisance, and trespass claims insofar as Chavers requested damages for sinkholes allegedly caused by the City's negligent maintenance of the open concrete-lined ditch. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Chavers v. City of Mobile " on Justia Law

Deidre W. Lee and Samuel G. McKerall appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Town of Magnolia Springs Mayor Charles Houser and Town Councilman Robert C. Holk. The Town of Magnolia Springs and the Magnolia Springs Planning Commission (the remaining defendants in the underlying action), appealed a judgment entered on a jury award to Lee and McKerall. In 2005, Lee purchased 47 acres of property in Baldwin County. In 2006, she submitted an application for preliminary subdivision-plat approval detailing a 124-lot residential subdivision to the Baldwin County Planning Commission. The Town of Magnolia Springs incorporated in June 2006, six months before Lee submitted her plat application to the Baldwin County Planning Commission. The first mayor and council for the Town of Magnolia Springs were sworn in 13 days before Lee submitted her application to the Baldwin County Planning Commission. When Lee submitted her application, the Town of Magnolia Springs had no jurisdiction over Lee's property, and only the Baldwin County Planning Commission had the authority to consider Lee's application because her property was outside the town limits. The Baldwin County Planning Commission tabled Lee's application. The Town of Magnolia Springs' mayor informed the Baldwin County Planning Commission that the jurisdiction of Magnolia Springs would extend to include Lee's property and that Magnolia Springs intended to pass a moratorium on subdivision approvals because "a couple of [the town's] council members ... have been involved in ... trying to get [Lee's plat application] delayed." He also acknowledged that Magnolia Springs had "no rules and regulations" regarding applications for preliminary subdivision-plat approvals. Lee sued when the plan was ultimately denied. After careful review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in favor of Lee against the Town of Magnolia Springs and its planning commission, as well as the summary judgment in favor of Houser and Holk, and pretermitted any remaining issues. The Court held that McKerall's claims against the Town of Magnolia Springs and its planning commission were barred by his failure to timely file a notice of claim, and reversed the judgment in his favor. View "Lee v. Houser" on Justia Law