Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation v. City of Fairfield
Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation ("AMIC") appealed the trial court's order certifying a class in the action filed by the City of Vernon and a class of similarly situated entities that had purchased uninsured motorist/underinsured-motorist coverage ("UM/UIM coverage") from AMIC. Vernon was the original class representative; however, after AMIC filed its notice of appeal of the class-certification order, Vernon settled its claims against AMIC and withdrew as the class representative. Because there was no longer a representative to "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class," the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court for a new class representative to be substituted for Vernon. The City of Fairfield substituted for Vernon as the class representative. After review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the underlying dispute: the Court concluded that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this dispute. Initial jurisdiction over this dispute was with the Alabama Department of Insurance and its commissioner. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's class-certification order, and remanded for dismissal. View "Alabama Mutual Insurance Corporation v. City of Fairfield" on Justia Law
Alabama v. $93,917.50 & 376 Gambling Devices
The State appealed an order that dismissed a forfeiture action that sought condemnation of certain devices, currency and other property. In 2011, the State executed a search warrant and seized the devices, currency and property from the premises of Greenetrack, Inc. Greentrack moved for the return of the seized property. The State electronically filed its complaint, with the signature lines for the government deputy attorneys general as "/s/ ________." The certificate of service had similar electronic signature lines. A few days later after these pleadings were filed, the State filed amended petitions, and again, the signature blocks lacked any text on each line following the "/s/." The trial court noted that the petitions appeared to lack signatures. After the hearing, the State amended its filings with typewritten names following the "/s/." The certificate of service listed the same counsel as the second amended petition, but no summons accompanied the second amended petition in the trial court record. The trial court ruled for the return of Greenetrack's property, currency and devices. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court, finding that though the State's petitions did not strictly conform with the stated rules, it did not require striking the State's petitions. "The failure to properly sign the petitions caused no identified prejudice to Greenetrack. … To conclude otherwise would be contrary to the principles of [the Rule] and would elevate form over substance." View "Alabama v. $93,917.50 & 376 Gambling Devices" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
Ex parte David Bronner, et al.
Tonya Denson, a member of the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama ("the ERSA"), and Venius Turner, a member of the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama ("the TRSA"), brought this action on behalf of themselves, individually, as well as similarly situated members of the Retirement Systems of Alabama ("the RSA") against:(1) David Bronner, in his official capacities as chief executive officer and secretary-treasurer of the ERSA, the TRSA, and the RSA and (2) the officers and members of the respective boards of control of the TRSA and the ERSA, in their official capacities (referred to collectively as "the RSA defendants"). Plaintiffs argued the RSA defendants violated their fiduciary duties with respect to their management of their respective retirement systems, and investments of the plans' assets. The RSA defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the trial court denied. The RSA defendants then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court, asking it direct the trial court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss and to grant the motion. Upon review of the trial court record and arguments by the parties, the Supreme Court granted the RSA defendants' petition. The Court directed the trial court to vacate its order refusing to dismiss the complaint and to grant the RSA defendants' motion to dismiss: "The doctrines of sovereign immunity and separation of powers require that the judicial branch honor that delegation and not take upon itself the task of reviewing the investment strategies and decisions of the boards of control, at least not under the circumstances presented here." View "Ex parte David Bronner, et al." on Justia Law
Trenier v. City of Prichard
Mark Trenier appealed a trial court's grant summary judgment in favor of the City of Prichard and its mayor, Troy Ephriam. This appeal involved a dispute over the interpretation of section 11-43C-38(a), Ala. Code 1975, which governed the appointment and removal from office of fire chiefs and police chiefs in Class 5 municipalities such as the City of Prichard. Trenier became the duly appointed fire chief for the City of Prichard in 2007 in accordance with section 11-43C-38(a). The "Time of Performance" section of the employment agreement expressly stated that Trenier would provide services for five years. The mayoral election for the City of Prichard was held in October 2012, at which time Troy Ephriam, who had served on the city council, was elected mayor of the City of Prichard. Before the conclusion of his mayoral term in 2012, former-Mayor Davis on two separate occasions attempted to have the city council approve subsequent employment agreements for Trenier and to have him reappointed as the fire chief; both attempts, however, were unsuccessful. Although Trenier's employment agreement expired on April 19, 2012, he continued to serve as fire chief until April 8, 2013, at which time newly elected Mayor Ephriam notified him that his employment was officially terminated. On July 16, 2013, Trenier filed a complaint against Mayor Ephriam in his official capacity, as well as against the City of Prichard, alleging a violation of his employment rights under 11-43C-38(a) and sought damages as a result thereof. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Trenier v. City of Prichard" on Justia Law
Nelson v. Megginson
Madeline Nelson and 25 other individuals formerly employed as nontenured teachers or probationary classified employees in the Mobile County Public School System appealed the dismissal of their action against the members of the Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County -- Ken Megginson, Judy P. Stout, Reginald A. Crenshaw, Levon C. Manzie, and William Foster -- and against the superintendent of the school system, Martha Peek. In 2009, the plaintiffs filed an action against the Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County which was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice three years later in light of the Supreme Court's decision in "Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County v. Weaver," (99 So. 3d 1210 (Ala. 2012)). In 2012, the plaintiffs refiled their action , alleging that their employment was terminated "pursuant to a reduction-in-force implemented by Defendants in response to alleged financial constraints." The plaintiffs further alleged that the failure to rehire them by the conclusion of the following school year was a violation of a written policy of the school system. The circuit court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint: "[t]his action was brought more than three (3) years from the date of accrual. All of the Plaintiffs' claims for mandamus, declaratory or injunctive relief would be barred by the two (2) year statute of limitations set out in 6-2-38(l). Finally, any of the Plaintiffs' claims for backpay or other monetary relief would be barred by the same two (2) [year] statute of limitations under 6-2-38(m)." On appeal to the Supreme Court, plaintiffs primarily contended that the circuit court erred in concluding that their claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations because they stated a breach-of-contract claim, which had a six-year statute of limitations. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs stated a claim of breach of contract and that therefore their claim was subject to a six-year, rather than a two-year, statute of limitations. Accordingly, the circuit court's dismissal was reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings.
View "Nelson v. Megginson" on Justia Law
D.C. Pruett Contracting Company, Inc. v. Jackson County Board of Education
The Jackson County Board of Education petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to enter an order dismissing the complaint of D.C. Pruett Contracting Company, Inc. on the ground of sovereign immunity. Pruett Contracting submitted a proposal for renovations to the Pisgah High School gymnasium. The Jackson County superintendent of education executed a purchase order authorizing Pruett Contracting to make certain renovations to the gymnasium, totaling $231,309. Pruett Contracting then began renovating the gymnasium. The Superintendent later received a letter from the State of Alabama Building Commission stating that "all work on the renovation of the Pisgah High School gymnasium [was] to stop immediately" because the project had not been submitted to or approved by the Building Commission. The Board instructed Pruett Contracting to cease all work on the gymnasium. Pruett Contracting submitted an invoice to the Board for the work that had been performed prior to the letter. Months later, because it had not received payment for its work, Pruett Contracting sued the Board, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment and seeking recovery of damages on theories of quantum meruit, work and labor done, open account, and account stated. The Board moved the court to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it was entitled to sovereign immunity as to the claims alleged by Pruett Contracting and that the court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. Pruett Contracting responded, arguing that this case involved a protected property interest, that immunity was thus precluded, and that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. The Supreme Court concluded the Board established that it was entitled to sovereign immunity and that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over this action; therefore, the action had to be dismissed. Because the Board demonstrated a clear legal right to an order directing the Circuit Court to dismiss Pruett Contracting's complaint, the Supreme Court granted the Board's petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the Circuit Court to dismiss Pruett Contracting's complaint.
View "D.C. Pruett Contracting Company, Inc. v. Jackson County Board of Education" on Justia Law
First United Security Bank v. McCollum
First United Security Bank and its wholly owned subsidiary, Paty Holdings, LLC (collectively, "the bank"), brought suit to recover excess funds received by Tuscaloosa County from the tax sale of real estate owned by Wayne Allen Russell, Jr., and on which First United had a mortgage. The bank foreclosed on its mortgage after the tax sale but before the demand for excess proceeds was made. The issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is an "owner" entitled under 40-10-28, Ala. Code 1975, to receive the excess proceeds from a tax sale of the real property foreclosed upon. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bank was entitled to the excess tax-sale proceeds. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings.
View "First United Security Bank v. McCollum" on Justia Law
Tuscaloosa Resources, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Enviromental Management
Alabama Rivers Alliance and Friends of Hurricane Creek (collectively, "ARA") petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Civil Appeals' decision reversing the trial court's decision to dismiss an appeal by Tuscaloosa Resources, Inc. ("TRI") of a decision of the Environmental Management Commission. The Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM") oversees the Commission. The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review to consider whether the Court of Civil Appeals' decision conflicted with its decision in "Price v. South Central Bell," (313 So. 2d 184 (1975)), and the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in "Personnel Board of Jefferson County v. Bailey," (475 So. 2d 863 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in this case conflicted with "Price" and "Bailey," and accordingly reversed its judgment.
View "Tuscaloosa Resources, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Enviromental Management" on Justia Law
Alabama Municipal Insurance Corporation v. Willie Allen
The issue in these four appeals was whether the $100,000 statutory cap of 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, applied when a peace officer, acting outside his employment, was sued in the officer's individual capacity. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the $100,000 statutory cap did not apply when a peace officer, acting outside his employment, was sued individually. "The limitation on recovery in the second sentence of 11-47-190 is intended to protect the public coffers of the municipality, not to protect municipal employees from claims asserted against them in their individual capacity. [. . .] We recognize that municipal employees were not the intended subject of the legislature's enactment of 11-17-190, and we also recognize that the legislature is better suited to speak comprehensively on the individual liability of municipal employees." View "Alabama Municipal Insurance Corporation v. Willie Allen " on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Injury Law
White v. John et al.
The State Comptroller, Thomas L. White, Jr., appealed a preliminary injunction entered in response to an action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by Karen John, the Alabama Education Association ("the AEA"), Randy Hebson, and the Alabama State Employees Association ("the ASEA"). This was the third time a case involving the question of deductions by the comptroller from a State employee's salary for payment of contributions and dues has come before the Supreme Court in recent months. The comptroller executed payroll deductions for dues from State employees who were members of the AEA and the ASEA. On June 29, 2012, the comptroller issued a "memorandum" to "Affected Organizations" regarding "Act 2010-761 Guidelines (State Comptroller Payroll Deductions, Revised June 2012)." The memorandum also contained a sample "Act 2010-761 Certification Form for Organizations:" if the organization wanted to receive salary deductions from State employees, the form required an individual from the organization to provide a notarized signature and to certify under penalty of being barred from receiving deductions that the organization would "not use any portion of the membership dues collected by payroll deduction from the pay of its members who are State employees for political activity as that term is defined in [the Act]" and that the organization would "provide to the State Comptroller a detailed breakdown of the expenditure of those membership dues not later than the deadline, and using the forms, prescribed by the Comptroller from time to time." The comptroller sent copies of the memorandum to the AEA, the ASEA, and other organizations that were receiving dues from State-employee members via salary deductions. The ASEA submitted its certification to the comptroller, along with a letter from its counsel, stating, in part, that the organization submitted the certification "under protest and without waiving any of its rights as they relate to any ongoing litigation concerning [the Act], or related to the rules and regulations promulgated in your 'Memorandum to Affected Organizations.'" The AEA declined to submit a certification form and thus was deemed ineligible to receive dues via payroll deductions. On August 17, 2012, the AEA, AEA member and State employee Karen John, the ASEA, and ASEA president Randy Hebson sued White in his official capacity as comptroller and the "Office of the State Comptroller" seeking a judgment declaring that the guidelines were void because they had been promulgated without following the procedures required in the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act. The Supreme Court reversed: plaintiffs' action was "due to be dismissed"insofar as it purported to name "the Office of the State Comptroller" as a defendant, and the circuit court was instructed to dismiss the action in that regard. Furthermore, the Court found the circuit court erred in issuing the injunction as plaintiffs did not meet their burden for injunctive relief. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
View "White v. John et al. " on Justia Law