Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1993, Michael Biddle was convicted in South Carolina of a lewd act upon a child, a violation of S.C. Code 16-15-140. He was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment; his sentence was suspended and he was ordered to serve 5 years on probation. Biddle moved to Alabama in January 2014. Under section 15-20A-10 of the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act ("ASORCNA"), Biddle's conviction required that he register as a sex offender, and subjected him to certain residency restrictions. On January 22, 2014, Biddle registered with the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department as a sex offender in compliance with ASORCNA. About a month later, Biddle filed a form averring that he was residing at an address in Jefferson County that was not within 2,000 feet of a school or a child-care facility. Biddle was ultimately indicted for two counts of violating the residency requirements of 15-20A-11. After a bench trial, Biddle was found not guilty on both counts. That same day and in the same proceeding, Biddle filed, in the criminal division of the Jefferson Circuit Court, a petition pursuant to 15-20A-23 that he may be relieved of the residency restrictions of the ASORCNA if he was "terminally ill or permanently immobile." Biddle alleged in his petition that he was terminally ill, that he needed a full-time caregiver, and that his sister lived in Vestavia Hills and would care for him if he resided with her. Biddle did not pay a filing fee to the circuit court for filing his petition, and he did not file the petition as a new civil case. The State filed an objection, challenging the circuit court's jurisdiction and asserting that Biddle's petition was incomplete because he had not paid a filing fee or sought in forma pauperis status. The circuit court granted Biddle's petition for relief, and the State filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court concluded the State had a clear legal right to the relief sought because the circuit court, sitting in a completed criminal case, lacked jurisdiction to relieve Biddle from the residency requirements of the ASORCNA in what should have been a civil proceeding. Biddle should have filed a "new" civil action in order to seek relief from the residency requirements of the ASORCNA. View "Alabama v. Biddle" on Justia Law

The Escambia County Board of Education terminated the employment of John Lambert, a tenured teacher, as the band director at Flomaton High School for leaving a pistol in his school office, which was locked. During the course of his teaching career and military service, Lambert was never charged with neglect of duty, insubordination, or failure to perform duties in a satisfactory manner. Before this incident, no school board had ever taken disciplinary action against Lambert, nor had Scott Hammond, the principal of Flomaton High School, ever disciplined Lambert. Before getting on a bus for a band trip where the students were waiting for Lambert to join them, Lambert placed a small bag on the desk in his office. The bag contained personal items, including clothing, tools, Lambertís checkbook, and 10 20-dollar bills in a folded bank envelope. The bank envelope was in the side pocket of the bag, which was zipped. Lambert placed the bag in his office because he did not want to leave it in his truck overnight while he was away on the trip. According to Lambert, he forgot that a loaded .380 automatic pistol and an additional loaded magazine were in a small case at the bottom of the bag. Both the case containing the pistol and the bag were zipped. The bag was black, and it was impossible to identify the contents of the bag from the exterior of the bag. Lambert, who had a permit for the pistol, testified that both his office door and the door to the band room were locked when he left for the band contest at approximately 8:00 a.m. Around noon that same day, a school custodian notified school administrators that a gun was found on school premises. Only Lambert, the custodian, and the principal had keys to Lambert's office. Lambert acknowledged the pistol was his, and discovered that $80 was missing from the bag. Lambert was placed on administrative leave, then later terminated. He appealed the Board's decision. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the decision of the hearing officer. The Supreme Court, however, reversed. "In light of the fact that this Court has resolved, as a material question of first impression, the standard of review a hearing officer is to apply to an employer's decision to terminate the employment of a tenured teacher, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remand the cause to that court to, in turn, reverse the judgment of the hearing officer and remand the cause to him with instructions to review the sanction imposed against Lambert under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review as that standard [was] articulated in this opinion." View "Ex parte John Lambert." on Justia Law

The Retirement Systems of Alabama ("RSA"), the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama ("TRS"), the Public Education Employees' Health Insurance Plan ("PEEHIP"), the Public Education Employees' Health Insurance Fund ("PEEHIF"), the Board of Control of TRS ("the TRS Board"), the Board of Control of PEEHIP ("the PEEHIP Board"), David Bronner, as chief executive officer of RSA and as secretary-treasurer of TRS and PEEHIP, and various members of the TRS Board and of the PEEHIP Board in their official capacities ("the PEEHIP defendants") sought mandamus review of the Circuit Court's denial of their motion to dismiss the claims filed against them by James Burks II, Eugenia Burks, Martin Hester, Jacqueline Hester, Thomas Highfield, Carol Ann Highfield, Jake Jackson, and Melinda Jackson, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals ("the public-education plaintiffs"). PEEHIP, which is managed by the PEEHIP Board, provided group health-insurance benefits to public-education employees in Alabama. The public-education plaintiffs alleged that a policy adopted by the PEEHIP Board in 2009 changed the amounts participants and their eligible dependents, and this change violated Article V, section 138.03, Alabama Constitution of 1901, as well as the public-education plaintiffs' rights to equal protection, due process, and freedom of association under the Alabama Constitution, the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The public-education plaintiffs also alleged that the 2009 policy violated Alabama public policy and their right to family integrity as protected by the Alabama Constitution. The public-education plaintiffs sought relief in the form of: (1) a judgment declaring "[the PEEHIP defendants'] practice of denying an allotment for insurance benefits to educators who are married to another educator and who have dependent children to be unconstitutional, discriminatory and unlawful under both State and Federal law"; (2) an injunction preventing the PEEHIP defendants from "denying an allotment for insurance benefits to educators whose spouse is also an educator in the public school system and who have dependent children"; (3) restitution of "amounts ... unlawfully withheld and/or ... amounts [the public-education plaintiffs] have paid for insurance that they would not have paid absent [the PEEHIP defendants'] unlawful conduct" or other equitable relief; and (4) costs and attorney fees. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Alabama Supreme Court granted the petition in part, denied in part, and issue a writ to direct the circuit court to dismiss all the public-education plaintiffs' claims against RSA, PEEHIP, the PEEHIP Board, PEEHIF, TRS, the TRS Board, the members of the TRS Board, and Bronner, in his capacity as chief executive officer of RSA and as secretary-treasurer of TRS; to dismiss all the public-education plaintiffs' state-law claims against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP; and to dismiss the public-education plaintiffs' claims against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP, for monetary relief, pursuant to § 1983. The petition was denied with regard to the public-education plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief, pursuant to section 1983, against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP. The PEEHIP Board and Bronner were entitled to immunity from the state law claims, but not to immunity from the Eleventh Amendment claims for prospective injunctive relief under section 1983. View "Ex parte The Retirement Systems of Alabama et al." on Justia Law

Keith Westphal and Joyce Osborn Wilson filed suit against David Northcutt III, DMD, Bobby R. Wells, DMD, Stephen R. Stricklin, DMD, Thomas T. Willis, DMD, Sam J. Citrano, Jr., DMD, William Chesser, DMD, and Sandra Kay Alexander, RDH, in their official capacities as members of the Alabama Board of Dental Examiners. Westphal and Wilson sought a judgment declaring unconstitutional the portion of the Alabama Dental Practice Act, (Sec. 34-9-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975) that made it unlawful for anyone other than a duly licensed dentist to perform teeth-whitening services, and sought a permanent injunction forbidding future enforcement of the prohibition in the Act on teeth-whitening services performed by non-dentists. The parties submitted cross-motions for a summary judgment, and the Jefferson Circuit Court entered a summary judgment in favor of the Dental Board. Westphal and Wilson appealed. But finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Westphal v. Northcutt III" on Justia Law

Dixon Mills Volunteer Fire Department, Inc. and its assistant fire chief, Louis Cass White, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion for summary judgment on the basis of immunity as to negligence claims asserted against them by plaintiffs L.C. Westbrook, Jr., and Kimberly Lewis. Plaintiffs were seriously injured when the automobile they were driving collided with a fire department truck that was dispatched to a house fire. Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court concluded that petitioners established a clear right to mandamus relief as to White, but not to the department itself. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted the petition as to White, and directed the trial court to enter summary judgment in his favor on plaintiffs' negligence claim. The Court denied the petition as to the department. View "Ex parte Dixon Mills Volunteer Fire Department, Inc." on Justia Law

Kevin Geeslin filed this action challenging a "convenience fee" and "token fee" charged in connection with his on-line electronic filing of a civil action (fees assessed in addition to the statutorily defined filing fee that were mandated by a 2012, administrative order issued by then Chief Justice Charles Malone). That 2012 order made it mandatory for parties to file all documents in civil actions on-line, or electronically in civil actions in Alabama circuit courts and district courts by parties represented by an attorney. "AlaFile" required credit-card payment of filing fees and charges users a "convenience fee" in addition to the filing fees. Geeslin filed a putative class action naming as defendants Chief JusticevMalone in his official capacity and On-Line Information Services, Inc. ("On-Line"), the company that managed and maintained the electronic-filing system for the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts ("AOC"). Geeslin alleged that Chief Justice Malone's order was unconstitutional and that the fees collected over and above the statutorily defined filing fee amounted to an illegal tax. Geeslin sought a judgment declaring the convenience fee and another "token fee" unconstitutional and a refund of the fees paid by him and the other putative class members. The Chief Justice and On-Line moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and Geeslin appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of dismissal as it related to all claims against On-Line, to all claims seeking monetary relief and injunctive relief, and to the action asserted against the Chief Justice under section 1983. As to the declaratory-judgment claim against the Chief Justice, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment of dismissal and rendered a judgment in favor of Geeslin. View "Geeslin v. On-Line Information Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The issues presented in three appeals (consolidated for review) were ones of first impression to the Alabama Supreme Court regarding the state Accountability Act (AAA). Plaintiffs Daniel Boyd (superintendent of the Lowndes County Public School System), Anita Gibson (a teacher and president of the Alabama Education Association) and Senator Quinton Ross, Jr. (representative of the 26th District) sued Julie Magee in her official capacity as the Commissioner of Revenue, and Thomas White, Jr. in his official capacity as the state Comptroller. Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the AAA under certain provisions of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 that allowed the substitution of House Bill (HB 84), the creation of certain tax credits, the appropriation of funds for those credits, the repeal of certain tax credits, and the creation of new debt - all in relation to education funding in the State of Alabama. The circuit court entered an order in favor of plaintiffs as to their first eight counts in their complaint. With regard to Counts IX and X, the court concluded the issues were moot. The circuit court then enjoined enforcement of the AAA. The State defendants moved to stay the circuit court order, then appealed. The Supreme Court, after careful consideration of the legislation at issue and the circuit court's order, affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The Court found: (1) no subsequent act of the Legislature mooted any issue presented here; and (2) the AAA was constitutional with regard to all of plaintiffs' allegations that it was not. The case was remanded for further proceedings on those issues deemed moot by the circuit court; the court was affirmed in all other respects. View "Magee v. Boyd" on Justia Law

Glenn Bynum and Larry Gipson appealed a trial court's order holding that certain amendments to section 28-2A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 (pertaining to the sale of alcoholic beverages in a municipality), were constitutional. After review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) it was clear that the Alabama legislature intended to omit 3 counties from inclusion in Act No. 2009-546 allowing municipalities with a population of more than 1,000 to hold elections regarding the sale of alcohol in their municipal limits; and (2) it was clear that the legislature did not include a severability clause in Act No. 2009-546. The legislature included a general severability provision in the Alabama Code, which the Supreme Court regarded as an expression of legislative intent concerning the general power and duty of the judiciary to sever and save statutory provisions not tainted by the unconstitutionality of other provisions in the statute. However, the Court reasoned that the inclusion of a severability clause in a particular act was a clear statement of a legislative intent to sever unconstitutional provisions in that act while allowing the constitutional provisions to remain. Municipalities with more than 1,000 residents in 64 counties have held elections on whether to sell alcohol. The exclusion of the 3 counties from the provisions of Act No. 2009-546 violated the Equal Protection Clause where the exclusion was not rationally related to the regulation of alcohol because no basis existed for excluding smaller cities within those 3 counties from participating in a "wet" or "dry" election and allowing smaller cities in the remaining 64 counties to do so. However, using severability to save Act No. 2009-546 was not permissible where it was obvious that the legislature excluded the three counties for no rational reason, and to edit Act No. 2009-546 by severing that language excluding the three counties would be to undermine the clear intent of the legislature. The Supreme Court left "it to the legislature to redraft a constitutionally sound law." Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bynum v. City of Oneonta et al." on Justia Law

The Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham ("the Board") petitions for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order granting the motion filed by the Alabama Surface Mining Commission ("ASMC") seeking to transfer the underlying action to Walker County. Shepherd Bend, LLC, joined ASMC's transfer motion. Upon review of the briefs submitted in this case, the Supreme Court concluded the Board demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief it sought; venue was indeed proper in Jefferson County. Therefore, the Court granted the petition and issued the writ directing the circuit court to vacate its order transferring the action to Walker County. View "Ex parte Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham." on Justia Law

The City of Florence, the Civil Service Board of the City of Florence ("the CSB") and Keith McDaniel appealed separately a circuit court judgment after a jury rendered its verdict in favor of William T. Ezell. In mid 2011, two positions for promotion to the job of battalion chief became available within the Florence Fire and Rescue Department. Benjamin Cochran, Melvin Brown, Tim Clanton, John T. Muse, McDaniel, and Ezell applied for the positions. The CSB conducted interviews with the candidates on September 1, 2011. Afterward, it promoted Cochran and McDaniel to the two battalion-chief positions. On September 12, 2011, Ezell filed a two-count complaint against the City and the CSB in the Lauderdale Circuit Court. A month later, the City and the CSB filed an answer in which they denied Ezell's allegations. They also asserted that Ezell had failed to join certain indispensable parties. The City and CSB simultaneously filed a motion to dismiss count 1 of the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing that all six applicants were indispensable parties. They then asked that count 1 of the complaint be dismissed or that Ezell be required to add Cochran, Brown, Clanton, Muse, and McDaniel as defendants. The trial court ordered Ezell to amend his complaint to make Cochran, Brown, Clanton, Muse, and McDaniel parties to the suit. Ezell amended count 1 of his complaint and also added the other applicants as defendants. The City and the CSB filed an answer to the amended complaint in which they denied Ezell's allegations and argued that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The jury returned the following verdict: "We are not reasonably satisfied that the decision of the [CSB] was correct and we find that the following 2 individuals should be promoted to Battalion Chief (pick two) ... Benjamin Cochran ... William Ezell." The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict and ordered that the status quo be maintained during the pendency of any appellate proceedings. The City, the CSB, and McDaniel filed posttrial motions, which the trial court denied. McDaniel appealed to the Supreme Court (docketed as case no. 1130372). The City and the CSB also appealed to the Supreme Court (docketed as case no. 1130373). Because Ezell failed to demonstrate that he had a right to appeal the CSB's decision, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain his appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed these appeals with instructions to the trial court to vacate its judgment. View "City of Florence v. Ezell" on Justia Law