Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Brenda Franks was a former nontenured employee of the Choctaw County Public School System. Before the 2008-2009 school year, Franks had been employed as a full-time counselor in the school system for three years when her contract was not renewed. For the 2008-2009 school year, Franks was offered and accepted a part-time, temporary position as a vocational counselor starting in February 2009. She signed an employment contract acknowledging that the position was temporary. She also signed a "Letter of Understanding Concerning Temporary Employment." Franks worked pursuant to the contract for five months. The superintendent notified Franks, in writing, of her intention to recommend that the School Board members cancel the contract because of a "justifiable decrease in jobs in the system." The Board members approved the recommendation to cancel the contract. Franks did not contest the cancellation. In July 2010, the Board members posted a vacancy for a business-education teacher. Franks applied for the position, but was not hired. Franks sued the Board and Superintendent, asserting that the Board members had terminated her employment based on a reduction in force ("RIF"), but that she was entitled to be hired for the teaching position pursuant to the RIF policy. Franks sought to be instated to that position, with backpay, interest, and restoration of progress toward tenure. However, Franks died prior to the conclusion of this suit. Petitioners Ronald Hampton, Darry Phillips, Wayne Taylor, Isaac Johnson, and Sharon Sheppard, the individual members of the Choctaw County Board of Education, and Sue Moore, the superintendent of the Choctaw County Public School System sought an order compelling the Choctaw Circuit Court to vacate its denial of their summary-judgment motion and to enter summary judgment in their favor on the ground that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims because of plaintiff's death and the petitioners' immunity. The Supreme Court concluded that the superintendent and the Board members demonstrated immunity and established a clear legal right to a summary judgment on the claims asserted against them in their official capacities. Therefore, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued a writ directing the Choctaw Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the petitioners' summary-judgment motion and to enter a summary judgment on all the claims asserted against the superintendent and the Board members. View "Ex parte Ronald Hampton, et al." on Justia Law

Dothan/Houston County Communications District and Ozark/Dale County E-911, Inc. ("the districts"), sued Century Tel of Alabama, LLC ("CTA"), and Qwest Communications Company, LLC (collectively, "the defendants"), seeking, among other things, to recover E-911 charges that the defendants were alleged to have not properly billed and collected in accordance with the Emergency Telephone Service Act ("ETSA"). The defendants moved the circuit court to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. The circuit court denied the defendants' motion. The defendants then petitioned the Supreme Court for permission to appeal from the circuit court's interlocutory order. The defendants contended that the "repealed-statute rule" prohibited the districts from suing to collect unpaid 911 charges requested to be levied prior to October 1, 2013. Specifically, the defendants argued that no cause of action could be brought for violation of a statute after that statute had been repealed. Further, the defendants argued that the districts' claims were barred because the ETSA did not authorize a private right of action against telephone-service providers for failing to bill and collect the 911 charges from subscribers. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. The Court found the statute at issue here was not repealed by subsequent acts by the Legislature, but amended, and civil actions were expressly authorized by Alabama law to bill and collect the 911 fees used by E-911 services to operate and maintain the emergency-communications system. View "Century Tel of Alabama, LLC v. Dothan/Houston Cty Comm. Dist." on Justia Law

The Alabama Corrections Institution Finance Authority ("ACIFA") and its ex officio vice president Kim Thomas appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding $5 million in compensatory damages to Albert Wilson, Donald Simmons, Rufus Barnes, Bryan Gavins, Joseph Danzey, and a class of current and former nonexempt correctional officers ("the correctional officers") employed by the Alabama Department of Corrections ("ADOC"). The correctional officers originally filed suit alleging that ADOC was violating its own regulations and state law in the manner in which it: (1) compensated correctional officers for overtime; (2) restricted the way correctional officers were allowed to use earned leave; and (3) paid correctional officers the daily subsistence allowance provided by law. The plaintiffs also sought class certification on behalf of all other similarly situated correctional officers employed by ADOC and requested injunctive relief, as well as money damages, to include backpay with interest, punitive damages, and litigation costs and expenses, including attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment entered on the jury's verdict: "Suffice to say, [the correctional officers] failed to present substantial evidence of a connection between ACIFA and the supervision of the correctional officers or how the correctional officers are paid. Without evidence indicating that ACIFA had anything to do with the personnel policies at issue or how correctional officers' pay is determined and distributed or the funds that are used to pay correctional officers, ACIFA cannot be held liable for the harms the correctional officers allege they suffered. Because of the lack of substantial evidence in support of the claims made by the correctional officers against ACIFA and against Thomas as ex officio vice president of ACIFA, the defendants were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on those claims." View "Alabama Corrections Institution Finance Authority v. Wilson" on Justia Law

John R. Cooper, in his official capacity as director of the Alabama Department of Transportation ("ALDOT"), appealed a Circuit Court's December 16, 2014, order enjoining him from prohibiting Eddie Ziegler, Lisa Ziegler Player, Jennifer Ziegler Cousins, Angela Gay Ziegler Bracknell, and Cathy Donaldson (referred to collectively as "the Zieglers"), from obtaining legal permits to build seven to eight houses on the Zieglers' property or from otherwise interfering with the Zieglers' plans and likewise enjoining Cooper from withholding consent for the building of those houses in the event the Zieglers obtain the required permits. Because the Supreme Court found that Cooper was entitled to sovereign immunity, it reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cooper v. Ziegler" on Justia Law

The State of Alabama, on behalf of Rick Allison, Probate Judge of Walker County, appealed a Walker Circuit Court judgment entered in favor of Jill Farris, the county administrator for Walker County. By statute, Judge Allison, as the chief elections officer for Walker County, must publish certain voter lists and election notices. Judge Allison argued on appeal, as he did in the circuit court, that he had the authority to determine in which newspaper of general circulation notices would be published and that he could also contract with that newspaper for the cost of publishing the notices. Farris argued Judge Allison did not follow established procedure by obtaining competitive bids for the pricing of such publishing. The Supreme Court As chief election officer for Walker County pursuant to statute, Judge Allison could contract to publish the notices he is required to publish. The Court reversed the circuit court's judgment insofar as it held otherwise. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including a determination of whether Judge Allison substantially complied with the competitive-bid law and, if so, whether Judge Allison's request for attorney fees was appropriate. View "State of Alabama ex rel. Allison, v. Farris" on Justia Law

The City of Birmingham sued "Bonedaddy's of Lee Branch" for failing to pay its business-license taxes, occupational taxes, interest, penalties and fees for multiple years since the business' formation in 2007. The City alleged that the defendants had failed and refused to submit business records and tax returns for the periods that were the subject of the complaint; that the defendants were currently engaged in business in the City of Birmingham in violation of the City's business-license code; and that notice of the final tax assessments had been mailed but that no payments had been forthcoming. The City asked the trial court to enter a preliminary injunction directing the defendants to refrain from further conducting business within the City and causing the sheriff to padlock the defendants' place of business in the City. The trial court ultimately granted the City's request, and Bonedaddy's was prohibited from further business until its back-taxes were paid. Cowan and Bonedaddy's argued on appeal that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a final judgment against defendant John Cowan in this case because, they say, the City did not comply with certain provisions of the Alabama Taxpayers' Bill of Rights and Uniform Revenue Procedures Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the City had issued a final sales-tax assessment against Bonedaddy's. The notice of final assessment, however, did not name Cowan individually as the taxpayer nor was the notice mailed to Cowan. Additionally, the City did not present any evidence at trial to indicate that it had ever issued a final sales-tax assessment against Cowan per se. Based on the evidence presented at trial, it did not appear that the City complied with the requirements of the TBOR with regard to Cowan. The Court reversed the trial court with respect to Cowan's responsibility to pay Bonedaddy's outstanding sale taxes, but affirmed with regard to the tax assessments against Bonedaddy's itself. View "Bonedaddy's of Lee Branch, LLC v. City of Birmingham" on Justia Law

Defendant Jimmy Walker petitioned for mandamus relief following the circuit court's denial of his motion for summary judgment. While plaintiff Jeremy Deason was was incarcerated, he participated in a Department of Corrections work-release program and was assigned to an inmate construction detail; Walker, who was employed as a "carpenter supervisor" with DOC's Correctional Industries Division, served as Deason's work-release supervisor. In 2010, Deason suffered an on-the-job injury when scaffolding he and Walker were dismantling collapsed. Before both Deason and Walker's ascent onto the scaffolding, Walker had performed a visual inspection of the scaffolding and the "mud plates," which prevent scaffolding from settling, in order to assess the stability of the scaffolding; according to Walker, the scaffolding appeared secure before Deason started ascending. As a result of his injuries, Deason sued, among other defendants, numerous DOC officials, including Walker, whom Deason sued only in his individual capacity. Specifically, as to Walker, Deason contended that Walker "started climbing the scaffold on the same side as [Deason] knowing that the scaffold was not set up properly for workers to climb the same side at the same time." The Supreme Court granted relief: "the record is devoid of any evidence indicating - and Deason does not establish - either that Walker violated any applicable DOC rule or regulation governing his conduct or that Walker was acting 'willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, [or] in bad faith' in the exercise of judgment in regard to the scaffolding when Deason was injured. Therefore, Walker has successfully demonstrated that he is entitled to State-agent immunity as to Deason's tort claims." View "Ex parte Jimmy Walker." on Justia Law

In 1993, Michael Biddle was convicted in South Carolina of a lewd act upon a child, a violation of S.C. Code 16-15-140. He was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment; his sentence was suspended and he was ordered to serve 5 years on probation. Biddle moved to Alabama in January 2014. Under section 15-20A-10 of the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act ("ASORCNA"), Biddle's conviction required that he register as a sex offender, and subjected him to certain residency restrictions. On January 22, 2014, Biddle registered with the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department as a sex offender in compliance with ASORCNA. About a month later, Biddle filed a form averring that he was residing at an address in Jefferson County that was not within 2,000 feet of a school or a child-care facility. Biddle was ultimately indicted for two counts of violating the residency requirements of 15-20A-11. After a bench trial, Biddle was found not guilty on both counts. That same day and in the same proceeding, Biddle filed, in the criminal division of the Jefferson Circuit Court, a petition pursuant to 15-20A-23 that he may be relieved of the residency restrictions of the ASORCNA if he was "terminally ill or permanently immobile." Biddle alleged in his petition that he was terminally ill, that he needed a full-time caregiver, and that his sister lived in Vestavia Hills and would care for him if he resided with her. Biddle did not pay a filing fee to the circuit court for filing his petition, and he did not file the petition as a new civil case. The State filed an objection, challenging the circuit court's jurisdiction and asserting that Biddle's petition was incomplete because he had not paid a filing fee or sought in forma pauperis status. The circuit court granted Biddle's petition for relief, and the State filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court concluded the State had a clear legal right to the relief sought because the circuit court, sitting in a completed criminal case, lacked jurisdiction to relieve Biddle from the residency requirements of the ASORCNA in what should have been a civil proceeding. Biddle should have filed a "new" civil action in order to seek relief from the residency requirements of the ASORCNA. View "Alabama v. Biddle" on Justia Law

The Escambia County Board of Education terminated the employment of John Lambert, a tenured teacher, as the band director at Flomaton High School for leaving a pistol in his school office, which was locked. During the course of his teaching career and military service, Lambert was never charged with neglect of duty, insubordination, or failure to perform duties in a satisfactory manner. Before this incident, no school board had ever taken disciplinary action against Lambert, nor had Scott Hammond, the principal of Flomaton High School, ever disciplined Lambert. Before getting on a bus for a band trip where the students were waiting for Lambert to join them, Lambert placed a small bag on the desk in his office. The bag contained personal items, including clothing, tools, Lambertís checkbook, and 10 20-dollar bills in a folded bank envelope. The bank envelope was in the side pocket of the bag, which was zipped. Lambert placed the bag in his office because he did not want to leave it in his truck overnight while he was away on the trip. According to Lambert, he forgot that a loaded .380 automatic pistol and an additional loaded magazine were in a small case at the bottom of the bag. Both the case containing the pistol and the bag were zipped. The bag was black, and it was impossible to identify the contents of the bag from the exterior of the bag. Lambert, who had a permit for the pistol, testified that both his office door and the door to the band room were locked when he left for the band contest at approximately 8:00 a.m. Around noon that same day, a school custodian notified school administrators that a gun was found on school premises. Only Lambert, the custodian, and the principal had keys to Lambert's office. Lambert acknowledged the pistol was his, and discovered that $80 was missing from the bag. Lambert was placed on administrative leave, then later terminated. He appealed the Board's decision. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the decision of the hearing officer. The Supreme Court, however, reversed. "In light of the fact that this Court has resolved, as a material question of first impression, the standard of review a hearing officer is to apply to an employer's decision to terminate the employment of a tenured teacher, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remand the cause to that court to, in turn, reverse the judgment of the hearing officer and remand the cause to him with instructions to review the sanction imposed against Lambert under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review as that standard [was] articulated in this opinion." View "Ex parte John Lambert." on Justia Law

The Retirement Systems of Alabama ("RSA"), the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama ("TRS"), the Public Education Employees' Health Insurance Plan ("PEEHIP"), the Public Education Employees' Health Insurance Fund ("PEEHIF"), the Board of Control of TRS ("the TRS Board"), the Board of Control of PEEHIP ("the PEEHIP Board"), David Bronner, as chief executive officer of RSA and as secretary-treasurer of TRS and PEEHIP, and various members of the TRS Board and of the PEEHIP Board in their official capacities ("the PEEHIP defendants") sought mandamus review of the Circuit Court's denial of their motion to dismiss the claims filed against them by James Burks II, Eugenia Burks, Martin Hester, Jacqueline Hester, Thomas Highfield, Carol Ann Highfield, Jake Jackson, and Melinda Jackson, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals ("the public-education plaintiffs"). PEEHIP, which is managed by the PEEHIP Board, provided group health-insurance benefits to public-education employees in Alabama. The public-education plaintiffs alleged that a policy adopted by the PEEHIP Board in 2009 changed the amounts participants and their eligible dependents, and this change violated Article V, section 138.03, Alabama Constitution of 1901, as well as the public-education plaintiffs' rights to equal protection, due process, and freedom of association under the Alabama Constitution, the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The public-education plaintiffs also alleged that the 2009 policy violated Alabama public policy and their right to family integrity as protected by the Alabama Constitution. The public-education plaintiffs sought relief in the form of: (1) a judgment declaring "[the PEEHIP defendants'] practice of denying an allotment for insurance benefits to educators who are married to another educator and who have dependent children to be unconstitutional, discriminatory and unlawful under both State and Federal law"; (2) an injunction preventing the PEEHIP defendants from "denying an allotment for insurance benefits to educators whose spouse is also an educator in the public school system and who have dependent children"; (3) restitution of "amounts ... unlawfully withheld and/or ... amounts [the public-education plaintiffs] have paid for insurance that they would not have paid absent [the PEEHIP defendants'] unlawful conduct" or other equitable relief; and (4) costs and attorney fees. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Alabama Supreme Court granted the petition in part, denied in part, and issue a writ to direct the circuit court to dismiss all the public-education plaintiffs' claims against RSA, PEEHIP, the PEEHIP Board, PEEHIF, TRS, the TRS Board, the members of the TRS Board, and Bronner, in his capacity as chief executive officer of RSA and as secretary-treasurer of TRS; to dismiss all the public-education plaintiffs' state-law claims against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP; and to dismiss the public-education plaintiffs' claims against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP, for monetary relief, pursuant to § 1983. The petition was denied with regard to the public-education plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief, pursuant to section 1983, against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP. The PEEHIP Board and Bronner were entitled to immunity from the state law claims, but not to immunity from the Eleventh Amendment claims for prospective injunctive relief under section 1983. View "Ex parte The Retirement Systems of Alabama et al." on Justia Law