Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Tuscaloosa City Council passed an ordinance limiting the maximum occupancy of certain restaurants, affecting a sports bar owned by CMB Holdings Group. The ordinance required establishments with restaurant liquor licenses to maintain occupancy limits based on their configuration as restaurants, not as bars or entertainment venues. This change reduced the sports bar's maximum occupancy from 519 to 287, negatively impacting its revenue. CMB Holdings Group sued the City of Tuscaloosa, the mayor, city council members, and the fire marshal, alleging racial discrimination and other claims.The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court dismissed most of CMB's claims, including those for money damages against the City and personal-capacity claims against the mayor and councilors due to legislative immunity. The court also dismissed claims for procedural and substantive due process, equal protection, and others, leaving only claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Alabama Constitution's Contracts Clause. CMB requested the court to alter or amend its judgment or certify it as final for appeal purposes. The court denied the request to alter or amend but granted the Rule 54(b) certification, allowing CMB to appeal the dismissed claims.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the Rule 54(b) certification was improper. The court found that the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims were closely intertwined, particularly regarding whether the ordinance affected vested rights or mere privileges and whether it served a legitimate public interest. The court concluded that separate adjudication could lead to inconsistent results and dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. View "CMB Holdings Groupv. City of Tuscaloosa" on Justia Law

The City of Helena appealed a decision by the Shelby Circuit Court that allowed the Pelham Board of Education (PBE) to acquire, develop, and use a piece of real property within Helena's corporate limits for an athletic field and parking lot to serve Pelham High School students. The property, purchased by the PBE in 2021, is adjacent to Pelham High School but located within Helena. Helena argued that the PBE lacked the authority to construct and operate school facilities outside Pelham's corporate limits and that the project violated Helena's zoning ordinance.The Shelby Circuit Court ruled in favor of the PBE, stating that city zoning ordinances do not apply to governmental functions performed by a government body. The court found that the PBE's construction of the athletic field was a governmental function related to public education, which is exempt from local zoning regulations. Helena appealed, arguing that the PBE's actions were not authorized under Alabama Code § 16-11-9 and that the project did not comply with Helena's zoning ordinance.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that § 16-11-9 does not restrict a city board of education's powers to the geographic boundaries of the city it serves. The court also concluded that the PBE's construction and operation of the athletic field constituted a governmental function related to public education, which is exempt from municipal zoning ordinances. Therefore, Helena's zoning ordinance could not be enforced against the PBE's project. The court affirmed the circuit court's order, allowing the PBE to proceed with the development and use of the property. View "City of Helena v. Pelham Board of Education" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the City of Gulf Shores and Coyote Beach Sports, LLC. The city passed a municipal ordinance regulating the motor-scooter-rental business, which required renters to possess a specific type of license. Coyote Beach Sports, a Louisiana-based company that rented motor scooters in Gulf Shores, claimed that this ordinance effectively halted its business as most customers did not possess the required license. Consequently, Coyote filed a complaint against the city, seeking a judgment declaring the ordinance invalid, monetary damages, and attorney fees and costs.The case was first heard in the Baldwin Circuit Court where, after a jury trial, the court declared the ordinance preempted by state law. The jury awarded Coyote $200,416.12 in compensatory damages. The city appealed the trial court's judgment. Later, Coyote filed a motion for attorney fees, and the trial court awarded Coyote $59,320 in attorney fees without holding a hearing. The city appealed this order as well.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and the issue of whether the municipal ordinance was preempted by state law. The court concluded that the ordinance was not preempted under any of the three recognized circumstances under which municipal ordinances are preempted by state law. The court found a distinct difference between the state's requirement for a license to operate a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle and a municipality's regulation of the rental of such vehicles. The court also found no conflict between the ordinance and state law. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the judgment of the circuit court and the order awarding Coyote attorney fees, remanding the matters for further proceedings. View "City of Gulf Shores v. Coyote Beach Sports, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute regarding the office of constable for the District 59 election precinct in Jefferson County, Alabama. Frederick Burkes, Sr. won the 2020 Democratic party primary for the office and was declared and certified as the winner. Prior to assuming office, he filed a bond as required by state law. However, James Franklin contended that the bond was not timely filed as it was not filed within 40 days of the declaration of Burkes's election. Consequently, Jefferson Probate Judge James Naftel declared the office of constable for District 59 vacant, leading to Governor Kay Ivey appointing Franklin to the office.Burkes initiated a quo warranto action against Franklin, challenging his appointment. The trial court ruled in favor of Franklin, a decision that was appealed by Burkes. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court found that Burkes had indeed filed his official bond on time, as per § 11-2-6 of the Alabama Code. However, Burkes's argument before the trial court was framed around a perceived conflict between § 36-5-2 and § 36-23-4 of the Alabama Code, not § 11-2-6. As a result, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's decision because Burkes had not presented an argument concerning § 11-2-6 to the trial court. View "State of Alabama ex rel. Burkes v. Franklin" on Justia Law

In this case, Fred Zackery sought access to confidential settlement agreements between the Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Gadsden ("the Board") and various carpet and chemical manufacturers. Zackery requested these agreements under the Open Records Act. The Board had sued the manufacturers, alleging they contaminated the Board's raw water intake. The Board settled with all the manufacturers and planned to use the settlement funds to build and maintain a new water-treatment facility.Zackery, a citizen of Gadsden and a local radio station manager, intervened in the lawsuit specifically to request disclosure of the settlement agreements. The trial court granted his intervention but ruled that the Board didn't have to disclose the agreements until it had accepted a bid for the construction of the water-treatment facility. This decision was grounded in Alabama's Competitive Bid Law, which is designed to guard against corruption and favoritism in awarding contracts for public projects.The Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the trial court's decision, affirming that the immediate disclosure of the settlements could interfere with the competitive bid process, potentially driving bids upwards and leaving fewer funds for the long-term operation and maintenance of the new facility. This situation, the court reasoned, could cause rate hikes for the Board's customers. Therefore, the court concluded that an exception to the Open Records Act justified nondisclosure of the settlement agreements until the competitive-bid process was complete. View "Zackery v. Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Gadsden" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Alabama, Emma Louie, Garry Rice, and Toice Goodson, employees of the Greene County Board of Education, sought a writ of mandamus directing the Greene Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor, asserting that they are protected by State-agent immunity. The claims against them were brought by Ester Eaton and Anthony Eaton, who alleged negligence and loss of consortium after Ester Eaton, a substitute teacher, was attacked while supervising a classroom of students in the Alternative Program and in-school suspension (ISS). The defendants argued that their supposed violations of school policies were in fact based on discretionary decisions, not violations of specific, mandatory rules, thus entitling them to State-agent immunity.The Supreme Court of Alabama agreed with the defendants, ruling that the school guidelines in question were not specific, nondiscretionary rules, but rather allowed for administrative discretion. As such, the court found that the defendants' actions fell within the scope of their discretion as state agents, and they were therefore entitled to State-agent immunity. Consequently, the court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Ex parte Louie" on Justia Law

The Ohio Valley Conference ("the OVC" -- a collegiate athletic conference) appealed a judgment dismissing its official-capacity and individual-capacity claims against Randall Jones, the Chair of the Board of Trustees of Jacksonville State University ("JSU"), and Don C. Killingsworth, Jr., the President of Jacksonville State University. On February 3, 2021, JSU informed the OVC that it intended to resign its OVC membership effective June 30, 2021. OVC filed this action against JSU, Jones, and Killingsworth, seeking a declaratory judgment and alleging breach of contract -- focusing solely on JSU's failure to pay the conference-resignation fee described in Article 4.5.3 of the OVC Constitution. The complaint also asserted one count against JSU -- conversion -- focusing solely on the OVC's allegation that JSU had failed to pay $15,000 for tickets received from the OVC for the OVC's 2021 conference championship basketball tournament. The complaint also asserted two counts against JSU -- promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment -- that incorporated both the conference-resignation fee and the value of the tickets to the conference championship basketball tournament as elements of damages. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded: the OVC's claims against Jones and Killingsworth in their official capacities seeking payment for the liquidated amount of the conference-resignation fee and for the value of the tickets JSU received for the OVC's 2021 conference championship basketball tournament did not constitute claims against the State, and, therefore, they were not barred by State immunity. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in dismissing the OVC's official-capacity claims against Jones and Killingsworth. However, the Court found the OVC failed to state individual-capacity claims against Jones and Killingsworth for which relief could be granted because Jones and Killingsworth lacked any duty apart from their official positions to make the payments the OVC sought to recover and because the OVC's complaint did not supply the factual allegations necessary to support those individual-capacity claims. View "Ohio Valley Conference v. Jones, et al." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the City of Orange Beach ("the City") appealed a judgment entered in favor of Ian Boles in regard to a dispute over the City's inspection of Boles' property. Between 2013 and 2015 Boles constructed two eight-bedroom duplexes on property he owned located within the City limits ("the beachfront property"). In September 2015, Boles filed a building-permit application seeking a permit to construct two additional multiple-level duplexes on the beachfront property. Additionally, in October 2015, Boles filed a separate building-permit application for the construction of a single-family dwelling on another parcel of property that Boles owned within the City limits ("the Burkhart Drive property"). At the time of each permit request, Boles completed a "Home Builders Affidavit" attesting that he was the owner of the property; that he would be acting as his own contractor on the proposed project, which would not be offered for sale; and that he was, thus, exempt from the requirement that he be licensed under Alabama's Home Builders Licensure Law. The building-permit packages provided to Boles explained that a certificate of occupancy for the proposed structure would not be issued until, among other things, "a subcontractor list has been submitted to the [City's] Finance Department." Boles also received with each package a blank subcontractor form for identifying all subcontractors for the proposed project, which specified that it was due within 10 days of the issuance of the building permits. Boles proceeded with construction on the two properties without completing or returning the subcontractor form for either property. Boles's electrical subcontractor apparently contacted the City to request an electrical meter-release inspection upon completion of the electrical portion of that project; the City refused. Boles contended the City either lacked the authority to and/or were exceeding their authority in refusing to inspect the beachfront property until the City received information to which, according to Boles, it was not entitled. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred both in submitting Boles's damages claims to a jury and in denying the City's motion seeking a judgment as a matter of law. The trial court's judgment was reversed, and these matters were remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Orange Beach v. Boles." on Justia Law

With the onset of COVID-19, the Alabama Department of Labor received a record number of applications for unemployment benefits. The Department struggled to process the additional million-plus applications in a timely fashion. The plaintiffs-appellants in this case were among the many individuals who experienced delays in the handling of their applications. They brought this lawsuit in an effort to jumpstart the administrative-approval process. In their operative joint complaint, each plaintiff raised multiple claims for relief, all of which sought to compel the Alabama Secretary of Labor, Fitzgerald Washington, to improve the speed and manner in which the Department processes their applications for unemployment benefits. Secretary Washington responded to the suit by asking the circuit court to dismiss all claims against him, arguing (among other things) that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the suit because the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted mandatory administrative remedies. After the circuit court granted that motion, the plaintiffs appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court. The Supreme Court agreed with Secretary Washington that the Legislature prohibited courts from exercising jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims at this stage. The Court therefore affirmed the circuit court's judgment of dismissal. View "Johnson, et al. v. Washington" on Justia Law

This appeal related to "electronic-bingo" operations conducted by the Department of Alabama Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States ("the VFW") at some of its Alabama posts. Travis Whaley and Randall Lovvorn contracted with the VFW to superintend and promote its electronic-bingo operations. Between 1997 and 2013, Whaley served the VFW as adjutant, commander, and quartermaster at different times. For his part, Lovvorn served as the VFW's accountant. The VFW contracted with G2 Operations, Inc. ("G2"), to conduct its electronic-bingo operations. Under contract, G2 agreed to conduct electronic-bingo operations at VFW posts throughout Alabama, and the VFW would receive 10% of the gross revenue. All the proceeds from electronic bingo were deposited into a VFW bank account. The VFW also entered into contracts with Whaley and Lovvorn, assigning them specific roles in its electronic-bingo operations. Several years later, after being notified of a tax penalty from the IRS, the VFW discovered a shortfall of $1,782,368.88 from what it should have received under its contracts with G2. The VFW filed a complaint asserting claims against G2 as well as additional claims against other parties, which were eventually whittled down throughout litigation until only claims against Whaley and Lovvorn remained. A jury reached a verdict against Whaley and Lovvorn on VFW's claims of breach of contract, fraudulent suppression, and conversion, awarding $1,782,368.88 in compensatory damages and $2,000,000 in punitive damages. Because the VFW's claims rely upon its own involvement in illegal transactions, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered judgment in favor of Whaley and Lovvorn. View "Whaley, et al. v. Dept. of Alabama Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States" on Justia Law