Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

T.J. sought a writ of mandamus to order the Montgomery Juvenile Court to adjudicate T.J. as the presumed father of S.W. (the child) and to vacate the juvenile court's order authorizing genetic testing to establish the child's paternity. In 2009, T.J. filed a petition in the juvenile court seeking custody of the child. T.J. contended that in his custody petition he alleged that he was the biological father of the child and that the child had lived with him since the child was born. The mother filed a petition seeking custody of the child. According to the briefs filed with the Supreme Court, the mother named "J.H." as the father of the child. The mother filed a motion requesting genetic testing of T.J. and J.H. to establish paternity of the child. T.J. objected. That same day, T.J. filed a motion to reconsider and an affidavit of paternity with the juvenile court. The juvenile court found that, because T.J. was incarcerated at the time the child was conceived and the mother was five months' pregnant when T.J. was released from prison, it was "unlikely" that T.J. in good faith believed he was the biological father of the child. Based on this finding, the juvenile court concluded that T.J. could not be the child's presumed father and authorized the genetic testing. On December 29, 2010, T.J. filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Court of Civil Appeals, asking that court to direct the juvenile court to adjudicate him, the presumed father of the child and to vacate the order authorizing genetic testing to determine the paternity of the child. The Court of Civil Appeals denied the petition on the ground that, because there was no record of the proceedings before the juvenile court, there was no way to know whether T.J. had presented sufficient evidence from which to determine that he had held the child out to the public as his natural child. Based on the briefs submitted to the Court, the evidence in that regard was disputed. Therefore, the Court could not conclude that there was sufficient evidence to hold that T.J. was the presumed father of the child. The Court remanded the case back to the juvenile court for further factfinding. View "In re: R.W. v. T.J." on Justia Law

Respondents James Casey, Sr. and his daughter Julie Toner sought a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss Petitioner Jo Ann Casey's (Julie's mother) petition to remove a guardianship and conservatorship proceeding from probate court to the circuit court. In 2008, Jo Ann filed for divorce. In her petition, Jo Ann alleged that James Sr. had committed domestic violence against her. According to James Sr. and Julie, the divorce proceeding was initiated as the result of undue influence exerted on Jo Ann by James Casey Jr. James Sr. moved to dismiss the divorce on the grounds that the then 74-year-old Jo Ann was mentally incompetent. The domestic-relations court held that James Sr.'s motion was moot, but the record never reflected why. Nevertheless, the court set the divorce for trial. James Sr. moved to have Jo Ann undergo an independent medical examination and for the court to appoint her a guardian ad litem. Jo Ann refused the examination, and moved the probate court to remove the guardianship proceeding to the circuit court. James Sr. and Julie argued on appeal that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to remove the guardianship proceeding when it entered the removal order. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the probate court had not entered an order creating a guardianship or conservatorship for Jo Ann. "Logically, because no guardianship or conservatorship has been created for Jo Ann, there [was] no 'administration or conduct' of such guardianship or conservatorship to be removed from the probate court to the circuit court." Accordingly, the Court dismissed the removal petition and issued the writ. View "Casey v. Casey" on Justia Law

In May 2008, seven-year-old Jordan Alexander Robertson was placed in foster care at the home of Verlin Spurgeon and Carol Spurgeon. In June 2008, Jordan drowned in the Spurgeons' swimming pool. James Brakefield, as administrator of Jordan's estate, sued the Spurgeons, among others, in circuit court alleging that they had negligently and/or wantonly caused Jordan's death. The Spurgeons moved the circuit court for a summary judgment, alleging, among other things, that the claims were barred by the doctrines of parental, State, and State-agent immunity. The circuit court denied the motion. The Spurgeons petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss the claims against them. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted their petition in part and issued the writ to direct the circuit court to dismiss the negligence claims against the Spurgeons. In all other respects, the Court denied the petition. View "Brakefield v. Alabama Dept. of Human Resources" on Justia Law

C.E. (Mother) appealed the reversal of a Juvenile Court judgment originally in her favor. This case arose from T.C.'s (Father) proposal to relocate the parties' two minor children to New York State. In 2006, the Juvenile Court awarded T.C. primary physical custody of the children and awarded C.E. visitation. Both parties were awarded joint legal custody. In November 2008, T.C. sent C.E. a certified letter to notify her of his plan to relocate to New York with the children. The notice was in "substantial compliance" with the Alabama Parent-Child Relationship Protection Act. One month later, C.E. sent the father notice that she objected to the relocation. Furthermore, C.E. petitioned the court for an order to prohibit the relocation. The father filed a motion to dismiss as untimely filed. The court denied the father's motion, which he appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. The appellate court concluded that C.E. had waived her right to file an action to oppose the relocation because her petition in Juvenile Court was not timely filed and reversed. A few days after the appeals court issued its judgment, C.E. filed an action in juvenile court to modify custody. T.C. moved to dismiss, and the court entered a "status quo" order. T.C. then petitioned for a writ of mandamus with the appellate court, arguing the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the modification action. The appellate court ultimately granted T.C.'s petition for mandamus, and ordered the Juvenile Court to vacate its status quo order. C.E. then appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that both the Juvenile Court and Court of Civil Appeals lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in addressing the merits of the issues raised by the parties. The Court found that the Juvenile Court's decision that C.E. sought to reinstate was void for lack of jurisdiction; the appellate court likewise lacked jurisdiction and should have dismissed T.C.'s appeal. Ultimately, C.E.'s original objection to the relocation was indeed untimely filed. The appellate court should have dismissed the case, but proceeded on the merits despite this technical defect. The Supreme Court granted C.E.'s petition for certiorari in order to vacate the both appellate court's and juvenile court's decisions to dismiss the case in its entirety. View "T. C. v. C. E." on Justia Law

A.S. and C.S., adoptive parents of a minor child, appealed an appellate court's order that affirmed visitation to the child's paternal grandparents without an opinion. A.S. and C.S. argued to the Supreme Court that the no-opinion affirmation was in direct conflict with the Court's opinion in "Ex part E.R.G." (2010). Upon review, the Court reversed the lower court's no-opinion order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re: A. S. and C. S." on Justia Law

Grandparents, E.R.G and D.W.G., challenged the constitutionality of the state Grandparent Visitation Act. The Grandparents and E.H.G. and C.L.G (the Parents) had a very close relationship. The failure of a business shared by the father and the grandfather caused financial difficulties for both families, and eventually the relationships between all involved disintegrated. Desirous to maintain relationships with their grandchildren, the Grandparents petitioned the circuit court for visitation under the Act. The Parents argued in their response to the Grandparents' petition that the Act was unconstitutional on both its face and as it applied to them. Upon careful consideration of the briefs submitted by the parties and the applicable legal standards, the Supreme Court held the Act was unconstitutional. "Because the Act authorizes a court to award visitation to a grandparent whenever doing so is 'in the best interests of the minor child,'" the Act could potentially override a parent's decision to deny the grandparent visitation without regard for the fundamental right of a fit parent to direct the upbringing for of his or her child. View "In re E.H.G." on Justia Law

Virginia McClung appealed a circuit court judgment that reformed a deed that conveyed an interest in land to her and her brother. In 1979 Ms. McClung’s parents divorced. Their separation agreement conveyed two parcels of property to their adult children, Ms. McClung and Charles Green, as "tenants in common, reserving unto [the parents] a life estate therein." At that time, none of the parties recognized a discrepancy between the separation agreement and the actual deed, which conveyed the property to the siblings as "joint tenants with the right of survivorship." The deed was recorded, the parents divorced, and the divorce decree "ratified and confirmed" the separation agreement. In 1992, Charles Green died. His sole heir was his 21-year-old daughter, Bridget Williams. Loretta Green, Ms. McClung’s mother died in 2007 leaving Ms. McClung as her sole heir. Subsequently, a dispute arose between Senior Green and his daughter over who was entitled to the rental income Loretta had previously received from the property. The father sued his daughter seeking all rents received from the property. In his suit, Mr. Green argued that he and his ex-wife intended that his children take the property as tenants-in-common after his and Loretta’s life estates expired. But owing to a mutual mistake, the deed had erroneously conveyed the property as a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. Mr. Green’s granddaughter joined in the lawsuit because she inherited her father’s interest in the property if the court reformed the deed. A month after he commenced his suit, Mr. Green died. The trial court ruled in his (and his granddaughter’s) favor, and Ms. McClung appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the trial record, the court found that before the 1979 deed could be reformed, there must be evidence to indicate that Loretta Green did not intend to convey the property to her children as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Neither the separation agreement nor the recorded deed accurately reflected Loretta’s intent at the time either document was executed. Accordingly, the Court found that the trial court’s reformation of the 1979 deed was inappropriate. The Court reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "McClung v. Green" on Justia Law