Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Alabama Supreme Court granted review of this case filed by E.L. seeking review of a Court of Civil Appeals decision to affirm a family court order insofar as that judgment recognized and gave effect to an adoption decree entered by the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia approving the adoption by V.L., E.L.'s former same-sex partner, of E.L.'s biological children, S.L., N.L., and H.L. E.L. and V.L. were involved in a relationship from approximately 1995 through 2011. During the course of that relationship, they maintained a residence in Hoover. In December 2002 E.L. gave birth to S.L., and in November 2004 E.L. gave birth to twins, N.L. and H.L. All births were achieved through the use of assisted-reproductive technology. The parties eventually made the joint decision to take legal action to formalize and to protect the parental role V.L. had undertaken. In 2007, V.L. filed a petition with the Georgia court to adopt the children. The Georgia granted the petition, and subsequently new birth certificates were issued. In approximately November 2011, E.L. and V.L. ended their relationship, and, in January 2012, V.L. moved out of the house E.L. and V.L. had previously shared. 2013, V.L. filed a petition in the Jefferson Circuit Court alleging that E.L. had denied her access to the children and had interfered with her ability to exercise her traditional and constitutional parental rights. She asked the Alabama court to register the Georgia judgment, to declare her legal rights pursuant to the Georgia judgment, and to award her some measure of custody of or visitation with the children. The matter was transferred to the Jefferson Family Court, and E.L. moved that court to dismiss V.L.'s petition on multiple grounds. The Jefferson Family Court ultimately denied E.L.'s motion to dismiss, without a hearing, and simultaneously awarded V.L. scheduled visitation with the children. E.L. filed her notice of appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals. After reviewing the record and analyzing the relevant law of both Alabama and Georgia, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Civil Appeals and the Jefferson Family Court erred in giving full faith and credit to the Georgia judgment because the Georgia court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the Georgia judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte E.L." on Justia Law

The father Andrew Duerr and mother Anne Marie Duerr were married in 1989, and had four children. The parties divorced in 2003. In October 2011, the father filed a petition to terminate alimony and to modify child support and visitation. In April 2013, the mother filed an answer and a counterclaim in which she sought postminority educational support for N.D., a child of the marriage, who was attending the Cleveland Institute of Music. After conducting a hearing, the trial court, among other things, ordered the father to pay up to $12,000 per semester in postminority support for N.D.'s tuition. The father appealed, arguing the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals affirming the trial court's order awarding postminority educational support for N.D. conflicted with "Ex parte Christopher," (145 So. 3d 60 (Ala. 2013)). After review, the Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Duerr." on Justia Law

The State sought emergency relief, and was granted that relief from the Alabama Supreme Court relating to the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples. The State, by and through the relators, contended that respondent Alabama probate judges were flouting a duty imposed upon them by Alabama's "Sanctity of Marriage Amendment" to its Constitution, and the Alabama Marriage Protection Act and that the Alabama Court should direct respondent probate judges to perform that duty. The circumstances giving rise to this action were the result of decisions and orders issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama "Searcy v. Strange," (Civil Action No. 14-0208-CG-N, Jan. 23, 2015)(S.D. Ala. 2015)), and "Strawser v. Strange," (Civil Action No. 14-0424-CG-C, Jan. 26, 2015)) and a subsequent order by that court, in each of those cases, refusing to extend a stay of its initial order pending an appeal. In "Searcy," the federal district court enjoined Alabama Attorney General Luther Strange from enforcing the Amendment and the Act. In "Strawser," the federal district court issued a preliminary injunction where a same-sex couple had been denied a marriage license in Mobile. "As it has done for approximately two centuries, Alabama law allows for 'marriage' between only one man and one woman. Alabama probate judges have a ministerial duty not to issue any marriage license contrary to this law. Nothing in the United States Constitution alters or overrides this duty." View "Ex parte Alabama ex rel. Alabama Policy Institute et al." on Justia Law

Mother Jennifer Ann Vest (Herron) petitioned the Supreme Court to review a Court of Civil Appeals decision to affirm a the Elmore Circuit Court's order imposing on her a five-day jail sentence for contempt. The contempt order arose out of a child-custody-modification action. The father filed a motion with the Elmore Court to modify custody of the parties' minor child. In response, the mother, in her motion to dismiss, clearly stated that there was an action pending in Mobile County involving the parties' child of which the father was aware. She further alleged that venue was proper in Mobile County and that the father had not objected to venue at the Mobile Court. The mother requested that the Elmore Court dismiss the father's motion to modify custody until such time as the Mobile Court addressed the mother's motion regarding the parties' child and her allegations against the father. The Supreme Court found that the Elmore Circuit Court erred in not recognizing the primacy of the Mobile action when the mother filed her motion to dismiss or to transfer the father's motion to the Mobile Circuit Court. Subsequently, the Court of Civil Appeals erred in concluding that the mother had waived the affirmative defense of abatement. Accordingly, the Alabama Supreme Court suspended the provisions of Rule 39(g) and (h), Ala. R. App. P., allowing the petitioner and the respondent to file briefs and to request oral argument, and the Court granted certiorari review of the Court of Civil Appeals' order affirming the Elmore Circuit Court's order holding the mother in contempt. View "Ex parte Jennifer Ann Vest" on Justia Law

Gerald Van Jones, the father, appealed a Court of Civil Appeals' decision that affirmed a trial court's order awarding postminority educational support for his son, Garrette Jones. According to the father, the Court of Civil Appeals erred in refusing to apply "Ex parte Christopher" in this case because the appeal of the trial court's order awarding postminority educational support for Garrette was pending in the Court of Civil Appeals when "Ex parte Christopher" was decided and, therefore, in accordance with that case, the Court of Civil Appeals should have reversed the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the father filed an appeal of the trial court's postminority-educational-support order on September 10, 2013; the Supreme Court decided "Ex parte Christopher" on October 4, 2013. Indeed, because this case was pending on appeal in the Court of Civil Appeals when "Ex parte Christopher" was decided, the Court of Civil Appeals erred by not applying that case's holding that a trial court does not have authority to order postminority educational support in this case and by not reversing the trial court's order. View "Ex parte Gerald Van Jones." on Justia Law

The Alabama Supreme Court granted B.C.'s petition for certiorari review based on the Court's recent decision in "Ex parte L.J.," ([Ms. 1121462, September 30, 2014] So. 3d (Ala. 2014)), in which the Court held that a juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction under 12-15-114 of the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act ("the AJJA") over a termination-of-parental-rights action when the subject of the termination was not a child alleged "to have committed a delinquent act, to be dependent, or to be in need of supervision." B.C. gave birth to a child in 2008. In 2010, the Limestone Juvenile Court entered a judgment adjudicating A.H. as the father of the child. In 2013, B.C. petitioned the juvenile court to terminate the father's parental rights to the child, alleging he abandoned the child, failed to adjust his circumstances to fit the child's needs, and that he failed to provide any financial support for the child. B.C. did not allege that the child was dependent, delinquent or in need of supervision. At a hearing on the mother's petition, father did not attend, but was represented by counsel, who moved to dismiss the termination proceedings on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The juvenile court ultimately entered an order terminating the father's parental rights. After review, the Supreme Court concluded, based on its holding in "Ex parte L.J.," that the judgment of the juvenile court was not void because it did not find the child to be delinquent, dependent, or in need of supervision. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded the case for that court to consider any arguments that may have been pretermitted by the Court of Civil Appeals' analysis of the effect of 12-15-114. View "Ex parte B.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari review to address whether a juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over a termination-of-parental-rights claim when the grounds for the termination did not involve a child alleged "to have committed a delinquent act, to be dependent, or to be in need of supervision." The Court held that a juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction under 12-15-114 over a termination-of-parental-rights claim when the subject of the termination was not a child alleged "to have committed a delinquent act, to be dependent, or to be in need of supervision." "[T]he legislature clearly expressed its intent in its 2014 amendments that under the 2008 AJJA the juvenile court have exclusive original jurisdiction over all termination-of-parental-rights proceedings. For this case, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded this case for that court to consider any arguments that may have been pretermitted by the Court of Civil Appeals' analysis. View "In re: C.C. v. L.J." on Justia Law

S.C., the maternal grandmother, petitioned the Juvenile Court to intervene and to grant her custody of S.D.A., who was 19 months old at the time of trial, and R.D.A., who was 9 months old at the time of trial, both of whom were in the custody of S.L.M. and R.S.M. S.L.M. and R.S.M. are not related to the children. In the petitions, the grandmother alleged that the children were dependent as to the mother and the biological father, that S.L.M. may have been awarded temporary custody of the children, and that it would be in the best interest of the children for the children to be placed in her custody. The maternal grandmother's counsel argued that the children should be placed with a relative and that, because the children's half sister was in the custody of the maternal grandmother, the children should be placed in the custody of the maternal grandmother and be united with their half sister. After considering the evidence, the juvenile court entered orders awarding custody of the children to the maternal grandmother. After S.L.M. and R.S.M.'s posttrial motions were denied, they appealed the judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals. On return to remand, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's judgments. The Supreme Court reversed: the evidence did not support a modification of custody. "Nothing in the record supports the conclusion that modifying custody and removing the children from the home of S.L.M. and R.S.M. would materially promote the children's best interest; therefore, granting the maternal grandmother custody of the children is plainly and palpably wrong." View "In re: S.L.M. and R.S.M. v. S.C." on Justia Law

O.S. and J.A.S. petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Civil Appeals' decision affirming the judgment of the circuit court in favor of E.S. setting aside a final judgment of adoption by the Probate Court of Walker County The Court granted certiorari review solely to determine whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider E.S.'s independent action seeking to set aside the probate court's judgment of adoption. Concluding that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re: O.S. and J.A.S. v. E.S." on Justia Law

Keone Kaukawele Fuqua ("the father") filed a petition asking that the Probate Court allow him to change the legal name of his daughter from Lyvia Grace Russell to Lyvia Grace Russell-Fuqua. Megan Marie Russell ("the mother") opposed the petition, and she appealed the court's court order granting the father's petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the probate court had no subject-matter jurisdiction over the parties' name-change dispute, and therefore vacated the order and dismissed the appeal. View "Russell v. Fuqua " on Justia Law