Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Howard Carl Whited was convicted of sodomy in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Whited to 35 years' imprisonment and ordered Whited to pay $50 to the Alabama Crime Victims Compensation Fund and court costs. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Whited's conviction and sentence in a 3-2 per curiam opinion. Whited petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, contending that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals conflicted with "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U.S. 668 (1984)). After evaluating "all the circumstances surrounding the case at the time of [Whited's] counsel's actions," including Whited's trial counsel's inability to provide a strategic reason for waiving closing argument; the seemingly strong arguments available to Whited from which the jury could possibly conclude that reasonable doubt existed as to Whited's guilt; and the length and highly emotional nature of the State's initial closing argument, the Supreme Court concluded that trial counsel's decision to waive closing argument was an "error[] so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment" and that the waiver of Whited's closing was deficient under "Strickland." Furthermore, had trial counsel presented a closing argument to the jury, "there is a reasonable probability that ... the result of the proceeding would have been different." The Alabama Court granted the petition, reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Ex parte Howard Whited." on Justia Law

The State of Alabama petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Pike Circuit Court to vacate its order granting Andre Ellis's motion for a new trial. Ellis was convicted on two counts of first degree rape, and burglary in the second degree. He received an 85-year sentence. Ellis moved for a new trial, alleging, among other things, that the State had failed to disclose crucial evidence in violation of "Brady v. Maryland," (373 U.S. 83 (1963)). The trial court ordered the State to disclose in camera certain evidence and, after conducting a hearing, entered an order dated May 17, 2013, granting Ellis's motion for a new trial based on the State's failure to turn over evidence in violation of Rule 16, Ala. R. Crim. P., and in violation of the principles of law set forth in "Brady." The State moved for consideration, on which the trial court did not rule. The State argued in its petition for mandamus that the trial court exceeded its discretion and its judicial authority in granting Ellis a new trial because the trial court improperly combed the prosecutor's files and incorrectly and improperly analyzed the contents in those files. The State also argued that the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting a new trial because Ellis never laid the proper predicate to compel the State to disclose the statements of the victims as required by state case law. Lastly, the State argued that the trial court exceeded its discretion in entering its order granting a new trial with regard to the rape charge involving one of the victims because Ellis made no allegation in his motion for a new trial regarding a discovery violation in the case in which that victim was the named victim nor did the trial court make any findings as to any alleged discovery violation pertaining to that case. Upon further review, the Supreme Court concluded the State failed to present exceptional circumstances justifying the issuance of a writ to direct the trial court to set aside its order granting Ellis's motion for a new trial. View "Alabama v. Ellis" on Justia Law

In an unpublished order, the Court of Criminal Appeals issued a writ of mandamus directing the trial court in the underlying case to "bar" the prosecution of respondent Margie Kelley, who had been indicted for three counts of capital murder. The State petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Court of Criminal Appeals to vacate its order. The Court of Criminals Appeals relied on the decision of "Davenport v. Alabama," (968 So. 2d 27 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005)) in arriving at its conclusion. In its mandamus petition, the State contended that "Davenport," in holding that an individual cannot be prosecuted for hindering the prosecution of another when the individual was also a principal, or participated, in that crime, misstated the law. The Supreme Court agreed. As such, the State met its burden for mandamus relief, and the Supreme Court granted its petition and issued the writ. View "Alabama v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Kevin Towles was convicted of capital murder for killing his son, Geontae Glass, who was under the age of 14 when he was killed. The jury recommended the death sentence, and the trial court sentenced Towles to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Towles's conviction and sentence in a per curiam opinion. The State petitioned for certiorari, arguing the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in reversing Towles's conviction based on the admission of certain testimony by Towles' other son, because the testimony was relevant and admissible to prove Towles's motive for killing Geontae. The State further argued that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in failing to apply a harmless-error analysis to the trial court's erroneous limiting instruction, which allowed the jury to consider Towles's collateral bad acts for improper purposes. Towles contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err in determining that Cameron's testimony was inadmissible to show motive because, he says, there was no logical or factual connection between Geontae's killing and the incidents of abuse testified to by Cameron. In this case, the Supreme Court found that the prior bad acts of assault and physical abuse were not perpetrated by Towles upon the victim Geontae. Rather, the prior assaults and abuse were perpetrated upon Cameron approximately three years before Geontae's murder. "We cannot say that Cameron's testimony relating to the physical assaults he suffered at the hands of Towles approximately three years before Geontae's murder was relevant to show that Towles intended to kill Geontae. Further, where the jury was faced with deciding whether Towles intended to murder Geontae or to assault him for disciplinary issues at school, the admission of the collateral assaults perpetrated by Towles upon Cameron were highly prejudicial. The probative value, if any, of the testimony concerning the collateral assaults upon one son simply does not outweigh the undue prejudice to Towles in his prosecution for the capital murder of his other son." Accordingly the trial court's admission of the collateral-acts testimony to show intent and its limiting instruction to the jury that the jury could consider the testimony for purposes of establishing intent constituted plain error. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Criminal Appeals. View "Towles v. Alabama" on Justia Law

In February 2008, a Mobile County grand jury charged Lam Luong with five counts of capital murder in connection with the deaths of his four children. Luong killed his four children by throwing them off a bridge into water 100 feet below the bridge. The trial court sentenced Luong to death for each of the five capital-murder convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Luong's convictions and death sentences, holding that the trial court erred by refusing to move the trial from Mobile County because, it reasoned, the pretrial publicity was presumptively prejudicial and by refusing to conduct individual questioning of the potential jurors regarding their exposure to that publicity. The Court of Criminal Appeals also held that the trial court erred in denying defense counsel funds to travel to Vietnam to investigate mitigation evidence and in admitting into evidence during the sentencing hearing a videotape simulation using sandbags approximately the weight of each child illustrating the length of time it took for each child to fall from the bridge to the water. After careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court held: (1) the trial court did not exceed the scope of its discretion in refusing to find presumed prejudice against Luong and refusing to transfer his case on that basis; (2) the trial court did not exceed the scope of its discretion in denying Luong's request that the trial court conduct individual voir dire; (3) and because the record established that the trial court considered the reasonableness of Luong's request and provided a means for Luong to develop mitigation evidence, the trial court did not exceed the scope of its discretion in denying Luong's request for funds for his counsel to travel to Vietnam to investigate mitigation evidence; and (4) the trial court did not exceed the scope of its discretion in admitting certain videotape evidence. Accordingly, the court of Criminal Appeals was reversed. View "Luong v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Criminal defendants Clement Poiroux, Lamar Osborne, Travis Blair, Christopher Raybon, Sara Hawkins, Brian Williams, Levorish Hudson, Joseph Johnson, Jr., Nicholas McNeil, and Willie Walker II, and McNeil & Stokley Enterprises, LLC, d/b/a Metro Bonding Co., Bay Area Bail Bonds, LLC, A-Plus Bonding, Inc., Alternative Justice Bail Bonding, Inc., A-Advantage Bonding, LLC, Affordable Bail Bond, Inc., and Allstar Bail Bonds, Inc. appealed the dismissal of their claims against various district attorneys, circuit court clerks, and other state officials. Several of the criminal defendants and of the bail-bond companies sued the defendants and fictitiously named parties alleging claims related to Act No. 2012-535, Ala. Acts 2012 (codified as 12-14-31 and 12-19-311, Ala. Code 1975). The criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies argued, among other things, that the fee assessed pursuant to 12-19-311(a)(1)a., Ala. Code 1975 ("the filing fee"), and the fee assessed pursuant to 12-19-311(a)(1)b., Ala. Code 1975 ("the back-end fee"), were unconstitutional. Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of all claims regarding the back-end fees, all claims seeking monetary relief, and all claims against the defendant sheriffs. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the criminal defendants' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court reversed the circuit court's judgment insofar as it dismissed the bail-bond companies' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants other than the defendant sheriffs. View "Poiroux v. Rich" on Justia Law

Petitioners-defendants Lt. Harvey Ruffin, a correctional officer at the Bullock Correctional Facility; Sgt. Shelton Patterson, a correctional officer; Sandra Giles, the deputy warden of the facility; and Kenneth Jones, the warden , all petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to grant their motion for summary judgment on immunity grounds. Petitioners were named in a suit brought by an inmate, Thomas Donahey, Jr., who was attacked by another inmate. Donahey alleged that the petitioners negligently, wantonly, and recklessly failed to protect him from the attack. Based on the uncontroverted evidence, the petitioners were entitled to immunity from all the claims asserted against them by Donahey. Accordingly, the petitioners met their burden showing a clear legal right to the relief sought, and the trial court was therefore directed to enter a summary judgment in their favor. View "Donahey, Jr. v. Ruffin" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision ordering the Limestone Circuit Court to set bail for Joel Moyers. Moyers was charged with a capital offense, and an issue arose over whether a defendant so charged was entitled to bail if the State did not intend to seek the death penalty. The State argued that the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in this matter conflicted with longstanding Alabama case law ("Ex parte Bynum," 312 So. 2d 52 (1975)). Alternatively, the State argued that the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision raised a material question of first impression that required decision by the Supreme Court. Based on the plain meaning of the statutory and constitutional provisions and the development of the case law in this area, the Supreme Court held that a "capital offense" within the meaning of constitutional and statutory provisions relating to bail is an offense that is punishable by death or by life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Therefore, when a defendant who is charged with a capital offense requests a trial court to set bail, under Ex parte Bynum, the court can deny that request for bail even if the State will not seek the death penalty. However, in order for the trial court to deny a request for bail from a defendant charged with a capital offense, the State must prove the three prerequisites noted in "Ex parte Patel," (879 So. 2d 532 (Ala. 2003)): "'The evidence must be clear and strong, that it would lead a well-guarded and dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that (1) the offense has been committed; (2) the accused is the guilty agent; and (3) he would probably be punished capitally if the law is administered.'" Moreover, Ex parte Patel held that if a defendant has been indicted for a capital offense, that defendant is presumed guilty for purposes of setting bail, and the defendant has the burden to overcome that presumption before he or she is entitled to bail as a matter of right. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Alabama v. Moyers " on Justia Law

Inmate Victor Russo appealed a circuit court's dismissal of his action against the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC). He challenged ADOC's implementation of a policy to charge a processing fee for money orders and cashier's checks deposited into an inmate's "prisoner money on deposit" account. The Supreme Court noted multiple fatal errors in Russo's pleadings, the sum of which was that Russo named ADOC as his sole adverse party, and that complaint "purported to effect an action against the State." As such, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear his case. The Supreme Court dismissed Russo's appeal.View "Russo v. Alabama Department of Corrections " on Justia Law

Charles Simmons was convicted of a Class A misdemeanor. He appealed the conviction to the Lowndes Circuit Court for a trial de novo. He was convicted and appealed the circuit court's judgment to the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the case. The State petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari review of the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The mother of the victim filed a complaint, stating that Simmons, a teacher, had had sexual contact with her daughter, who at the time the sexual contact occurred was under 19 years old. It was undisputed that the mother's complaint was not included in the file forwarded to the circuit court by the district court clerk. An information, however, was filed in the circuit court by the district attorney after Simmons had filed his notice of appeal for a trial de novo. Before the trial in the circuit court commenced, Simmons moved to dismiss the case against him because, he said, the original charging instrument from the district court, the mother's complaint, was not being used to prosecute his case, and he objected to being prosecuted on the information filed by the district attorney subsequent to his conviction in the district court. The circuit court denied his motion, and trial proceeded. Simmons was then convicted. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that, "[i]n the absence of a proper charging instrument, the circuit court could not exercise jurisdiction over Simmons's appeal," and that the circuit court's judgment was void and due to be set aside, and it reversed the judgment and remanded the case. The Supreme Court concluded after its review that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that the circuit court could not exercise its jurisdiction or that the circuit court's jurisdiction did not attach because the charging instrument from the district court was not used to prosecute Simmons's case in the circuit court. View "Alabama v. Simmons" on Justia Law