Justia Alabama Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Amanda Holderfield was convicted of second-degree assault. She was sentenced to 60 months' imprisonment; that sentence was suspended, and Holderfield was ordered to serve 3 years' supervised probation, to undergo mental-health treatment and substance-abuse treatment, to pay $100 to the Alabama Crime Victims Compensation Fund, and to pay restitution of $2,219.99 to the "City of Gardendale Municipal Works Comp Fund." Holderfield filed a "Motion to Set Aside Order of Restitution and Request Hearing," which the circuit court later denied. The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Holderfield's appeal, without an opinion. The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine whether a motion to modify or set aside a restitution order in a criminal case should be treated as a motion for a new trial under Rule 24.1, Ala. R. Crim. P., with regard to tolling the time for taking an appeal. After review, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissing the appeal in this case as untimely, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Amanda Holderfield." on Justia Law

Sabrina Jackson, as the administratrix of the estate of Tony Lewis, Jr., deceased, filed a verified petition requesting preaction discovery from defendants the City of Montgomery ("the City") and QCHC, Inc., a/k/a Quality Correctional Health Care ("Quality"). Lewis was being held in the Montgomery municipal jail when he died unexpectedly on the night of January 12, 2015, or the early morning hours of January 13, 2015. Petitioner believed jail authorities and health care personnel were negligent and deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of Lewis, and thereby denied him treatment needed to save his life, if said treatment had been administered promptly. The petition also alleged that Lewis was given some medication by the health care personnel, which may have caused him to stop breathing, and that this act "may have amounted to negligent malpractice and/or deliberate indifference." The circuit court granted the preaction discovery petition, but the defendants applied for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court granted the petitions and issued the writs, finding that Jackson could not establish that she was unable to bring an action or that preaction discovery was necessary to preserve evidence in her case. View "Ex parte QCHC, Inc., a/k/a Quality Correctional Health Care." on Justia Law

The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review to determine whether there was a "fatal variance" between the indictment, which charged James Hall with theft of "currency," and the evidence produced at trial, which established theft of the funds by means of depositing a check. Hall was the "commander" of the Houston County chapter (Chapter 87) of the Disabled American Veterans ("the DAV"). In 2013, Hall had issued to himself a check from the DAV's bank account in the amount of $1,500, purportedly to reimburse Hall for expenses incurred in the performance of his duties as commander. He deposited the check into his personal bank account. The expenditure, however, had not been approved by the DAV chapter and, therefore, violated the provisions of the DAV's constitution and bylaws. The DAV requested that Hall reimburse the funds to the DAV and provide the DAV with documentation supporting the alleged expenses. Hall failed to do so. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no material variance in the indictment and the evidence, and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. View "Ex parte James R. Hall." on Justia Law

Petitioners-inmates Curtis Cook and Joe Hold, Jr. filed "petition[s] for release order" pursuant to the Alabama Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (APLRA). Petitioners also filed requests for in forma pauperis ("IFP") status. Both requests for IPF status would ultimately be denied. Then both filed for writs of mandamus relief, seeking that the Court of Criminal Appeals set aside the IFP orders. The Court of Criminal Appeals determined it lacked jurisdiction over the cases and remanded to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals determined it lacked jurisdiction and transferred the petitions to the Supreme Court. Cook's and Holt's mandamus petitions arose from actions seeking relief based on the conditions of their incarceration, rather than from actions giving rise to their incarceration. Therefore, the proceedings underlying the petitions are civil, not criminal, in nature. However, the mere fact that the Department of Corrections was the agency charged with overseeing Cook's and Holt's incarceration did not bring their mandamus petitions within the Court of Civil Appeals' exclusive appellate jurisdiction either. Having determined that only the Supreme Court could review the cases, the Court then turned to the merits of petitioners' claims. The Court then found neither petitioner met his burden proving he was entitled to mandamus relief, and denied both requests. View "Ex parte Curtis J. Cook, Jr." on Justia Law

The Alabama Department of Corrections ("the DOC"); Cheryl Price, former warden of Bibb Correctional Facility; Dwayne Estes, former assistant warden of the facility; and Captain John Hutton, a correctional officer at the facility, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion for a summary judgment and to enter a new order granting the motion on the ground that they were entitled to immunity. The suit against defendants arose over the stabbing death of Tyus Elliot, who was allegedly killed by another inmate. Based on the evidence presented, the Supreme Court concluded defendants were entitled to immunity from all claims. Accordingly, defendants have shown a clear legal right to the relief sought, and the circuit court was directed to enter a summary judgment in their favor. View "Ex parte Alabama Department of Corrections et al." on Justia Law

Devonte Acosta was convicted of first-degree burglary and was sentenced to 156 months in prison. Acosta argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that the trial court improperly prevented him from presenting his defense that he was not present during the burglary at trial by refusing to admit certain statements into evidence. After concluding that Acosta's argument was properly preserved for appellate review, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the statements in question. The Court reasoned that the trial court's strict application of the hearsay rule deprived Acosta of the ability to present a complete defense. Upon review of the record, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Acosta's fundamental rights to a fair trial and to due process were not violated by the trial court's refusal to admit the statements into evidence. The court of Criminal Appeals was therefore reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte State of Alabama." on Justia Law

Michael Kelley petitioned for certiorari review of a Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to affirm the trial court's judgment sentencing Kelley to death for his convictions for two counts of capital murder, and for sentencing him to life for his conviction on one count of sexual torture. The Alabama Supreme Court granted Kelley's petition solely to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review Kelley's sexual-torture conviction. After that review, the Court reversed in part and remand. Kelley alleged that the Court of Criminal Appeals lacked jurisdiction to affirm his sexual-torture conviction because, he argues, his sexual-torture conviction was not ripe for appeal, and on this ground, the Supreme Court agreed. View "Ex parte Michael Brandon Kelley." on Justia Law

Petitioners R.J.J., W.L.C., and W.F. were convicted of hunting after dark, hunting from a public road, and hunting with the aid of an automobile. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed their convictions by an unpublished memorandum. The petitioners challenged the sufficiency of the State's evidence, arguing: (1) the State produced no evidence indicating that the petitioners had in their possession an artificial light suitable for night hunting and that the State produced tenuous evidence indicating that the petitioners were in an area frequented by protected wildlife; (2) the State's circumstantial evidence failed to link the petitioners to the shots allegedly fired and that evidence of two shots fired could not support three hunting convictions; and (3) the State failed to prove that the petitioners had the intent to hunt. The Supreme Court reversed petitioners' convictions and instructed the trial court to enter a judgment acquitting petitioners of all charges. View "Ex parte W. F., W.L.C., and R. J. J." on Justia Law

In 2009, Christopher Dalton pled guilty to two counts of attempted murder, one count of breaking and entering an automobile, and one count of misdemeanor theft. Dalton was sentenced to 2 terms of 30 years' imprisonment for his attempted-murder convictions, a 5-year prison sentence for his unlawful-breaking-and-entering conviction, and a 1-year prison sentence for his theft-of-property conviction. The sentences were to run concurrently. In November 2009, Dalton filed his first Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition, alleging that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he erroneously told Dalton that, on the 30-year sentence for attempted murder, he would be eligible for parole in 6 years. The Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately affirmed the trial court, finding that Dalton's counsel did not promise parole or that he would be eligible for parole in six years. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals, "a promise of parole and a representation as to when a defendant will be eligible for parole are two different things." The case was remanded for the circuit court to determine whether Dalton's trial counsel misrepresented his eligibility for parole. View "Ex parte Christopher Eric Dalton." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Alabama Supreme Court's review centered on the propriety of a probation revocation hearing. The State moved to revoke the probation of Carless Wagner based on allegations that he violated two conditions of his probation. At the end of the hearing in question, the trial court revoked Wagner's probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence with the Department of Corrections. Wagner appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court's order, finding that Wagner had not received a probation-revocation hearing in compliance with Rule 27.6(c), ALa. R. Crim. P. The State appealed the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment. After review, and finding that Wagner received a hearing that "substantially conformed" with the Rule , the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. View "Ex parte State of Alabama." on Justia Law